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the connivance of a weak and recreant Executive, might have become the Magna Charta of American slavery, General Sherman gave the sanction of his name, as the immediate representative of the military power of the United States.

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The act, viewed in its purely military bearing, must be regarded as one of most dangerous insubordination. Had there been no express orders to direct Gen. Sherman, the terms of surrender accorded by Lieutenant-General Grant to Lee were available as a guide to the subordinate general. The prime feature of that surrender was illustrated in the brief and emphatic report of Grant to the War Department: "There has been no relaxation in the pursuit during its pendency." How did the subordinate in this case follow the example of his superior? By a prompt concession of an armistice to his crafty opponent-a concession which, as it was the first eager thought of Lee, was naturally likewise the prime consideration with Johnston and his illustrious mentors, Davis and Breckinridge. On that concession depended all the hopes of personal safety of these fugitives from justice. On that concession depended their ability to show the "sympathizing" outside community that, before they resigned their posts as Confederate leaders, the status of the Confederacy was formally acknowledged by a United States commander, next to the highest in rank in the national army.

But General Sherman had more than the example of his immediate chief to guide him, if he desired to escape the grave charge of insubordination. He had before him the direct injunctions of the late President, which directly forbade the discussion of political terms of settlement between military commanders and rebel leaders. So long ago as the 3d of March-the very closing day of President Lin

coln's first term-Secretary Stanton was instructed to write to General Grant that the President desired him "to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of Lee's army, or on some minor and purely military matter." If a transcript of this absolute injunction was not made, textually, for Sherman's guidance, the injunction itself was perfectly known to him, and he was well aware that powers of negotiation were not denied to the lieutenantgeneral to be conceded to one of his subordinates.

We fear that this most unfortunate step of General Sherman has already led to results of serious detriment to the national cause. It has probably allowed Davis and Breckinridge, with their prominent and responsible confederates in the rebellion, to secure their personal safety; and there is some reason also to apprehend that it may have allowed Johnston to remove his army beyond the immediate reach of his late antagonist. Its worst effects, however, were averted by the prompt and peremptory intervention of the President; and we hope that the presence of the lieutenantgeneral, who set out for North Carolina before midnight on Friday, may obviate all the serious evils which it was calculated to involve.

[The dispatches of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton, on the violation of General Sherman's truce, referred to in the Report, Part IV., and the Examination, are as follows.]


Washington, D. C., April 27—9.30 a. M.

Major-General DIX:

The department has received the following dispatch from Major-General Halleck, commanding the Military Division of the James:

Generals Canby and Thomas were instructed some days ago that Sherman's arrangement with Johnston was disapproved by the President, and they were ordered to disregard it, and to push the enemy in every direction. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

RICHMOND, Va., April 26-9.30 P. M.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

Generals Meatle, Sheridan, and Wright are acting under orders to pay no regard to any truce or orders of General Sherman respecting hostilities, on the ground that Sherman's agreement could bind his own command and no other.

They are directed to push forward, regardless of orders from any one except General Grant, and cut off Johnston's


Beauregard has telegramed to Danville that a new arrangement has been made with Sherman, and that the advance of the Sixth Corps was to be suspended until further orders.

I have telegraphed back to obey no orders of Sherman, but to push forward as rapidly as possible.

The bankers here have information to-day that Jeff. Davis's specie is moving South from Hillsboro', in wagons, as fast as possible.

I suggest that orders be telegraphed, through GeneralThomas, that Wilson obey no orders from Sherman; and notifying him and Canby, and all commanders on the Mississippi, to take measures to intercept the rebel chiefs and their plunder.

The specie taken with them is estimated here at from six to thirteen millions.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General commanding.

[The subjoined article, written in defence of General Sherman against the above attacks, appeared in the Washington "Chronicle," May 25th, and is attributed to the pen of his brother, Senator Sherman.]

[For the Daily Chronicle.]


A QUARREL between two high officers of the Government is always unfortunate, unseemly, and usually injurious to each. This is especially so when they are working in the same great cause, and that cause brilliantly successfulcrowned with a glorious peace. It is idle to conceal evidences of passion eagerly promulgated by the telegram and press, and it is well for kindly lookers-on to take a dispassionate view, to see if all this heat is necessary. The writer of this knows both parties, and is certainly friendly to each.

The commencement of any difference was with the Sherman-Johnston convention. This, if approved by the President, would have made peace between the Potomac and Rio Grande. The objections made to this are included in three propositions: 1st, That Sherman had no power to make such a treaty. The answer is obvious, that he never

claimed or attempted to conclude the arrangement. All he did "conclude" was a truce for a few days; and he then submitted, for the approval or rejection of the President, this important offer of a general peace. Even in arranging the truce he had it all on his side. Wilson was still moving and holding the outer coils of the net, while Sherman was building railroads and repairing roads and bridges, ready for the final spring if the arrangement was disapproved. He gained every thing by the truce, and lost nothing. Johnston was "corelled," and was kept so by this very truce, while Sherman was never more active in preparing for future movements, if necessary. It is said generals have no business to make truces or deal with political questions, and that Grant was reproved for this; but Sherman had made truces before, and for a year has been distinguished for his treatment of political questions, without a word of caution or reproof from his superiors. The telegram to Grant, now published as an official order of an old date, was withheld from Sherman, and Sherman had been instructed to open communications with rebel civil authorities.

The second objection is that the arrangement recognized the rebel State government and officials. This is the most serious objection, and amply justified the Government in rejecting or modifying the arrangement; but the official papers show clearly that Sherman refused to grant this in any shape or form, until the order of Weitzel, issued while Mr. Lincoln was present in Richmond, convened the rebel Legislature of Virginia and recognized the rebel Governor Smith. With this order before him, without a word of the contrary tenor, Sherman informed Johnston of the order, and waived his previous objection to recognizing the rebel State authorities. Why should Sherman be denounced for

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