But

President, and his partisans, to the Bank of the United States, had been confined to measures tending to direct public opinion against a renewal of the charter, but in no wise affecting the credit and pecuniary interests of the institution. A new and bolder assault was then made, which nevertheless was legal and proper in form and manner. The Secretary of the Treasury announced to Congress suspicions of the solvency of the institution and consequently of the safety of the public moneys of which it was the depository. Almost simultaneously, an agent was appointed by the Secretary, and a committee of investigation by the House of Representatives, who were respectively charged with the duty of examining the condition of the bank. The result of both those investigations established the facts that the bank was solvent, and the public moneys entirely safe. The House of Representatives passed a resolution to that effect, and this was regarded by the directors of the bank, and the community, as conclusive that the public deposits would not be removed. The bank, as far as its credit was concerned, had passed unharmed through the investigation. no sooner had Congress adjourned, than the President prepared for a new assault, one not like the other, within the forms of law and the ordinary mode of procedure, but one which was intentionally to be violent and injurious to the interests of the stockholders. To prepare the minds of his partisans for this measure, certain presses, known to enjoy his confidence, gave out that, although the deposits were safe, yet they nevertheless ought to be and would be removed, and that whatever doubts might exist, the President would in due time give satisfactory reasons for a course so unexpected. Mr. M'Lane, the Secretary of the Treasury, known to be opposed to the removal, was transferred to the State Department, and Mr. Duane, who was appointed in his place, was, with probable reason, supposed to concur with the President. To these significant indications the directors of the bank could not be inattentive. In the month of June, a secret negotiation was carried on by the President with local banks, to transfer the public moneys to them. Thus it came to the knowledge of the directors of the Bank of the United States, that the institution was to be deprived of the moneys, the custody of which was guaranteed to it by law; but when? for what cause? in what manner? and whether all at once, or from time to time? were studiously concealed. This conduct of the administration indicated that the measure was to be so

conducted that the blow should be as injurious as it was intended to be vindictive. Such was the attitude assumed in the summer of 1833 by the administration toward the bank, on which commerce relied not only for accustomed, but for increased accommodation. The bank then had a right to apprehend from the executive the withdrawal of the government deposits, and the deprivation in future of the accruing public moneys. When the directors regarded the violence of the attack meditated by the President, when they considered that it was to be inflicted by the hand of one who wielded the executive power of the government, and whose influence controlled a majority in both houses of Congress, and who was supported by a press and a party possessing predominant influence in the Union, which had never failed to support every measure he had adopted; and when they considered that the avowed object of the measure was to enfeeble the institution, they were well justified in apprehending that a shock would be given to its credit, and that a demand of specie would ensue. Entertaining these apprehensions, what were the directors of the United States Bank to do? Obviously their duty to the institution, to the depositors, to the government, and to the country, was to prepare for the blow which was anticipated. But how must they prepare? Precisely as safety fund banks and all other banks do―by accumulating specie and reducing discounts. Such, sir, was the attitude into which the Executive brought the Bank of the United States.

Let us now turn to the state banks. Those institutions were indebted to the bank of the United States, in a sum greater than the aggregate of specie in their vaults. They anticipated that they would be required to pay that debt, so as to enable that institution to comply with the demands of the government. They, too, were to change their relations toward that institution. Charged henceforward with the regulation of the currency, it was necessary for them to look elsewhere than to the favor of the United States Bank for the specie required to maintain their circulation. They, too, apprehended a shock to confidence, and thus they were compelled to prepare for the emergency, by the reduction of their debts and circulation. Thus, at the same time, when commerce required extraordinary accommodations, not only the United States Bank, the local banks, but new ones also, were compelled by the executive to retrench. The decision of the

President, that the deposits should be removed, was announced on the 21st of September. The shock apprehended was immediately experienced, as is proved by the fact that the deposits of individuals in the United States Bank were immediately reduced. Thus, from the first of October to the first of November, the public deposits were reduced 1,636,124 dollars, and the private deposits were within the same time reduced 1,723,821 dollars, making the whole reduction of deposits 3,359,945 dollars. It will astonish those who have read the governor's message and the report of the committee, to learn that, notwithstanding this immense reduction of deposits in consequence of the acts of the executive, the United States Bank actually reduced its discounts during the same period, only 2,883,594 dollars.

During all this period of pressure, the United States Bank has left in the state banks an average amount uncalled for, of 3,464,956 dollars. Sir, I put to all candid men in the Senate the question, whether the Bank of the United States has oppressed the country or the state banks? No man but a reckless partisan will answer this question in the affirmative. Sir, the judgment of bankers and merchants (and they are most competent to decide upon the matter, and have the deepest interest in it) approves and acquits the United States Bank. But while that institution has been able to sustain itself with so very slight a reduction of discounts, the pressure has, in a much greater ratio, diminished the ability of the state banks to keep up their discounts and circulation. How much they have reduced either, is not ascertained; but the fact is known that, in this state alone, they have withdrawn from circulation, three millions of dollars. Sir, it is with pain and regret that I remark that the message of the governor withholds all details and explanation on this interesting subject, and yet charges upon the United States Bank a wanton and unnecessary reduction of its discounts for the purpose of oppressing the people.

Sir, were it true that this pressure has been produced by those whom his excellency stoops to stigmatize, what then? Is gross usurpation to be tolerated, because to resist and expose it may produce a panic? Never, sir, will I submit to such a policy while I have any responsibility as a citizen.

But, sir, neither those who produced, nor those who prolonged this panic, were the opponents of the administration. The President and his partisans-they are responsible for it all. To them i

have traced its origin. They have had the power to arrest it. They have sullenly refused. When the voice of complaint reached them, they declared it false and factious. When the reality of the pressure could no longer be denied, they answered that it could affect none but those who employed borrowed capital, and they were entitled to neither relief nor sympathy. When this unfeeling response would no longer avail, the country was assured that the President was trying an experiment, to see if state banks could not be substituted as the fiscal agents of the government. The sincerity of this answer was questioned, and then came the bolder avowal that the President was making an experiment, whether local banks, as well as the general institution, could not be dispensed with altogether, and the people be brought back to a specie currency-a retrograde movement more injurious than an Agrarian law. Thus, as the excitement has increased, the usurpation of the President has grown bolder. The conduct of the executive, the rude denial of all relief, the promulgation of these crude theories and bold and unconstitutional purposes-these have nourished the vulture distrust, which has fastened upon the currency.

Sir, there was never a charge so reckless as that made by the governor, that there has been manifested by the United States. Bank an especial hostility to this state and its institutions. During all this pressure, that institution has kept up its discounts both at New York and Buffalo, to their accustomed amounts. And there has been constantly due a large balance from the New York banks. If there is any one fact clearly established, it is that the institution has curtailed its operations elsewhere to sustain the commerce of the city of New York, where its discounts were increased, from the 1st of October to the 1st of February, from 6,180,833 dollars to 6,458,540 dollars; while the public deposits in the institution were reduced from 4,130,322 dollars to 258,350 dollars. Sir, he must calculate largely upon popular credulity, who, with these facts before him, will put forth such an allegation.

There is one other allegation in the message and in the report of the committee so disingenuous that I cannot pass it by without animadversion. These documents assert that the removal of the deposits did not diminish the ability of the bank to continue and increase its discounts, and yet the President and Secretary, nevertheless assign as the reason for the removal, that it was necessary in order to compel the bank to reduce its discounts and prepare

for its dissolution. The governor and this very legislature, scarcely three months ago, approved the removal for that very reason. Sir, how enviable is that abundant measure of glory which covers such inconsistencies as this!

If I have been at all successful, I have shown that all the evils hitherto experienced and yet to be apprehended from the pressure, are the necessary consequences of the removal of the deposits. The governor and committee have revived the question, whether that removal was necessary? Having once discussed that question in this place, I shall be very brief upon it now. But how are circumstances changed since that discussion! Then we were assured there was not, nor could there be, any pressure; now a pressure exists so alarming that the state is seen borrowing six millions for the relief of its citizens!

The reasons given were vindictive. It was necessary to punish the bank and to diminish its power. To which it ought to be a sufficient answer, 1st. That in inflicting this punishment, the President assumed legislative power, defining the offence and the penalty, judicial power convicting the bank, and executive power, conferred by no law, enforcing the punishment.

But if this be not a sufficient reply to those who think such powers may be safely assumed by the executive, then I would say to them they can now see how blind revenge is! The penalty has been inflicted, the blow has fallen, the offender is unharmed, is still as strong, as powerful as before. Where, then, has the blow fallen? Look upon this suffering country, and see in her the victim! But there was the pretext of the public good, the public morals were to be saved by preventing the renewal of the charter of the bank. Sir, in my experience, I have never seen any thing so preposterous as this affected alarm at the power of the bank. Of all the institutions of the country, it is the most powerless, the most defenceless. Popular feeling is most easily directed against it. Honor, firmness, candor, moral courage, are necessary to maintain its cause even against false accusations; but it is the braggart's bravery to crowd into the foremost rank of its assailants. It is supererogatory to add that legislative action is necessary to confer on the executive the power to preserve the public morals.

Sir, if I have established the several preliminary points I have stated, it will follow that the measure to be adopted in order to VOL. 1-4.