The Dubuque. the mortgagee to set up his lien as against the lien of libelant. 1. As Hutchings' liability was contingent only at the time the mortgage was given, the security of the mortgage was, of course, also contingent; but when Hutchings' liability became fixed and absolute, then the security of the mortgage also became fixed and absolute. The mortgage was, therefore, good and valid, as between the parties, from and after the maturity of the notes, October 26, 1866, if not before.. 2. The debt to secure which the mortgage was given fell due October 26, 1866, and Hutchings' liability to be sued upon it accrued at that time. By the terms of the mortgage, the time of payment was extended, in all, to November 25, 1868, with provision for further extension. It is to be presumed that this forbearance would not have been given except upon the giving the mortgage security. This, of itself, constituted a valid consideration for the mortgage, and, it is fair to presume, was the principal motive of Hutchings in giving it. Again. If the mortgage had not been given, and the time extended, the bank could have sued Hutchings upon the debt, and attached the vessel, or seized the same in execution. And a lien thus obtained has been recognized by high authority as sufficient to entitle the. attaching creditor to intervene and contest a previous lien on the ground of laches. See Blaine v. The Charles Carter, 4 Cranch, 328; Packard v. The Louisa, 2 Woodb. & M. 48. There can be no sound reason why a lien voluntarily given for the same debt, should not be equally effectual. It expressly appears in the proofs, that the mortgage was taken by the bank without any notice whatever of libelant's claim. I hold, therefore, that the intervenor in this case is a bona fide mortgagee for a valuable consideration, and, 1 1 The Dubuque. as such, is entitled to intervene and contest the priority of libelant's lien. It remains, therefore, to consider and determine the question of laches on the part of libelant in bringing forward and enforcing his lien. In determining this question, the same rules apply to liens for wages as to liens for repairs and supplies. Notes to Abb. on Shipp. 539; Leland v. The Medora, 2 Woodb. & M. 104; Allen v. The Buckeye State, 1 Newb. 111, 114. In the case of seagoing vessels, it seems to be pretty Iwell settled that such liens will in no case be extended beyond the next voyage if they are unknown to the public, and new interests of third persons as to the vessel intervene without notice. This, however, can hardly be applied strictly to vessels navigating the lakes, where numerous voyages are made during each season, no one voyage occupying more than two or three weeks. But the principle is the same, viz: that such liens should not be enforced to the injury of parties who have acquired subsequent rights and interests in the vessel without notice, where there has been unreasonable delay in enforcing the lien; and it has been held in this district, by my honored predecessor, that, as a general rule, there is great reason to limit these tacit liens to the season of navigation, and not to extend them beyond one year, as applied to the navigation of the lakes. See The Buckeye State, 1 Newb. 111. No fixed rule, however, can be laid down upon the subject. What will constitute unreasonable delay, must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. While liens for seamen's wages are the most favored in the admiralty, the policy of the law is that they should not be protracted beyond a reasonable oppor The Dubuque. tunity for their enforcement, to the injury of third parties acquiring subsequent liens without notice. Perhaps the safest and most satisfactory general rule to be adopted, deduced from the authorities, and from the nature of the subject, would be that a delay to enforce a maritime lien after a reasonable opportunity to do so, shall be taken and deemed as a waiver of the same as against subsequent purchasers or incumbrances in good faith, without notice, unless such delay is satisfactorily explained. See Packard v. The Louisa, 2 Woodb. & M. 48; Blaine v. The Charles Carter, 4 Cranch, 328; The Utility, 1 Blatchf. & H. 218; The Lillie Mills, 1 Sprague, 367; The Chusan, 2 Story C. Ct. 456, 468; The Buckeye State, 1 Newb. 111. In this case the service on account of which the lien is claimed, ended December 5, 1865, and the libel was filed February 13, 1869, three seasons of navigation having fully passed. In the mean time, about three days after the service ended, libelant had a settlement with the owner concerning his wages and another matter, and agreed upon a general balance due him, and received a part of the same in money, and the owner's note for the remainder. Nothing more was done by libelant until nearly the close of the next season's navigation, when the intervenors acquired their lien upon the vessel without notice of any claim on the part of libelant; and in this precise shape matters remained for upwards of two years and four months longer, beforeany attempt whatever was made on the part of libelant to enforce his lien. During all this time the vessel was engaged in navigation upon the lakes, and where she might have been seized; and no explanation of the delay is attempted or offered. It is difficult to conceive of an array of facts afford ing a stronger or more conclusive presumption that. li The Dubuque. · belant had waived his lien, and looked to the owner alone for payment. The settlement and taking of the note is mentioned in this connection because, although not evidence of an express waiver of lien, it is an important link in the chain of circumstances going to prove a presumptive waiver. The rights of the owner are not now under consideration, and the presumptive waiver of lien by libelant is held to apply only as against the mortgage lien of the intervenors. Therefore, if libelant desires to continue his suit as against the owner, a decree must be entered postponing his lien to the mortgage lien of the intervenors, and that such mortgage lien be first paid to the intervenors, together with their costs of suit to be taxed, out of the proceeds of the sale of the vessel. Otherwise, the libel must be dismissed, with costs to intervenors. Decree accordingly. The Hornet. THE HORNET. District Court; District of North Carolina, 1870. SCOPE OF THE JUDICIAL POWER. -QUESTIONS AS TO EXISTENCE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. When a question arises, in judicial proceedings, relative to the existence or validity of an organization claiming to be the lawful government of a foreign country, the courts of the United States are bound by the decision of the executive power. Such a question is political, and not judicial, in its nature. When a civil war is pending in a foreign country, between a portion of the people who adhere to a long established government, and another portion who assert a new government, the courts of the United States cannot recognize such new government, or admit it or its agents or representatives to a standing as parties in judicial proceedings, until the executive power has publicly recognized such new government. Application to interpose a claim, in admiralty. The steamer Hornet was seized upon a libel of information, founded upon a charge of violating the neutrality laws. J. Morales Lemus, as agent of the socalled " Republic of Cuba," now applied to be allowed to intervene and interpose a claim and contest the suit. The only question now made was as to the propriety of allowing such agent to claim. BROOKS, J.-The question submitted to the court is-can this court recognize as existing, any government or organized body of people, or element known as the Republic of Cuba, to the extent of allowing that as a body politic, or government to come through an agent |