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148

a Oct. 23,

1861.

THE BALTIMORE PLOT.

troops were crossed, and active preparations were in progress for moving strongly upon the Confederates, when, on Tuesday night," General McClellan arrived at Poolesville. Then, as he says, he "learned, for the first time, the full details of the affair." The preparations for a forward movement, which promised the most important results for the National cause, were immediately suspended, and orders were

determined to go that night myself, and take with me another of my men. I purposed looking the field over, with the view of ascertaining the probability of such an attempt being made. In the morning of Saturday I found a want of harmony among the friends of the Union-scarcely any two looked at the crisis through the same medium. Mr. Colfax invited me to attend a meeting of a sort of committee of members of both houses of Congress, at the residence of Senator Trumbull, that morning. It numbered about a dozen persons, and there were about twelve different opinions among them as to the ultimate designs of the conspirators. The extreme views were entertained by Senator Trumbull and Rep. E. B. Washburn. One of these gentlemen regarded the matter as nothing more than the usual Southern vaunting; that the South had been badly defeated, and the secession talk meant nothing but braggadocio; that they had had things so long their own way, it could not be expected of them to quietly submit to defeat; a few weeks and all would be peaceful again.' The other gentleman was of opinion that the Southern men meant every word they uttered; that they had been preparing for this thing since 1882; that he was convinced they had selected this time because they think themselves ready, while we are not; that they have made preparations which we know nothing about; that their plan was to destroy the Government and to start one of their own; and that to take possession of Washington was more than half the battle.'

"None of the remaining gentlemen agreed with either of these, nor with themselves.

"While at this meeting, I learned that a large number of detectives had been sent for to all the larger cities, East, North, and West, and among these it was mentioned that Marshal Kane, of Baltimore, had been applied to, and had promised to send ten detectives. I told the gentlemen plainly the Marshal would betray them; that his sympathies were with the South in any movement they would make; that but a few weeks before he had declined an invitation to exchange a detective of his for one of mine, on the ground that he had but one in his force, and consequently he could not now furnish them with ten. In reply, I was informed that Mr. Corwin had confidence ir. Marshal Kane, and they also had confidence in Mr. Corwin. So, as they decided to hold on to the Marshal and his bogus detectives, I concluded not to act with them.

"I then called on a number of other members of Congress, without finding much improvement; the excep tional case was Senator Grimes. One distinguished Senator informed me that he was in counsel with Jefferson Davis, and that in a day or two they would be able to adjust all apparent differences.

"After that I went among the people, and soon found that Mr. Washburn was nearer right than any other member of Congress I had talked with. I also found that the safety of the country depended on LieutenantGeneral Scott, and I determined to consult with him; but I feared the General could not spare sufficient time to talk with me as fully as I desired, and then concluded to see one of his confidential officers. On inquiring, I learned that two of General Scott's family had great influence with him, Col. Robt. E. Lee and Capt. Chas. P. Stone. I do not know what induced me to select Captain Stone in preference to Col. Lee, but I did so, and called on the Captain at his quarters. We conversed freely in regard to the impending trouble, and especially of the danger in which Washington stood. I informed him I would leave three of my detectives in the city, and, at his request, agreed to instruct them to report to him verbally any things of importance they should discover.

"I stopped in Baltimore that night on my way home, and ascertained from Marshal Kane himself the plan by which Maryland was to be precipitated out of the Union, against the efforts of Govr. Hicks to keep it there; and with Maryland also the District of Columbia. He told me Maryland would wait for the action of Virginia, and that action would take place within a month; and that when Virginia seceded through a convention, Maryland would secede by gravitation.' It was at this interview I ascertained Fort McHenry to be garrisoned by a corporal's guard, consisting of one man, and that the Baltimore police were keeping guard on the outside, to prevent the roughs from capturing it prematurely. I communicated the facts to Captain Stone, and on the following Wednesday, January 9th, troops from Washington took possession of the fort, under orders from General Scott.

"At a subsequent visit to Washington I called, of course, on Captain Stone, and informed him of the purposes contemplated in Baltimore. He then requested me to put some of my men on duty there, and instruct them to report to him in person, by word of mouth, and not by mail, as he could not trust the mails. I had previously placed two men there, and on my return selected a third, whom I sent directly to Captain Stone for special instructions. Under these instructions, this officer, David S. Bookstaver, remained at Baltimore until February 23d, when I relieved him. During that period, while apparently occupied as a music agent, Bookstaver gave particular attention to the sayings and doings of the better class of citizens and strangers who frequent music, variety, and book stores, while the other two detectives had joined an organization of rebel roughs, destined to go South or elsewhere, whenever their services should be required.

"It was on the evening of Wednesday, February 20th, that Bookstaver obtained the information that made it necessary for him to take the first train for Washington. Before going, he posted a letter to me, briefly stating the condition of things, and of his intention to go on the four o'clock morning train and report. I shall complete this narrative with an extract from a letter written by Captain Stone on the subject.

It is impossible, with the time now at my disposal, to give you any thing like a detailed history of the information derived from your men, and from dozens of letters and reports from other sources, addressed some

HOW MR. LINCOLN WAS SAVED.

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given for the entire force to recross the river to the Maryland side. Generals Banks and Stone, and the troops under their commands, were disappointed and mortified, for they knew of no serious impediments then in the way of an advance. General McClellan subsequently said, that "a few days afterward," he "received information which seemed to be authentic, to the effect that large bodies of the enemy had been ordered from Manassas to Leesburg, to cut off our troops on the Virginia side;" and that their timely withdrawal had probably prevented a still more serious disaster." Plain people inquired whether sufficient re-enforcements for the Nationals, to counteract the movement from Manassas, might not have been spared from the almost one hundred thousand troops then lying at ease around Washington, only a few miles distant. Plain people were answered by the question, What do you know about war?

times to the General-in-Chief and sometimes to myself, which served to convince both of us that there was imminent danger that Mr. Lincoln's life would be sacrificed, should he attempt to pass through Baltimore at the time and in the manner published in the newspapers as the programme of his journey.

"The closing piece of information on the subject was brought by one of your men, Bookstaver. He had for weeks been stationed in Baltimore, and on the morning of Thursday (two days before the intended passage of Mr. Lincoln through Baltimore) he arrived by the early train and reported to me. His information was entirely corroborative of that already in our possession; and at the time of making my morning report to the General-in-Chief, I communicated that. General Scott had received from other sources urgent warnings also, and he stated to me that it was almost a certainty that Mr. Lincoln could not pass Baltimore alive by the train on the day fixed. "But," said the General, "while you and I know this, we cannot convince these gentlemen that Mr. Lincoln is not coming to Washington to be inaugurated as quietly as any previous President.”

"I recommended that Mr. Lincoln should be officially warned; and suggested that it would be altogether best that he should take the train of that evening from Philadelphia, and so reach Washington early the next day. General Scott said that Mr. Lincoln's personal dignity would revolt at the idea of changing the programme of his journey on account of danger to his life. I replied to this, that it appeared to me that Mr. Lincoln's personal dignity was of small account in comparison with the destruction, or, at least, dangerous disorganization of the United States Government, which would be the inevitable result of his death by violence in Baltimore; that in a few days more the term of Mr. Buchanan would end, and there would (in case of Mr. Lincoln's death) be no elected President to assume the office; that the Northern cities would, on learning of the violent death of the President-elect, pour masses of excited people upon Baltimore, which would be destroyed, and we should find ourselves in the worst form of civil war, with the Government utterly unprepared for it.

"General Scott, after asking me how the details could be arranged in so short a time, and receiving my suggestion that Mr. Lincoln should be advised quietly to take the evening train, and that it would do him no harm to have the telegraph wires cut for a few hours, he directed me to seek Mr. W. H. Seward, to whom he wrote a few lines, which he handed me.

"It was already ten o'clock, and when I reached Mr. Seward's house he had left: I followed him to the Capitol, but did not succeed in finding him until after 12 M. I handed him the General's note; he listened attentively to what I said, and asked me to write down my information and suggestions, and then, taking the paper I had written, he hastily left.

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The note I wrote was what Mr. Frederick Seward carried to Mr. Lincoln in Philadelphia. Mr. Lincoln has stated that it was this note which induced him to change his journey as he did. The stories of disguise are all nonsense; Mr. Lincoln merely took the sleeping-car in the night train. I know nothing of any connection of Mr. Pinkerton with the matter.'

"The letter from which the above extract is made was sent to me by General Stone, in reply to an inquiry of mine, made in consequence of having seen an article in a newspaper which gave the whole credit of the movement to a person who I supposed had little to do with it. My opportunity for knowing who the parties were that rendered this service to the country was very good, but I thought it advisable to have the testimony of one of the most active in it to sustain my views. For obvious reasons, I have not called on either of the other living parties to the matter, regarding the above sufficient to satisfy all reasonable persons that the assassination consummated in April, 1865, would have taken place in February of 1861 had it not been for the timely efforts of Lieutenant-General Scott, Brigadier-General Stone, Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Frederick W. Seward, Esq., and David S. Bookstaver, of the Metropolitan Police of New York.

"I am, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

"JOHN A. KENNEDY."

1 See General McClellan's Report, page 84.

150

"ALL QUIET ON THE POTOMAC."

CHAPTER VI.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.-THE TRENT AFFAIR-CAPTURE OF ROANOKE ISLAND.

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OR the space of nearly two months after the disaster at Ball's Bluff, the public ear was daily teased with the unsatisfactory report, "All is quiet on the Potomac!" The roads leading toward the Confederate camps, near Bull's Run, were never in better condition. The weather was perfect in serenity. The entire autumn in Virginia was unusually magnificent in all its features. Much of the time, until near Christmas, the atmosphere was very much like that of the soft Indian summer time. Regiment after regiment was rapidly swelling the ranks of the Army of the Potomac to the number of two hundred thousand men, thoroughly equipped and fairly disciplined; while at no time did any reliable report make that of the Confederates in front of it over sixty thousand. Plain people wondered why so few, whom politicians called "ragamuffins" and "a mob," could so tightly hold the National Capital in a state of siege, while the "bravest and best men of the North," fully armed and provisioned, were in and around it, and Nature and Patriotism invited them to walk out and disperse the besiegers, lying not two days' march from that Capital. But what did plain people know about war? Therefore so it was that they were satisfied, or tried to be satisfied, with a very little of it from time to time, though paying at enormous rates in gold and muscle for that little. And so it was that when, just before Christmas, the "quiet on the Potomac " was slightly broken by an event we are about to consider, the people, having learned to expect

little, were greatly delighted by it.

Let us see what happened.

When McCall fell back from Drainsville, the Confederates reoccupied it. His main encampment was at Langley, and Prospect Hill, near the Leesburg road, and only a few miles. above the Chain Bridge, on the Virginia side. The Confederates became very bold after their victory at the Bluff, and pushing their picket-guards far up toward the National lines, they made many incursions in search of

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FORAGERS AT WORK.

forage, despoiling Union men, and distressing the country in general. With

BATTLE NEAR DRAINSVILLE.

151

McClellan's permission, McCall prepared to strike these Confederates a blow that should make them more circumspect, and stop their incursions. He had observed that on such occasions they generally left a strong reserve at Drainsville, and he determined to attempt their capture when an opportunity should offer. Later in December the opportunity occurred, and he ordered Brigadier-General E. O. C.

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2

a Dec., 1861.

E. O. C. ORD.

Brigadier-General Reynolds to move forward with his brigade toward Leesburg, as far as Difficult Creek, to support Ord, if required. When the force of the latter was within two miles of Drainsville, and his foragers were loading their wagons, the troops were attacked by twentyfive hundred Confederates, under General J. E. B. Stuart, who came up the road from the direction of Centreville. A severe fight ensued. The Confederates were greatly outnumbered, and were soon so beaten that they fled in haste, carrying in their wagons little else than their wounded men. The brunt of the battle had fallen on the Sixth and Ninth Pennsylvania, the Rifles, and Easton's Battery. The National loss consisted of seven killed and sixty wounded; and their gain was a victory, and "sixteen wagon-loads of excellent hay, and twenty-two of corn." Stuart reported his loss at forty-three killed and one hundred and forty-three wounded. He had been induced to attack superior numbers by the foolish boast of Evans, that he had encountered and whipped four to his one; and he tried to console his followers by calling this affair a victory for them, because McCall did not choose to hold the battle-field, but leisurely withdrew to his encampment. This little victory greatly inspired the loyal people, for it gave them the assurance that the troops of the Army of the Potomac were ready and able to fight bravely, whenever they were allowed the privilege.

While the friends of the Government were anxiously waiting for the almost daily promised movement of the Grand Army toward Richmond, as the year was drawing to a close, and hearts were growing sick with hopes. deferred, two events, each having an important bearing on the war, were in

1 His brigade was composed of Pennsylvania regiments, and consisted of the Ninth, Colonel Jackson; Tenth, Colonel McCalmont; Twelfth, Colonel Taggart; Bucktail Rifles, Lieutenant-Colonel T. L. Kane; a battalion of the Sixth; two squadrons of cavalry, and Easton's Battery-in all about 4,000 men.

2 His troops consisted of the Eleventh Virginia, Colonel Garland; Sixth South Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Seagrist; Tenth Alabama, Colonel Harvey; First Kentucky, Colonel T. H. Taylor; the Sumter Flying Artillery, four pieces, Captain Cutts; and detachments from two North Carolina cavalry regiments, 1,000 in number, under Major Gordon. Stuart was also on a foraging expedition, and had about 200 wagons with him.

3 Report of General McCall, December 20, 1861; also, General Stuart to General Beauregard, December 21, 1861.

152

OPINIONS OF THE BRITISH ARISTOCRACY.

progress; one directly affecting the issue, and the other affecting it incidentally, but powerfully. One was the expedition that made a permanent lodg ment of the National power on the coast of North Carolina; and the other was intimately connected with the foreign relations of the Government. Let us first consider the latter event. The incidents were few and simple, but

they concerned the law and the policy of nations.

We have already noticed the fact that the conspirators, at an early period of their confederation against the Government, had sent representatives to Europe, for the purpose of obtaining from foreign powers a recognition of the league as an actual government.' These men were active, and found swarms of sympathizers among the ruling and privileged classes of Europe, and especially in Great Britain. There was an evident anxiety among those classes in the latter country to give all possible aid to the conspirators, so that the power of the Republic of the West, the hated nursery of democratic ideas, might be destroyed by disintegration resulting from civil dissensions. Fortunately for the Republic, the men who had been sent abroad by the conspirators were not such as the diplomats of Europe could feel a pro

1 See page 259, volume I.

2 We have already observed the "precipitate and unprecedented" proceedings, as Mr. Adams termed it, of the British Government, and the leaders of public opinion in England, in allowing to the insurgents the privileges of belligerents. [Chapter XXIV., volume I.] In Parliament and out of it, no favorable occasion was omitted, by many leading men, to speak not only disparagingly, but often very offensively, of the Government and people of the Republic. The enemies of free institutions and supporters of privileged classes acted upon the old maxim of political craft, “Divide and Govern," and they exerted all their powers to widen the breach between the people of the Free and Slave-labor States. Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, the author, who had received the honors of knighthood, which allied him to the aristocratic class in Great Britain, appeared among the willing prophets of evil for the Republic. He declared in an address before an Agricultural Society, on the 25th of September, 1861, that he had long foreseen and foretold to be inevitable" a dissolution of the American Union; and then again, mounting the Delphic stool, he solemnly said: "I venture to predict that the younger men here present will live to see not two, but at least four, and probably more than four, separate and sovereign Commonwealths arising out of those populations which a year ago united their legislature under one President, and carried their merchandise under one flag." He rejoiced in the prospect that so gladdened his vision, and said: 'I believe that such separation will be attended with happy results to the safety of Europe, and the developinent of American civilization." The desire for such separation was evidently engendered in the speaker's mind by an unpleasant horoscope of the future of the Great Republic. If it could have been possible,” he said, that, as population and wealth increased, all the vast continent of America, with her mighty seaboard, and the fleets which her increasing ambition as well as her extending commerce would have formed and armed, could have remained under one form of government, in which the executive has little or no control over a populace exceedingly adventurous and excitable, why, then, America would have hung over Europe like a gathering and destructive thunder-cloud. No single kingdom in Europe could have been strong enough to maintain itself against a nation that had once consolidated the gigantic resources of a quarter of the globe."

A little later, Earl Russell, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in an after-dinner speech at Newcastle-uponTyne, declared that the struggle in America was "on the one side for empire, and on the other for power," and not for the great principles of human liberty, and for the life of the Republic, for which the Government was really contending. A little later still, the Earl of Shrewsbury, speaking with hope for his class, at the old city of Worcester, said that he saw in America the trial of Democracy, and its failure. He believed the dissolution of the Union to be inevitable, and that men there before him would live to "see an aristocracy established in America," In the same hour, Sir John Pakington, formerly a cabinet minister, and then a member of Parliament, told the same hearers, that, "from President Lincoln, downward, there was not a man in America who would venture to tell them that he really thought it possible that by the force of circumstances the North could hope to compel the South to again join them in constituting the United States." Sir John Bowring, an eminent English scholar, in a kindly letter to an American friend in England, expressed his solemn conviction of the utter separation of the States, and intimated that the Government lacked the sympathy of Englishmen because it had not "shown any disposition to put down slavery." Overlooking the fact that the fathers of the Republic fought for the establishment of liberty for all, and that the conspirators were fighting for the establishment of the slavery of the many for the benefit of the few, he made a comparison, and said, "It does not appear to me that you are justified in calling the Southerners rebels. Our statesmen of the time of George III, called Washington and Franklin by that name." Lord Stanley, who had traveled in the United States a dozen years before, and better understood American affairs, said, in a speech early in November, that a Southern Confederacy would be established. "He did not think it reasonable to blame the Federal Government for declining to give up half their territory without striking a blow in its defense;" but the real difficulty in this case, in his mind, was

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