Mar. 16.-The Central Saskatchewan Consolidated Boards of Trade unanimously passes a Resolution declaring its "desire to go on record as, heartily and from a purely national standpoint, endorsing the attitude of the Provincial Government toward the Reciprocity Agreement."

Mar. 18.-J. G. O'Donoghue, a leader in the Trades Unions of Canada, writes the Toronto Star a letter of elaborate support to the Agreement. He sums up as follows: "The result will mean cheaper food for the worker. The worker will have two markets instead of one."

Mar. 23. Further Resolutions presented to Parliament show the Tofield and Lethbridge Boards of Trade in Alberta, the Estevan, Sask., Board, the Directors of the Alberta, Horse, Swine and Cattle Breeders Associations, as being favourable to the Agreement. Mar. 29. A further batch of Memorials presented to Parliament show Resolutions by various Liberal organizations favouring Reciprocity and also from the Boards of Trade of Hanley, Sask., and Ridgeway, Ont., the Grain Growers Associations throughout the West, the Club Chenier and Reform Club of Montreal, the Canadian Club of New York.

Apr. 2. The Independent Labour Party of Toronto endorses Reciprocity by a large majority.

Apr. 20.-The Trades and Labour Council of Montreal declares by 44 to 13 in favour of Reciprocity.

As already stated Conservative opinion showed in some quarters a certain amount of hesitancy. So much and so long had Reciprocity in natural products been described as, academically, a good thing that at first glance the change in times and conditions was not so obvious a matter as it afterwards became while the patriotic or sentimental objection had not been aroused by United States speeches and apparent policy. Vigorous Party opposition soon developed, however, and to the Montreal Star and the Toronto News were added the enthusiastic antagonism of such papers as the Orange Sentinel with its statement of Feb. 2nd: "In spite of the unfriendliness of our neighbours we have become independent of their trade and are growing more powerful every day. At no time in the history of Canada has there been so little reason for us to throw ourselves and our natural wealth into the arms of a nation which has exhausted its own resources." Imperial organizations, with their inherent Conservative tendencies in such a matter, were, also, soon up in arms and the British Empire League, the United Empire Loyalists and the Daughters of the Empire started the stirring up of public feeling, although the Empire Club of Toronto refused to express itself. In Parliament the Opposition commenced and carried on a keen fight, and obtained the support of Messrs. Clifford Sifton, Lloyd Harris and William German-three Liberals of light and leading. "Let the people decide" became the slogan of Conservative attack and independent criticism while the Conservative Legislatures of Manitoba, British Columbia, Ontario and New Brunswick passed Resolutions of antagonism to the Agreement.

Progress of the Liberal Revolt and Manifesto of the 18 To

ronto Men

The most important incident of this period, however, was the document published on Feb. 20 and signed by 18 prominent Liberals of Toronto-all well-known in spheres of life apart from politics in the ordinary sense of that term. The feeling of dissatisfaction with the Reciprocity proposals in various financial, industrial and mercantile circles found expression in this afterwards famous appeal to public opinion and was, probably, bound to do so in some form or other. The speeches of Sir Edmund Walker, J. D. Allan and R. S. Gourlay at the Board of Trade protest meeting on Feb. 16th foreshadowed active opposition from within the Liberal ranks of a pronounced character. The speech of Sir Edmund Walker was, in particular, a clear, clean-cut analysis of the measure, in what he believed to be the wider points of view involved, and, coming from the President of the Canadian Bank of Commerce an institution with $17,000,000 of capital and reserves, with over 200 branches in Canada, and with roots deep in the very Western Provinces from which the chief support of Reciprocity was expected—the utterance was a most significant

one.

His expressed objections were (1) that the making of this Agreement had aroused once more the dormant hope in the minds of millions of people in the United States that Canada would some day become a part of the Union; (2) that the farmers of Canada did not need experiments, were never so prosperous as now with their mortgages paid off, with prices for their products high, and abundant markets within the Empire for all they could sell; (3) that Reciprocity would still further hamper the struggling halibut and salmon fisheries of the Pacific coast by allowing intensified American competition and would promote the dumping of lowgrade lumber from the United States upon the Canadian market; (4) that Western cattlemen would find it expedient under the Agreement to ship their cattle to Chicago and Canadian railways would lose the haul eastward while a similar process would develop in the shipment of wheat; (5) that Winnipeg would cease to be the greatest wheat market of the continent and its trade would go to Duluth and Minneapolis while Port Arthur and Fort William would be set back for years; (6) that the fruit industry of Ontario and British Columbia would be menaced with ruin." Although I am a Liberal, I am a Canadian first of all," said Sir Edmund, "and I can see that this is much more than a trade question. Our alliance with the Mother Country must not be threatened. We must assimilate our immigrants and make out of them good Canadians. And this Reciprocity Agreement is the most deadly danger as tending to make this problem more difficult and fill it with doubt and difficulty. The question is between British connection and what has been well called Continentalism."

The signers of the Manifesto mentioned, and in the order given, were Sir Edmund Walker; John L. Blaikie, President of the Canada Landed & National Investment Co.; W. D. Matthews, exPresident of the Toronto Board of Trade and Vice-President of the Dominion Bank; W. K. George, ex-President of the Canadian Manufacturers Association and of the Toronto Industrial Exhibition, and Vice-President of the Sterling Bank of Canada; Z. A. Lash, K.C., an eminent lawyer and capitalist; W. T. White, VicePresident and General-Manager of the National Trust Company; George T. Somers, Vice-President of the Board of Trade and President of the Sterling Bank of Canada; R. S. Gourlay, PresiIdent of the Toronto Board of Trade and a Piano manufacturer; Sir W. Mortimer Clark, K.C., LL.D., ex-Lieut.-Governor of Ontario; R. J. Christie, President of Christie, Brown & Co., and a prominent manufacturer; Hugh Blain of Eby, Blain and Co., a leading wholesale merchant and Director of The Globe, the chief Ontario organ of the Liberal party; H. S. Strathy, a Director and for many years General-Manager of the Traders Bank of Canada; L. Goldman, Managing-Director of the North American Life Assurance Co., and G. A. Somerville who held the same position in the Manufacturers Life Insurance Company-both well-known Insurance men; Wellington Francis, a prominent lawyer and Director of the Standard Bank and several Companies in Toronto; J. D. Allan, ex-President of the Board of Trade; E. R. Wood, Vice-President of the Central Canada Loan & Savings Co., a Director on many concerns and one of the leading financiers in Canada; John C. Eaton, President of The T. Eaton Company Ltd. and said to have 17,000 employees in his service. The document was as follows:

:

We oppose ratification of the proposed Reciprocity agreement with the United States of America:

1. Because in the year 1897 the Parliament of Canada repealed the legislation then existing relating to Reciprocity and since such repeal neither the people of Canada nor their Parliament have entrusted the Government with any duty or authority to negotiate with respect to any agreement on the subject;

2. Because the present unexampled prosperity of Canada is the result of the policy which has been pursued in the development of her trade and of her natural resources; because this has involved the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars upon railways, canals, steamships, and other means of transportation between East and West and West and East and the obligation to incur further great expenditure for the same purpose; and because further development along the same lines would be seriously checked by the proposed Reciprocity agreement and the benefits of the expenditures referred to would be to a great extent lost;

3. Because it is essential to the continued national unity and development of Canada that no trade relations with any country should be agreed to by Canada on any basis which would check the growth and development of trade between the various parts of Canada with each other, or between Canada and the various parts of the Empire; and because the proposed Reciprocity agreement between Canada and the United States of America would seriously check the growth and development of this trade;

4. Because any present benefit to any section of Canada or to any interests or individuals therein which might accrue from the proposed Agreement would be more than offset by the loss and injury which would accrue to other sections and interests and individuals and, because, the result to Canada as a whole would be greatly injurious;

5. Because as a result of the proposed Agreement the freedom of action possessed by Canada with reference to her tariffs and channels of trade would be greatly curtailed, and she would be hampered in developing her own resources in her own way and by her own people;

6. Because after some years of Reciprocity under the proposed Agreement the channels of Canada's trade would have become so changed that a termination of the Agreement and return by the United States to a protective tariff, as against Canada, would cause a disturbance of trade to an unparalleled extent and because the risk of this should not be voluntarily undertaken by Canada;

7. Because to avoid such a disruption Canada would be forced to extend the scope of the Agreement so as to include manufactures and other things;

8. Because the Agreement as proposed would weaken the ties which bind Canada to the Empire, and because the Unrestricted Reciprocity which would naturally follow would still further weaken these ties and make it more difficult to avert political union with the United States;

9. Because the disruption in the channels of Canada's trade which was caused by the termination of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 and the subsequent establishment of a protective tariff by the United States gave rise to a decided leaning in many minds towards annexation with the United States, and this at a time when Canada was mainly peopled by native-born Canadians and other British subjects to whom the prospect of annexation was most unwelcome, and because Canada in a comparatively few years will have millions of newcomers, a large percentage of whom will have come from foreign countries, and because if Canada should then have to choose between disruption of her channels of trade with the United States or political union with them, the preservation of Canadian autonomy and Canadian nationality would be enormously more difficult;

10. Believing as we do that Canadian nationality is now threatened with a more serious blow than any it has heretofore met with and that all Canadians who place the interests of Canada before those of any party or section or individuals therein should at this crisis state their views openly and fearlessly, we, who have hitherto supported the Liberal Party in Canada, subscribe to this statement.

It is impossible to review the discussion aroused by this published protest. The favourite Liberal argument-the concise epitome of many and varied comments-was that it embodied the opposition of the "big interests" of finance and manufacture against something which would be of benefit to the masses of the people. More moderate arguments against the 18 Liberals included (1) the claim that Reciprocity had never been abandoned by the Liberals and that Canada wanted it and needed it as much as ever: (2) that Reciprocity would increase Canadian trade and development and not hamper them; (3) that it would not in the end injure the East and West transportation systems of the country but that even if it did Railways were made for the people and not the people for the Railways; (4) that the increased prosperity of the farmers would ultimately make every other class prosper proportionately; (5) that if the United States did terminate the Agreement abruptly no such result could follow as in 1866 because

Canada was now and would be then a strong and united nation able to take care of itself.

Following the issue of this Manifesto-which immensely strengthened the Conservative opposition to the Agreement in Parliament and the country-Mr. Clifford Sifton, Minister of the Interior for nine years (1896-1905) in the Laurier Cabinet, a strong, logical speaker and the chief influence in the Immigration movement which had built up Western Canada, took vigorous ground against the proposals. His position and activity as Chairman of the Canadian Commission on Conservation naturally, perhaps, paved the way for this opposition and certainly his succeeding speeches made effective use of studies along that line. In the Commons on Feb. 28th he announced amidst every evidence of keen interest, personal, political and public, that in this connection he could no longer follow the Leader of his party. In a speech of really remarkable lucidity Mr. Sifton summed up his objections to Reciprocity. In the first place, he contended, it had not been the policy of the Liberal party for 20 years and three Elections had passed without an official reference to it by the Governments of Canada or the United States; the Liberal Tariff of 1897 was one of moderate protection, British preference, stability and no Reciprocity; the Government had made this Agreement in a hurry, without a mandate from the people, without exact information or careful inquiry, in an arbitrary and unexpected fashion.

He supported the British preference but would not support any substantial increase at the expense of Canadian industries; he dwelt at length upon the value of the home market to Canadian Iarmers, the soundness of their prosperity, the steady increase in their prices, the independence afforded by their own protected market for 80 or 90 per cent. of their total production, with a British market open for all the rest and much more. This would all be given up under Reciprocity for "a market which might remain open for five years, perhaps for less, perhaps for more. Let any occasion arise and the United States could deprive Canada of her market. We are putting our heads into a noose." Reference was made to the most-favoured nations, under British treaties, whose farm products would also come in free and the speaker declared that under this new policy the Canadian market in food products would be controlled by United States Trusts. As to the West he believed that the Western farmer would in the long run get less for his wheat besides having the reputation of his superior grades merged in the inferior ones to the south. In the cattle trade the West for the time would benefit but it would be through becoming " a backyard of Chicago." The farmers would not long stand being put on a free trade basis for what they sold and a protective basis for what they bought and this would mean the eventual destruction of Canadian industries and full dependence upon the United States. Mr. Sifton concluded as follows:—