that was in its contribution of confidence and ardor to the South. Thus regarded, it was an important event, and its effects of the happiest kind. The victory was achieved at a time when the public mind was distressed and anxious on account of the constant backward movements of our forces in Virginia, and the oft-recurring story of "surprise" and consequent disaster to our troops in the neighborhood of the enemy's lines. The surrender of Alexandria, the surprise and dispersion of a camp at Philippi by a body of Federal troops,*

The disaster at Philippi was inconsiderable; but it was the subject of some recrimination at the time, and Colonel Porterfield, the Confederate commander, was subjected to a court-martial, which, in the main, exonerated him, and complimented him for his courage. Colonel Porterfield had been ordered to Grafton about the middle of May, 1861, with written instructions from General Lee to call for volunteers from that part of the State, and receive them into the service, to the number of five thousand; and to co-operate with the agents of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad; and with verbal orders to try to conciliate the people of that section, and to do nothing to offend them. Finding, soon after his arrival, that the country was in a state of revolution, and that there was a large and increasing Federal force at Camp Denison, in Ohio, opposite Parkersburg, and another in the vicinity of Wheeling, Colonel Porterfield wrote to the commanding general, that unless a strong force was sent very soon, Northwestern Virginia would be overrun.

Upon directing the captains of organized volunteer companies to proceed with their companies to Grafton, they replied that not more than twenty in companies numbering sixty were willing to take up arms on the side of the State; that the others declared, if they were compelled to fight, it would be in defence of the Union. Colonel Porterfield succeeded in a week in getting together three newly-organized companies. This force was increased by the arrival of several other companies, two of which were unarmed cavalry companies-amounting in all to about 500 infantry and 150 cavalry. These troops had been at Grafton but a few days, when, or about the 25th of May, Colonel Porterfield was reliably informed of the force of the enemy and withdrew his command to Philippi. Orders were given for the destruction of the Cheat bridge, but were not executed. The enemy's force at Grafton was about eight thousand men. On the 3d of June, through the failure of the guard or infantry pickets to give the alarm, the command at Philippi was surprised by about five thousand infantry and a battery of artillery, and dispersed in great confusion, but with inconsiderable loss of life, through the woods. The command had no equipments and very little ammunition. Such was the inauguration of the improvident and unfortunate campaign in Western Virginia.

General Garnett succeeded Colonel Porterfield in the command in Northwestern Virginia, with a much larger force (about six thousand men), but ɔne obviously inadequate, considering the extent of the district it was ex pected to defend, the hostile character of the country, and the invading forcer of the enemy.

and the apparently uncertain movements of our forces on the Upper Potomac, had unpleasantly exercised the popular mind; and had given rise to many rash and ignorant doubts with respect to the opening events of the war. The battle of Bethel was the first to turn the hateful current of retreat, and sent the first gleam of sunlight through the sombre shadows that had hung over public opinion in the South.

It is certain that the movements on the Upper Potomac were greatly misunderstood at the time, especially with regard to the evacuation of Harper's Ferry. General Joseph E. Johnston, who had been a quartermaster-general in the old United States service, and had resigned to take part in the defence of his native State, Virginia, had assumed command at Harper's Ferry, on the 23d of May. On the 27th of the same month, General Beauregard had relinquished his command at Charleston, being assigned to duty at Corinth, Mississippi; but, the order being recalled, he was put in command at Manassas, our forces being divided into what was known as the armies of the Potomac and of the Shenandoah. At the time General Johnston took command at Harper's Ferry, the forces at that point consisted of nine regiments and two battalions of infantry, with four companies of artillery—a force which was certainly not sufficient, when we consider that it was expected to hold both sides of the Potomac, and take the field against an invading army. After a complete reconnoissance of the place and environs, General Johnston decided that it was untenable, but determined to hold it until the great objects of the government required its abandonment.

The demonstrations of the Federal forces in the direction of the Valley of Virginia were certainly thwarted by the timely falling back of our army from Harper's Ferry to Winchester. General Patterson's approach was expected by the great route into the Valley from Pennsylvania and Maryland, leading through Winchester, and it was an object of the utmost importance to prevent any junction between his forces and those of General McClellan, who was already making his way into the upper portions of the Valley. On the morning of the 13th of June, information was received from Winchester that Romney was occupied by two thousand Federal troops, supposed to be the vanguard of McClellan's army. A detachment was

dispatched by railway to check the advance of the enemy; and on the morning of the 15th, the Confederate army left Harper's Ferry for Winchester.

The next morning, after the orders were issued for the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, brought one of those wild, fearful cenes which make the desolation that grows out of war. The splendid railroad bridge across the Potomac-one of the most superb structures of its kind on the continent-was set on fire at its northern end, while about four hundred feet at its southern extremity was blown up, to prevent the flames from reaching other works which it was necessary to save. Many of the vast buildings were consigned to the flames. Some of them were not only large, but very lofty, and crowned with tall towers and spires, and we may be able to fancy the sublimity of the scene, when more than a dozen of these huge fabrics, crowded into a small space, were blazing at once. So great was the heat and smoke, that many of the troops were forced out of the town, and the necessary labors of the removal were performed with the greatest difficulty.

On the morning of the day after the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, intelligence was received that General Patterson's army had crossed the Potomac at Williamsport; also that the Federal force at Romney had fallen back. The Confederate army was ordered to gain the Martinsburg turnpike by a flank movement to Bunker's Hill, in order to place itself between Winchester and the expected advance of Patterson. On hearing of this, the enemy crossed the river precipitately. Resuming his first direction and plan, General Johnston proceeded to Winchester. There his army was in position to oppose either McClellan from the West, or Patterson from the North-east, and to form a junction with General Beauregard when necessary.

Intelligence from Maryland indicating another movement by Patterson, Colonel Jackson with his brigade was sent to the neighborhood of Martinsburg to support Colonel Stuart, who had been placed in observation on the line of the Potomac with his cavalry. On the 2d of July, General Patterson again crossed the Potomac. Colonel Jackson, pursuant to instructions, again fell back before him; but, in retiring, gave him a severe lesson. With a battalion of the Fifth Virginia Regi

ment and Pendleton's Battery of Field Artillery, he engaged the enemy's advance. Skilfully taking a position where the smallness of his force was concealed, he engaged them for a considerable time, inflicted a heavy loss, and retired when about to be outflanked, scarcely losing a man, but bringing off forty-five prisoners.

Upon this intelligence, the force at Winchester, strengthened by the arrival of General Bee and Colonel Elzey and the Ninth Georgia regiment, were ordered forward to the support of Jackson, who, it was supposed, was closely followed by General Patterson. Taking up a position within six miles from Martinsburg, which town the enemy had invested, General Johnston waited for him four days, hoping to be attacked by an adversary double his number. Convinced at length that the enemy would not approach him, General Johnston returned to Winchester, much to the disappointment of his troops, who, sullen and discontented, withdrew in the face of the enemy.

On the 15th of July, Colonel Stuart, who, with his cavalry, remained near the enemy, reported the advance of General Patterson from Martinsburg. He halted, however, at Bunker's Hill, nine miles from Winchester, where he remained on the 16th. On the 17th, he moved his left to Smithfield. This movement created the impression that an attack was intended on the south of the Confederate lines; but, with a clear and quick intelligence, General Johnston had penetrated the designs of the enemy, which were to hold him in check, while. "the Grand Army" under McDowell was to bear down upon General Beauregard at Manassas.

In the mean time, General McClellan's army had moved southwestward from Grafton. In the progress of the history of the war, we shall meet with frequent repetitions of the lesson of how the improvident spirit of the South, in placing small forces in isolated localities, was taken advantage of by the quick strategic movements and the overwhelming numbers of the North. The first of the series of these characteristic disasters was now to befall the South.

THE BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN.

The main column of Federal troops under General McClellan was estimated to be twenty thousand strong; his movements were now directed towards Beverley, with the object of getting to the rear of General Garnett, who had been appointed to the command of the Confederate forces in Northwestern Virginia, and was occupying a strong position at Rich Mountain, in Randolph county.

The strength of General Garnett's command was less than five thousand infantry, with ten pieces of artillery, and four companies of cavalry. The disposition of these forces was in the immediate vicinity of Rich Mountain. Col. Pegram occupied the mountain with a force of about sixteen hundred men and some pieces of artillery. On the slopes of Laurel Hill, General Garnett was intrenched with a force of three thousand infantry, six pieces of artillery and three companies of cavalry.

On the 5th of July, the enemy took a position at Bealington, in front of Laurel Hill, and a day or two afterwards a large force appeared in front of Rich Mountain.

On the morning of the 11th instant, General Garnett received a note from Colonel Pegram at Rich Mountain, stating that his pickets had that morning taken a prisoner, who stated that there were in front of Rich Mountain nine regiments of seven thousand men and a number of pieces of artillery; that General McClellan had arrived in camp the evening before, and had given orders for an attack the next day; that General Rosecrans had started a night before with a division of the army three thousand strong, by a convenient route, to take him in the rear, while McClellan was to attack in front; that he had moved a piece of artillery and three hundred men to the point by which General Rosecrans was expected, and that he had requested Colonel Scott, with his regiment, to occupy a position on the path by which the enemy must come. As soon as General Garnett received this note, he sent a written order to Colonel Scott to move to the point indicated by Colonel Pegram, and to defend it at all hazards.

The attack on Colonel Pegram was met with the most gallant resistance. The fight lasted nearly three hours. The enemy