FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

273

extreme left, which was in danger of being cut off if Prentiss's hard-pressed troops should perish. McArthur took a wrong road, and came directly upon Withers. He engaged him gallantly, and for a time there seemed to be a prospect of salvation for the environed troops. But McArthur was soon compelled to fall back. Prentiss's second division was hurried up, but it was too late. In the struggle, Peabody had been killed, Prentiss had become separated from a greater portion of his division, and it fell into the wildest confusion. By ten o'clock in the morning, it had practically disappeared. Fragments of brigades and regiments continued to fight as opportunity offered, and a large number of the division drifted behind new-formed lines, particularly those of Hurlbut. Prentiss and three of his regiments, over two thousand in number, maintained an unassailed position until late in the afternoon, when they were captured, sent to the rear of the Confederate army, and then marched in triumph to Corinth, as prisoners of war.

We have seen how McClernand's left hastened to the support of Hildebrand. As Sherman's line fell back, McClernand was compelled to bring in the remainder of his brigades to the protection of his left; for against that the Confederates, elated by their success in demolishing Prentiss, now hurled themselves with great force. McClernand's whole division formed a front along the Corinth and Pittsburg Landing road, with his batteries in good position, and there, until ten o'clock, he foiled every attempt of his foe to gain that road. Very soon a new peril appeared. The falling back of Sherman gave the Confederates a chance to flank McClernand's right, and quickly they seized the advantage. They dashed through the abandoned camps and pressed onward until driven back by Dresser's rifled cannon, which had smitten them fearfully. But reserves and fresh regiments pressing up toward the same point, with great determination and overwhelming numbers, compelled McClernand to fall back. His batteries were broken up,' many of his officers were wounded, and a large number of his men lay dead or mutilated on the field. The division fell slowly back, fighting gallantly, and by eleven o'clock it was in a line with Hurlbut's, that covered Pittsburg Landing.

We have alluded to the perilous position of the brigade of Stuart, of Sherman's division, on the extreme left of the National line,' to whose assistance General W. H. L. Wallace sent McArthur. It was posted about two miles from Pittsburg Landing on the Hamburg road, near the crossing of Lick Creek. Its position was isolated, and could be easily reached by the foe by a good road from Corinth; but, as it was intended to land Buell's forces at Hamburg, it was thought the brigade might be safely left there until that event. But the Confederates did not wait for the arrival of Buell; and now, when they were thundering away at the front of Sherman, McClernand, and Prentiss, his advance was more than half a day's usual march away. The isolated brigade was, therefore, placed in great peril. So isolated was it, that the first intimation its commander had of disaster on

1 Dresser had lost several of his rifled cannon, three caissons, and eighteen horses. Schwartz had lost half of his guns and sixteen horses; and McAllister had lost half of his 24-pound howitzers.

2 David L. Stuart was a resident of Chicago, and was then, as colonel of a regiment from Illinois, acting brigadier-general, in command of a brigade composed of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, and Fifty-fourth (Zouaves) and Seventy-first Ohio regiments.

VOL. II.-56

274

GRANT ON THE BATTLE-FIELD.

the right was the cessation of firing in that direction, the scream of a shell in its passage among the branches above him, and in the apparition of a Confederate column of cavalry and infantry bearing down upon him by the forest road from Corinth to Hamburg. That column was mostly composed of Breckinridge's reserves. He had planted batteries on heights near the ford, and under cover of these his troops rushed to the attack. For ten minutes a desperate conflict ensued, when Stuart fell back and sent to Wallace for aid. It was furnished, as we have seen, but missed its aim. McArthur, however, so vigorously fought the Confederates that Stuart's force was saved from capture, and was enabled to retreat to a place of comparative safety, where its shattered members were brought into order.

« April 6,

1862.

It was now twelve o'clock at noon." The Confederates had full possession of the ground on which lay the first line of the National army in the morning, and of the camps of Sherman, McClernand, Prentiss, and Stuart. Three of the five divisions of that army on the field had been thoroughly routed, and all were hemmed within a narrow strip of ground between the triumphant Confederate line and the broad and rapid Tennessee River. General Grant, who was at his head-quarters at

ULYSSES S. GRANT.

Cherry's, eight miles away when the battle commenced,' had hastened to the field at the summons of the cannon's roar. He reached it at about eight o'clock, and at ten was with Sherman, when the battle was hottest. He comprehended the peril that threatened his whole army, and he took vigorous measures to avert it by re-forming the shattered brigades, re-establishing batteries and new lines, and ordering General Lewis Wallace, at Crump's Landing, to hasten to the field of strife with his fresh division. Buell's advance was at Savannah, but could not come in time, perhaps, to assist in

the struggle, and he believed that he must win or lose the battle without them.

The gap made by the demolition of Prentiss's brigade and Stuart's retreat, through which the Confederates expected to rush upon Hurlbut and push him into the Tennessee River, was speedily closed by General W. H. L. Wallace, who marched with his remaining brigades and joined McArthur, taking with him the Missouri batteries of Stone, Richardson, and Webber, which were all under the command of Major Cavender. Hurlbut had been stationed

in open fields; now he fell back to the thick woods between his camp and

1 There was some disposition to censure General Grant for having his head-quarters so far away from the bulk of his army. It is proper to remember that Savannah was the point toward which his expected re-enforcements under Buell, were to join him; and it was essential for him to be where he could, at the earliest moment, confer with that commander, after he should reach the Tennessee. Grant spent most of each day with his main army, returning to his quarters in a steamer at evening.

DEFEAT OF THE NATIONAL ARMY.

275

the river, and there, from ten o'clock in the morning until between three and four o'clock in the afternoon, he and Wallace held the Confederates in check, fighting a greater part of the time, and hurling back tremendous charges by the massed foe. On both sides death had been reaping a bountiful harvest. The brave General Wallace had fallen, mortally wounded, and been carried on a litter from the field. General Gladden, of the Confederate army, had been killed, and their Commander-in

chief, General A. S. Johnston, who had almost recklessly exposed himself, had also been mortally hurt at about halfpast two o'clock.1

The superior force of the Confederates pressed Hurlbut further toward the river at four o'clock. At that time the gallant Wallace fell, and the command devolved on General McArthur. His division, animated by his words and deeds, had been fighting hopefully, but they too were now compelled to retreat, to avoid being flanked and surrounded, as Prentiss had been. They took position in a line with Hurlbut's men, about half a mile from the river, having lost only a single heavy gun, which was afterward recovered.

The day was now fairly lost. The victorious Confederates occupied the camps of all the Union divisions on the field excepting Wallace's, and just in the rear of that the broken and terribly smitten army had now gathered in a space of not more than four hundred acres on a rolling plateau, very near the high banks at Pittsburg Landing, below which four or five thousand fugitives from the battle-field, chiefly inexperienced troops, were ignobly sheltering themselves from the storm of war. The army could fall back no farther. Its next retrograde movement could only be into the flood of the Tennessee, for there were not transports enough there to carry over it a single division.*

1 Johnston was hit by a piece of a shell that burst near him. It struck his thigh, half way between his hip and knee, cutting a wide path, and severing the femoral artery. Governor Harris, of Tennessee (his brother-inlaw), who was his chief of staff, was at his side. Ten minutes after he was lifted from his horse he died. Johnston was one of the bravest and most accomplished officers in the Confederate army. His death was concealed from his troops at that time, and it was not publicly made known until the army had returned to Corinth. Johnston's body was left on the field when the Confederates fled the next day, and was buried there. In January, 1867, his remains were taken to Austin, in Texas, for re-interment. The disloyal mayor and other citizens of Galveston asked permission of General Sheridan, the military commander of that district, to honor the remains by a public demonstration of respect in that city, to which Sheridan replied, in a note to the mayor:"SIR-I respectfully decline to grant your request. I have too much regard for the memory of the brave men who died to preserve our Government to authorize Confederate demonstrations over the remains of any one who attempted to destroy it. "P. H. SHERIDAN, "Major-Gen. U. S. A."

This shows the manner of carrying the wounded from the field when unable to walk. These litters are made as portable as proper strength will allow, and so constructed as to fold up. They are composed of two poles with a canvas stretched between, and strap yokes for the bearers.

3 The Nationals had lost a division commander (Prentiss), a large number of field officers, and about three thousand men as prisoners, besides many killed and wounded, together with a great portion of their artillery, about twenty flags, colors, and standards, thousands of small arms, and a large supply of forage, subsistence, and munitions of war.

4 It is related that Buell, when talking with Grant about the peril of giving battle with a deep river so nearly at his back, inquired, "What would you have done had you been pressed once more on Sunday evening ?"-" Put

276

AN UNFORTUNATE MISUNDERSTANDING.

The only hope of salvation seemed to be in the co-operation of the gunboats, which now might give them aid in fighting, or the help of Buell's

STEPHEN A. HURLBUT.

vanguard, then on the opposite shore,

or the advent of Lewis Wallace with his fine division, who had been anxiously expected all the afternoon. As the columns were pushed back from one position to another, Grant anxiously listened for the noise of Wallace's cannon thundering on the flank of the Confederates. Early in the morning he had sent him word to hold his troops in readiness to march at a moment's warning, "certainly not later than eleven o'clock." At half-past eleven Wallace received an order from his chief to move up and take position "on the right of the army, and form a line of battle at a right angle with the river." Time passed on; the Confederates were pressing hard; the disorganized brigades were in great confusion and falling back toward the river's brink. Yet Wallace did not come. Grant sent one of his staff to hurry him up. He did not come. Then he sent his adjutant-general (Captain Rawlins) to urge him forward, and yet he did not appear. Night had fallen, and the discomfited army lay huddled in great peril on the banks of the Tennessee, when the seemingly tardy General arrived. He was afterward censured for the delay, for the impression went abroad that, had he promptly responded to Grant's call, victory for the National army might have been achieved on that day, for he was a skillful commander, and his men, fresh and spirited, had been well tried, and found sufficient in all things. A few words of explanation, afterward given, made the record of that prompt and gallant officer clear to the apprehension of his chief and the people, and showed that the whole delay had occurred in consequence of a blunder of omission committed by Grant's messenger who bore the order for his advance.

my troops across the river," was Grant's reply. "But you had not transportation sufficient," answered Buell "Plenty," responded Grant," to take over all that would have been left when we had done fighting."

1 Wallace's division was composed of three brigades, stationed on the road from Crump's Landing to Purdy, the first at the Landing, the second two miles out, and the third two miles and a half farther, at Adamsville. Owing to the pushing back of an Ohio brigade, that had been sent out to reconnoiter in the direction of Purdy, his division marched as far as Adamsville in a drenching rain, on Friday night (April 4), and there a brigade was left. The first brigade, commanded by Colonel Morgan L. Smith, was composed of the Eleventh and Twenty-fourth Indiana and Eighth Missouri. The second, commanded by Colonel John M. Thayer, was com posed of the First Nebraska, Twenty-third Indiana, and the Fifty-sixth and Fifty-eighth Ohio. The third brigade, under Colonel Charles Whittlesy, was composed of the Twentieth, Sixty-eighth, Seventy-sixth, and Seventyeighth Ohio. To the division were attached Thurber's Missouri and Thompson's Indiana Batteries; also the third battalion of the Fifth Ohio, and third battalion of the Eleventh Illinois cavalry.

2 General Grant, as we have seen, had ordered General Wallace to place his division" on the right of the army." That position in the morning was about four miles from Pittsburg Landing. The messenger who bore the order not only omitted to inform Wallace that the "right" had been beaten back, and was thus much nearer Pittsburg Landing, but had told him (as he doubtless supposed truly) that the Confederates were being repulsed at all points. Believing it to be yet in its morning position at the right of Shiloh Meeting-house, Wallace promptly put his whole division (excepting two regiments left at Crump's Landing) in motion half an hour after receiving the order, by the nearest route to the supposed "right of the army." When he had proceeded, as rapidly as the miry roads would allow, for about six miles, the roar of battle quickening the steps of his soldiers,

PREPARATIONS FOR A NIGHT ATTACK.

277

By the side of a little log house which had lately been the post-office of Pittsburg Landing, and constituted the "village," General Grant and his staff were grouped at sunset on that fearful Sunday evening, while there was a lull in the storm of war. They were in continual expectation of another attack, but Grant felt confident of final victory.' Buell's vanguard was in sight, and Wallace was expected to appear at every moment. If the assailants could be kept at bay a few hours, all would be well. Preparations to withstand them were hastily made. The quiet time was improved, and in a semicircle around the army, half a mile back from the bluff, slight earthworks of half-moon form were quickly thrown up, and twenty-two heavy guns were mounted on them, under the direction of Colonel Webster, Grant's chief of staff, and manned by artillerists selected from all the batteries.

These guns were scarcely in position, toward the close of twilight, when a lurid glare lighted up the surrounding forests, and shot and shell from Confederate cannon on the left and center of the Nationals came crashing through the trees in the direction of the Landing, but falling short of the intended victims. These were quickly answered by Grant's guns, when the Confederate brigades in full force pressed forward from their new line, that stretched between the positions of Stuart and Hurlbut in the morning, from Lick Creek across the Corinth road, and tried to cross a ravine that separated them from the Nationals, in order to give a final and crushing blow to the latter. This force was large, composed of Chalmers on the right, with Breckinridge in the rear; and ranging to the left, the reduced brigades of Withers, Cheatham, Ruggles, Anderson, Stuart, Pond, and Stevens were engaged. They were bravely met by the National infantry, composed of portions of all the brigades, and by the well-directed artillery,' and were kept at bay until a force that had not yet been brought into action was placed in position and commenced work. This was composed of the gun-boats Tyler and Lexington, under the general command of Lieutenant William Gwin. They came up to the mouth of the little creek that traverses a short ravine at Pittsburg Landing, and were soon hurling 7-inch shells and 64-pound shot up that hollow in the bluff, in curves that dropped them in the midst of the Confederates. General Nelson, who led Buell's advance, had crossed the river with Ammon's brigade, and bore an important part in repelling the assailants. The crushing blow which the latter expected to give was foiled, and the palm of victory, which they confidently expected to hold before midnight, eluded their grasp. Three hours before that midnight, the roar of battle, which had been kept up during the evening, had ceased, and Beau

he was overtaken by Captain Rawlins and another, and from them first learned that the National troops had been beaten back toward the river. His route would take him to an isolated and dangerous position in the rear of the Confederates, so he retraced his steps, crossed over to the river road near Snake Creek, by the nearest possible route, passed that stream over a bridge, and took his assigned position on the right of the army. He had marched and countermarched, in consequence of misinformation and lack of information, about sixteen miles, which had consumed the whole afternoon.

1 A remark made by General Prentiss seems to have been the cause of Beauregard not pressing an attack that night. That general asked Prentiss if the Nationals had any fortifications at the river, to which he replied, "You must consider us poor soldiers, general, if you suppose we would have neglected so plain a duty." The truth was, the Nationals had not a single fortification anywhere on or near that battle-field until after Beauregard ceased to fight on Sunday evening. Had he pressed forward, he might have captured the entire army.

2 Among these pieces were two long 32-pound siege guns, but there seemed to be no one to work them, when Dr. Cornyn, surgeon of the old First Missouri artillery, offered his services for the purpose. They were accepted, and the guns were worked most efficiently.