INDICTMENT-Continued.

2. In an indictment under section 44 of the Bankrupt Act of 1867,
it is not sufficient, either as to the proceedings or the jurisdic-
tion of the court in bankruptcy, to rely merely upon a general
averment. All matters necessary to constitute the offense as
defined by the act must be pleaded. United States v. Pres-

cott, 169.

3. The description of the goods, in an indictment under the act,
should be as definite as in a declaration in trover. Ib.

4. The word feloniously should be omitted in indictments under the
act. The offenses made indictable are misdemeanors. Ib.

5. In drawing indictments, figures should not be used for dates. Ib.
6. Drawing indictments under the Bankrupt Act of 1867,-ex-
plained. Ib.

7. An indictment for treason under section 2 of the act of July 17,
1862, 12 Stat. at L. 590, need not use the phrase "levying war,"
specifically; to follow the language of the act is sufficient.
United States v. Greathouse, 364.

8. An indictment for "falsely making," &c., coin of the United
States, under section 20 of the crimes act of 1825, 4 Stat. at L.
121, need not aver an intent to pass the coin as true, nor an in-
tent to defraud. United States v. Peters, 494.

INFORMATION.

In prosecuting an information to enforce a seizure, under the act of
August 6, 1861, issues of fact should be submitted for trial by a
jury, according to the course of the common law. The act does
not contemplate the determination of the facts by the judge, as
in causes of admiralty jurisdiction. United States v. Athens
Armory, 129.

INJUNCTION.

1. Section 19 of the Internal Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat.
ut L. 152, as amended March 2, 1867, Id. 475,-which provides
that no suit to restrain the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court, -applies to all cases where the
officer has power to inquire and determine whether the thing
assessed by him is liable to taxation, however erroneous his
decision of that question may be. Pullan v. Kinsinger, 94.
2. The statute is not unconstitutional; either as depriving the party
of his property without due process of law, or as refusing trial
by jury. Ib.

3. When a patent expires during the pendency of a suit for infringe-
ment, no perpetual injunction can be granted, but complainant
may obtain a decree for an accounting. Jordan v. Dobson, 398.

INJUNCTION—Continued.

4. The general principles which govern courts of equity in granting
preliminary injunctions, and in dissolving them upon the filing
of the answer,-stated. Shoemaker v. National Mechanics
Bank, 416.

INSANE PERSONS.

1. Mania,—which is mental derangement accompanied by excitement,
-and dementia,-which is derangement accompanied by general
enfeeblement of the faculties-do not invariably affect all the
operations of the mind. The law recognizes the fact that either
of these forms of derangement, may be limited (as monomania
always is) to particular subjects, and may be consistent with
capacity to act upon other subjects. Hall v. Unger, 507.

2. In determining the ability of an alleged insane person to execute
any particular act, the inquiry should first be, what degree of
mental capacity is essential to the proper execution of the act in
question; and then, whether such capacity was possessed, at
the time, by the party. Ib.

3. The execution of a power of attorney to convey land requires no
greater exercise of reason than does the making of a will of
real property; and the question of capacity may be determined
by the same rules, in either case.

Ib.

4. The definition of "a sound and disposing mind and memory,"
given by WASHINGTON, J., in Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. Ct.
585,-viz: that the testator must be capable of making his will,
with an understanding of the nature of the business in which he
is engaged, a recollection of the property of which he means to
dispose, of the persons who are the objects of his bounty, and
of the manner in which it is to be distributed between them;
that it is not necessary that he should view his will with the
eye of a lawyer, and comprehend its provisions in their legal
form; but it is sufficient if he has such a mind and memory as
will enable him to understand the elements of which it is con-
posed, the distribution of his property in its simple forms,—ap-
proved, and applied as a proper test for determining the ca-
pacity of a land owner to make a power of attorney authoriz-
ing the conveyance of his lands. Ib.

5. The law presumes that every adult man is sane, and possessed of
the absolute right to sell and dispose of his property in whatever
way he may choose; his will in every case standing as the reason
of his conduct. The burden of proving insanity lies on the
party who asserts it. Ib.

6. The fact of the existence of a prior or subsequent lunacy, except

where it is habitual, does not suffice to change the burden of

INSANE PERSONS-Continued.

proof. But when such habitual insanity is shown to have
existed, then the presumption is, that the party was insane at
the time; and the burden of proof rests with those who allege
the party's competency. Ib.

7. In considering whether an act impeached on the ground of in-
sanity was valid, the attending circumstances may be consid-
ered; particularly the reasonableness of the act, and the ap-
proval of it at the time by the relatives of the party. Ib.

8. It seems that, in general, a witness who subscribes an instrument,
or an officer who takes the acknowledgement of one, is bound
to satisfy himself, before he signs, that the party has the requisite
mental capacity to execute the instrnment; and that the pre-
sumption of capacity is therefore strengthened by the fact of
attestation. Ib.

INSURANCE.

1. A circuit court ought not to entertain a bill in equity filed by an
insurance company, after a loss has occurred under a policy is-
sued by them, to procure a decree canceling the policy and en-
joining the insured from bringing any action upon it, where the
bill is founded upon charges of fraud in obtaining the policy,
which, if true, might be set up in defense of an action at law
upon it.
So held, where the policy contained a clause limiting
the time for suing upon it to twelve months from the date of
the loss; so that there was no danger of injury to the com-
plainant through an unreasonable delay to sue. Home Ins. Co.
v. Stanchfield, 1.

2. A clause in an insurance policy declaring that the policy shall be
void if assigned without the consent of the company, does not
apply to a transfer made under the bankrupt law, by a register
in bankruptcy, to an assignee appointed for the insured. Stark-
weather v. Cleveland Ins. Co., 67.

3. By a supplement to its charter, a mutual insurance company was
authorized to insure "for a specific rate of premium to be paid
in cash, in the same manner as insurance companies" not mu-
tual "are accustomed to do." The object of the supplement
was to enable the company to issue two classes of policies, one
on the mutual, and the other on the non-mutual plan, the pre-
miums on the latter to be paid in cash. Held, that the com-
pany might accept a note for such premium, instead of cash;
the taking being a mere extension of the time of payment, and
none the less a payment in cash. Carey v. Nagle, 156.

4. The bankruptcy of the company is no defense to an action by the
assignee of a note given for the premium on a policy of insur-
ance. Ib.

INTERNAL REVENUE.

1. Section 19 of the Internal Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat.
at L. 152, as amended March 2, 1867, Id. 475,-which pro-
vides that no suit to restrain the assessment or collection of any
tax authorized, sha'l be maintained in any court,-applies to
all cases where the officer has power to inquire and determine
whether the thing assessed by him is liable to taxation, how-
ever erroneous his decision of that question may be. Pullan v.
Kinsinger, 94.

2. The statute is not unconstitutional; either as depriving the
party of his property without due process of law, or as refusing
trial by jury. Ib.

3. An act of Congress,-such as section 44 of the act of July 20,
1868, 15 Stat. at L. 142, which declares that real property em-
ployed in a violation of a revenue law shall be forfeited there-
for,-is not unconstitutional. Such an act may be sustained as
a regulation of civil policy appropriate to accomplish a purpose
vital to government. United States v. Distillery in West-Front-
street, 192.

4. A supervisor of internal revenue is entitled, under the provisions
of the Internal Revenue Act of July 20, 1868, §49, 15 Stat. at L.
144, to examine the books and papers belonging to banks, bank-
ers, brokers, and banking associations, and is not bound to in-
form the owners of his purpose in making such examination.
Stanwood v. Green, 184.

5. Where a summons for the production of books has been issued by
the supervisor of internal revenue, and such summons has been
duly executed, but not complied with, a United States district
judge may, upon application, and proof of these facts, issue a
writ of attachment. Ib.

6. Section 49 of the act of July 20, 1868, 15 Stat. at L. 144,-which
gives supervisors of internal revenue the right to examine such
books and papers as show the operation of banks, &c., with
the public, and are connected with the internal revenue of the
United States,-is not unconstitutional, either as purporting to
authorize an unreasonable seizure and search, or as compelling a
party to testify against himself. Ib.

7. Under the Internal Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. at L.
98, a removal by a distiller, of spirits distilled by him, from
the place of distillation to a bonded warehouse, is a legal act;
and it cannot be predicated of such a removal, where this is the
only overt act charged, that it was done to defraud the United
States of the tax thereon, so as to bring the case within those
contemplated by section 14 of the act. United States v. One
hundred barrels of Spirits, 305.

INTERNAL REVENUE-Continued.

8. Under the Internal Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, as amended
March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. at L. 483, distilled spirits purchased in
good faith by the claimant, while they were in a bonded ware-
house of the United States, to whose collector he paid the taxes
due thereon, cannot afterwards be seized in his hands and con-
demned as forfeited by reason of the previous failure of the dis-
tiller, in the course of the manufacture thereof, to keep the
books and to make the tri-monthly reports required of him by
law. Ib.

9. Section 5 of the act of March 31, 1868, 15 Stat. at L. 58, is not a
repeal of that part of section 25 of the act of March 2, 1867, 14
Id. 483, which denounces penalties against distillers, for failing
to make the entries and reports required of them by law. Ib.
10. The legislation of Congress respecting forfeitures against distil-
lers,-reviewed; and the conclusion reached that it shows
a uniform policy, from the beginning, not to extend forfeitures
to property in the hands of innocent third persons.

JUDGE.

Ib.

A decree signed by a district judge after he has tendered a condi-
tional resignation, but before it has been accepted by the
government, is valid. Northrop v. Gregory, 503.

JUDGMENT.

1. The distinction between cases in which judgments may and those
in which they may not be impeached collaterally, may be stated
thus: They may be impeached by facts involving fraud or col-
lusion, but which were not before the court or involved in the
issue or matter upon which the judgment was rendered. They
may not be impeached for any facts, whether involving fraud
or collusion or not, or even perjury, which were necessarily be-
fore the court and passed upon. The Acorn, 434.

2. If, pending a writ of error or appeal, no stay of proceedings hav-
ing been obtained, proceedings are taken to enforce the judg-
ment, and property of the defendant is sold under them, the
purchaser acquires a good title. South Fork Canal Co. v. Gor-
don, 479.

3. This rule is not a measure of protection afforded to strangers bid-
ding at judicial sales only, but extends to the parties or their
privies. It rests upon the principle that a judgment of a court
having jurisdiction is, however erroneous, efficacious until
reversed. Ib.

4. The rule governing the restoration, after reversal, is this: that
the party unsuccessful in the court below is to be restored, by