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become so chilled in any change of events, or in any mutation of for tune, as to forget alike its debts of gratitude and its objects of pride in the glorious past; and that the time could ever come when the household effects of Stonewall Jackson would be sold under the hammer of an auctioneer, and the family of this man committed to the trials and chances of poverty !

CHAPTER XXIII.

VICKSBURG, THE SECOND PRIZE OF THE WAR.-GEN. GRANT.—WHAT HIS PERSISTENCY WAS WORTH.-HIS NEW SCHEME OF ATTACK.-TWO PARTS OF THE ENTERPRISE.-PORTER'S GUNBOATS RUN THE BATTERIES.-GRANT'S MARCH FROM MILLIKEN'S BEND.-BLINDNESS OF GEN. PEMBERTON AT VICKSBURG.-ANTECEDENTS AND CHARACTER OF THIS COMMANDER. HIS EXTREME INCOMPETENCY.-PRESIDENT DAVIS BLAMED.-HIS CAPRICE AND OBSTINACY.-GRANT CROSSES THE MISSISSIPPI AND MOVES TOWARDS PORT GIBSON.—GEN. JOHNSTON'S TELEGRAM TO PEMBERTON.-CRITICAL OPPORTUNITY OF THE CAMPAIGN.—— PEMBERTON REFUSES TO USE IT, AND DISREGARDS JOHNSTON'S DESPATCH.-battle of PORT GIBSON.—EXTRAORDINARY VALOUR OF BOWEN'S COMMAND.-GRANT TURNS GRAND GULF AND MOVES UPON JACKSON.-GEN. JOHNSTON'S ARRIVAL AT JACKSON.-SITUATION AND STRENGTH OF THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.-EVACUATION OF JACKSON.-JOHNSTON OFFERS A SECOND OPPORTUNITY OF ATTACK TO PEMBERTON.-THE LATTER DISOBEYS THE ORDER AND COMMITS A FATAL ERROUR.-SHERMAN'S INCENDIARY RECORD IN JACKSON.— HIS USE OF THE FIRE-BRAND.-GRANT FORCES BATTLE UPON PEMBERTON.-BATTLE OF BAKER'S CREEK.-TREMENDOUS EXERTIONS OF STEVENSON'S DIVISION. GEN. LORING FAILS TO SUPPORT HIM, REMAINS INACTIVE, AND IS CUT OFF IN THE RETREAT.—PEMBERTON'S NEW POSITION UPON THE BIG BLACK.—ITS STRENGTH. IT IS SHAMEFULLY ABANDONED.-DISGRACEFUL RETREAT OF PEMBERTON'S ARMY.-THE FATE OF VICKSBURG VIRTUALLY DECIDED AT THE BIG BLACK.-GEN. JOHNSTON ORDERS THE EVACUATION OF VICKSBURG. PEMBERTON ENTRAPPED THERE.-SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.CONFIDENCE OF THE GARRISON RESTORED.-PROSPECT OF RELIEF FROM JOHNSTON.-HOW IT WAS VISIONARY.-TWO ASSAULTS OF THE ENEMY REPULSED.-PAINFUL OPERATIONS OF SIEGE.-SUFFERINGS OF THE GARRISON.-JOHNSTON HAS SOME HOPE OF EXTRICATING THE GARRISON. TAYLOR'S ATTACK AND REPULSE AT MILLIKEN'S BEND.PEMBERTON'S DESPATCH TO JOHNSTON. THE REPLY: SOMETHING MAY YET BE DONE TO SAVE VICKSBURG."-JOHNSTON PREPARES TO ATTACK ON 7TH JULY.—PEMBERTON SURRENDERS ON FOURTH OF JULY.-HIS CONFERENCE WITH GRANT.A TERRIBLE DAY'S WORK.-EXTENT OF THE DISASTER TO THE CONFEDERATE CAUSE.-SURRENDER OF PORT HUDSON.-OTHER EVENTS IN THE REGION OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONNECTED WITH THE FALL OF VICKSBURG.OPERATIONS IN THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI.-BATTLE OF HELENA.-OBJECT OF GEN. HOLMES' MOVEMENT ON HELENA.-AN EXTRAORDINARY MARCH.-AN EXTRAORDINARY COUNCIL OF WAR. GEN. PRICE PROTESTS AGAINST AN ATTACK.-HE IS ORDERED TO TAKE GRAVEYARD" FORT.-HE SUCCEEDS. THE OTHER ATTACKS FAIL.-DISASTROUS RETREAT OF gen. HOLMES. THE CAMPAIGN IN LOWER LOUISIANA.-GEN. TAYLOR'S CAPTURE OF BRASHEAR CITY AND ITS FORTS.-HIS OPERATIONS IN THE LAFOURCHE COUNTRY.-HIS SUCCESSES NEUTRALIZED BY THE FALL OF VICKSBURG AND PORT HUDSON.-BANKS RETURNS TO NEW ORLEANS AND THE ENEMY HOLDS THE ENTIRE LINE OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

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THE object of the enemy's operations, second to Richmond, was distinctly the possession of Vicksburg and the opening of the whole length of the Mississippi River. Enormous efforts had been made to obtain these two great prizes. Five attempts upon Richmond had failed. Three at tempts upon Vicksburg-that of Porter's fleet; that of Sherman's army; and that of Grant, which may be designated as an attempt to force a passage to the rear of the town, including the project of a canal across the isthmus and the enterprises known as the Yazoo Pass and Sunflower Expeditions-had accomplished nothing. Foiled again at Chancellorsville, in the great aim of the Virginia campaign, the enemy turned with renewed vigour upon the second object of the war, and public attention was immediately directed to the great campaign likely to decide the fate of the Mississippi Valley.

Gen. Grant had already obtained a great reputation for persistency-a slight title to merit, it may be remarked, when a commander has at his disposal abundant means, and at his back a government so generous and rich as never to call its officers into account for the loss of life and of treasure in any case of ultimate success. He now proposed to change his plan of operations against Vicksburg. He determined to invest the town, and having turned the defences on the Mississippi and Yazoo Rivers, to cut off the defenders from all communication with the east. One part of the enterprise was to run Porter's gunboats and a number of transports past the works at Vicksburg; while a land force, consisting of two corps, under Grant in person, should march from Milliken's Bend to Carthage, a distance of thirty-five miles, interrupted by marshes and streams. Both movements succeeded. On the 16th and 22d April, two fleets of gunboats and transports ran the batteries with insignificant disaster, and repeated the lesson that had been taught more than once in the war, that, unless where obstructions have been placed, steamers will run the gauntlet of almost any fire. By the last of April, Grant, having marched down the west bank of the river, and joined Porter's gunboats at Carthage, was ready to execute the next step in his scheme of attacking Vicksburg from the south

east.

His adventure was a complete surprise to Gen. Pemberton at Vicksburg. This commander, who had been appointed to what the Confederates designated as the department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, had been so blind as to suppose Grant's object was not Vicksburg, but Bragg's army in Tennessee, and as late as the middle of April, he had proposed to order troops to Tullahoma, under the delusion that Rosecrans would be reinforced from Grant's army. The mistake was characteristic of a commander who was in no way qualified for the great trust to which he had been exalted. The appointment of Gen. Pemberton to the defence of

CHARACTER OF GEN. PEMBERTON.

387

Vicksburg was an unfortunate one; it was probably the most unpopular single act of President Davis, who was constantly startling the public by the most unexpected and grotesque selections for the most important posts of the public service. Pemberton had not yet fought a battle in the war. He was a Pennsylvanian by birth; he had been a major in the old United States service; and from this inconsiderable rank, without a single record of meritorious service in the Confederacy, he had been raised by a stroke of President Davis' pen to the position of a lieutenant-general, and put in command of a post second in importance to the Confederate capital. He had previously had some uneventful commands at Norfolk and at Charleston. He was removed thence in consequence of frequent protests; but in each instance with promotion, as if the President was determined to mark his contempt for a public opinion which did not appreciate his favourite, or hoped to inspire a dull brain by adding another star to his collar. He was sent to Vicksburg with a larger command and a more extensive field, to show eventually the accuracy of the public judgment as to his capacity even for subordinate positions. With armies so intelligent as those of the Confederacy, no man unfitted for command could long maintain their confidence and respect. He might intrench himself with all the forms and parade of the schools; but intelligent soldiers easily penetrated the thin disguise, and distinguished between the pretender and the man of ability. So it was at Vicksburg. Pemberton had already given there early evidence of his unfitness for command. While Grant was assiduously engaged under his eye, for months, in preparing the powerful armament which was to spend its force on the devoted fortress, his adversary took no notice of the warning. The water batteries, which might have been strengthened, were afterwards found to be so imperfect as to inflict but slight damage on the gunboats, and permit the run of all the transports of a large army with equal impunity. The fortifications of Grand Gulf, where Grant was now making his next demonstration, had been neglected, until the tardy attempt rendered the accumulation of guns and stores there an easy prey to the enemy. Vicksburg, with an abundant country around it, had only two months' instead of twelve months' provisions. How was Pemberton engaged? Immersed in official trifles, laboriously engaged in doing nothing, while the murmurs around him and the friction of events had developed personal characteristics which, with want of confidence of officers and men, rendered him highly unpopular. Of a captious and irritable nature, a narrow mind, the slave of the forms and fuss of the schools, Gen. Pemberton was one of those men whose idea of war began with a bureau of clothing and equipment, and ended with a field-day or dress-parade. Warning after warning was sounded; but President Davis turned a deaf ear to them, not, perhaps, that he cared especially for Pemberton, but because his own vanity was so exacting that

even to question his infallibility of selection was an offence not to be con doned.

Gen. Grant, having effected a junction with the gunboats below Vicksburg, next determined to turn the works at Grand Gulf, which defended the mouth of the Big Black River, by landing at a point lower down the river. Accordingly he marched by its right flank, crossed opposite Bruins. burg, and on the 30th April landed on the left bank, and immediately pushed forward towards Port Gibson, a small town near the mouth of the Big Black River.

Gen. Pemberton, who appeared to have been at last aroused to a sense of the danger of his position, telegraphed the news of Grant's movement to Gen. Johnston, nominally commanding the Western armies, and then at Tullahoma with Bragg. He received orders to attack at once. Gen. Johnston despatched: "If Grant crosses the river, unite all your troops to beat him. Success will give back what was abandoned to win it." It was the critical opportunity of the campaign. Grant had landed with about 50,000 men. By drawing all his forces from different posts, leaving only enough in Vicksburg to answer Porter's chronic bombardment, Gen. Pemberton could have concentrated nearly 40,000 troops, and these, with the advantage of a difficult country, and with slight field-works, might at all events have delayed Grant until Vicksburg was provisioned, and Johnston had arrived with reinforcements. But we shall see that the bewildered commander, without the resolution to risk a decisive battle, committed the unpardonable errour of allowing his army to be cut up in detail by an enemy with massed forces.

BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON.

The only Confederate force which was to meet the enemy's advance towards Port Gibson was a division of troops under Gen. Bowen. This brave and devoted officer had been left with a few thousand men to confront an overwhelming force of the enemy, as Gen. Pemberton had insisted upon putting the Big Black River between the enemy and the bulk of his own forces, which he declared were necessary to cover Vicksburg. Gen. Bowen had fifty-five hundred men. He was opposed by the corps of Gen. McClernand, numbering probably twenty thousand men. An engagement ensued on the banks of a small stream, which crossed the road from Bruinsburg. The enemy, by the extraordinary valour and constancy of the small force of Confederates, was kept back for an entire day, until just before sunset Gen. Bowen was compelled to fall back, executing a retreat without confusion, and saving the bulk of his army.

The position of Grand Gulf turned, and the battle of Fort Gibson won,

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