What is likely to be your condition as to health in this camp? General McClellan: Better than in any encampment since landing at Fortress Monroe. The corps commanders were asked as to "the present and prospective condition as to health" in their "present encampment," and replied: Sumner: As good as any part of Eastern Virginia. Heintzelman: Excellent for health, and present health improving. Keyes: A little improved, but think camp is getting worse. Porter: Very good. Franklin: Not good. To the inquiry, "Where is the enemy now?" McClellan replied: "From four to five miles from us, on all the roads — I think nearly the whole army - both Hills, Longstreet, Jackson, Magruder, Huger." The other Generals, asked "where and in what condition they believed the enemy to be?" said: Sumner: I think they have retired from our front; were very much damaged, especially in their best troops, in the late actions, from superiority of our arms. Heintzelman: Don't think they are in force in our vicinity. Keyes: Think he has withdrawn, and think preparing to go to Washington. Porter: Believe he is mainly near Richmond. He feels he dare not attack us here. Franklin: I learn he has withdrawn from our front, and think that is probable. The corps commanders were examined on two other points, as follows: If it were desired to get the army away, could it be safely effected? Sumner: I think we could, but I think we give up the cause if we do it. Heintzelman: Perhaps we could, but I think it would be ruinous to the country. Keyes: I think it could if done quickly. country. move the army and ruin the Franklin: I think we could, and that we better think Rappahannock the true line. (McClellan had expressed the opinion that "it would be a delicate and very difficult matter.") Is the army secure in its present position? Keyes: With help of General B. (Burnside) can hold position. Porter: Perfectly so. Not only, but we are ready to begin moving forward. Franklin: Unless river can be closed, it is.* If civilians embarrassed him with crude and conflicting views on army affairs, the President, after comparing these opinions, could hardly hope to find any sure refuge in the judgment of the military man. Congress was still in session, and his stay could not be prolonged. He had satisfied himself as to some essential facts, and had found the situation not so bad as he feared. He evidently did not give very earnest attention to McClellan's letter of advice while there; † yet there were two points in it that were already engaging his attention *The answers of Keyes and Franklin to the last question are given differently in "Complete Works," N. & H., II. 202. † In McClellan's Own Story" (p. 487), it is stated that Lincoln read the letter in the General's presence, but made no comment upon it. ! and received speedy action. One was the matter of a broader policy regarding slavery (to be noticed later): the other, the appointment of a General-in-chief of all the armies. On the 11th of July the selection of Major-General Halleck for this position was officially announced. CHAPTER VI. 1862. Dealing with the "Fundamental Cause "- Three Notable Letters. In his message of the previous December the President had plainly enough indicated his conviction that it might become necessary to deal more radically with the fundamental cause of the war. Three months later (March 6, 1862) he sent a special message to Congress, recommending the passage of a joint resolution declaring: That the United States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system. In favor of this proposal he urged the effect which the "initiation of emancipation" would have upon the insurgents, and as to the financial side of the question, suggested that "very soon the current expenditures of this war would purchase at fair valuation all the slaves" in any State. Quoting from his December message the words, "the Union must be preserved; and hence all indispensable means must be employed," he added: "I said this not hastily, but deliberately." At his request a number of Senators and Repre sentatives from the Border slaveholding States met him soon after for conference on the subject. There was respectful attention to his views, with no sympathetic response. When told that Greeley's Tribune understood the proposition to mean that the Border States "must accept gradual emancipation on the basis suggested, or get something worse," he disclaimed any intended menace. Mr. Crittenden assured him, as the interview was closing, that, whatever might be the final action of those present, all thought him to be "solely moved by a high patriotism and a sincere devotion to the happiness and glory of his country." The ques tion was considered in the House of Representatives the next day (March 11th), and the resolution, after some sarcastic comments by Thaddeus Stevens, was adopted, 97 to 36-five Southern members voting yea. It was concurred in by the Senate a month afterward, receiving the President's signature on the 10th of April. An order of General Hunter (May 9th) proclaimed that "slavery and martial law" (which he had established in his department) are in a free country “altogether incompatible," and that the persons "in Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina heretofore held as slaves are therefore declared forever free." To Secretary Chase, who advised that this be approved (as he thought Fremont's similar action should have been), Lincoln pointedly answered: "No commanding General shall do such a thing upon my responsibility without consulting me." In his proclamation disclaiming * Mr. Crisfield, of Maryland, made an extended memorandum of this interview at the time, which Mr. Crittenden indorsed as correct. vol. ii.-6 |