POSITION OF THE NATIONAL TROOPS. 253 a March, 1862. The morning of the 5th (when Van Dorn moved) was blustery, and snow covered the ground. Curtis was unsuspicious of the movements of his enemy until two o'clock in the afternoon, when scouts and fugitive citizens came hurrying to his tent, in which he was writing, with the startling intelligence that the Confederates were approaching in large force from the direction of Fayetteville, that their artillery had already passed that place, and that their cavalry would be at Elm Springs, not more than twelve miles from head-quarters, that night. Curtis at once determined to concentrate his forces in Sugar Creek Valley, not far from Mottsville, and a short distance south of Pea Ridge, a portion of a spur of the Ozark Mountains, on the highway between Fayetteville and Springfield, where there was a good point for defense and an abundance of water, and where General Davis had already thrown up intrenchments.' He gave orders accordingly, and there, on the morning of the 6th of March," the greater portion of his troops were gathered, excepting those under General Sigel and a few who were yet abroad. Sigel had moved his camp from Osage Springs to a point nearer Bentonville, to secure a better position for obtaining forage. He now found his command, and a train of two hundred wagons, placed in a perilous position by Van Dorn's sudden and unexpected advance; but, as we shall observe presently, he extricated them with small loss. • 1862. e March 1. d March 5. Van Dorn had marched rapidly from his camp near the Boston Mountains, in the edge of the Indian Country, about fifty miles from Pea Ridge, accompanied by Generals Price, McCulloch, McIntosh, and Pike. Informed of the strength of Curtis's position in front, he left the direct road at Fayetteville, and, marching more westward through Bentonville, struck the highway near the State line, about eight miles north of Sugar Creek, in the rear of the Nationals, thereby, as he thought, cutting off Curtis's supplies and re-enforcements, and securing him and his army as captives. It was while he was on that march from Fayetteville that his approach was made known." He encamped that night at Cross Hollows, which Carr had left; and Sigel, by a skillful movement in sending cavalry to Osage Springs to cover his right flank, safely conducted his train from McKissick's farm, west of Bentonville, to the latter place, and secured it from the grasp of the Confederates. Leaving a rear-guard (Thirty-sixth Illinois and a portion of the Second Missouri) at Bentonville, he sent his train forward toward Sugar Creek. Mistaking an order, Colonel Schaeffer with the Second Missouri also went forward, leaving only about six hundred men and five pieces of light artillery behind. These were surrounded by a battalion of cavalry forming Price's body-guard, and Louisiana infantry. Fortunately, Sigel had remained with his rear-guard, and he handled his little band so skillfully and bravely that they cut their way through, and, changing front, they fought and fell 1 That valley is low, and from a quarter to half a mile wide. The hills are high on both sides, and the main road from Fayetteville, by Cross Hollows to Keitsville, intercepts the valley nearly at right angles. The road from Fayetteville, by Bentonville, to Keitsville is quite a détour, but it also comes up the Sugar Creek Valley.— General Sturgis's Second Report. 2 This is a place at the head waters of the Osage Creek, and not far from those of Sugar Creek. It was so named because three hollows, or ravines, from 75 to 100 feet wide, there cross each other. It was to this strong position that General Price fled when he left Missouri, and from which Curtis drove him in the march to Fayetteville. 254 FLANK MOVEMENT OF THE CONFEDERATES. back alternately along the cross road leading through Leetown to the Elkhorn Tavern, until they were met by re-enforcements sent out by Curtis, when the pursuit ended. In this gallant affair Sigel lost twenty-eight killed and wounded and about fifty made prisoners.' The latter were chiefly Schaeffer's men, who had fallen into an ambuscade. The remainder joined the forces of Davis and Carr at the west end of Pea Ridge, an elevated table-land broken by ravines, and inclosed in a large bend of Sugar Creek. 1862. Van Dorn completed his flank movement on the night of the a March. 6th," and proceeded to attack the Nationals early the following morning. He left a small force to make a feint on their front, while Pike, with his Indian followers, took position about two miles to their right, to divert their attention from the main point of attack in their rear. Price occupied the main road not far from the Elkhorn Tavern, north of Curtis's camp, and McCulloch and McIntosh lay north of Sigel and Davis, after the National army had changed position, as we shall observe presently. In the mean time Curtis had been busy in felling trees to block the avenues of approach to his camp, and the roads running parallel to the main highway. Breast works had been speedily constructed at important points, and a battery had been planted and masked near the passage of the main road across Sugar Creek, under the direction of General Davis. His position was strong. On the morning of the 7th, Curtis was first informed of Van Dorn's flank movement, which seriously threatened the communication between his camp and his resources. The peril was extreme, and prompt action was necessary. He at once changed his front to rear, bringing his line of battle across Pea Ridge, and prepared to fight. The number of his foes was more than double that of his own, but there was no alternative. He must either fight or make a perilous flight. His ample preparations to receive Van Dorn in his front were now useless, and he was compelled to meet the skillful Mississippian on a field of the latter's own choosing. In that change of front, the First and ALEXANDER ASBOTH. Second divisions, under Sigel and Asboth, were on his left, the Third, under Davis, composed his center, and Carr's Fourth division formed his right. His line of battle stretched between three and four miles, from Sugar Creek to Elkhorn Tavern. Confronting this was the Confederate line, with Price and his Missourians on their right, McIntosh in the center, and McCulloch on their left. A broad and deep ravine called Cross Timber Hollow, covered with fallen trees, intersected the lines of both armies, and made maneuvering very difficult. At about half-past ten in the 1 Congratulating his troops on the 15th of March, Sigel said of this affair-"On the retreat from Bentonville to Sugar Creek, a distance of ten miles, you cut your way through an enemy at least five times stronger than yourselves." BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE. 255 a March 7, 1862. morning, Colonel Osterhaus was sent out with a detachment of the Third Iowa cavalry and some light artillery (Davidson's Peoria Battery), supported by the First Missouri cavalry, Colonel Ellis, and Twentysecond Indiana, Colonel Hendricks, to fall upon Van Dorn's center before he could fully form in battle order. Just as this movement had commenced, and Curtis was giving instructions to division commanders at Asboth's tent, word came to him that his pickets, under Major Weston (Twenty-fourth Missouri), on his extreme right, near Elkhorn Tavern, had been heavily attacked. Colonel Carr was at once sent to the support of Weston, and a severe battle ensued. Thus opened the fight on that eventful morning. Meanwhile Osterhaus had advanced about a mile beyond Leetown, and attacked what seemed to be a small body of Confederates in the edge of a wood and shrub-oak thicket. He brought three cannon (Davidson's Battery) to bear upon them, and they were apparently dispersed. Then he moved forward with the Iowa cavalry, to clear the woods of any insurgents that might be left, when he fell into a trap which had been laid for him. The woods swarmed with Confederates. The charge of the cavalry was broken, and they were driven back in disorder upon their supports, hotly pursued by Van Dorn's horse and foot. Two guns were captured by the latter, and a total rout and dispersion of the attacking column seemed inevitable, when General Davis and his division, who had bivouacked on the alert all the night before, came to the rescue, with General Sigel, who appeared on the Confederate flank. Curtis had at first ordered Davis to the relief of Carr on his extreme right, but, deeming the peril to Osterhaus the most imminent, he directed him to hasten to his aid. Davis changed his march. skillfully under fire, and advancing through Leetown his Second brigade,' commanded by Colonel Julius White, he was soon fighting heavily with McCulloch and McIntosh, and Pike's Indians, under himself and Ross. The battle was fierce and destructive. The Confederates were continually re-enforced. Davis and Osterhaus recoiled and recovered alternately; and the line of battle swayed like a pendulum. The issue of the strife seemed doubtful, when the Eighteenth Indiana, who had been ordered to attack the Confederate flank and rear, performed the duty so vigorously with ball and bayonet that they drove them from that part of the field, strewed it with the dead and wounded bodies of Texans and Indians, and recaptured the two cannon which, amid the shouts of the victors, were instantly trained upon their foe. That regiment and the Twenty-second (Colonel H. D. Washburn), from the same State, were conspicuous for their gallantry on the occasion. The latter had engaged a large force of Arkansas troops and Indians, and put them to flight. The Confederates had now become fugitives in turn. In their flight they left their dead and wounded on the field, among whom were Generals McCulloch and McIntosh, mortally hurt. The insurgents tried to re-form at their former position on the Bentonville road, but the arrival, at about this time, of Sigel with two batteries of heavy artillery (18-pounders) settled the issue of the day. After a brief but sharp artillery duel, the Confederates were driven back, and Sigel's heavy guns, with Osterhaus's command, were 1 See sub-note, page 252. 256 BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE. moved toward the right to assist Colonel Carr, if necessary. The day was fast wearing away, and, there being no indications of a disposition on the part of the Confederates to renew the fight, Davis's command bivouacked on the field they had so nobly assisted in winning.' While the battle was raging in the center, Curtis's right wing was heavily pressed. Colonel Carr had moved up the main road toward Elkhorn Tavern; Colonel Dodge's brigade filing off to the road leading from that place to Bentonville, where Captain Jones, of the Iowa Battery, opened upon the Confederates, and a smart artillery fight ensued, in which infantry were engaged. Colonel Vandever's brigade passed about half a mile beyond the tavern, and Captain Hayden's Dubuque battery at about nine o'clock also opened upon the Confederates. Very soon there was fighting along the whole line of Carr's division, and one of the guns of the Dubuque battery was captured by the foe. So fierce and heavy was the work of the Confederates, that Carr was driven back a short distance after an hour's hard fighting. Still hard pressed, he fought on. He sent for re-enforcements, but all Curtis could spare were a few cavalry, his body-guard, and a little mountain howitzer, under Major Bowen. He told the gallant Colonel to stand firm, and he did so. Again, when Carr thought he could hold out no longer, Curtis sent him word to 'persevere" and he should receive succor. He did so at a fearful cost - how fearful, the records of the sad havoc made in the ranks of the Fourth and Ninth Iowa, and Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Missouri, bear witness. A little later, when Curtis was satisfied that his left and center were safe, he sent first some artillery and a battalion of infantry to Carr's aid. Then he ordered General Asboth to move to the right with his division, by the Fayetteville road, and take position at the Elkhorn Tavern, while Sigel should re-enforce Davis, and, if proper, press toward the Elkhorn also. Asboth was accompanied by the Commanding General, who arrived at Carr's position at about five o'clock, and found him severely wounded in the arm, but fighting bravely. Many of his officers were disabled, and his dead and maimed, composing nearly one-fourth of his entire command, strewed the ground, over which he had been pushed back about a mile. For seven hours he had contested the field inch by inch, under a continuous fire. The re-enforcements were timely, and prevented more severe disaster. General Asboth planted his cannon in the road and opened a heavy fire at short range, but was soon severely wounded, while his guns became silenced for want of ammunition. The fight, for a time, was very fierce. The Second Missouri regiment became hotly engaged; and the Fourth Iowa, who were falling back in good order, after exhausting their ammunition, quickly obeyed a command to make a bayonet charge, and so recovered the field they had abandoned. One of Curtis's body-guard was shot dead, and an orderly near the General was hit with a bullet. The pressure on his line was yet heavy 1 This has been called The Battle of Leetown, it having been fought near that village. 2 Colonel Vandever had been to Huntsville, in Madison County, for the purpose of capturing a regiment of insurgents there. These had left two days before. On receiving a message from General Curtis, announcing the approach of Van Dorn, Vandever made a forced march of forty-one miles to the National camp, making only three halts, of fifteen minutes each, during the entire distance. The infantry consisted of the Ninth Iowa and Twenty-fifth Missouri. Vandever arrived on the evening of the 6th, and went into the fight refreshed. Another expedition under Major Conrad, consisting of about six hundred infantry, a section of artillery, and a battalion of cavalry which had been sent toward the borders of the Indian Nation, did not return in time to engage in the battle. BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE. 257 and unabated, and Asboth had directed his now useless cannon to be taken back to a place of safety, when a courier came from Sigel to herald his near approach. Animated by these tidings, the Nationals stood firm until their ammunition was entirely exhausted and night fell. The Confederates fired the last shot, but the Nationals held the field. The wearied Union troops slept that night on their arms. Their right had suffered disaster, but their center had driven the Confederates from the battle-ground, and their left was untouched. In such condition (the lacking being supplied with ammunition), they awaited the dawn to renew the conflict. Their foe, severely smitten and disheartened by the loss of two generals and scores of maimed and slaughtered comrades, were quite willing to have an opportunity for repose. Both armies lay among the dead and dying during that gloomy night. Van Dorn, who had been a greater part of the day in command of the troops that fought Carr, now concentrated his whole available force on Curtis's right. He lodged at the Elkhorn Tavern that night, and made preparations to open the battle in the morning. Curtis was vigilant, and easily penetrated his enemy's designs; so, notwithstanding the weariness of his troops, he effected a change of front during the darkness. At two o'clock in the morning he was joined by Sigel and his command, who had been compelled to make a wide circuit in order to reach that position, and at a little after sunrise the Nationals were almost ready for battle, the whole four divisions so posted as to fight Van Dorn with vigor. Curtis and his troops were in fine spirits, and felt confident of victory. The silence of the Confederates so late in the morning seemed ominous of weakness, and when a stir was observed among them, the General, fearing they might be moving off, did not wait for Asboth and Sigel to get into position, but ordered Davis, who occupied the center in the new line, to open the battle. Davis at once deployed Colonel Pattison's brigade a few hundred yards to the right of the Fayetteville road, to support Klaus's First Indiana battery, which was placed at the edge of an open field, between the hills at Elkhorn Tavern and the National camp. Davidson's battery was placed in a similar position on the left of the road, supported by White's brigade. These batteries opened fire briskly, and were responded to with terrible energy from batteries which the Confederates had planted during the night, some of their heavy guns sending raking shot, and compelling the National right to fall back to avoid them. The battle-line was soon perfected, with Asboth and Sigel a little to the rear of the remainder. Curtis well knew the ground and the relative position of his foe. He ordered his right to move forward to a position occupied the night before, while the left was so extended as to command Pea Ridge and make a flank movement on that wing almost impossible. Upon an elevation on the extreme right, which commanded Van Dorn's center and left, he planted the Dubuque battery, with orders for the right wing to support it, and very soon its commander, Hayden, opened a galling fire on the Confederates. Captain Davidson, with his First Iowa battery, also opened fire on their center, and thus skirmishing was kept up until Sigel's command on the left was in perfect readiness, when the decisive action commenced. 1 This was called by the Confederates the Battle of Elkhorn. VOL. II.-55 |