DECEPTION AT WASHINGTON.

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rumours. Gen. Scott had advised the President that, in his military judgment, it had become impracticable to reinforce Fort Sumter, on account of the number of batteries erected by the Confederates at the mouth of the harbour; that an entrance from the sea was impossible. But Mr. Lincoln, and especially one member of his Cabinet, Mr. Blair, were firm in their refusal to evacuate the fort. It now became the concern of the government to avoid the difficulty of military reinforcements by some artifice that would equally well answer its purposes. That artifice was the subject of secret and sedulous consultation, that extended through several weeks.

About the last of March, Capt. Fox, of the Federal Navy, was sent to Charleston by the government, and stated that his object was entirely pacific. He was, by a strange credulity, allowed to visit the fort and to communicate with Major Anderson. His real object was to carry concealed despatches to Major Anderson, and to collect information with reference to a plan for the reinforcement of the garrison. On his return to Washington he was called frequently before President Lincoln and his Cabinet to explain his plan for reinforcing the fort, and to answer the objections presented by Gen. Scott and the military authorities. The project involved passing batteries with steamers or boats at night at right angles to the Confederate line of fire, and thirteen hundred yards distant -a feat which Capt. Fox argued was entirely practicable, and that many safe examples of it had been furnished by the Crimean War.

In this conflict of counsels the Washington administration hesitated. Mr. Lincoln, at one time, although with bitter reluctance, agreed that the fort should be evacuated, if the responsibility of the act could be thrown on the preceding administration of Mr. Buchanan. A leading article for a New York paper had been prepared, the proof-sheet of which was submitted to Mr. Lincoln and approved. In this, the ground was taken that the evacuation was an absolute military necessity, brought about by treason on the part of Mr. Buchanan, who, it was insisted, might have reinforced and supplied the garrison, but not only failed to do so, but purposely left it in such condition as to force his successor in office to encounter the ignominy of yielding it up to the Southerners. This same article lauded Mr. Lincoln's pacific policy, saying: "Had war-not peace -been his object,—had he desired to raise throughout the mighty North a feeling of indignation which in ninety days would have emancipated every slave on the continent, and driven their masters into the sea-if need be, he had only to have said-"Let the garrison of Fort Sumter do their duty, and perish beneath its walls: and on the heads of the traitours and rebels and slavery propagandists be the consequences."

And yet the horrible alternative depicted here and indicated as the means of rousing the North to a war of extermination upon slavery and

slave-owners, was eventually and deliberately adopted by Mr. Lincoln. The point with the government was to devise some artifice for the relief of Fort Sumter, short of open military reinforcements, decided to be im practicable, and which would have the effect of inaugurating the war by a safe indirection and under a plausible and convenient pretence. The device was at last conceived. On the afternoon of the 4th of April, President Lincoln sent for Capt. Fox, and said he had decided to let the expedition go, but he would send a messenger from himself to the authorities at Charleston, declaring that the purpose of the expedition was only to provision the fort, peaceably or forcibly, as they might decide for themselves.

Meanwhile the dalliance with the Confederate commissioners-the part of the artifice allotted to Secretary Seward-was kept up to the last moment. At one time Mr. Seward had declared to Judge Campbell, who was acting as an intermediary between the Secretary and the commissioners, that before a letter, the draft of which Judge Campbell held in his hand, could reach President Davis at Montgomery, Fort Sumter would have been evacuated. Five days passed, and instead of evacuating, Major Anderson was busy in strengthening Sumter! A telegram from Gen. Beauregard informed the commissioners of this. Again Judge Campbell saw Mr. Seward, and again, in the presence of a third party, received from him assurances that the fort was to be evacuated, and was authorized by him to state to the commissioners, that "the government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter, without giving notice to Governor Pickens.” This was on the 1st of April. On the 7th, Judge Campbell again addressed Mr. Seward a letter, alluding to the anxiety and alarm excited by the great naval and military preparations of the government, and asking whether the peaceful assurances he had given were well or ill founded. Mr. Seward's reply was laconic: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept: wait and see!" On the very day that Mr. Seward uttered these words, the van of the Federal fleet, with a heavy force of soldiers, had sailed for the Southern coast!

THE REDUCTION OF FORT SUMTER.

On the 3d of March President Davis had commissioned P. G. T. Beauregard, then Colonel of Engineers in the Confederate service, Brigadiergeneral, with official directions to proceed to Charleston, and assume command of all the troops in actual service in and around that place. On arriving there he immediately examined the fortifications, and undertook the construction of additional works for the reduction of Fort Sumter, and the defence of the entrances to the harbour.

On three sides, formidable batteries of cannon and mortars bore upon the Fort. On the south, at a distance of about twelve hundred yards, was Cumming's Point on Morris' Island, where three batteries had been completed, mounting six guns and six mortars. Farthest off of these, was the Trapier battery, built very strongly with heavy beams and sand-bags, and containing three eight-inch mortars; next the "iron battery," covered over with railroad bars, and having thick iron plates to close the embrasures after the guns were fired. Nearest to Sumter was the "Point battery," a very large and strong work, containing three ten-inch mortars, two forty-two pounders and a rifled cannon. From these works, a long line of batteries stretched down the sea side of Morris' Island, commanding the ship channel, and threatening a terrible ordeal to the Federal vessels, should they attempt to enter. Nearly west of Sumter, on James' Island, was Fort Johnson, where a strong battery of mortars and cannon was erected. On the northeast was Fort Moultrie, ready with Columbiads, Dahlgren guns, mortars, and furnaces for red-hot shot. In the cove near the western end of Sullivan's Island, was anchored a floating battery, constructed of the peculiarly fibrous palmetto timber, sheathed with plate iron, and mounting four guns of heavy calibre.

On the 8th day of April a message was conveyed to Gov. Pickens of South Carolina, by Lieut. Talbot, an authorized agent of the Federal Government. It was as follows:

"I am directed by the President of the United States, to notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only, and that if such attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition will be made, without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort."

The long suspense was over; the Federal fleet was approaching the coast. The message was telegraphed by Gen. Beauregard to Montgomery, and the instructions of his Government asked. Mr. Walker, the Confederate Secretary of War, replied, that if there was no doubt as to the authorized character of the messenger, Beauregard should at once demand the evacuation of Sumter, and if refused, should proceed to reduce it. The demand was made at two o'clock of the 11th April. Major Anderson replied: "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication demanding the evacuation of this Fort, and to say in reply thereto, that it is a demand with which I regret that my sense of honour and of my obligation to my Government prevent my compliance." Nothing was left but to accept the distinct challenge of the Federal Government to arms. A little past three o'clock in the morning of April 12th, Gen. Beauregard communicated by his aides with Major Anderson, notifying him that "he would open the fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from that time."

At 4.30 A. M., the signal shell was fired from Fort Johnson. The fire from Fort Johnson was quickly followed by that of Moultrie, Cumming's Point, and the floating battery. The incessant flash of the ordnance

made a circle of flame, and the bursting of bombs over and in Fort Suinter became more and more constant as the proper range was obtained by the artillerists.

Fort Sumter did not reply until seven o'clock. About that hour, it poured a well-directed stream of balls and shell against Moultrie, the floating battery, and the work on Cumming's Point. The fire continued throughout the day. Towards evening it became evident that that of the Confederates was very effective. The enemy was driven from his barbette guns; several of them were disabled; the parapet walls had crumbled away; deep chasms had opened below; the embrasures of the casemates had been so shattered as no longer to present a regular outline; the chimneys and roofs of the houses were in ruins.

While this bombardment was going on, a portion of the Federal fleet had reached the rendezvous off Charleston. It attempted to take no part in the fight. The only explanation of this extraordinary conduct of the naval expedition is found in a curious account from the pen of Capt. Fox himself. He writes: "As we neared the land, heavy guns were heard, and the smoke and shells from the batteries which had just opened fire on Sumter were distinctly visible. I immediately stood out to inform Capt. Rowan, of the Pawnee, but met him coming in. He hailed me and asked for a pilot, declaring his intention of standing into the harbour and sharing the fate of his brethren of the army. I went on board, and informed him that I would answer for it, that the Government did not expect any such gallant sacrifice, having settled maturely upon the policy indicated in thơ instructions to Capt. Mercer and myself."

Early in the morning of the 13th, all of the Confederate batteries reopened upon Fort Sumter, which responded vigorously for a time, directing its fire specially against Fort Moultrie. At eight o'clock A. M., smoke was seen issuing from the quarters of Fort Sumter; upon this, the fire of the Confederate batteries was increased, as a matter of course, for the purpose of bringing the enemy to terms as speedily as possible, inasmuch as his flag was still floating defiantly above him. Fort Sumter continued to fire from time to time, but at long and irregular intervals, amid the dense smoke, flying shot, and bursting shells. The Confederate troops, carried away by their naturally generous impulses, mounted the different batteries, and at every discharge from the fort, cheered the garrison for its pluck and gallantry, and hooted the fleet lying inactive just outside the bar.

A little past one o'clock a shot from Moultrie struck the flag-staff of Sumter, and brought down the ensign. At this time the condition of

Sumter and its garrison, had become desperate; the interiour was a heap of ruins; the parapet had been so shattered that few of its guns remained mounted; the smoke was packed in the casemates so as to render it impossible for the men to work the guns; the number of the garrison was too small to relieve each other; incessant watching and labour had exhausted their strength. The conflagration, from the large volume of smoke, being apparently on the increase, Gen. Beauregard sent three of his aides with a message to Major Anderson, to the effect that seeing his flag no longer flying, his quarters in flames, and supposing him to be in distress, he desired to offer him any assistance he might stand in need of. Before his aides reached the fort, the Federal flag was displayed on the parapets, but remained there only a short time, when it was hauled down, and a white flag substituted in its place.

The fort had surrendered. The event was instantly announced in every part of Charleston by the ringing of bells, the pealing of cannon, the shouts of couriers dashing through the streets, and by every indication of general rejoicing. "As an honourable testimony to the gallantry and fortitude with which Major Anderson and his command had defended their posts," Gen. Beauregard not only agreed that they might take passage at their convenience for New York, but allowed him, on leaving the fort, to salute his flag with fifty guns. In firing the salute, a caisson exploded, which resulted in mortal injuries to four of the garrison. This was the only loss of life in the whole affair. It appeared indeed that a Divine control had made this combat bloodless; and that so wonderful an exemption might have invited both sections of America to thoughts of gratitude and peace.*

But it was not to be so. The fire of the war first drawn at Sumter produced an instant and universal excitement in the North. It convinced the people of that section that there was no longer any prospect of recovering the Southern States by the cheap policy of double and paltering speeches. From the madness of their conviction, that they could no longer hope to accomplish their purposes by peaceful deceits and amusements of compromise, there was a sudden and quick current of public sentiment in the North towards the policy of coercion, with the most instant exertions to effect it.

The battle of Sumter had been brought on by the Washington Govern

The North has been famous for cheap heroes in this war. Major Anderson was one of the earliest. When he arrived in the North from Sumter, he was greatly lionized, and travelled around the country feasting and speech-making. He was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, and appointed to command the forces then gathering in Kentucky for the Western campaign. But he unexpectedly resigned; probably because he was unwilling to put in jeopardy his easily acquired reputation, or perhaps because, as he had once despatched from Sumter to Washington, “his heart was not in the war."