Jordan v. Dobson. there is in mechanical construction. And yet when asked, what is there new in the combination of the re-issued patent, he answers, that he finds none, “other than the peculiar combination with the carding machine," previously mentioned by him. After reviewing carefully the testimony of this witness, I am inclined to think when he gave his opinion that there is nothing new in the combinations claimed in the re-issued patent, he meant only that the machines, devices, or elements, out of which the combinations are formed, are all old. But if this was not his meaning, and if the largest latitude be allowed to his opinion, there is still a decided preponderance of evidence that the combinations described in the patent were new when the patent was first granted. Henry B. Renwick has been produced as a witness for the complainant, an expert of extensive knowledge. His opinions are before me. They are that, to the extent of his knowledge, the combinations mentioned in the third and fourth claims of the complainant's patent were new, at the time when the original patent was granted, his knowledged extending to all patents, English and French, before that date, and to descriptions from such books as he could find published prior to that time. More than this, he has compared the combinations with the plates and descriptions in "The Operative Mechanic" and Law Journal, referred to by Mr. Jenks, and has pointed out what appears to me very substantial differences. He has testified that one of the machines which Mr. Jenks thinks the same in principle as one of the combinations claimed by the complainant, has no feed apron, and no condensing apparatus of any kind, that it does not form a roving, that the bobbins are not revolved by means of a drum (in all these particulars unlike Goulding's combination), and that the machine is merely a bobbin and flyer machine for spinning flax. He is equally positive that the other machine referred Jordan v. Dobson. to by Mr. Jenks is entirely different in principle from the combination claimed as the fourth in the re-issued patent, and he gives as reasons for his opinion that it is not a twisting machine, it has no reel or bobbin from which roving is taken, it has no row of spindles to which the bobbin is parallel, no traveling carriage, and no jaws, or their equivalents for retaining rovings, that, in fact, it is a machine for winding silk into skeins. Without pursuing this examination further, it is manifest that if Mr. Renwick is to be believed (and no attempt has been made to show that he has stated the facts incorrectly), the improvements claimed in the complainant's patent differ entirely from the machines or devices with which Mr. Jenks compared them, alike in principle, in mode of operation, in mechanical construction, and in the results produced. The defense of want of novelty of invention consequently fails. The only other defense set up by the defendants that requires notice is, that the complainant has acquiesced in invasions of his rights until it would be inequitable now to assert them. Of this I discover no evidence. What is relied upon is a license granted by the patentees to Alfred Jenks & Son, given April 12, 1864, to make and sell at Bridesburg, or Philadelphia, in Pennsylvania, the machinery patented, upon the terms in the license specified. The terms were that the licensees should purchase a license for the use of the machinery manufactured and sold by them before delivery, that they should furnish monthly to Jordan (then the assignee of the patent), a statement of all persons to whom they had sold and delivered such machinery, and that they should stamp on such machinery so delivered, before its delivery, the words "Patented by John Goulding, December 15, 1826. Re-issued July 29, 1836. Extended August 30, 1862;" or some equivalent marks. How such a license as this Shoemaker v. National Mechanics' Bank. can be regarded as acquiescence in any invasion of the complainant's rights, is more than I can comprehend. It is rather a distinct and positive assertion of them, a plain indication of an intent to hold responsible any and all persons who might purchase the machinery from the licensee and use it. There is evidence that the machines were sold to some parties without exacting any royalty for the patentee, but there is nothing to show that the patentee ever acquiesced in the use by the purchasers. Upon the whole I am of opinion that every defense set up has failed, and that there is nothing which could justify my withholding a decree in favor of the complainant. But as the extended patent has now expired, there can only be a decree for an account. Decree accordingly. SHOEMAKER v. THE NATIONAL MECHANICS' BANK. Circuit Court, Fourth Circuit; District of Maryland, March, 1869. NATIONAL BANKS.-INJUNCTION. A circuit court has jurisdiction, upon a proper bill filed by a stockholder of a national bank, to enjoin the officers of the bank from misapplying its funds to the prejudice of the stockholder's interest therein, by acts which are not warranted by the charter, or amount to a breach of trust. The general principles which govern courts of equity in granting pre Shoemaker v. National Mechanics' Bank. liminary injunctions, and in dissolving them upon the filing of the answer,-stated. A loan made by a national bank in excess of the restriction imposed by section 29 of the National Banks Act of June 3, 1864, 13 Stat, at L. 99,-which provides that the total liabilities to any banking association, of any borrower, shall not at any time exceed one-tenth of the capital stock,—is not void, upon that account. The loan may be enforced; though (by section 53) the bank is exposed to forfeiture of its franchise, and the officers participating are declared personally liable.* A national bank has power to lend money upon the note or other personal obligation of the borrower secured by a pledge of stock of a corporation as collateral security. Section 8 of the National Banks Act of June 3, 1864, 13 Stat. at L. 101,-which authorizes such banks to exercise under that act all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking, by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, &c., by receiving deposits, by buying and selling exchange, &c., by loaning money on personal security, and by issuing, &c., circulating notes,contains five distinct grants of power; and neither grant is a limitation upon any other. An averment that the officers of a bank have loaned its funds to a specified person "upon the collateral security of railroad stock," does not show a violation of section 8; for the phrase "collateral security" imports a security additional to the personal obligation of the borrower; and, by the fourth of the powers conferred by section 8, the bank may loan upon personal security not embraced in the first power. Application for an injunction. GILES, J.-This bill is not filed to have the charter of defendant as a national bank declared null and void for the causes mentioned in section 53 of the act to provide a national currency, &c., passed June 3, 1864. This would not be the appropriate proceeding for such a purpose. That could only be accomplished by a suit instituted by the comptroller of the currency. But this is a bill filed by one of the stockholders in the National Mechanics' Bank of this city, to restrain the * See the succeeding case. Shoemaker. National Mechanics' Bank. president and directors of the said bank from pursuing a course which, he alleges, is in violation of the requirements of their charter under the said act, and by which they are wasting the assets of the said bank, to the loss and injury of the complainant and its other stockholders. Such being the object of the bill, if its allegations were admitted by the answer, or proved on final hearing to the satisfaction of the court, it would be its duty to restrain the officers of the said bank from any further misapplication of its funds which might result from any act not warranted by its charter, or which would amount to a breach of trust. This is clear from the decision of the supreme court in the case of Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 341. In that case the court says: "It is now no longer doubted, either in England or the United States, that courts of equity in both have jurisdiction over corporations, at the instance of one or more of their members, to apply preventive remedies by injunction to restrain those who administer them from doing acts which would amount to a violation of charter, or to prevent any misapplication of their capitals or profits which might result in lessening the dividends of stockholders, or the value of their shares, as either may be protected by the franchise of a corporation, if the acts intended to be done create what is in the law denominated a breach of trust." The motion for this injunction has been heard on bill and answer. And the principle is now almost universally recognized, that, where the answer denies all the circumstances upon which the equity of the bill is founded, the court will refuse the writ of injunction. It becomes necessary, therefore, to carefully examine the bill and answer; the bill, that we may learn what are the facts which it sets forth, and on which it |