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BATTLE OF MONOCACY BRIDGE.

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from the invalid corps; and the rapidity of reinforcements was the important and critical concern.

On the 3d July, Gen. Early approached Martinsburg, accompanied by a cavalry force under Ransom. Gen. Sigel, who was in command of the Federal forces there, retreated across the Potomac at Shephardstown; and Gen. Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry, crossed the river, and occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards Frederick City. Meanwhile Gen. "Lew." Wallace, a commander much akin in character to "Beast" Butler, and who had distinguished himself in Baltimore by a cowardly ferocity and an easy prowess in the arrest and persecution of citizens, pushed out from that city with Ricketts' division and his own command, and took a position at Monocacy Bridge.

BATTLE OF MONOCACY BRIDGE.

Gen. Early had pressed on, crossed the Potomac, and, advancing to Frederick City, found it evacuated by the Federal troops, and that the enemy had concentrated his forces at Monocacy Bridge, four miles distant. The Federals held the east bank of the river, which runs due north and south, and were drawn up along the railroad. Early, having crossed the river south of the bridge, sent forward Evans' brigade across an open field to develop the strength of the enemy. It moved steadily under a heavy fire of musketry until within fifty yards of the enemy's position, when another body of Federals emerged from the woods on its right, and took it in flank. The other forces of Early were rapidly moved to the critical point; a simultaneous charge was made; and the enemy broke in shameful confusion, leaving the railroad and national pike, and retreating in the direction of Gettysburg. His losses were more than a thousand killed and wounded, and seven hundred prisoners.

From Monocacy Gen. Early moved on Washington, his cavalry advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th July. He was now within sight of Washington, and the fire of the skirmishers was heard at the "White House," and in the department buildings of the capital. The enormous march, however, had diminished his army. The five hundred miles of incessant advance, at twenty miles a day, left him only eight thousand infantry, about forty field pieces and two thousand cavalry with which to assault the works around Washington.

The most important of these works was Fort Stevens. On the 12th a severe skirmish, resulting from a reconnoissance, occurred in front of this fort; but Gen. Early declined to follow it up, and, by a decisive blow, attempt the capture of Washington. Reflecting that he was in the heart of the enemy's country, and not knowing what force defended the capital,

he abandoned his design upon it, and in the night of the 12th commenced his retreat.

There has been much question as to the extent of the danger to which Washington was at this time exposed, and as to the merit of Early's declination of attack. Northern writers declare that if Early had made a vigorous attack when he first came up, and not lost a day in a fruitless reconnoissance, it would have resulted in the capture of the city, so feebly was it then defended. Fortunately we have some distinct evidence on this point. Gen. Grant has testified that two divisions of the Sixth Corps, and the advance of the Nineteenth Corps had reached Washington before Early got there. Whether it would have been prudent for Early to match this force, while Hunter was hastening from the West to strike his rear, and cut him off from his only avenue of retreat across the Potomac, is a question for the military critic to decide.

Gen. Early, having broke up his camp before Washington, retreated, and with little molestation recrossed the Potomac, and finally stood at bay on the Opequon to protect the Shenandoah Valley. The results of the expedition fell below public expectation at the South, where again had been indulged the fond imagination of the capture of Washington. But the movement was, on the whole, a success; Early brought off five thousand horses and twenty-five hundred beef cattle; and the primary object of the march had been accomplished when he retreated and posted himself in the Shenandoah Valley-a standing threat to repeat the enterprise upon Washington -for we shall see that it was no longer a mere detached column that opposed him, but an army of forty or fifty thousand men. To that extent Gen. Grant had been weakened, and the heavy weight upon Gen. Lee's shoulders lightened.

THE MINE FIASCO AT PETERSBURG.

While Early was detached from Lee's lines, Gen. Grant made what may be described as his last attempt to take Petersburg by a coup de main. There were three parts of the enterprise: an assault on the Federal position on Burnside's front; the explosion of a mine under an angle of the Confederate works, to open the way to the attack; and a feint of operations on the north side of the James, to deceive Lee into sending away a portion of his troops.

In June a plan had been suggested by one of Burnside's officers to excavate a tunnel under an angle of the Confederate works that was covered by a six-gun battery. On the 25th July the work was completed. Its length was about five hundred feet, and at the end of the tunnel the mine was formed, running parallel with and directly under the fort that was to

THE MINE EXPLOSION OF PETERSBURG.

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be destroyed. On the 27th, the enormous quantity of 12,000 lbs. of powder was placed in the mine, fuses were constructed and connected with the magazine, and everything was in readiness for the grand explosion.

The mine was exploded between four and five o'clock in the morning of the 30th July. An immense mass of dull, red earth was thrown two hundred feet in the air; human forms, gun-carriages, and small arms were mingled in what appeared to be a bank of clouds blazing with lightning; a great shock smote the ear, and the ground trembled as if by an appalling convulsion of nature. Instantly, before the rumble of the explosion had died away, every piece of siege artillery on the enemy's line, and all the field artillery that could be brought into position opened as with the grand chorus of death. With such an infernal display to strike terrour into the Confederates and to demoralize men suddenly awakened from sleep, the Ninth Corps, fifteen thousand strong, marched out to attack, and complete what was thought to be an easy and certain victory.

But Lee's soldiers were not men who could be fought after the Chinese fashion of assailing the ears with terrible sounds. They were quickly prepared to meet the enemy. The assaulting colum.n, on reaching the scene of explosion, found that there had been opened here a huge crater, one hundred and fifty feet .ong, sixty feet wide, and from twenty-five to thirty deep. It did not advance beyond it; instead of rushing forward and crowning the crest, the assailants made the most shameful exhibition of timidity; they huddled into the crater, they sought shelter there, and no commands or persuasions could move them further. A division of negro

troops was thrown into the crater-this maw of death; and for two hours the mingled mass of white and black troops, utterly demoralized, unable to pluck up courage to make a determined charge upon the crest, swayed to and fro in the hollow of the exploded earthworks, while the Confederates were rapidly bringing up their artillery on the right and left of the crater to destroy the enemy before he could extricate himself from the disgraceful coil. Once a feeble charge, in which the black troops were put in advance, was made towards the crest. It was encountered by Mahone's brigade. His men were ordered not to fire until they could see the whites of the negroes' eyes. At the first volley delivered at this distance, the blacks broke; they were panic-stricken and past control; they rushed through the troops in the crater back to the original lines, while into this slaughterpen the Confederates now poured an incessant storm of bombs and shells. Retreat across the open space in rear of it was to run the gauntlet of death. The ground all around was dotted with the fallen; while the sides and bottom of the crater were literally lined with dead, the bodies lying in every conceivable position. Some had evidently been killed with the butts of muskets, as their crushed skulls and badly smashed faces too plainly indicated; while the greater portion were shot, great pools of blood having

flowed from their wounds and stained the ground. In a few short hours of morning the enemy had lost between four and five thousand men, and had accomplished nothing.

"This miserable affair," as Gen. Grant himself was forced to entitle it appears to have been sufficient to satisfy him that he could not hope for the capture of Petersburg from expedients, partial efforts and coups de main, and that the task was one of magnitude far beyond his original comprehension. His last spasmodic effort went far to persuade the Northern public that his whole campaign was a failure, and that they had miscalculated the importance of his mere vicinity to the Confederate capital, when Gen. Lee had been able to hold Petersburg against an attack combining so many elements of success, and that too after he had detached an important column into the valley of Virginia, and sent five of his divisions to the north side of the James. The commentary of the New York Times was logical and significant. It said: "Under the most favourable circumstances, with the rebel force reduced by two great detachments, we failed to carry their lines. Will they not conclude that the twenty-five thousand men that held Grant in check are sufficient to garrison the works of Petersburg Will they not conclude that, if they were able thus to hold their own with the force of from eighteen to twenty thousand men sent to the north side of the James River neutralized, this force is available for active operations elsewhere?"

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CHAPTER XXXIII.

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SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA THE IMPORTANT CORRESPONDENT OF GRANT'S IN VIRGINIA,
-THE ON-TO-RICHMOND," AND THE ON-TO-ATLANta," the twO IMPORTANT MOVE-
MENTS OF 1864.-SHERMAN'S DEMAND OF NUMBERS.-GEN. JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON'S COM
MAND.-HE PROPOSES AN OFFENSIVE MOVEMENT.IS BALKED BY BRAGG AT RICHMOND.
-STATEMENT OF JOHNSTON'S FORCES ON 1ST MAY.-JOHNSTON'S POLICY OF RETREAT.-
HE PROPOSES TO FIGHT AT CASSVILLE; BUT IS OVERRULED BY HOOD AND HARDEE.—HE
CROSSES THE ETOWAH-ENGAGEMENT AT NEW HOPE CHURCH.-BATTLE OF KENESAW
MOUNTAIN.SHERMAN'S GHASTLY EXPERIMENT.—HE RESORTS TO MANŒUVRING.-JOHN-
STON RETIRES TO ATLANTA.-THE SITUATION AROUND ATLANTA.-DEFEAT OF STURGIS'
COLUMN IN NORTH MISSISSIPPI.-JOHNSTON MASTER OF THE SITUATION.-WONDERFUL
SUCCESS OF HIS RETREAT.-HE HOLDS SHERMAN SUSPENDED FOR DESTRUCTION.-NAVAL
FIGHT IN MOBILE BAY.—A MATCH OF 212 GUNS AGAINST 22.-HOW THE GUN-BOATS SELMA
AND MORGAN FOUGHT THE ENEMY.-GALLANT FIGHT OF THE IRON-CLAD TENNESSEE.-
—SURRENDER OF THE FORTS IN THE HARBOUR.-LITTLE VALUE OF FARRAGUT'S CONQUEST.
-EXCESSIVE LAUDATION OF HIM IN THE NORTH.-SINKING OF THE CONFEDERATE PRI-
VATEER ALABAMA.-REVIEW OF THE RESULT OF THE PRIVATEERING SERVICE OF THE CON-
"6
FEDERATES.-A GLANCE AT BRITISH NEUTRALITY."-HOW EARL RUSSELL WAS BULLIED
BY THE WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT.—THE STORY OF THE LAIRDS' RAMS.-CRUISE OF THE
ALABAMA.—WHY SHE FOUGHT THE KEARSARGE OFF THE FRENCH COAST.-CAPT. SEMMES'
MOTIVES FOR A NAVAL DUEL.-THE ALABAMA SINKING.THE FEDERAL VESSEL SENDS

NO RELIEF.-MR. SEWARD'S LITTLE REMARK ABOUT "PIRATES."-DISCOVERY OF CON

CEALED ARMOUR ON THE KEARSARGE.-HOW THE RICHMOND EDITORS WOUID HAVE
TREATED CAPT. WINSLOW.-A CURIOUS ANECDOTE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT.-CAFTURE OF
THE PRIVATEER FLORIDA.-THE EXPLOIT OF NAPOLEON COLLINS IN A NEUTRAL PORT.-
HE ATTEMPTS TO SINK AND THEN STEALS THE CONFEDERATE VESSEL.-THE NEW YORK
66
HERALD AND THE PAGES OF HISTORY."-INVASION OF MISSOURI BY GEN. PRICE.-HOW
AND WHY IT FAILED. THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI SUNK OUT OF SIGHT IN THE WAR.

THE important correspondent of Grant's campaign in Virginia was that of Sherman in Georgia; the great military effort of 1864 being resolved into two important movements: the "On-to-Richmond," and the "On-to-Atlanta." These grand movements were on different sides of the Alleghany mountains; a thousand miles of distance intervened between them; but both concurred in the design of attempting deep operations in the South, and reaching what were deemed vital points of the Confederacy.

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