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CH. XIX.]

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ALTERNATIVES FOR MCCLELLAN.

the
in command of the right wing of the
army, and a part of whose corps held
the strongly entrenched position of
Beaver Dam Creek.

199

of Fitz John Porter, who was direct upon Richmond, or to transfer the right wing to the south bank and make a change of base to the James. River. The first course just named was too full of risk, and in case of re pulse the entire army would be destroyed. Some critics, like Mr. Swinton, are

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During the afternoon of the 26th of June, the rebels crossed in several columns, in the vicinity of Mechanics of opinion that the second of these ville and Meadow Bridge, and attacked alternatives was both bold and brilliant, McCall, who was in position at Beaver in fact too much so for McClellan,* and Dam Creek. Our troops were conceal that it might have been tried with good ed by earth works, commanding the prospect of success. The last, the Mechanicsville road, on which change of base, was judicious, and 1862. the rebel divisions under Long. though attended with serious difficulty street were advancing; and when the and danger, was probably the safest enemy had approached within short under all the circumstances. The disrange, they opened a very destructive tance from Fair Oaks to the James River fire of artillery and musketry in the was about seventeen miles, and there faces and on the flanks of the foe, driv- was only a single road by which baging them back in great confusion. The gage and stores could be moved; but slaughter was terrible, the rebels having the activity and steadiness of our troops lost between three and four thousand, were such, that the purpose of the comwhile the Union loss was inconsiderable. manding general was nearly completed Another effort was made by the enemy before it was at all comprehended by in the morning, but without success; the rebels. The wagons and heavy Jackson, meanwhile, having passed guns were withdrawn during the night Beaver Dam Creek above, turned the of the 26th of June, and united with position, and, of course, rendered it un- the train which was to set out the next tenable for our troops.* evening for the James River. At the It now became a question requiring same time Stoneman proceeded with a immediate decision on the part of Mc-flying column to the White House, Clellan, what was to be done; whether which depot, all the stores along the to cross with his entire army and fight railroad having been re-shipped or dethe rebels on the north bank of the stroyed, was evacuated. Stoneman Chickahominy, or to concentrate his having successfully accomplished his troops on the south bank and march work, fell back upon Yorktown. The

* It is a curious question why McDowell, who was remaining inactive at Fredericksburg, did not make a demonstration along the Richmond road. Had he done so, of which Lee was afraid, Jackson's flank march would have been entirely impracticable. The authorities at Washington, with their insane terror in regard to rebel assaults upon the city, will, if ever the history of the rebellion is fully wri ten, have much to answer for.

* "Army of the Potomac," p. 147. Mr. Swinton also quotes from the report of Magruder, who says: "I considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger part of it was on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, the bridges had been all destroyed, but one was rebuilt, and there were but 25,000 men between his- McClellan's-army of 100,000 men and Richmond."

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rear guard of McCall's division, con. sisting of Seymour's brigade, was attacked by the enemy, who, being sharply repulsed, did not attempt further to molest the movement of our men.

Under the circumstances, with the rebels threatening various parts of the centre and left, it was felt to be impossible for Porter to cross to the south bank of the Chickahominy by daylight. Jackson had turned the position of the right wing at Beaver Dam Creek, and McClellan deemed it absolutely neces sary to engage him with Porter's corps and with whatever reinforcements could be sent from the south bank. The enemy were so close upon Porter that there was no alternative. He must be met and repulsed; for, in any event, the abandonment of Porter's position at that time would have placed the right flank and rear of our army at the mercy of the foe. It was a case of necessity to fight the rebels where our men stood, and to hold the position, at any cost, until night (this was the 27th of June), and in the meantime to perfect the arrangements for the change of base to the James River.

The position now occupied by Porter, between Coal Harbor and the Chickahominy, was well chosen, and his force was so arranged as to make an effective resistence to the attacks of the enemy. About two P.M., on the 27th of June, A. P. Hill, with the advance of Lee's column, began the attack. Jackson, who was to form the rebel left, had not yet come up, and Longstreet awaited his arrival before going into action. Hill's attack, though furious and persistent, was met with the

1862.

greatest firmness on the part of our men, and after several hours' desperate efforts he was compelled to retire in the greatest disorder and with heavy loss. Longstreet now began an attack on the left of the Union position, and Jackson's corps having come up, a general advance from right to left was made at six o'clock. Porter had called for reinforcements, and had received in response only Slocum's division, making his entire force about 35,000 men.*

The assault now made was fierce and tremendous. Our right held its ground, and repulsed the enemy with great steadiness and bravery. Our left showed equal valor, but being worn down by fighting nearly all day, and furiously charged upon by Hood's Texan troops, it gave way; confusion and derangement ensued, and great disorder from the commingled cavalry and infantry; Jackson carried the height on the left by a rush, capturing 14 pieces of artil lery; and defeat, if not destruction, seemed to have fallen with crushing weight upon Porter and his men. Happily two brigades, sent across the river by Sumner, appeared just in time, and under the influence of their vigorous and spirited help, the stragglers were stopped, and the troops finally rallied and were reformed. The darkness fast coming on prevented Lee from pushing his advantage. He did not yet

time, says that Magruder's "great show and move * Swinton, speaking of the position of matters at the ment and clatter," kept all our commanders occupied, and they declared that, no troops could be spared "And thus it happened that' while on the north side of

the Chickahominy 30,000 Union troops were being as sailed by 70,000 Confederates, 25,000 Confederates on "Army of the Potomac," p. 151.

the south side held in check 60,000 Union troops."

CH. XIX.]

CROSSING OF WHITE OAK SWAMP.

comprehend McClellan's plans, and he and his officers exulted in the thought that now our army would be inevitably captured or destroyed.

During the night the final withdrawal of the right wing across the Chickahominy was completed, without difficulty and without confusion, a portion of the regulars remaining on the left bank until the morning of the 28th. Early on that morning the bridges were burned, and the whole army was thus concentrated on the right bank of the Chickahominy. The loss on the Union side, though severe, was never accurately estimated; the rebel loss was probably not short of 10,000.

In striving to secure his change of base to the James River, McClellan displayed much skill and ability. He masked the retreat of his troops by holding the line of works on the south side of the Chickahominy, and completely deceived Magruder and Huger respecting what was going on. It was not, in fact, till the night of the 28th of June, that Lee, having ascertained what had taken place on the York River, and disappointed in his expectations as to supplies, etc., in that direction, fully divined the purpose of McClellan, who, meanwhile, had gained 24 hours, which were of very great value and importance to him in his difficult undertaking.

In the course of the night of the 27th, Gen. Keyes was ordered to cross the White Oak Swamp with the 4th corps, and take up a position to cover the pas. sage of the trains. Measures were also taken to increase the number of bridges across the swamp. The trains were set in motion at an early hour, and con

VOL. IV.-26

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tinued passing night and day until all had crossed. There was the long train of 5,000 wagons and 2,500 beef cattle, which all traversed the morass in safety by the single narrow passage provided. On the 28th, Porter's corps was also moved across the White Oak Swamp, and on the morning of the 29th, took up a position covering the roads leading from Richmond towards White Oak Swamp and Long Bridges. Durthe night of the 28th and 29th, the divisions of Slocum and McCall were ordered across the White Oak Swamp, and were placed in position to cover the passage of the remaining divisions and trains. In the course of the same night, the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman and the division of Smith were ordered to fall back so as to cover Savage Station on the railroad. They were ordered to hold this position until dark, and then to retire across the swamps and rejoin the rest of the army.

Lee, on the morning of June 29th, hastened to set out in pursuit of the retreating army. Magruder and Huger were to take the Williamsburg and Charles City Roads; Longstreet was to cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge and move down near the James, so as, if possible, to intercept the retreat; and Jackson, passing over Grape Vine Bridge, was to make his way down the south bank of the Chickahominy.

Sumner, having ascertained that the rebels were crossing the Chickahominy and marching toward Savage Station, moved his troops from Allen's Field to that place, and united with Smith's division. Heintzelman, who was on Sumner's left, fell back entirely, and

crossed White Oak Swamp. This left the brunt of the attack by Magruder to be borne by Sumner at Savage Station; and bravely was it borne. Jackson did not arrive to aid Magruder, in consequence of having to rebuild the bridge over the Chickahominy; and Magruder impetuously attacking Sumner, met with a bloody repulse. During the night, the second corps and Smith's division crossed the swamp in safety, with all their guns and material, and brought up the rear of the wagon train. The pursuit undertaken by Lee was made in two columns, Jackson proceeding by way of the White Oak Swamp, and Longstreet by the roads skirting the James River, so as to cut off our column on its march. Jackson, delayed by the necessity of restoring the bridge, found, on attempting to cross the swamp, that our batteries effectually stopped his passage. Consequently, he was unable to advance and join Longstreet in the battle at Glendale or Turkey Bridge, which took place on the afternoon of June 30th. Longstreet, on reaching the intersection of the New Market and Quaker Roads, by which latter the army and its trains were hurrying towards the James River, found this important point covered by McCall's Pennsylvania troops, supported by Sumner and Hooker on the left, and Kearny on the right. About three P.M., the fighting was begun by Longstreet and Hill, who made desperate efforts to force the position, but were repulsed by the terrible fire of artillery and musketry on the part of our men. The brunt of the attack fell upon the division of McCall, who was taken pri

soner, and the battle was continued until night brought it to a close.

1862.

The rebels having been thus severely handled, left our men free to act without molestation until the following day. Accordingly, the last of the trains reached Haxall's Landing during the evening, and under cover of the night the troops quietly withdrew, and arrived in safety at an early hour the next morning, to occupy a new and very strong position on Malvern Hill. Lee, finding this to be the case, determined to attack McClellan on the 1st of July, not without hope that an army which had gone through what the Army of the Potomac had, day after day for nearly a week, could be beaten in a general engagement. But the result showed how greatly he erred in his calculation. McClellan promptly placed the army in position to meet the enemy, should he again attack the left of our line; a brigade was posted in the low ground to the left of Malvern Hill, watching the road to Richmond; and the line of our troops then followed a line of heights nearly parallel to the river, and bending back through the woods nearly to the James on our right. The attack by the rebels was fierce and determined; but it was met with heroic steadiness by our troops, and our artil lery fire was fearfully destructive to the enemy. Late in the evening, the rebels fell back and gave up the battle.

It being necessary that the army should, as soon as possible, reach its supplies and a place of rest, McClel lan left Malvern Hill, and the troops retired, during the night of the 1st and 2d of July, to Harrison's Bar, on the

CH. XIX.]

CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN.

James River. Lee, having ascertained that McClellan was too strongly posted to make it safe to venture further attack, took up his march some three or four days after, and returned to Richmond. The losses in killed, wounded and missing, in these Seven Days' Battles were, on the Union side, over 15,000; on that of the rebels, considerably greater, being, according to some authorities, more than 19,000

There was much of disappointment and grief in the loyal states at the failure of the campaign against Richmond, and the disastrous retreat to the James River. At the same time it was freely admitted that McClellan displayed generalship of a high order in this retreat, and accomplished successfully one of the most difficult and hazardous of the operations of war, and that the heroism of the army was worthy of perpetual memory. In his report, under date of July 15th, McClellan avows himself willing to abide by the candid decision of competent and trustworthy judges. "To the calm judgment of history and the future, I leave the task of pronouncing upon this movement, confident that its verdict will be that no such difficult movement was ever more successfully executed; that no army ever fought more repeatedly, heroically, and successfully against such great odds; that no men of any race displayed greater discipline, endurance, patience, and cheerfulness, under such hardships. My mind cannot coin expressions of thanks and admiration warm enough, to do justice to my feelings toward the army I am so proud to command."

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Pollard, as representing the state of feeling in the rebel states, is quite jubi lant over the enforced retreat of McClel lan; yet, at the same time, he is com pelled to acknowledge the ability and energy displayed by both the command. ing general and all under his direction, and to confess that little real advantage was gained to the cause of secession by all that Lee and his army accomplished. If McClellan and his army could have been routed utterly, then the rebellion might have entertained hopes of ulti mate success; but as he parried the blows of Lee with great skill, and dealt equally severe blows in return, effecting finally the transfer of his force in safety to the banks of the James River, it is evident on reflection, that the advantages obtained were more apparent than substantial, and that whatever might be the feelings of the moment, the loyal states would not yield to disappoint ment, but would prosecute the war to the complete crushing of the rebellion.*

On the 5th of July, Davis, at Richmond, issued an address for the purpose of rousing the energies of his followers and of the troops under his control. Gen. McClellan also, on the national holiday, July 4th, in an address to the "Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac," uttered words of encouragement and promise. "On this, the nation's birthday, we declare to our foes, who are rebels against the best interests of mankind, that this army shall enter the capital of the socalled Confederacy; that our National Constitution shall prevail; and that

* "Second Year of the War," pp. 73-76. Pollard is very severe on the blunders and bungling work of those in command at the time in Richmond.

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