clause applicable to persons fleeing from justice in consequence of the commission of crimes, could apply to those persons brought to California by their masters. The Court concluding, says: "The judgment of the Court is, that the writ be dismissed, and that the slaves Robert Perkins, Carter Perkins, and Sandy Jones, be remanded to jail, into the custody of the Sheriff of the County of San Francisco, and by the said Sheriff delivered to his master or his agent without delay or cost." Justice Anderson, concurring in his written opinion, has exhibited much research and ability; but his decision is burdened with the shallow display of that love of compromise which has characterized the friends of Slavery in all sections of the Republic. A single extract from his opinion is here given: "It would be a poor evidence of our fidelity to the spirit of compromise to resort to a very strained and technical construction, by a surprise and strategy to deprive our American brethren of their property, because they came here in good faith, trusting to the protection of the National Constitution. This would not be the favorite mode that a wise Statesman or a just and patriotic Judge should elect to allay a long, deep, and sorely irritated feeling, or to consign to oblivion the unkind remembrances of the past; but a plain and truthful administration of the laws will do this. It will mark, too, the justice of our noble State; and if any other word was needed, I would say, our wisdom. No complaint can then go up against us to our far off brethren for the want of the first, and the latter will stand out in illuminated letters, declaring the truth of the law as it is, the purity of our motives, and our devotion to our whole Union." It will be seen how anxious the learned Judge was not to surprise his distant brethren, and how sincerely he desired to avoid a show of want of "fidelity to the spirit of compromise." The reader must judge how "illuminated" are "the letters declaring the truth of the law" in these decisions. The next California case of importance was the case of Ex-parte Archy, on habeas corpus before the Supreme Court, January term, 1858. Reported in 9th California, page 147. The statute relating to "fugitives from labor" expired by limitation on the 15th of April, 1855, as will be seen by referring to it, and this case came under the Constitution of the United States and the "comity" of States. Charles A. Stovall, a citizen of Mississippi, who came across the plains in 1857, brought with him his slave, making California his home, entering into business, advertising his business as permanent, and hiring out Archy on a river boat-Archy receiving part of the wages and Stovall the balance. Archy became a resident of the State by the free will of his masternot as an escaped slave-for he came in company with his master, and was employed by him in the State for almost a year, and was unquestionably entitled to his freedom. The decision of Justice Burnett is neither dignified with a pretension to impartial research nor legal knowledge; and judging by his own language, he decided the case upon the score of policy. He says: "This is the first case, and under these circumstances we are not disposed to rigidly enforce the rule for the first time; but in reference to all future cases it is our purpose to enforce the rules laid down strictly, according to their true intent and spirit. It is therefore ordered that Archy be forthwith released from the custody of the Chief of Police and given into the custody of the petitioner, Charles A. Stovall." As this was the "first case," the learned Judge would consign Archy back to Slavery, but in the "fu ture" he would do better and "enforce the rules laid down, strictly." These rules were, that where a person took his slaves into a Free State and held them there until they gained a residence, he should hold that they were free. See Chief Justice Terry's concurring opinion in confirmation of this. He says: "I concur in the judgment and in the principles announced in the opinion of my associate, while I do not entirely agree with his conclusions. From the facts of the case, I think the delay of the petitioner was unavoidable, and that the fact of his engaging in labor in order to support himself during his necessary detention, did not divest his rights under the law of comity as laid down in the opinion." The language of the Chief Justice is, that because Stovall found it necessary to rely upon the earnings of Archy for his support, that there was an implied legal dominion in the former over the latter, and, that so long as the necessity of support existed with Mr. Stovall, he must continue to collect and appropriate the earnings of his "slaves." And notwithstanding that California was a free State, Archy could be removed beyond its limits, at the will of his "master." Stovall's counsel said: "But I cannot consent to stultify the members of the Convention who framed, or my fellow citizens who ratified the Constitution, by the indulgence of the thought that the section in view owed its place in the Constitution to so blind an infatuation as sympathy for a few hundred negro slaves. * * * Slavery derives its force and dignity from the same principles of right and reason, the same views of the nature and constitution of man, and the same sanction of Divine revelation as those from which the science of morality is deduced. Its effect is the moral and physical improvement of the slave himself." |