If one state should deem a navigation act favourable to its own growth, the efficacy of such a measure might be defeated by the jealousy or policy of a neighbouring state. If one should levy duties to maintain its own government and resources, there were many temptations for its neighbours to adopt the system of free trade, to draw to itself a larger share of foreign and domestic commerce. The agricultural states might easily suppose, that they had not an equal interest in a restrictive system with the navigating states. And, at all events, each state would legislate according to its estimate of its own interests, the importance of its own products, and the local advantages or disadvantages of its position in a political or commercial view. To do otherwise would be to sacrifice its immediate interests, without any adequate or enduring consideration; to legislate for others, and not for itself; to dispense blessings abroad, without regarding the security of those at home.1

§ 260. Such a state of things necessarily gave rise to serious dissensions among the states themselves. The difference of regulations was a perpetual source of irritation and jealousy. Real or imaginary grievances were multiplied in every direction; and thus state animosities and local prejudices were fostered to a high degree, so as to threaten at once the peace and safety of the Union.2

1 New Jersey early felt the want of a power in congress, to regulate foreign commerce, and made it one of her objections to adopting the articles of confederation, in her representation to congress.-2 Pitk. Hist. 23, 24; 1 Secret Journ. 375; The Federalist, No. 38.

22 Pitk. Hist. 192, 214, 215; 1 Amer. Museum, 272, 273, 281, 282, 288; The Federalist, No. 22.-1 Amer. Mus 13 to 16; 2 Amer. Mus. 395 to 399; The Federalist, No. 7; 1 Elliot's Debates, 75; 1 Tucker's Black. Comm. App. 159, 248, 249.—Mons. Turgot, the Comptroller General of

§ 261. These evils were aggravated by the situation of our foreign commerce. During the war, our commerce was nearly annihilated by the superior naval power of the enemy; and the return of peace enabled foreign nations, and especially Great Britain, in a great measure to monopolize all the benefits of our home trade. In the first place, our navigation, having no protection, was unable to engage in competition with foreign ships. In the next place, our supplies were almost altogether furnished by foreign importers or on foreign account. We were almost flooded with foreign manufactures, while our own produce bore but a reduced price.1 It was easy to foresee, that such a state of things must soon absorb all our means; and as our industry had but a narrow scope, would soon reduce us to absolute poverty. Our trade in our own ships with foreign nations was depressed in an equal degree; for it was loaded with heavy restrictions in their ports. While, for instance, British ships with their commodities had free admission into our ports, American ships and exports were loaded with heavy exactions, or prohibited from entry into British ports.2 We were, therefore, the victims of our own imbecility, and reduced to a complete subjection to the commercial regula

the Finances of France, among other errors in our national policy, observed, that in the several states, "one fixed principle is established in regard to imposts. Each state is supposed to be at liberty to tax itself at pleasure, and to lay its taxes upon persons, consumptions, or importa tions; that is to say, to erect an interest contrary to that of other states."1 Amer. Museum, 16.

1 5 Marsh. Life of Washington, 69, 72, 75, 79, 80.

2 1 Tuck. Black. App. 157, 159; 5 Marsh. Life of Wash. 77, 78; 2 Pitk. Hist. 186 to 192; 1 Amer. Museum, 282, 288; 2 Amer. Museum, 263 to 276; Id. 371 to 373; 3 Amer. Museum, 554 to 557, 562; North American Review, Oct. 1827, p. 249, 257, 258.

tions of other countries, notwithstanding our boasts of freedom and independence. Congress had been long sensible of the fatal effects flowing from this source; but their efforts to ward off the mischiefs had been unsuccessful. Being invested by the articles of confederation with a limited power to form commercial treaties, they endeavoured to enter into treaties with foreign powers upon principles of reciprocity. But these negotiations were, as might be anticipated, unsuccessful, for the parties met upon very unequal terms. Foreign nations, and especially Great Britain, felt secure in the possession of their present command of our trade, and had not the least inducement to part with a single advantage. It was further pressed upon us, with a truth equally humiliating and undeniable, that congress possessed no effectual power to guaranty the faithful observance of any commercial regulations; and there must in such cases be reciprocal obligations.1 "America (said Washington) must appear in a very contemptible point of view to those, with whom she was endeavouring to form commercial treaties, without possessing the means of carrying them into effect. They must see and feel, that the Union, or the states individually, are sovereign, as best suits their purposes. In a word, that we are a nation to-day, and thirteen to-morrow. Who will treat with us on such terms?" 2

§ 262. The difficulty of enforcing even the obligations of the treaty of peace of 1783 was a most serious national evil. Great Britain made loud complaints of infractions thereof on the part of the several states, and

1 5 Marsh. Life of Wash. 71, 72, 73; 2 Pitk. Hist. 189, 190; 3 Amer. Museum, 62, 64, 65.

2 5 Marsh. Life of Wash. 73; North American Review, Oct. 1827, p. 257, 258; Atcheson's Coll. of Reports, p. 55.

demanded redress. She refused on account of these alleged infractions to surrender up the western ports according to the stipulations of that treaty; and the whole confederacy was consequently threatened with the calamities of Indian depredations on the whole of our western borders, and was in danger of having its public peace subverted through its mere inability to enforce the treaty stipulations. The celebrated address of congress, in 1787, to the several states on this subjec, is replete with admirable reasoning, and contains mela choly proofs of the utter inefficiency of the confedera tion, and of the disregard by the states in their legislation of the provisions of that treaty.1

§ 263. In April, 1784, congress passed a resolution, requesting the states to vest the general government with power, for fifteen years only, to prohibit the importation and exportation of goods in the ships of nations, with which we had no commercial treaties; and also: prohibit the subjects of foreign nations, unless authorized by treaty, to import any goods into the United States, not the produce or manufacture of the dominions of their own sovereign. Although congress expressly stated, that without such a power no reciprocal advantages could be acquired, the proposition was never assented to by the states; and their own countervailing laws were either rendered nugatory by the laws of other states, or were repealed by a regard to their own inter

1 Journals of congress, April 13, 1787, p. 32; Rawle on Constitution, App. 2, p. 316. It was drawn up by Mr. Jay, then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and was unanimously adopted by congress. It however failed of its object. And the treaty of 1783, so far as it respected British debts, was never faithfully executed until after the adoption of the constitution of the United States. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. R. 199; Hopkins v. Bell, 3 Cranch, 454.

ests.1 At a still later period a resolution was moved in congress, recommending it to the states to vest in the general government full authority to regulate external and internal commerce, and to impose such duties, as might be necessary for the purpose, which shared even a more mortifying fate; for it was rejected in that body, a hough all the duties were to be collected by, and id over to the states.2

p

f

§ 264. Various reasons concurred to produce these traordinary results. But the leading cause was a owing jealousy of the general government; and a nore devoted attachment to the local interests of the states; a jealousy, which soon found its way even into the councils of congress, and enervated the little power, which it was yet suffered to exert. One memorable instance occurred, when it was expected, that the British garrisons would surrender the western Ρ sts, and it was thought necessary to provide some regular troops to take possession of them on the part of America. The power of congress to make a requisition on the states for this purpose was gravely contested; and, as connected with the right to borrow money and emit bills of credit, was asserted to be dangerous to liberty, and alarming to the states. The measure was rejected, and militia were ordered in their stead.3

§ 265. There were other defects seriously urged against the confederation, which, although not of such a fatal tendency, as those already enumerated, were deemed of sufficient importance to justify doubts, as to its efficacy as a bond of union, or an enduring scheme

1 2 Pitk. Hist. 192; 5 Marsh. Life of Wash. 70.

2 5 Marsh. Life of Washington, 80, 81.

3 5 Marsh. Life of Washington, App. note 1.