tend to give such creditor a preference. The necessary effect of
such payment is to give a preference. Judgment may be given
against a respondent whose answer sets up no other matter of de-
fense than the denial of the intent, as upon failure to answer. 16.
5. Where the act of a register in adjudging a petitioner a bankrupt
is void at the time when made, for want of authority in the
mover of the petition to present it, it cannot be sustained by a
ratification, on the part of the petitioner, of the presentment.
Matter of Lady Bryan Mining Co., 527.
BILL OF REVIEW.
PLEADING, 8.
BILLS AND NOTES.
BANKING, 5, 6.
1. The liability of a carrier of passengers, as such, for the baggage
of a passenger, is limited to such property as is delivered to the
care and custody of the carrier, or his agents and servants, du
ring the transportation. It does not extend to articles which
the passenger has in charge. The R. E. Lee, 49.
2. Thus, where jewelry usually worn by two lady passengers upon a
steamboat, as a part of their apparel, was left by them in their
state-room in a carpet-bag, with other articles of personal use,
and was stolen while they were at supper,-Held, that the
steamer was not liable therefor.
3. In order to hold carriers liable for damages for injuries sustained
by the occupant of premises adjoining their storehouse, through
the explosion therein of a highly dangerous article,—e. g., nitro-
glycerine,-held for transportation, the proof must show either
that the defendants introduced the article with a knowledge of
its dangerous character, or that they were negligent in the care
and management of it. There is no absolute rule that the oc-
cupant of premises is an insurer against ill consequences to
others from everything which he introduces upon them, irrespec-
tive of knowledge of its dangerous character. Nor is a carrier
bound, as such, to know the character of the goods received by
him for transportation. Parrott v. Barney, 197.
CIRCUIT COURTS.
COURTS, 3-9.
1. Where the plaintiff in an action under the act of May 31, 1870,
16 Stat. at L. 140, for damages for preventing him from voting,
alleges in the same count or cause of action that defendant pre-
vented plaintiff from voting for several different officers, and
that he refused his vote, refused to swear him as to his qualifi-
cations, &c., his pleading is bad for duplicity; upon special de-
murrer or motion to strike out. These different acts are distinct
causes of action, under the statute, and should be alleged in
separate counts or statements. McKay v. Campbell, 120.
2. In order to sustain an action, under the statute, for refusing to
swear the plaintiff in order to enable him to prove his qualifica-
tions as an elector, as prescribed by the State law, the evidence
upon the trial must show that the reason for the defendant's
alleged refusal was on account of the race, color, or previous
condition of servitude of the plaintiff. Hence, this fact must
be alleged in the complaint. Ib.
3. On indictment under section 19 of the act to enforce the right of
citizens to vote, &c., approved May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. at L. 144,
for "unlawfully preventing certain qualified voters from freely
exercising the right of suffrage ;" where the proof was, that the
defendant, with others, attacked a number of voters, waiting
in line for their turn to cast their ballots, and expelled them
from the room; and that said voters afterwards returned and
voted ;-
Held, 1. That the defendant committed the offense which
Congress meant to define and punish in the clause of the section
under which the indictment was drawn.
2. That the prevention took place, and the offense was com-
plete, by the expulsion of the voters from the polls, although
the prosecutors afterwards voted. United States v. Souders, 456.
4. The words "exercising the right of suffrage" in section 19 of the
of the act of May 31, 1870, may be held to mean "voting,"
without bringing that section in conflict with the provisions of
section 4 of the act,-provided that the penalties prescribed in
section 19 be understood to apply to offenses committed at elec-
tions for members of Congress, and those in section 4 to State,
county, and municipal elections. Ib.
1. Neglect on the part of a pilot of a river steamboat to lay her
course, when approaching another boat, in conformity to the
well settled custom of boats plying upon that river; or the fail-
ure to keep a proper lookout,- e. g., when the man on the look-
out is stationed in the pilot-house behind the steamer's chim-
neys, instead of on the hurricane deck,—is a fault in navigation
which exposes the steamboat to liability for a collision occurr-
ing in consequence. The Magenta, 495.
2. Where both of the colliding vessels are in fault for the collision,
the aggregate damages sustained by the two should be shared
equally between them. Ib.
The powers and duties of commissioners, in criminal cases, ex-
plained. United States v. Schumann, 524.
1. Even in determining the construction of a statute authorizing a
confiscation of property for an offense by its owner, words are
not to be confined to a strict technical sense, when so doing
will clearly defeat the evident intent of the statute. United
States v. Athens Armory, 129.
2. Thus, the employment of the phrase "prize and capture," in the
act of August 6, 1861, 12 Stat. at L., 319,-declaring private
property used in promoting insurrection to be "lawful subject
of prize and capture,"-does not limit the operation of the act
to property taken at sea. Property found on shore, or even
land itself, may be condemned under the act. Ib.
3. An unqualified pardon, granted to the owner prior to the seizure
of property, or the institution of any proceedings to condemn
it, under the acts authorizing confiscation of property used to
promote the rebellion of 1861-'65, is a bar to a judgment of
condemnation. 16.
1. Section 49 of the act of July 20, 1868, 15 Stat. at L. 144,—
which gives supervsiors of internal revenue the right to examine
such books and papers as show the operation of banks, &c.,
with the public, and are connected with the internal revenue of
the United States, -is not unconstitutional, either as purporting
to authorize an unreasonable seizure and search, or as com-
pelling a party to testify against himself. Stanwood v.
Green, 184.
2. An act of Congress,—such as section 44 of the act of July 20,
1868, 15 Stat. at L. 142, which declares that real property em-
ployed in violation of a revenue law shall be forfeited therefor,
-is not unconstitutional. Such an act must be sustained as a
civil policy appropriate to accomplish a purpose vital to gov-
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.
ernment. United States v. A Distillery in West-Front-street,
192.
3. The constitutional grant of power to Congress, to establisk
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, is not limited to
passing enactments similar in scope and operation to those in
force in England, when the Constitution was adopted. It gives
Congress plenary power over the subject of bankruptcy; under
one limitation only, that the laws passed upon that subject
shall be uniform throughout the United States. Silverman's
Case, 243.
4. The reasons why this power should be vested in the national gov.
ernment,-explained. 16.
5. Under the Constitution, any and all uniform legislation, tending
to promote the distribution of an insolvent debtor's assets
among his creditors, and his discharge from their demands, is
within the power of Congress. Ib.
6. The wisdom and soundness of the policy of allowing insolvent
debtors to dictate preferences in the distribution of their assets,
-questioned. Ib.
7. A State, acting through its legislature, may denude itself, by a
contract, of power to impose taxes upon a corporation. But
such exemption must be conferred expressly, or must appear by
clear and necessary implication from the legislative act; it
cannot be favored by presumption or intendment. Minot v.
Philadelphia, Wilmington, &c. R. R. Co., 323.
8. A tax upon the ordinary and lawful means of transportation is
really a tax upon the thing carried; hence, a State law imposing
a tax upon locomotives, passenger and freight cars, &c., being
not merely a police regulation, but an expedient for raising rev-
enue, involves a tax upon the passengers and freight transported,
and is unconstitutional as interfering with commerce between
the States. Ib.
9. Congress has power to authorize, by special act, the extension of
a patent, notwithstanding the fact that the original patent has
previously expired, and the invention has been introduced to
public use. Jordan v. Dobson, 398.
10. Query, whether under the fifteenth amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, Congress has power to pass any law to
operate upon private individuals? United States v. Souders, 456.
11. Sections 12 and 13 of the pension act of July 14, 1864, 13 Stat.
at L. 387,-which prescribe the fees of agents employed to col-
lect pensions, and impose a penalty for receiving a greater fee
than such as is prescribed,-
-are not unconstitutional. The
power to secure to the pensioner the receipt of the pension
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued.
granted, free of unreasonable tolls or exactions, is incident to the
undeniable power of Congress to grant pensions.
1. A loan made by a national bank in excess of the restriction
imposed by section 29 of the National Banks Act of June 3, 1864,
13 Stat. at L. 99,-which provides that the total liabilities to
any banking association, of any borrower, shall not at any time
exceed one-tenth of the capital stock,-is not void, upon that
account. The loan may be enforced; though (by section 53)
the bank is exposed to forfeiture of its franchise, and the officers
participating are declared personally liable. Shoemaker v.
National Mechanics' Bank, 416; Stewart v. National Union Bank
of Maryland, 424.
2. Although a loan made by a corporation appear to be in excess of
a limit imposed by statute, and therefore not enforceable, yet, if
it has been executed by the parties, a court of equity will not
interpose, at the suit of the creditor of the borrower, to cancel
the transaction and compel a return of the securities, but will
leave the parties where it finds them. Stewart v. National Union
Bank of Maryland, 424.
1. A circuit court has jurisdiction of a suit by a citizen of another
State against a corporation created by the State in which the
court is held; notwithstanding the corporation also holds char-
ters from other States. Minot v. Philadelphia, Wilmington, &c.
R. R. Co., 323.
2. The payment, by a corporation, to the government of the State,
of a bonus for granting a charter of incorporation, does not pro-
tect the grantee of the franchise from all taxation, except such
as the State has reserved a right to impose in the charter
itself. Ib.
3. The trustees of a stock corporation have not power to direct the
filing of a petition to have the corporation adjudged a bank-
rupt. Matter of Lady Bryan Mining Co., 527.
An indictment for "falsely making," &c., coin of the United States,
under section 20 of the crimes act of 1825, 4 Stat. at L. 121,
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