LEE IN WESTERN VIRGINIA.

a Sept. 11, 1861.

97

OF CARNIFEX FERRY, ceased. Rosecrans intended to renew it in the morning, and his troops lay on their arms all night, some of them within a hundred yards of the intrenchments. When day dawned," Floyd, who had been wounded in the arm, had fled. Terrified by the fury of the assault on the previous day, he had stolen softly away in the dark, leaving a large amount of ammunition, arms, stores, and equipage behind. He crossed the Gauley over a hastily constructed bridge of logs, which he broke down behind him, destroyed the ferry-boat, and hastened to Dogwood Gap, and thence to a secure spot on the summit of Big Sewell Mountain, near New River, thirty miles distant from the battle-field. After resting there a few days, he pushed on to Meadow Bluff, whilst Wise, who had refused to send him re-enforcements at the Ferry, and now refused to follow him,' strengthened the position on Big Sewell Mountain, and called it "Camp Defiance."

The Battle of Carnifex Ferry was regarded as a decided victory for the Nationals, and an excellent test of the quality of the soldiers. These troops, with the exception of the cavalry of Stewart, of Indiafia, and Schaumberg, of Chicago, were all from Ohio. They went into the battle after a hard march of seventeen miles, not more than four thousand strong, and fought nearly two thousand men, behind intrenchments,' for three or four hours, losing fifteen killed, and seventy

wounded. The Confederates report

ed their loss at one killed and ten wounded.'

The expulsion of Floyd from Carnifex Ferry was soon followed by a conflict between the forces of General Reynolds, of the National army, and those of General Lee, of the Confederate army, at important posts among the mountains farther to the northward. Reynolds's troops, forming the first brigade of Rosecrans's Army of Occupation in Western Virginia, consisted of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Indiana Regi

ROBERT E. LEE.

Wise could not reconcile his pride and duty. The former prevailed, and made him insubordinate. Ho refused to send re-enforcements to Floyd, at Carnifex Ferry, and the latter declared to his superiors at Richmond that the failure to receive them was a capital reason for his inability to hold that position. Wise, at that time, according to Pollard, was endeavoring to win laurels exclusively for himself in another direction; but, as usual, he failed. He was quick to follow Floyd in his retreat before danger; but, as soon as that danger seemed remote, he again became insubordinate, and, as we have observed in the text, remained on the summit of Big Sewell Mountain, and established "Camp Defiance" there. There, on the 18th, he made a speech to his Legion, in which he told them that hitherto he had never retreated, excepting in obedience to superior orders, and that there he was determined to make a stand, notwithstanding his own troops numbered only 1,700, while those of his foe were reported by Floyd to be 15,000. He did not believe this statement; "nevertheless, they must be prepared to fight great odds, front and rear, for successive days."

men.

2 Pollard, in his First Year of the War, page 165, says: The force of General Floyd's command was 1,740 Others put it at a much higher number. It was probably about 2,000."

Report of General Rosecrans to Adjutant-General Townsend, September 11th; of General Benham to General Rosecrans, September 13th; of Colonels Lytle and Smith, and Lieutenant-Colonel White, September 11th, 1861; and of General Floyd, to the Confederate "Secretary of War," September 12th; also army correspondence of the Cincinnati Gazette and Lynchburg (Va.) Republican.

VOL II.-45

98

REYNOLDS AND LEE AMONG THE MOUNTAINS.

ments, the Third and Sixth Ohio, detachments of the First and Second Vir ginia, Burdsall's Ohio, and Bracken's Indiana cavalry, and Loomis's Michigan Battery. With these forces he held the roads and passes of the more westerly ranges of the great Allegheny chain, from Webster, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, to the head waters of the Gauley, among the spurs of the Greenbrier Mountains. His head-quarters, at the time of Rosecrans's movement from Clarksburg, were at Cheat Mountain Pass (Crouch's), at the western foot of the hills over which goes the highway from Huttonsville to Staunton. There he had the Thirteenth Indiana, Colonel Sullivan, with two pieces of artillery, and a small cavalry force. These were disposed along the approaches to the Pass, to guard against surprise. On the Summit of the Cheat, as we have observed, General McClellan had left Colonel Kimball with the Fourteenth Indiana as an outpost,' which that officer had strengthened, and where he now had the aid of about forty cavalrymen.

General Lee's head-quarters, at this time, were at Huntersville, in Pocahontas County. His scouts were active everywhere, and so were those of Reynolds. The adventures of these men during several weeks furnish material for the wildest romances. The opposing parties frequently met, and engaged in sharp conflicts; and scarcely a day passed that the sound of the desultory firing of small-arms was not heard among those solitary hills. Scouting became a most exciting pleasure to many who were engaged in it; but time and circumstances soon brought about more sober work.

It was evident, from the movements of Lee's scouts on the mountains, early in September, that he was contemplating an expedition against some of Reynolds's important posts, for the purpose of capturing his army in detail, or of breaking through and severing his lines of communication, and marching to the Ohio; or, possibly, for the interception of Rosecrans in his march toward the Gauley. He was watched with sleepless vigilance, and on the day after Floyd's retreat from Carnifex Ferry, it was evident that he was moving against the post on the Summit, and another at Elk Water, at the western foot of the mountain, seven miles from the former by a bridle-path over the hills, and eighteen by the road. His object was to secure the great Cheat Mountain Pass, and have free communication with the Shenandoah Valley at Staunton. For this purpose he marched from Huntersville on the

@ 1861.

night of the 11th of September," with nine thousand men, and nearly a dozen pieces of artillery. He had succeeded, with great difficulty, in placing his troops to make a simultaneous attack upon the Summit, Elk Water, and the Pass. A storm was sweeping over the mountains, and favored the expedition. At midnight the telegraph wires between Kimball, at the Summit, and head-quarters, were cut, and all communication ceased. The last message to the Colonel from General Reynolds was one from Elk Water, warning him of impending danger. It was heeded, and promptly acted upon. The bridle-path between the Summit and Elk Water was immediately picketed, and, on the morning of the 12th, a horseman was sent down the mountain with dispatches for Reynolds. He met some wagons without horses or men. It was a supply-train, that had been moving

1 See page 536, volume I.

A STRIFE FOR THE SUMMIT.

99

up under the escort of the Twenty-fifth Ohio, and had been cut off. He hastened back with the news, when Colonel Kimball, at the head of the Fourteenth Indiana and twelve dragoons, hurrieed to the spot, near which they met the Confederates in force, and drove them. Kimball then detailed one hundred men, under Captain Higgins, to re-enforce Captain Coons, who was closely invested on a ridge near the Pass. They fought their way down, and found Coons stubbornly holding his position, having repelled every assault. In a short time the Confederates in that vicinity, driven at several points by the men of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Indiana, and Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Ohio, were discomfited and dispersed, and in their flight cast away every thing that might encumber them. So the attempt to reach the rear of the National works on the Summit was foiled, and another portion of the Confederate troops, which appeared on and near the Cheat River, on the front and flank of Kimball's position, were at about this time routed by a few Indiana and Ohio troops, under Captain Foote, of the Fourteenth Indiana. The Confederates engaged in this attempt upon the Summit and the Pass were nearly five thousand in number, and were led in person by General Anderson, of Tennessee.' The troops that opposed them did not number more than six hundred.

a

• Sept. 12, 1861.

¿Sept.

General Reynolds, who had hastened around to Elk Water, was ignorant of these important movements on the mountain. He arrived there toward evening, and found a large force of Confederates, under General Lee, threatening the position. They were kept at a respectful distance by the Parrot guns of Loomis's battery, and all was silent at the gathering of darkness on the evening of the 12th. Reynolds was satisfied that Kimball had performed all that could be done in defense of his post, yet he was determined to open communication with him. He ordered Colonel Sullivan to take his Thirteenth Indiana, and cut his way, if necessary, by the main road; and Colonels Morrow and Moss were ordered to do the same by the bridle-path. These troops left at three o'clock on the morning of the 13th; the former from the Pass, and the latter from Elk Water. They found their prescribed work already performed. They secured the provision train, and reached the Summit at At the same time Lee advanced in heavy force upon Elk Water, with the apparent intention of making a direct attack. Reynolds's pickets were driven in, when a 10-pounder Parrot gun of Loomis's battery was pushed about three-fourths of a mile to the front, and did such execution that the Confederates withdrew. In that position both armies remained until night, when Lee withdrew still farther under cover of the darkness, and on the following day took post along the slopes of the Greenbrier Mountains, about ten miles from Elk Water. He attempted a flank movement on the Cheat Summit, on the 15th, but was driven away. The repulse of Anderson on the mountain had satisfied Lee that his grand strategic plan for severing and destroying Reynolds's army, and pushing on to the Ohio, had failed. In the encounters during these two or three days, the Nationals lost ten

dawn.

1 General Anderson's brigade consisted chiefly of Tennessee and Arkansas troops, with some Virginians. Those employed against the Summit and the Pass were the Twenty-third, Twenty-fifth, Thirty-first, and Thirtyeventh Virginia Regiments, a Virginia battery under Colonels Talliafero and Heck, and the First, Seventh, and Fourteenth Tennessee, under Colonel Manly.

100

BATTLE ON THE GREENBRIER.

killed, fourteen wounded, and sixty-four prisoners. The Confederate loss was about one hundred killed' and wounded, and ninety prisoners.

a Sept. 20, 1861.

Lee, having failed in his designs against Reynolds, withdrew from the Cheat Mountain region with a greater part of his force, and joined Floyd at Meadow Bluff, at the close of September." He had left General H. R. Jackson, of Georgia, with about three thousand men, on the Greenbrier River, at the foot of Cheat Mountain, and a small force at Huntersville, to watch Reynolds. He now proceeded to fortify Wise's position on Big Sewell Mountain, which confronted the Nationals on and near the Gauley River and New River, and there, as the senior officer, he concentrated his own forces, and those of Floyd and Wise, and found himself in command of an army of at least twenty thousand men."

¿ Oct. 2.

Reynolds now resolved to act on the offensive. At the beginning of October he moved with about five thousand men upon Jackson's intrenched camp, on the Greenbrier, near a noted tavern, called "Travelers' Repose," on the Staunton pike. His forces, composed of Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Virginia troops, left the summit of Cheat Mountain at a little before midnight," for "an armed reconnoissance," as he termed it. They reached the front of the Confederates, twelve miles distant, at dawn, when the Ninth Indiana, under Colonel Milroy, drove in the advance pickets. Kimball's Fourteenth Indiana took position directly in front, and Loomis's battery was planted within seven hundred yards of the works, where it opened fire. Howe, of the Fourth Regular Artillery, and Daum, also in command of artillery, brought their guns into position at about the same distance. Three of the Confederate cannon were disabled, when heavy reenforcements for the garrison were reported to be near. The Nationals were eager to storm the works before these should arrive, but the General would not permit it. They were allowed to make a flank movement on the Confederate right, and attempt a dislodgment. The Confederates, perceiving their design, were prepared at that point, and with a terrible storm of grape and canister they repulsed the assailants. Reynolds lost ten killed and thirty-two wounded. Jackson's loss in the picket-firing and in the trenches was estimated at over two hundred. The engagement had lasted about seven hours. Reynolds fell back to Elk Water.

1 Among the killed was Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Washington, of General Lee's staff. He was the former owner of the mansion and mansion-farm of the estate of Mount Vernon, which he sold to the Ladies' Mount Vernon Association a few years before the war broke out. He was out on the evening of the 13th, with two other officers, reconnoitering the works at Elk Water, when he was shot dead by three Minié bails, from a picket post of the Seventeenth Indiana. These penetrated his breast, which was covered by a rich white satin vest. In his pocket was found a complete description of the works at Elk Water. His remains were tenderly cared for, and sent to General Lee the next morning. Washington was about forty years of age.

2 Report of General J. J. Reynolds to Assistant Adjutant-General George L. Hartsuff, September 17th, 1861; of General Robert E. Lee to L. Pope Walker, September 18th, 1861; The Cheat Mountain Campaign, in Stevenson's Indiana Roll of Honor; Pollard's First Year of the War. Whilst evidently giving Lee full credit for rare abilities as an engineer, Pollard regarded him as incompetent to execute well. He says: "There is reason to believe that, if General Lee had not allowed the immaterial part of his plan to control his action, a glorious success would have resulted, opening the whole northwestern country to us, and enabling Floyd and Wise to drive Cox with ease out of the Kanawha Valley. Regrets, however, were unavailing now. General Lee's plan, finished drawings of which were sent to the War Department at Richmond, was said to have been one of the best-laid plans that ever illustrated the consummation of the rules of strategy, or ever went awry on account of practical failures in its execution."

3 When Lee arrived at Floyd's camp at Meadow Bluff, he wrote to Wise, advising him to fall back without delay. Wise hesitated, and invited General Lee to visit him, and inspect his position. Lee did so, and, satisfied that it was the most advantageous place of the two, ordered him to remain. This tacit approval of Wise's insubordination offended Floyd; but the concentration of all the forces under Lee prevented any ill consequences.

ROSECRANS AND FLOYD ON NEW RIVER.

101

a Sept. 24, 1861.

Lee's position on Big Sewell Mountain was directly in front of that of Rosecrans, who occupied the country in the crotch formed by the Gauley River and New River. His main camp was on New River, and his lines extended down to the Gauley. The breach between Wise and Floyd widened, and, late in September, the former was recalled to Richmond by the Confederate "Secretary of War." Lee held Wise's position on Big Sewell for about three weeks, in sight of Rosecrans, who had been re-enforced; but did not venture to attack him. The latter then fell back, without Lee's knowledge, and concentrated his forces near the junction of the rivers. Lee, too, was then recalled to Richmond, and was soon afterward sent to take charge of the coast defenses of South Carolina and Georgia. Floyd and Rosecrans were once more competitors for the possession of the Kanawha Valley. The former, late in October, took position on the left bank of New River, and erected batteries there a little above its junction with the Gauley, and on the first of November he opened an annoying fire on the National camp. Already very troublesome raids had been made by small parties of Confederates, and on one occasion they had approached within twelve miles of Charleston.

Floyd's batteries now commanded the road over which Rosecrans's supplies had to pass to his camp at the junction, and it was resolved to dislodge or capture him. Troops were thrown across for that purpose. An attempt of General Schenck to cross behind Fayetteville, and strike Floyd's rear, was frustrated by a sud

den flood in New River, and the Confederates were struck.only in the

front, opposite the mouth of the Gauley, by the First Ken

REGION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WESTERN VIRGINIA.

tucky, under Major Leeper. This was gallantly performed,' and Floyd recoiled. General Benham had crossed below the mouth

b Nov. 12.

His army now numbered about 10,000 men, composed of the brigades of Generals Cox, Benham, and Schenck, the latter having been transferred from the Army of the Potomac.

Lee's campaign in Western Virginia was a failure, and the hopes centered on him were signally disappointed. The Confederate historian of the war, Pollard, commenting on Lee's failure to attack Rosecrans, says (1.171): "Thus the second opportunity of a decisive battle in Western Virginia was blindly lost, General Lee making no attempt to follow up the enemy, who had so skillfully eluded him; the excuse alleged for his not doing so being mand, swollen streams, and the leanness of his artillery horses."

3 See Lee's letter of resignation, note 8. pg 421, volume I.