hands of England. The British nation is a mercantile one. We also are a mercantile people with whom England deals largely, and we are agents in carrying on a large portion of the commerce of England with other countries. The trade between the two countries employs 10,000 American vessels and 9,000 British vessels, with an aggregate tonnage of three millions of tons. The comfort and welfare and happiness of the British nation depends, as do our own largely, on the preservation of that commerce. War between the two nations would sweep it from the ocean. The ministry that should involve that nation in war with the United States, would be driven from power by public indignation, arising out of universal calamity and distress.

England is a manufacturer. Her imports in all her domains are valued by hundred of millions annually, and her exports are equivalent. She needs raw materials-cotton and wool and other articles, and bread-stuffs and provisions. And to get these, while extending the markets for her manufactures, she bends all the policy of her commercial and fiscal systems. We furnish those indispensable supplies lavishly, and we consume her fabrics of iron, cotton, flax, wool, silver, gold, every thing in preference to manufacturing for ourselves. A war with the United States would close these relations at once, and the artisans and laborers of England would be involved in calamities such as they have never yet known.

England is a creditor nation. We are debtors to her. Heaven knows how much capital is not accumulated in England. It is a capital that has been gathered through a thousand years, by a nation of wonderful and world-searching sagacity, industry, and enterprise. We employ of that capital all that we can obtain, for we have need of it all, to bring at once into sudden development and perfection vast and perpetually-extending regions, which, for near 6,000 years, were, by civilized man, untrodden and unknown. A large portion of our public debt is owned in England. Large masses of our state debts are owned there. In addition to that, our merchants are indebted to England I know not how much; but I have known the time when the whole public and private debt of the United States, owed to British subjects, was not less than $250,000,000. The interest on this debt constitutes the support of a considerable portion of the British community.

England, then, cannot wisely desire, nor safely dare, a war with

the United States. She knows all this, and more: that war with the United States, about these fisheries, would find the United States able to surround the British colonies. She would find that the dream of conquest of those colonies, which broke upon us, even in the dawn of the revolution, when we tendered them an invitation to join their fortunes with ours, and followed it with the sword; that dream, which returned again in 1812, when we attempted to subjugate them by force, would come over us again; and that now, when we have matured the strength to take them, we should find the provinces willingly consenting to captivity. A war about these fisheries would be a war which would result either in the independence of the British provinces, or in their annexation to the United States. I devoutly pray God that that consummation may come; the sooner the better; but I do not desire it at the cost of war, or of injustice. I am content to wait for the ripened fruit which must fall. I know the wisdom of England too well to believe that she would hazard shaking that fruit into our hands, for all that she could hope to gain by insisting on, or enforcing with armed power, her rigorous construction of the convention concerning the colonial fisheries.

Sir, what is the condition of England for a war with the United States at this moment? Her power has been extended over the East, and she employs nearly all her armies in India, and in Africa, to maintain herself against the natives of the one continent and the savages of the other. At this very moment, those who understand her condition best, say that her home defences are inadequate to protect her against an invasion by France. Wise and able statesmen, now representing the ruling and prevailing interest of the country, demand of the Parliament to add to their defences, by extending and reorganizing the militia; and it is a great party question in that kingdom, whether the safety of England shall be secured by such an increase, or whether it shall be left exposed to an invader.

What is the condition of English power in Canada, and in the British provinces? England has never, since the war of 1812, had so small a military force in those provinces as now. The Imperial government has maintained heretofore some show of naval defence upon our lakes. But within the last six months it has broken up the whole naval force there, and now none whatever exists. While thus showing the supposed motives to peace

on the part of Great Britain, I confess that peace is no less the interest and the instinct of our own country. The United States might aggrandize themselves by war, but they are sure to be aggrandized by peace. I thank God that the peace of the world is largely subject to the control of these two great powers; and that, while they have common dispositions toward harmony, neither has need of war to establish its character for firmness or for courage. Each has had enough of

"The camp, the host, the fight, the conqueror's career."

Some honorable senators have averred that they could not trust this administration, because of its antecedents; that Britain was induced to assume a bold tone on this question, by triumphs which she had obtained in negotiations with this administration. One general remark meets all these objections; and that is, that they are extraneous issues, each one sufficient for a discussion in itself. Any senator, who thinks the interests of the country have been sacrificed can bring it before the Senate and the country, and present it distinctly for examination.

But, sir, what are these charges in regard to Cuba? Why, as I understand, that this administration interposed to prevent an expedition, which it was alleged was fitted out in this country for that island, in violation of our neutrality laws. Was this all? If it was, let senators dissatisfied repeal the neutrality laws if they can, and not censure the President for executing them. What complaint is made in regard to Mexico? Why, that the Secretary of State employed a British banker, as an agent, to pay the instalments on the debt of this government, payable in the city of Mexico. I see nothing wrong in that. An agent was necessary, and a foreign one. I believe the money was honestly paid to Mexico, and that she was satisfied. But it is said that British creditors got a portion of the money. I know not what obligations we were under to take measures to defeat British creditors, or any others, or the British government, from obtaining satisfaction of any of their debtors. Indeed, in some of the states, there is a system of remedies founded on the principle that the creditor has a right to attach money belonging to his debtor in transitu.

What has the administration done, or neglected to do, in regard to the Sandwich Islands? It is understood that this imagined shortcoming of the administration consists in the President's not

having entertained, as is supposed, a proposition from the government of the Sandwich Islands, to put themselves under the protection or subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the United States. I submit to honorable senators, that they begin at the wrong end: It was settled by the last precedent that the function of annexing belonged, not to the President, but to Congress. Congress have power "to admit new states." Let senators who desire annexation, introduce the bill. I am ready to entertain the question for examination, and to act as prudence, wisdom, and the great interests of the country, shall be found to require. But I cannot prejudge a question so great, so momentous.

These alleged and mistaken triumphs of England, then, form no cumulative evidence to support the censures bestowed upon the administration in regard to the transaction in question.

And, now, what is the real question before Congress in regard to these fisheries? That question is simply this: The British colonies insist upon the rigorous construction of the convention of 1818, so as to exclude us from entering the large British bays, and distract and annoy our fishermen; and the people of the United States resist that construction, and they never will yield it. The British government approve in words, and yet, so far as their acts are concerned, refuse to support it. The controversy is thirty years old, and seems an endless one. While that question is kept up, the American fisheries, which were once in a most prosperous condition, are comparatively stationary or declining, although supported by large bounties. At the same time, the provincial fisheries are gaining in the quantity of fish exported to this country, and largely gaining in their exportations abroad. In 1844, those colonies sent us products of the fishery valued at $264,000; in 1851, the value of their fish which we received was $781,000. In 1844, they exported through our ports, to other countries, fish valued at $3,000; and 1851, their exported products were valued at $173,000!

Our fishermen want all that our own construction of the convention gives them, and want and must have more-they want and must have the privileges of fishing within the three inhibited miles, and of curing fish on the shore.

Consider for a moment the magnitude of the interest of the fisheries-that it employs a fleet of twelve hundred sail, managed by twelve thousand men, and a capital of four millions of dollars;

and that, together with the whale fishery, it constitutes the basis of our naval power.

Shall we not try to quiet and end this long and injurious dispute, and to procure for the fishermen not only peace and security, but also an extension of the fishing ground and its privileges? That is the question, and I am for the fishermen.

Sir, there ought to be a decision on this matter some time or other. At all events, delay is injurious and dangerous. We think the right is with us, and so I am sure it is. But nevertheless it is a question. The British government are our equals, and they hold it an open question. They quote American authorities, especially that of Chancellor Kent, against us. This shows us that they are as confident in maintaining their position as we are in maintaining ours. We can dictate no terms to Great Britain. We will not allow her to dictate terms to us.

Now, sir, can we, in any event, yield our right to navigate the Gut of Canso, and with it the fisheries of the Straits of Northumberland? No! Can we enjoy our fisheries as we ought while these disputes exist? No! Are we to leave them open, and, if so, shall our fisheries be carried on hereafter under the surveillance of an armed British squadron, and the guardianship of a naval fleet of our own?

The indications are abundant that it is the wish of the Senate that the Executive should not treat upon this subject, and I think wisely. I agree on that point with my honorable and distinguished friend from Massachusetts, [Mr. DAVIS.] What the colonies require is some modification of commercial regulations which may affect the revenue. This is a subject proper to be acted upon by Congress, not by the President, if it is to be acted upon at all. It must not be done by treaty. We seem to have courted the responsibility, and it rests upon us. Let us no longer excite ourselves and agitate the country with unavailing debates; but let us address ourselves to the relief of the fishermen, and to the improvement of our commerce.

Now, sir, there is only one way that Congress can act; and that is by reciprocal legislation with the British Parliament or the British colonies of some sort. I commit myself to no particular scheme, or project of reciprocal legislation, and certainly to none injurious to any agricultural or manufacturing interest. I, for one, will give my poor opinion upon the subject; and it is this: