Art. 15.-THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

AT the beginning of January public attention was directed chiefly to the Near East, whither French and British troops were being hurried as fast as ships could carry them; while the Germans were reported to be pressing on the repairs to the railway from Belgrade to the Greek frontier, and preparing for an advance against the Allies' position at Salonika. Information published in the press from day to day was, indeed, so contradictory as to cause many people to doubt whether Salonika was ever seriously menaced. That the Allied headquarters expected the enemy to attack may be inferred from General Sarrail's action in blowing up the railway bridges at Demir Hissar and Kilindir on Jan. 12. The demolition of these costly structures, besides involving a heavy claim for compensation, and the risk of aggravating the already strained relations with the Greek Government, would inevitably add to the difficulties which would confront the Allied force when it, in turn, should take the offensive. A step of such importance would not be taken prematurely, or without definite necessity; and the fact that, after having been so long deferred, it was ultimately taken without a previous understanding with the Greek Government, suggests the inference that on the date named General Sarrail became convinced of the imminence of a hostile advance which there had been previously no great reason to apprehend.

But, if the Germans designed an attack, they had no intention of committing themselves too deeply to the enterprise. With the defeat of the Serbians and the opening of the road to Constantinople the main objects of their policy had been accomplished. The appearance of the Franco-British force in Macedonia was an unpleasant episode which had not been provided for in their plans; but it threatened Austro-German interests only indirectly, while it was an immediate menace to Bulgaria's newly-acquired territory in Serbian Macedonia. Just as the conquest of this territory had been left to the Bulgarians, so its defence should rest with them; and, so long as the defence should be successful, AustroGerman interests, which lay further north, would be

secure. Austria, indeed, covets Salonika; so does Bulgaria; but neither could have it, because among Germany's Balkan bargains there was a guarantee assuring the integrity of Greek territory. Herein lay one of the difficulties in the way of arranging the offensive; for Bulgaria was unwilling to attack Salonika when, if successful, she could not keep it. By assisting in the conquest of Serbia her part of the bargain had been completed, and she preferred to hold the fruits of her treachery defensively, rather than to bear the greater part of a costly offensive in the interest of her patron and ally without additional bribes. Ultimately, it is said, she was bought by further concessions of Serbian territory; but not till the end of December, when the opportunity for a coup de main had passed. General Sarrail was already strong enough to defy attack, except by larger forces than Bulgaria could muster, supported by heavy artillery, which could not be employed until the railway had been reconstructed.

The new railway bridge over the Save at Belgrade is reported to have been opened for traffic on Dec. 30, but the tunnel near Ripanj was not ready till a week or two later. The precise date is unknown, but it was before Jan. 15, when the first through train was run from Berlin to Constantinople. Meanwhile work on the NishGhevgeli section of the line had been pushed forward at high pressure; and there is no apparent reason why it should not have been completed by Jan. 12, the date when General Sarrail seems to have thought that an attack was imminent.

But complications had arisen which would account for the enemy changing their plans. The Bulgarian army had suffered heavily at the hands of the Serbians; part was engaged in Northern Albania, and part in watching the Danube frontier of Rumania; the remainder, said to comprise eight divisions, could not take the offensive without strong support. The Germans had, at the outside, five divisions in Serbia, including garrisons; and, having arranged for important operations in France to follow the Balkan campaign, were not in a position to give much help even had they been disposed to do so. There remained the Austrians and the Turks. The former were fully occupied in subjugating the Vol. 225.-No. 447.

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Montenegrins, and in opposing a Russian offensive on the Bessarabian frontier which had necessitated the withdrawal of such troops as could be spared from the Balkans. The Turks, after the evacuation of Gallipoli by the Allies, had concentrated a force about Xanthi on the Greco-Bulgarian frontier, apparently with a view to advancing on Salonika; but the series of defeats which began on Jan. 8 obliged them to turn their attention to Armenia. Thus the force available for active operations in Macedonia amounted, at the outside, to three German and eight Bulgarian divisions, or about 120,000 rifles with artillery, a force which was clearly inadequate for an attack on Salonika.

Since that time Salonika has become a stronghold which in defensive strength far surpasses all the great fortresses of the pre-war period, because the positions which surround it are at such a distance as effectively to secure the town and harbour from bombardment, while the entrenchments embody the principles evolved from recent experience, and are generally considered, probably with justice, to be as impregnable as science and artillery can make them. Nothing is to be gained, however, by standing on the defensive if the enemy decline to attack; and, as a base for offensive action, Salonika has certain disadvantages. The avowed purpose of the Allies is to reconquer Serbia for the Serbians, which can only be effected by large forces equipped for mountain warfare, necessitating the substitution of pack for wheeled transport, and the provision of mountain artillery. The operations of large forces would be seriously hampered by difficulties of supply. Roads are practically nonexistent; and there are only the single-line railways from Salonika to Uskub and Monastir, probably illsupplied with rolling-stock. The use of motor-transport being impossible, the supply of forces operating at a distance from the railways with a view to outflanking movements would be a task of some difficulty. Similar difficulties would, of course, confront the enemy if they should take the offensive, with the additional disadvantage that the attack would be purely frontal, as the flanks of the Salonika position rest on the sea, and cannot be turned. The Germans, indeed, are unlikely to contemplate such a hazardous enterprise, even in the doubtful

event of their being able to provide the requisite force. They would risk much to gain little. As will be seen later, they must look elsewhere for decisive success; while defeat would ruin their prestige in the Balkans, which seems to be already on the wane, and would, perhaps, cause Rumania to join the Entente Powers, with the consequence that the Austrian flank in Galicia, which depends for its security on the neutrality of Rumania, would be turned. It is, therefore, to be expected that the enemy will remain on the defensive on the frontier, where they occupy a strongly-entrenched position. The conquest of Montenegro and Albania by the Austrians has not improved the situation for the Allies, who are deprived of the assistance which the Italians might have rendered in the re-conquest of Serbia by operating against the enemy's flank; while General Sarrail will be exposed to similar activities on the enemy's part during his advance.

What, then, is the value of Salonika to the Allies? The reconquest of Serbia, which at the present stage would promise to be a costly and difficult enterprise, would not bring them much nearer decisive victory; nor would the defeat of the Bulgarians, who are unlikely to be of much further value to the Germans for offensive purposes, advance matters much. Nothing short of an invasion of Hungary across the Danube could be expected to determine the main issue; and the difficulty of such an undertaking has been enhanced by the precaution which the Germans have taken of constructing fortifications of great strength along the line of the river, and on its approaches. It is therefore possible that the value of Salonika, which thus far has been no more than a pied à terre in the Balkans, may not appear until the closing scenes of the war, when the enemy, having been weakened and reduced to the defensive, is being driven back on all the main fronts. At that stage an advance from Salonika might expedite the final decision. Whether it is worth while, in the meantime, to lock up an important force there is a question on which opinions may differ.

The Russian offensive on the Bessarabian frontier, to which allusion has been made above, began about

Christmas, and continued for nearly a month. The operations took the form of a principal attack in the space between the rivers Pruth and Dniester, directed against Czernowitz, combined with an offensive in the area between the Sereth and the Strypa, designed to drive the Austrians across the latter, and, the right flank having been thus secured, to force the passage of the Dniester on the left. The attack on Czernowitz succeeded in attaining the heights north-east of the town, where it was held up by a labyrinth of trenches, and failed to make further progress. In the other sphere of action the Austrians were driven across the Strypa, but maintained the line of the Dniester intact till, on Feb. 8, some weeks after the close of the operations, the Russians captured Uscieczko, ten miles north-west of Zalesczyki, and reached the southern bank, only, however, to be driven back again. Subsequently, on March 19, the capture of the bridge-head at Michalcze, a point three miles further up-stream, was reported; but the bridge had been destroyed, and the Austrians, at the time of writing (March 31), were still in possession of the right bank.

The interest of these inconclusive operations lies chiefly in their political and strategical aspects. In view of the undecided attitude of the Rumanians, who are supposed only to be awaiting a favourable change in the situation to join forces with the Allies, a decisive Russian success in such close proximity to the frontier might end their hesitation; while, irrespective of Rumania's attitude, the Russians, by breaking through in the Bukowina, would turn the enemy's defences in Galicia. It is, therefore, not surprising that large Austrian and German reinforcements were hurried up from all quarters, including the Balkans, causing a complete dislocation of any aggressive schemes the enemy may have had in mind on the Eastern or the Balkan front. The combination of attacks on the Strypa with the advance on Czernowitz was in accordance with the interrelation of the StrypaDniester and Bessarabian fronts, which causes them to be mutually dependent. An advance up the Pruth valley towards Stanislau would turn the line of the Dniester; while the possession of the latter would make the Austrian defences in the Bukowina untenable. The