Johnston. He was believed capable of doing marvels, and as if to afford him the better opportunity for such glory he was provided hitherto with only ordinary or inadequate means. But was it not the settled purpose of his adversaries to remain on the defensive, prolonging preparation until spring? Two gateways for an assailant were the mouths of the Tennessee and the Cumberland Rivers, and these it had been intended by the Confederates to possess when they occupied Columbus. Grant had unexpectedly arrived a few hours before them at Paducah and secured both gateways with a firm hand, and there was now an effective gunboat fleet commanded by Foote. If Buell could be kept at bay and Halleck would busy himself with expeditions down the Mississippi and into Arkansas, Johnston had nothing to fear from that direction. What he specially needed was time. He set about the construction of defensive works on the two rivers more than eighty miles upward from the Ohio, near the line between the States of Kentucky and Tennessee, where those streams, flowing north, approach within eleven miles of each other. Fort Donelson was on the west side of the Cumberland, near the town of Dover, and Fort Henry on the east side of the Tennessee, with a minor work opposite. Johnston also ordered the building of gunboats, two of which were well advanced toward completion before the close of January; and in a few weeks more, if left undisturbed, he would have had a considerable fleet for river service. His chief anxiety seems to have been, hitherto, to guard against an advance by Buell. Had the defensive and "simultaneous" policy continued until spring, Johnston might

possibly have accomplished all that was expected of his military genius.

Grant, while pushing his preparations for the work marked out for him, had not neglected opportunities for observation. When he first occupied Paducah he appreciated the importance of the two rivers passing through the Confederate line; and when his forces and the number of Foote's gunboats were sufficient to warrant serious thought of the matter, he conferred with the naval commander on the expediency of an attempt to take Fort Henry, should his superior give his consent. Foote agreed that the project was feasible, and it was laid before Halleck early in January, but coldly received. Then followed the demonstration which confirmed Grant and Foote in their views, and brought to their support General C. F. Smith, in whose military judgment Halleck had great confidence. But for incidental results of this "demonstration in force," the great opportunity would probably have been lost.

Halleck finally consented, and the movement of fifteen thousand troops on transports and of seven gunboats began on the 2d of February. After severe fighting, in which there were serious casualties to the fleet, Fort Henry was surrendered to Flag-officer Foote on the 6th, and Grant, whose men had been detained by fogs and floods after disembarking, arrived and took possession. Nearly all the garrison had escaped be fore the surrender, taking refuge in Fort Donelson, against which Grant determined to proceed at once. Additional troops and supplies were ordered from Paducah; the fleet was sent back to the Ohio and around by the Cumberland; and meanwhile all the

forces at hand, after garrisoning the captured works, were as soon as practicable put in readiness for the march.

Fort Donelson was of much greater strength and extent than Fort Henry, occupying a table-land more than one hundred feet above the level of the river banks. The outer works covered the town of Dover and extended northward to Hickman's Creek, a considerable stream at high water. The guns of the river batteries were protected by strong earthworks. Above, on the plateau, there were eight heavy guns in place, commanding both land and water, besides field batteries. The garrison, including reinforcements under Generals Floyd and Buckner, numbered about seventeen thousand.

Grant's main forces from Fort Henry arrived before the outer works of Donelson on the 12th. The night following was cold; there was a light snow on the ground, and the soldiers had a dreary and benumbing bivouac which the morning seemed tardy in relieving. But they had come out to fight, and bore the severe hardship without loss of spirit. These men had gone through no very prolonged drilling in camp, had no perfection of equipment, yet were ready to do their best.

The guns of the Carondelet were heard below Fort Donelson on the 13th-the preconcerted signal in advance of the Flag-officer and the rest of his command. Grant had formed his lines that morning, extending a distance of three miles, his right under McClernand, its extreme near the river above Dover, his left under C. F. Smith, touching Hickman Creek

below the fort, and approaching the enemy's outer entrenchments generally within about one hundred yards.

During the day the transports arrived, anchoring out of range of the hostile batteries, and a brigade of soldiers under General Thayer was landed. Other troops from near Fort Henry were joined with Thayer's, constituting a third division under the command of General Lew Wallace (previously commanding a brigade of Smith's division), which took position between McClernand and Smith, closing up the lines more effectually.

On the 14th, Foote moved up and engaged the water batteries. An hour's cannonading drove most of the Confederate gunners from their pieces, on the river bank; but now the St. Louis and Louisville had become disabled, and began to drift down stream. Not one of the ironclads had escaped injury; there had been a loss of fifty-four men, killed or wounded; the heavy guns of the upper batteries were brought to bear on the assailants with destructive fury; and Foote, himself seriously hurt, withdrew his vessels to a place of security.

General Floyd, now in command at Donelson, after consulting his division and brigade commanders, determined to attack Grant's right next morning, in order to open the road up the river, as a way of retreat to Nashville. Grant was absent conferring with Foote then in no condition to leave his vessel, several miles down the river when the fighting on the 15th began. Riding hurriedly to the right of his lines, he found there had been severe losses by McClernand's men, who had been driven back, but Wallace had come effectively to

their support. Quickly comprehending the exact state of affairs, Grant ordered a general advance, bringing into action Smith's division, in whose front the enemy had been weakened to support his left. Smith broke through the enemy's outer works, gaining a commanding position from which he could not be dislodged. Thus ended nine hours' fighting.

Floyd, availing himself of the slight means of river transportation at command, fled toward Nashville that night, taking with him as many Virginia troops as could be carried. Colonel Forrest also got away, with a body of cavalry, by the partly overflowed road from Dover southward.

Buckner, on whom the command now devolved, sent a flag of truce early the next morning (16th), asking a suspension of hostilities in order to negotiate terms of capitulation. Grant returned the memorable reply: "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately on your works."

Buckner did not delay his surrender. The entire force remaining-nearly half of Johnston's army—and twenty thousand stand of arms as well as a large amount of stores, with the fort, works and guns, were given into Grant's possession. The numbers here engaged and the losses in killed and wounded on both sides (Union - 500 killed, 2,108 wounded; Confederate - 466 killed, 1,534 wounded *) were somewhat greater than on the field at Bull Run. In material fruits to the victor, the two battles are not comparable.

Johnston, by whose order Bowling Green was evac

*War Records.