This was one of the most pretentious shows Wilkinson ever made in his commercial dealings in the West. The flags and guns were for a studied effect on the popular mind, unless perchance, the guns might be used to frighten off Indian marauders. Certainly he had no fear of the Spaniards. Most of the trade was carried by groups of two or three flatboats.18 The commerce down the river was only a part of the commercial venture as well as the political maneuver. Wilkinson, also, imported up the river from the Spanish domains a considerable quantity of commodities. The Spanish governor hoped to reap much from the possibilities of this up-river trade. He suggested to Wilkinson that he attempt no great profits from this trade, as to do so would mullify the main effects in view. "I have good reason to expect," he continued, "that the arrival of the boats will produce the most agreeable sensation among those people and make them feel more keenly that their felicity depends on the concession of such commercial facilities by his majesty and for the aquesition of which I conceive there are few sacrifices which they would not make." 19 It has been stated by some that Wilkinson made a fortune out of this trade. Another estimate is that his whole sales amounted, perhaps to $100,000.20 It is certainly true that if he grew rich out of this business, he had lost his wealth by 1791; for in that year he entered the United States army mainly for the money he would receive. In 1790 he was writing humiliating letters to his creditors, trying to stave off threatened law suits, until he could get money to meet their claims.21 The two mules that were brought into Frankfort in 1789, said to have been loaded with money for Wilkinson, were most likely part of a scheme to impress the Lincoln County farmers, who were there to receive money due them for tobacco they had advanced him.22 But regardless of how much profit Wilkinson was able to make, there can be no question that the economic situation was relieved appreciably by this trade; 23 and to that extent Wilkinson gained influence with the population generally, which he hoped to make ample use of at the proper time. Wilkinson had no exclusive agreement with the Spanish governor for conducting all the trade in the West with the Spaniards. Even if he should have had such an understanding, it could never have been carried out; for the dishonesty of Spanish officials was notorious. Some private traders were bribing their way through to New Orleans; others were less successful and were seized at the first Spanish port.24 Often those 18 As an example, in 1791, Wilkinson shipped one hundred and twenty hogsheads of tobacco to New Orleans on three flat boats in charge of Hugh McIlvain. The invoice for this cargo may be found in the Innes MSS., Vol. 2, 23. 19 For instance in 1788, a boat with a cargo valued at $8,000 was brought up from New Orleans. Verhoeff, Kentucky River Navigation, 56. 20 Ibid, 60, 61. 21 The impression seemed to have prevailed at that time among some, at least, that Wilkinson was reaping a harvest. John Breckinridge wrote in 1790, "We have some speculating Geniuses that are frequently floating to New Orleans and always bringing back bad returns; I leave you to judge of their Success." Letter to Nathaniel Richardson, February 11, 1790, in the Breckinridge MSS. [1790] in Library of Congress. 22 In the money sent Wilkinson on his tobacco transactions in New Orleans was a safe place to include his pension. 23 A copy of a letter written in Louisville, December 20, 1789, in Draper MSS. Collections, says, "Our trade with Spain has been very brisk, for some time past, and promises fair to be more so in the spring of the year. Permits have been granted by the Spanish government at New Orleans, to a number of persons to import flour, wheat, tobacco, and all kinds of provisions." It states that the prices of these commodities have increased considerably since the trade was opened. For further material on Wilkinson's trade see, James Wilkinson, Memoirs of My Own Times [Philadelphia, 1816], 3 vols; Daniel Clarke, Proofs of the Corruption of James Wilkinson, passim. 24 Andrew Bayard in a letter to Harry Innes, November 14, 1790, describes his who were able to get through and dispose of their cargoes were prohibited from taking out gold or silver coins.25 There were other regions in the West than Kentucky for Spain to intrigue with. She had her agents in the different communities in the Tennessee country and further south; and she played fast and loose with the Mississippi as the whim or occasion demanded. But Wilkinson was the most able and important of all those affected with this western malady. In Kentucky, he found men in the highest official position in the District who condoned, sympathized with, or actively aided him in his politico-economic connections with Spain. Innes was connected with much of what Wilkinson was doing and scheming, and was at one time actively engaged with him in his commercial transactions.26 The full meaning of Wilkinson's scheme, and the other Kentucky leaders in the movement will appear, when the grand effort was made in the summer and fall of 1788 to sever Kentucky's connection with the Union. difficulties with some boats bound for New Orleans. He says they stuck on the rocks at Louisville where they remained for two weeks, and that he had to pay laborers twenty English pounds to aid in removing them. Innes MSS., 19, No. 38. During 1789 and 1790 the rates charged by Spain on goods from United States [including Kentucky] were 20 per cent ad valorem; and for continuing on with them out of Spanish territory again, an export duty of 6 per cent was exacted. Innes MSS., 19, No. 63. 25 Ibid, 19, No. 61. 26 In the famous Street-Innes trial, the connection Innes had with Wilkinson and the Spaniards was gone into. Much of the evidence as to the actual guilt was fragmentary and circumstantial. Richard Thomas in an affidavit admitted going to New Orleans some time in 1787 or 1788 on business for Wilkinson and Innes, but never heard the latter say any thing about a Spanish connection. Innes MSS., 18, No. 38. Scattered through the Innes MSS. are fugitive letters and other documents, showing that Innes had a close connection with Wilkinson during this period. CHAPTER XXI THE SPANISH PLOT-THE SIXTH CONVENTION The next step in the movement for statehood was the election and meeting of the convention called for July [1788]. As has been noted, throughout the year 1787 and following, Wilkinson had been insidiously gaining an influence over the Kentuckians through that method that touched the people closest, their economic welfare. During this same period other events of great interest to Kentuckians were happening in Philadelphia. After four months of deliberations, the Constitutional Convention finished its labors in September [1787] and submitted to the states of the old Confederation a new constitution. The people west of the mountains had not been unmindful of what was going on in the East. A new national government might be stronger and more considerate of the needs of the West, or it might prove otherwise. In the summer of 1788 the Kentuckians were given a chance to register their decision on the question. As a part of Virginia, the District of Kentucky was given fourteen delegates to the convention called to determine Virginia's attitude on the new framework of government. Before the time for the Kentucky elections, the people had been played upon by their leaders and their very circumstances to such an extent that very few were in favor of the new document. Harry Innes wrote John Brown in February, 1788, that he was certain that "if the Constitution is adopted by us that we shall be the mere vassals of the Congress and the consequences to me are horrible and dreadful."1 As a result of these feelings, Kentucky sent to the Richmond convention what was supposed to be a solid delegation of opposition. Madison had early seen the dangers to Virginia's ratification lurking in the Virginia counties west of the mountains. He wrote Washington, "Kentucky has been extremely tainted and is supposed to be generally adverse, and every possible piece of address is going on privately to work on the local interests & prejudices of that and other quarters." 2 The convention met and the fight was soon on. Madison was among the leaders for ratification; Patrick Henry ably led the opposition. Both factions seemed to believe that the Kentucky delegation held the balance of power. Madison declared that "The only danger I apprehend is from the Kentucky members; and one consideration only has any weight with them: a fear that if the new government should take place, that their navigation would be given up." 3 The Kentucky delegation immediately became the object of every species of argument and intrigue. Patrick Henry played effectively on their fears that the navigation of the Mississippi might be sacrificed by the new government. He played this argument in season and out. With all of his power of oratory he pictured the West teeming with industry and wealth. He then turned to the other side of the picture, and showed a region deserted and in desolation and ruin. Skillfully playing on the desires and hopes of the Kentucky delegates, he bent his argument so as to leave in their minds the impression 1 Innes MSS., 28. Letter dated February 20, 1788, written from Danville. 2 Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, I, 384. 3 Writings of James Madison, V, 115. that the former picture would come true if ratification were defeated; but if this new government should be established, then the Mississippi would never be opened, and the worst must come. Henry was here using a dangerous weapon on the Kentuckians, and he can not be wholly freed from blame for much of what was afterwards said and done in Kentucky. The friends of ratification argued the strength the new government must have and the certainty that it would immediately set about securing the right to the Mississippi as well as redressing other Kentucky grievances. They showed how Kentucky had received nothing from the old Confederation government, and that the new government could scarcely do less for the West than the old had done. George Nichols, who was soon afterwards to become a resident of Kentucky, said, "I think that Kentucky has nothing to expect from any one state alone in America. She can expect support and succor alone from a strong, efficient government, which can command the resources of the Union when necessary. She can receive no support from the old Confederation. Consider the present state of that country. Declared independent of Virginia, to whom is she to look for succor? No sister state can help her. She may call upon the present general government; but whatever may be the wish of Congress, they can give them no relief. That country contains all my wishes and prospects. There is my property and there I intend to reside. I shall be averse to the establishment of any system which would be injurious to it. I flatter myself that this government will secure their happiness and liberty." 5 But little headway could be made against the effects of Patrick Henry's fervid oratory on the open Mississippi. On the eve of the final vote Madison became apprehensive that ratification might fail. He wrote Hamilton, "If we have a majority at all, it does not exceed three or four. If we lose it Kentucky will be the cause; they are generally if not unanimously against us." On the final vote, only three of the Kentucky delegates stood for ratification. They were Robert Breckenridge, Rice Bullock, and Humphrey Marshall; and these undoubtedly voted against the wishes of their constituents. Thus was the discontent of the Kentuckians increased. They had not only not yet been able to obtain separation from Virginia; but now they were to be tied, as the tail of the Virginia kite, to a new governmental arrangement, which they had almost unanimously tried to defeat. But in the meantime, other concerns of more vital interest to Kentuckians than ratification of the new constitution were agitating them. As has already been stated, one of the acts of the fifth convention was to request Virginia to appoint a Kentuckian on the Virginia delegation in the Congress of the Confederation. Anxious to please and to pacify, she designated John Brown, one of the Kentucky members of the General Assembly. On the convening of Congress, which proved to be the last under the old Confederation, Brown appeared to press the fifth convention's petition for admission into the union. But the old Confederation government in all its parts had by this time fallen so completely into disrepute, that for months no quorum could be obtained. But delay was fatal to Kentucky's petition, since Congress must give its permission, according to the Virginia compact, before July 4 [1788]. Finally when a quorum arrived, most of the representatives felt that 4 Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, I, 430-432. 5 Debates of the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution * * * * with the Journal of the Federal Convention * [Washington, 1836], Edited by J. Elliott, III, 360, 361. 6 Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, I, 434. 7 Brown, Political Beginnings of Kentucky, 106; Proceedings of the American Historical Association, V, 360. Two of the Kentucky delegation did not vote. the old Confederation in a dying gasp, should not enter into any business that might well be taken care of by the new government. On February 29, Brown started his proceedings by presenting the whole situation in Kentucky, to Congress in a long speech. The question thus set going was in March stifled in a committee, and for over two months Brown was unable to get definite action. On July 2, the committee of the whole recommended the passage of an act assenting to Kentucky's separation from Virginia and the admission of the new state into the Union. One month later such an act was on the verge of passing, when a report reached Philadelphia that New Hampshire had ratified the federal constitution, making the ninth state, and, thus, putting an end to the old Confederation. Further action was dropped. On the following day, the whole question was ended in the adoption of a recommendation to the new government that it admit Kentucky into the new Union.8 The decadence of Congress and the near approach of the new federal government cannot be held wholly responsible for the failure of Kentucky to get permission for statehood. Brown in his unfailing efforts to advance the statehood question was balked by that Eastern hostility to the West and its growing influence, that had so effectively played into the hands of certain leaders in Kentucky who had been urging that there should be an end to forbearance and that some decided action should be taken. A sectionalism between North and South was also rearing itself in this question. Brown said he was baffled by the group of Northern representatives who argued that to admit Kentucky would be to give the South a greater influence, and that either Vermont or Maine should enter the Union to offset Kentucky." This idea of balancing the sections was contained in a verse that went the rounds of the day: "Kentucky to the Union given, And neither South nor North prevails." 10 Balked as it seemed at every turn, the Kentuckians in the summer of 1788 began to make preparations for the assemblying of their sixth convention, which was widely believed would be the last. Thoughts on the contents of a constitution were beginning to be exchanged, greatly aided by the contributions appearing in the Kentucky Gazette. An organization that was playing an important part in formulating ideas into constitutional provisions was a group of men who were organized during the latter part of December of 1786 and came to be known as the Danville Political Club. This club was so closely identified in its membership with the successive conventions, that it can almost be called a secret caucus of those assemblies. Men who became its members formed more than one-fourth of the representatives to the first convenion [1785]; seven out of twenty-six in the second convention [1785]; and ten out of thirty-eight in the fifth convention [1787]. Among its members were Harry Innes, Christopher Greenup, John Brown, Thomas Todd, George Muter, Samuel McDowell and Benjamin Sebastian. Its membership was exclusive; not all who asked admittance were received.11 It was a training school for the future statesmen of Kentucky. Its method of debate was for two members to open the discussion on each side, and then the floor was free to all who cared to speak.12 Its mem 8 Brown, Political Beginnings of Kentucky, 112-120, 139-144. 9 Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 170. 10 J. Schouler, History of the United States of America [New York], 1908, Revised Edition, I, 164. 11 Thomas Speed, The Political Club, Danville, Kentucky, 1786-1790 [Louisville, 1894], 100, 101. All the minutes extant are found here. 12 Ibid, 105. |