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Cu. IV.



"It was at this time that the enemy's reinforcements came to his aid from the railroad train, understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army.* They threw themselves in the woods on our right and towards the rear of our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The re

and to the left of the road, down which much severe fighting. Some of the our troops had marched from Sudley regiments which had been driven from Spring, is a hill with a farm-house on the hill in the first two attempts of the it. Behind this hill the enemy had, enemy to keep possession of it had beearly in the day, some of his most come shaken, were unsteady, and had annoying batteries planted. Across the many men out of the ranks. road from this hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge, or table of land. The hottest part of the contest was for the possession of this hill with a house on it. Rickett's battery, which did such effective service and played so brilliant a part in this contest, was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the hill, and became the object of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded our officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, and allowing it to approach without firing upon it-in disabling the battery, and then attempting to take it. Three treat soon became a rout, and this times was he repulsed by different soon degenerated still further into a corps in succession, and driven back, panic. Finding this state of affairs and the guns taken by hand, the horses was beyond the efforts of all those who being killed, and pulled away. had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on the field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form in line, and offer the appearance at least of organization. They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Col. Porter's force of regulars. Once on

"The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had been fighting since half-past ten o'clock in the morning, and it was after three o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since two o'clock in the morning, and had made what, to those unused to such things, seemed a long march before coming into action, and were without food. They had done

* The rebel general, T. J. Jackson, was of especial service at this period of the battle. Coming up with his brigade of fresh troops, and displaying great steadiness, one enthusiastic South Carolina officer shouted, "Look, there is Jackson standing like a stonewall!" This epithet was considered a happy one, and was very generally attached afterwards to Jackson's name.-See Cooke's " Life f Jackson," pp. 68, 77.

* Beauregard, in his elaborate report, made some considerable time later, states that the balance of Johnston's force arrived under Kirby Smith, about three P.M., having left Manassas by railroad at noon. It was just at this critical moment that 4,000 fresh troops came to their help, and the rebels were enabled to gain the day.

the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost.

"By sundown," as General McDowell states, in conclusion, "most of our men had gotten behind Centreville Ridge, and it became a question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for our men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the


asserting, that the Union army was beaten by a force less than half their own number. Davis was in favor of immediate pursuit and a dash at the capital, which course indeed was the natural one to be adopted in order to reap the fruits of victory; but it was evident that the rebels were in no condition to avail themselves of their opportunity.+

Beauregard, though boasting of his great success, gives as his excuse for not following up and destroying the enemy, that his men were worn down by a long fight in a July day, and were hungry and thirsty; also, that

had no cavalry. Johnston accorded with this view of the subject, and said, in addition, that the certainty that General Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington with his

day before, and the utter disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the army, seemed the next day it rained steadily, and he to all who were near enough to be consulted-division and brigade commanders and staff to admit of no alternative but to fall back. On send ing the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found, as they reported army of 30,000 men sooner than to me, that our decision had been they could, prevented any serious anticipated by the troops, most of those thoughts of advancing against the who had come in from the front being capital. From all which, it may safely already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing and hurrying them along. At about ten o'clock, the rear guard (Blenker's brigade), moved, covering the retreat, which was effected during the night and next morning."

Jefferson Davis left Richmond by railroad on this eventful Sunday morning, and reached the field of battle about 4 P.M., when the contest was virtually decided. He telegraphed the welcome news to the Confederate Congress that same night, stating, truly enough, that it had been "a hard fought field." but, with needless mendacity,

be inferred that the ability, not the will, was wanting, and that the rebels acted judiciously in not making a futile attack upon Washington.

The losses at Bull Run were, according to General McDowell's report, 481

30,000, and was fully equal in numbers to that under command of General McDowell, and yet Davis unde took to say, as above, "our force was 15,000; that

* Beauregard's army numbered not less than

of the enemy estimated at 35,000." See Beauregard's

Report, and Pollard's "First Year of the War," p. 101.

+ See "Stonewall Jackson; a Military Biography," (New York, 1866) by John Esten Cooke, a profound

admirer of the man who had attained so singular a sobriquet. According to Mr. Cooke, Jackson, as he sat

exclaimed, "Give me ten thousand men, and I will be in Washington to-night!"

on his horse looking at the retreating Union troops,

CH. IV.]



killed, 1,011 wounded, 1,216 missing. The effect of the disaster at Bull Beauregard reported the rebel loss at Run was astounding. The news at 269 killed, 1,533 wounded, in all 1,852. first from the field of battle, as made Johnston made the number of killed known by reports and telegraphic com378, but agreed with Beauregard in the munications, had been cheering, and general result. No notice was taken promising certain and great victory. of some two or three hundred prison- The next news told of utter rout and ers made by our army in the early part disgrace; and Monday and Tuesday, of the battle and sent to Washington. the 22d and 23d of July, saw the Beauregard claimed as prisoners not streets of the capital thronged with less than 1,600 Union soldiers, and panic stricken crowds of those who estimated our loss at 4,500. Probably had literally fled when no man

the nearest approximation to the exact truth now possible is, rebel loss over 2,000; Union loss over 3,000. Beauregard also claimed as the spoils of the day, 28 pieces of artillery, about 5,000 muskets, nearly 500,000 cartridges, a garrison flag, and 10 colors captured in the field or in the pursuit ; and besides these, 64 artillery horses with their harness, 26 wagons and much camp equipage, clothing, and other property left behind.

Our limits do not admit of dwelling upon particular instances of valor and spirit on the part of the great majority of our officers and men, or of noticing the lack of these soldierly qualities and instincts, which were expected, as a matter of course, from all our troops. Neither are we able now to spare time in narrating well authenticated cases of barbarity, cruelty and outrage towards the dying and the dead, after the battle was over. The conduct of the rebels on this occasion was marked by ungovernable, blind fury, and was disgraceful in the last degree to themselves and our common humanity.*

* See Duyckinck's "War for the Union," vol. i., pp. 402--416; Senator Wade's Report to the Senate, in


pursued. In the great cities, and throughout the country, as the wildly exaggerated telegrams made known the overthrow of our army, the people were in a maze, and could with difficulty credit the unwelcome reports of disgraceful defeat. High-spirited and self-confident, never supposing defeat possible, men at the North ran into an opposite extreme, and for the moment looked upon what the rebels had done at Bull Run as a virtual guarantee of their final success.* But the depression and discouragement, wonderful as they seemed, were only temporary. Bitter as was the lesson of that memorable week at the close of July, it was a salutary lesson. It showed loyal men what was before them; that it was no holiday undertaking of a few weeks or months to put down rebellion or trea son, organized as they were on a scale

behalf of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War; April 30th, 1862.

* Military critics (such as Major Barnard and others)

are agreed, that General McDowell's plan of the battle

was well laid and would have resulted in a decisive

victory, had it not been for delays, above noted, on

Friday and Saturday, and the escaping of Johnston's four or five thousand men from Patterson's watching, thereby causing a panic among a portion of the Union army just at the critical moment.

of magnitude and power undreamt of heretofore; and that, if the Union was to be sustained, it must be by united, steady, unflinching energy and devotion in its behalf. The resolution and spirit of Congress we have already noted (see p. 54). The people of the loyal states likewise speedily nerved themselves to avenge the losses at Bull

Run, and to hold up the hands of the government at any cost, in crushing the mad and desperate attempt to destroy the life and integrity of the nation.

We shall see, as we proceed in our narrative, how thoroughly the noble, manly qualities of our countrymen were roused up into efficient action in this their hour of trial.




Position of foreign nations-Course of England and France, how affecting the United States-Importance of foreign relations Secession efforts abroad — Feeling towards the United States in Great Britain and France -Hostility to the Union - British government hastens to acknowledge belligerent character of Southern Confederacy - Queen's proclamation - How looked on in America-Neutrality enjoined - Ill success of the rebel agents abroad-Louis Napoleon's course Diplomatic notes and courtesies - Friendly spirit of Russia

- Articles of Congress of Paris (1856) on privateering — Offer of the United States on the subject - Proviso of Earl Russell — Privateering carried on -- The Savannah taken - Trial of the privateersmen; are they pirates or not? - Davis's threats and acts - Government abandon the prosecution - Privateering only moderately successful - The Petrel and the St. Lawrence- The Jeff. Davis and her end-The negro Tillman's heroism - Public feeling at this date Mason and Slidell new agents to go to Europe-Reach HavanaSail in the Trent, English mail packet-Capt. Wilkes in San Jacinto stops the Trent and captures Mason and Slidell and their secretaries - Public applause - Attitude of the government - Excitement in England - Rebel commissioners demanded — War apparently imminent - Mr. Seward's argument and decisionMason and Slidell given up-Chagrin and disappointment of the rebels and their friends at home and abroad-Pungent remarks of the London Times.

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THE position of foreign nations and | friends and well wishers of our country, the probable course to be pursued by they should so direct their policy, and them in regard to the United States, should assume such ground, as that the was a matter of very grave importance weight of their influence would be given at the outbreak of the rebellion. Eng to the support of the Union and the land and France, especially, were so crushing out the rebellion, the case situated as to render their line would be rendered more easy of settle1861. of action of the utmost moment, ment by means of the United States whether for good or evil, to the Great power on the land, where alone the Republic. If, acting out the noble, rebels had succeeded in organizing any manly part, which becomes sincere effective resistance against the authority

CH. V.]



of the government. If, on the other The leaders in the seceded states were hand, the great maritime nations, like also profoundly interested in the con England and France, should see fit, dition of affairs abroad, and the manner more or less openly to encourage the so- in which their present attempt at a called confederacy in its ambitious de- breaking up of the Union might be signs, and in addition to recognizing its looked upon by the great powers of belligerent character, should aid in fur- Europe. If England and France should nishing it not only with supplies of favor their cause, directly, or at least various sorts but also with the means indirectly, it would greatly facilitate of preying upon the commerce of the matters, and would almost ensure suc United States, they certainly had the cess to the rebellion; but if they power so to do, while holding a profess- should refuse entirely any countenance edly friendly attitude to the government to this proposed rending in pieces of which they were virtually helping to the Union, and should look upon the undermine and destroy. And, in such outbreak as an insurrection, which the an event, the rebellion would be all the lawful government of the land was able more likely to protract its existence, if to and would in due time suppress, not finally to succeed in accomplishing then, the hopes and expectations of the its ends. confederates would be sadly curtailed of their fair proportions, and their chances of final success very consider ably diminished.

Fully alive to the importance and necessity of securing foreign sympathy and aid, the astute leaders in secession and revolution had given very careful attention to the subject from the beginning. Agents, admirably adapted to the work in hand, such as Yancey,* Rost, Mann, and Butler King, had been sent abroad to leaven the public opinion, to excite prejudice against 1861. the government, to gain the ear of politicians and men in power, to

Of course, the government of the United States felt an unusually deep interest in the views which might find predominance among foreign nations, who were watching with profound concern the incipiency of our great national struggle; and was well aware how much depended upon the course which they might think best to adopt. It was consequently seen at once to be of the highest importance, that our country should be represented at foreign courts by the ablest and most energetic men which could be obtained. Happily, Messrs. Adams, Dayton, Clay, Motley, Marsh, and others were selected, and misrepresent the origin and aim of the by their labors at their several posts, rebellion, to enlarge upon the advanta they soon gave evidence of the wisdom ges they had to offer, in a commercial which had led to their appointment. point of view, to foreign nations, and Our country had abundant reason to such like; and it must be confessed, be satisfied that her interests were com- that, by persistent, unscrupulous statemitted to the hands of some of her ments, by activity and zeal worthy of noblest sons. * See McPherson's "History of the Rebellion," p. 27

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