ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT OF LOUIS-PHILIPPE.

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was prosperous, but continued subject to vehement political agitations. It was imputed to the king that he had violated his implied compact with the people on his accession, and had rendered his rule monarchical not only in form but administration. Unceasing insurrections ensued in Paris, Lyons, Rouen, and Lisle; they were suppressed chiefly by the national guard. No fewer than seven attempts were made upon the life of the king. It was impossible that his government could maintain itself in face of such unrelenting hostility without additional safeguards. These were sought by precautionary or severe repressive measures the fortifications of Paris, and the September laws of 1835, by which the independence of juries and the freedom of the journals were violated. By legal coercion or direct bribery the Press became little better than a state engine; and so completely was the irresponsibility of the crown established, that the mere avowal of republicanism was made an offence, and all mention of the king in respect to any political measure, except in praise, was prohibited. Offences of the press were made triable by the Chamber of Peers; and if the accused were sentenced to imprisonment the sentence might be enforced in France or any colony- Algeria, for instance. These guarantees were deemed by their authors, the Duc de Broglio*, MM. Thiers and Persil, essential to the maintenance of order and peace, against the sedition of the ultra journals and the unceasing attacks of assassins and republicans.

For the perpetuation of this arbitrary system a power

Address of the Duc de Broglie to the Chambers, August 4. 1834. The French ministers seized the opportunity afforded by the atrocious attempt of Fieschi on the life of the king, to strengthen the executive power. The Parisians facetiously termed the new dungeon and gagging bills les lois Fieschi,

ful machinery was organised under the two divisions of force and corruption. Of the first the chief element was a large standing army, and an omnipresent police officered by the dependants of government. The second lever of power consisted in a lavish public expenditure. It was an appeal to the baser passion of human nature, to the most ignoble form of seduction - pecuniary gain. The economy of governments is usually a safe test of their value, and their expensiveness increases with their demerits. Despotisms cannot win, only buy services; hence the most hateful forms of rule are always the most squandering. The Orleans dynasty was peculiarly so; with his eleven palaces, Louis-Philippe lived in a style of more wasteful ostentation than any of his royal predecessors, but with fewer of their illusions to disguise it. Next was an immense host of employés, 600,000 in number; and, as the number of registered electors was only 200,000, it left three places for each voter to aspire to. Here were ample resources for influencing the elections, and securing a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Other influences controlled the legislature, not less adverse to the patriotic discharge of its duties. Various monopolies exist in France very obstructive to commerce and industry, but which could not be opened without detriment to the rival interests of Louis-Philippe and many of the deputies, as the owners of vast forests and extensive coal and iron works. Under such auspices any proposition for free trade, and a liberal interchange of French wines and luxuries for English coal and iron, was not likely to be favourably listened to by the juste milieu administration of the doctrinnaires.

The general summary of Orleans rule is, that it was, beyond example, expensive to the people, not from the pursuit of any national benefit or popular fascination,

GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE ORLEANS RULE. 741

but in the support of arbitrary power by large armies and profuse patronage. Next, it was an irresponsible domination; all the checks and the vigilance that ought to have been exercised over it by the public press or parliament were neutralised or conciliated by open corruption. Thirdly, it comprehended in its action only partial interests, not the general weal; it was the interests of placemen and monopolists, not of the community, that were predominant in both the chambers and the executive. Lastly, the government was one of reaction, not of progress; it was not Young but Old France of which Louis-Philippe was enamoured, and which his policy tended to revive by ambitious family alliances and diplomatic relations. It certainly had one redeeming excellence in its love of peace; and in this respect it approximated to the government of Sir Robert Walpole under George II., and which it also resembled in its unscrupulous resort to sinister means for the carrying on public affairs. Only a few months before the revolution of February, 1848, the French press and Chamber of Deputies had been occupied with the exposure of jobs and examples of ministerial cupidity. The ministries of both M. Thiers and M. Guizot were irreparably damaged in public opinion by the disclosures of 1847-of the sale of peerages and the bartering of ministerial patronage for shares in joint-stock companies.

In much of this there may have been the exaggeration of faction, and a counter-presentment may have been possible. It is difficult to obtain the authentic materials of history. In private memoirs there is suppression, the rest diluted or varnished over. Contemporary journals and testimonials consist chiefly of semiinformation, lies, or misconceptions, false or distorted. views of the moment. Solon modestly said of his laws,

that they might not be the best possible, but that they were the best the character of the Athenians admitted of framing. In common with Sir R. Walpole the policy of Louis-Philippe may have been prescribed by the exigencies of his position. In the personal qualities of both there were many redeeming traits; more especially perhaps in Louis-Philippe, who was of exemplary probity and amiability, of vast experience, great wisdom, and firmness of resolve. Those who act in a high sphere are seldom free, or have the requisite leisure for defending themselves, and must submit to be misunderstood or misrepresented. They are not all so fortunate as Napoleon at St. Helena, who had opportunity for making his own rejoinder to calumnies, and vigorously used it.

That the Orleans government was bad both in principle and practice there can be no hesitation in conceding; but whether a better was practicable will, perhaps, best appear in the sequel. It is certain Louis-Philippe's administration was profligate enough to rouse the ire of moderate citizens, and make them favourable to reform. In fear of anarchy and foreign intervention they had borne deception and misrule for seventeen years. But patience has its limits; and the limit of endurance seems to have been reached when an arrogant minister, elated by a long term of power, refused the smallest concession, even to allow the question of reform to be agitated. The results of M. Guizot's mistaken conservatism were the memorable events which followed, a tremendous insurrection of three days' continuance, the flight of the citizen king and his Calvinistic misleader, the proclamation of a republic, and the nomination vivâ voce of a provisional government consisting of Dupont, Arago, Lamartine, Pagès, Ledru-Rollin, and Cremieux.*

* Intoxicated by prosperity, men are apt to forget their own

RISINGS IN BERLIN, VIENNA, AND MILAN. 743

The example of the Paris insurrection was electric, and a corresponding energy and unity of classes drove out or mastered the ruling powers at Vienna, Berlin, Milan, and Rome. The year 1848 will ever be memorable in history, and is fertile in lessons both to princes and people. The popular risings in the continental capitals could not, unseconded by prevalent opinion, have achieved such triumphs. It shows that the European mind had been revolutionised that it was ripe for change and that the nations of the continent had become dissatisfied with the irresponsible license of hereditary power. Had the fermentation abroad been casual, or without just cause, it might have been regretted as a profitless disturbance of the general tranquillity; but such does not appear to have been its true character. France may have accelerated, but can hardly be charged with the production of the simultaneous movements in Germany and Italy; and her example in 1848 would have been as little contagious as in 1830, had not the elements of commotion been previously accumulating. In brief, the convulsions of the continent were the natural effilorescence of the long tranquillity of Europe. Paradoxical as it may appear, the victory of Waterloo had been the active revolutionist; it had conferred on Europe its greatest blessing in the longest peace on record; and peace is the great benefactor of nations. It is in peace

lessons. Speaking of the fanatical efforts of Charles I. to force the English liturgy on Scotland, M. Guizot remarks (History of the English Revolution of 1640): “The attempt had that issue, which has often, in similar cases, been the sorrow and astonishment of the courtiers of despotism; it failed at the point of apparent success." Just so Louis-Philippe's government failed, when apparently (for real it could not be on so rotten a foundation) most assured by force, intrigue, and corruption.