consistent with a due responsibility in the government to the people, 267. England (see "Great Britain "). Europe: Her arrogant pretensions, 66. Faction: Defined, 51; its latent cause inherent in human nature, 53; the various and unequal distribution of property the most common and durable source of it, 53. Federal Farmer: An opponent of the Constitution, 424. Federal Constitution (appendix) 561570 Feudal System: Account of it, 100, 288. Fisheries, The, 64. Fox, Charles James: his India bill, 449. Geometry: Why its principles are received without difficulty, 180; incomprehensibility of one of them, 181. Georgia: Provision in her constitution, concerning the separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 307; number of representatives in the more numerous branch of her legislature, 345. Germanic Empire: Its origin, constitution, and disadvantages, 109. Gold and Silver: Principle on which the States are inhibited to make any thing else a tender in payment of debts, 277. Government (see "Minorities "): A government, the constitution of which renders it unfit to be entrusted with all the powers which a free people ought to delegate to any government, would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the national interests, 139; the danger of fettering it with restrictions which cannot be observed, 152; examples among the States of impracticable restrictions, 153; remarkable feature of every government reported by ancient history which was established by deliberation and consent, 223; the reason of it, 224; ought to control the passions, and to be controlled by the reason of the public, 309, 315, 323; the greatest of all reflections on human nature, 323; wise kings will always be served by able ministers, 401; the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration, 427; definition of a limited constitution, 484; the general genius of a government is all that can be substantially relied on for permanent effects, 532. Great Britain (see "Standing Armies"): Her government, 233; the House of Commons, 329, 354, 360; the House of Lords, 408; why the king's power of an absolute negative on bills has been long disused, 429; Constitution of Great Britain, concerning a separation of the departments of power, 300. Grotius: Cited, 116, 541. Con High Seas: The power under the Constitution of defining and punishing offences on them, 260. Holland: Not a republic, 233. House of Representatives see stitution," ""Treaties"): Qualifications of the electors and the elected, 327; term of a member's service, 329, 333, 339; biennial elections defended, 335, 338; argument in their favor derived from the time they afford a representative for acquiring the requisite information, 335, 337, 345; the ratio of representation, 339, 344; its proposed number of members defended, 345. 355; provision of the Constitution concerning the ineligibility of its members under certain circumstances, to civil offices, 350; imputed tendency of the plan for the House of Representatives, to elevate the few above the many, 356; provision for the future augmentation of its members considered, 362; economy consulted by the provision for its temporary number, 366; dangers of a multitudinous representative assembly, 365; maxim as to the proper number of representatives, 367; why more than a majority ought not to be required for a quorum, 367; provision for regulating elections to it, 368; less likely than local legislatures to be partial to particular interests, 375: advantage of uniformity in the time Impeachments (see "Senate," "Judiciary," "States," under their several titles). Indians: Difficulties concerning them when residing within a State, 262. Innovation: Its dangers exaggerated, some of its beneficial results, 81. Ireland, Elections in, 330. Jefferson, Thomas: Cited to show the evils in the constitution of Virginia, arising from the want of a barrier between the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 310; his draft of a Constitution cited, 313; his idea of a convention for correcting breaches of it, 314; defects of this plan, 314-18. Jenkinson, Charles: His remarks introductory to his bill for regulating the commerce between Great Britain and the United States, 126. Judiciary (see "Jury Trial "): Want of, 132; objections to constituting the Supreme Court a tribunal, either singly or jointly with the Senate, for trying impeachments, 409 ct seq.; mode of appointing the Judges, their tenure of office during good behavior, 482-494; the weakest of the three departments of power, 484; vindication of its power to pronounce legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, 485; the independence of the judges essential, and why, 487 peculiar advantages of the provision in the Constitution for their support, 492; precautions for their responsibility, 492; omission of a provision for removing them on account of inability, defended, 493; six classes of cases, to which the judicial power of the federal government ought to extend, 494 et seq.; these classes of cases com pared with the particular powers given by the Constitution to the judiciary, 498; distribution of authority in the judicial department, 501; statement of objections to the Supreme Court having undivided power of final jurisdiction, 501; these objections answered, 502; the power in Congress of constituting inferior courts considered, 505; why the objects of these courts would not be accomplished by the instrumentality of the State courts, 506; the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court confined to two classes of causes, 507, 509; whether the Supreme Court ought to have appellate jurisdiction as to matters of fact, 509, 512; such jurisdiction does not abolish trial by jury, 512; summary view of the authority of the Supreme Court, 512; whether the State courts are to have concurrent jurisdiction in regard to causes submitted to the federal jurisdiction, 512; in instances of concurrent jurisdiction between the national and State courts an appeal would lie from the State courts to the Supreme Court of the United States, 514; whether an appeal would lie from the State courts to subordinate federal judicatories, 515. Jurisdiction: Literal meaning of the word noticed, 510, note. Jury Trial: Answer to the objection that the Constitution contains no provision for the trial by jury in civil cases, 516 et seq.; in no case abolished by the Constitution, 518, 520; examination of the remark that trial by jury is a safeguard against an oppressive exercise of the power of taxation, 521; the strongest argument in its favor, in civil cases, is, that it is a security against corruption, 522; difference between the limits of the jury trial in the different States of the Union, 523; ineligible in many cases, 526; proposition concerning it made by the minority of Pennsylvania, 525; proposition from Massachusetts, 528. Legislation: Evils of a mutable, 389 et seq. Legislature: Danger of its usurpations in a representative republic, 308, 313, 316. Louis XIV., Anecdote of, 16. Mably, Abbé de. On a confederate republic, 32; on Achæan League, 106; on United Netherlands, 118. Maintenon, Madame de, 28. Marlborough, John, Duke of, 31; Sarah, Duchess of, 28. Maryland, 128; Provision in her constitution concerning the separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary power, 306; concerning her Senate, 398. Massachusetts: Insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, 32, 121; provision in her constitution, concerning the separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 303; number of representatives in the more numerous branch of her legislature, 345; size of her senatorial districts compared with that of the districts proposed by the convention, 361; provision concerning impeachments, 414, note, proposition from, in regard to jury trial, 528. Maxims: Certain maxims in geometry, ethics, and politics, carrying internal evidence, 180. Military Force (see "Constitution," Standing Armies "). Militia: Its disadvantages and merits, 150; power of regulating it, 168. Minorities: Two modes of protecting them from usurpations by majorities, 325 et seq.; to give a minority a negative upon a majority which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision, is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser, 129. Minos, 223. Mississippi, Navigation of the, 18, 64. Money: Power, under the Constitu tion, of coining it, 264, 277. Montesquieu: Refutation of the erroneous opinion that he considered the republican polity unsuited to a large extent of country, and his praise of a confederate republic, 47, 48, 51, 270, 274; true extent of his doctrine, requiring a separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 300, 302; his remarks concerning the judiciary, 484, note. Naturalization: Provision of the Constitution concerning it, 264. Navigation of the lakes, 64. Navy Practicability of creating a federal navy, 65; its advantages, 67; the Southern States the nursery of wood, and the Northern of men, for ships, 65; importance of establishing a navy as early as possible, 146; power in the federal Constitution of erecting one, 254. Negative on bills (see "Great Britain," "President") Netherlands: Their government, 115; an evil attending the constitution of the States-General, 469. New Hampshire: Provision in her constitution, concerning the separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 303; the size of her senatorial districts, compared with the size of the districts proposed by the convention, 361; provision concerning impeachment, 414, note. New Jersey: Provision in her Constitution, concerning the separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 305; concerning impeachments, 414; her provisions concerning the unity of the Executive and a council of appointment, 438. New York: Her controversy with the district of Vermont, 35; alleged excellence of her constitution, 144, 154; provision in her constitution, concerning the separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 304; number of representatives in the more numerous branch of her legislature, 345; size of her senatorial districts compared with that of the districts proposed by the convention, 361; her constitution makes no provision concerning the locality of elections, 381; provision concerning impeachments, 413; provision concerning the unity of her Executive, 438 and note; where, by her constitution, the qualified power of negativing bills is vested, 462; provision of her constitution, prohibiting any person more than sixty years old from being a judge, 493. North Carolina: Revolt of a part of, 32; provision in her constitution, concerning a separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 306. Numa, 223. Pennsylvania: Disturbances in, 34; constitution on standing army, 142; concerning the separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 305, 311; number of representatives in the more numerous branch of her legislature, 346; provision concerning impeachments, 414, note; proposition from the minority of, concerning jury trial, 525. Pericles Examples of the injury resulting to his country from his personal motives of action, 27. Poland: Her government, 113, 233; an evil of the Polish Diet, 469. Political Economy: There is no common measure of national wealth, and why, 123. Pompadour, Madame de, 28. Post-Roads: Provision of the Consti tution concerning them, 266. President of the United States: Exaggeration noticed of the authority vested in him by the Constitution, 234; the power of filling casual vacancies in the Senate falsely ascribed to him, 421; why the power of filling, during the recess of the Senate, vacancies in federal offices, is confided to him, 422; peculiar eligibility of the mode provided for his appointment, 423 et seq.; why the office of President will seldom fall to the lot of any man not qualified in any degree to fill it, 426; his constitution compared with that of the king of Great Britain and with that of the governor of New York, 428; his qualified negative on bills, 429 et seq.; a shield to the Executive, 458; an additional security against the enacting of improper laws, 459; the power likely to be exercised only with great caution, 459; practice in Great Britain, 459: cases for which, chiefly, it was designed, 460; where vested by the constitution of New York, 462; refutation of the doctrine that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of a republican government, 436; the unity of the Executive defended, 437; objections to a plural Executive, 438; objections to an executive council, 438, 445; the responsibility of the President necessary, 444; the term of four years for his office defended, 448 et seq.; his reëligibility defended, 451 et seq.; danger of in. stability in the system of administration, 453; danger, particularly, from frequent periodical changes of subordinate officers, 454; fallacy of the advantages expected to arise from ineligibility for reëlection, 454; the provision in the Constitution for the compensation of the President, 456; his power as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, 462; his power of requiring the opinions in writing of the heads of the executive departments, 463; his power of pardoning, 463; answer to the objection against his having the sole power of pardon in cases of treason, 464; his power in relation to treaties, 465 et seq.; his power in regard to the appointment of federal officers, 471; less apt than a numerous assembly of men to consult personal or party feelings in appointments, 472; the coöperation of the Senate, a check on a spirit of favoritism in the President, 474; his power in regard to the removal of officers, 478; the constitution of the President combines the requisites to public safety, 481. Press The liberty of the, 537; tax on newspapers in Great Britain, 538, note. Public Acts: Records, etc., provision of the Constitution concerning them, 266. Public Debt: Would be a cause of collision between the separate States or Confederacies, 37; obligation of the federal government concerning public debts, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, 274. Public Lands: A fruitful source of controversy, 33, 35. Removals of federal officers (see "President"). Representation: The principle of it, said to be an invention of modern Europe, 78, 329, 395; idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people by persons of each class, visionary, 204; distinction between the principle of representation among the ancients, and in the United States, 397. Republic: Defined, 57 (see "Confederate Republic"); its advantages, 109 et seq.; error of the opinion that it is unsuitable to a large district of country, 77; natural limits of one, 78; one of its weak sides, the inlets which it affords to foreign corruption, 131; defined or described, 232; inapplicability of the title to certain governments which have received it, 232; obligation of the federal government to guarantee to every State a republican form of government, 270. Rhode Island: Provision in her constitution, concerning elections, 333; number of representatives in the more numerous branch of her legislature, 346; iniquitous measures of, 392. Rome: Senate of, 394; tribunes of, 399; evils arising from her having plural consuls and tribunes, 438, 469. Romulus, 223. Rutherford, Dr. Thomas, cited, 541, note. Senate (see Elections," 'Judiciary"): Will generally be composed with peculiar care and judgment, and why? 160; its constitution, 384 et seq.; qualifications of senators, 384; appointment of senators by the State legislatures, 385 equality of representations in the Senate, 385; Number of senators and duration of their appointment, 387; its power in regard to making treaties, 400, 403; provision for the biennial succession of one third of new senators, 402; viewed as a court of impeachment, 407; the objection which would substitute the proportion of two thirds of all the mem bers composing the Senate, to that of two thirds of the members present considered, 470; its cooperation with the President in appointments, a check on favoritism, 472 et seq.; answer to the objection that the President, by the influence of the power of nomination, may secure the complaisance of the Senate to his views, 475, 476; its consent would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint officers, 476. Servius Tullius, 223. Shays Rebellion, 28. Slaves: The importation of them after the year 1808 prohibited, 261; possess the mixed character of persons and property, 340; defence of the provision of the Constitution combining them with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, 340 et seq. Socrates, 347 Solon, 223. South Carolina: Provision in her constitution, concerning the separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 306; provision concerning elections, 333; number of representatives in the more numerous branch of her legislature, 346; provision concerning impeachments, 414, note. Sparta: Her Senate, 394; her Ephori, 396, 399. Standing Armies (see "Constitution"): One advantage of them in Europe, 40; would be an inevitable result of the dissolution of the Confederacy, 41; their fatal effects on liberty, 41-see p. 250; why they did not spring up in the Grecian republics, 42; nor to any considerable extent in Great Britain, 44. 251; wisdom of the provision of the federal Constitution in this particular, 142, 146, 156; why it is better for an army to be in the hands of the federal government than of the State governments, 147. 148; silence in regard to them in the constitutions of all the States except two, 142, 143, 151, 153; provision concerning them, in the English Bill of Rights framed at |