belief in the justice of the Allied cause and the race-pride that will not hear of defeat, even the pro-Ally Americans might despair of the downfall of Germany.

The Government should remember the enormous difference between the experience of England and that of the neutral nations in this War. Away from England the great crisis has produced no atmosphere. No one can realise what the War is until he has lived for a while under its shadow. He can appreciate neither its curse nor its blessing; he has no idea of what it has brought nor what it has taken away. To him, isolated facts stand out without proper background or perspective; and, since the Government has chosen to paint its scanty disclosures in such dull grey tones, the colour of the unofficial information is startlingly vivid. In England there is abundant and obvious evidence of self-sacrifice, patriotism and determination; but in foreign lands, these things are not perceived; and there is nothing to reduce unfortunate incidents to their true value.

In England a true conception of the condition of affairs is helped by the tales that fly from mouth to mouth, the abundance of which has been such a curious consequence of the muzzling of the Press. In London, in truth, Rumour has come into its own again; and at every street-corner one can hear a new tale from a 'man just back from the Front,' or a 'close friend of a Minister.' One statement sets off another; the average person takes what he hears lightly; and in the end a fair balance is struck. But in America these same rumours receive an altogether undue importance. They come from fewer persons; they have acquired the prestige of the 3000 miles they have travelled; and they are seized by the newspapers as additions to the regular despatches of unquestioned authenticity. Thus mere scraps of clubgossip acquire the dignity of semi-official statements; and that they have in the main favoured the Allies is as much the result of good luck as anything else.

No one wants the newspapers to publish a line that would assist the Germans; but there is no reason why the American public should not be given news that would assist the Government, and be kept posted up on matters which would encourage the friends of the

Allies throughout the world. Once or twice Mr Balfour has been persuaded to write letters or grant interviews for publication; and the relief they afforded to those filled with anxiety is a token of how much can be accomplished by lifting the veil with discretion and authority. For months last summer the Government maintained an obstinate silence with regard to the submarine peril and the way it was being met, which made it very difficult for Englishmen in America to uphold the prestige of the Fleet. At the date of writing, an intricate and technical dispute concerning shipping is clouding the relations between Great Britain and the United States, the British side of which might well be given to the Press with the happiest results. Why should not the Government call in the aid of a competent writer, possessing adequate knowledge and gifted with the art of clear, terse and popular expression, supply him with the requisite information-inspire' him, in fact--and let him supply a leading New York journal with such a statement. We undertake to say there would be no need to add the words, 'American papers, please copy.'

The Censor, in short, should be entrusted with positive as well as negative functions. He should be required to supply the newspapers with material for articles on all matters, the publication of which would assist the cause of the Allies. He should realise that, in this World-War, all men are interested and all men are anxious; and that the more it depends upon the success of attrition, the more the belligerents will need the sympathy and aid of the neutrals. Without deviating a hair's breadth from the truth, he can do much to spread confidence in the ultimate victory of the Quadruple Entente; and, if he does that, he will bring that victory appreciably nearer. News the neutral peoples will have, whether Whitehall wishes it or not; and it depends mainly upon the British Cabinet whether that news will be to the country a hindrance or a help.

Art. 10.-BRITISH DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR EAST.

1. The War and Democracy. By R. W. Seton-Watson, and others. Macmillan, 1914.

2. The War and the Balkans. By Noel Buxton, M.P., and C. R. Buxton. Allen & Unwin, 1915.

3. Roumania and the Great War. By R. W. SetonWatson. Constable, 1915.

4. Nationalism and War in the Near East. By a Diplomatist. Edited by Lord Courtney. Clarendon Press, 1915.

5. La question du Bosphore et des Dardanelles. Dascovici. Geneva: Georg & Cie., 1915.

By N.

THE trend of British policy in the Near East in recent years was summed up by His Majesty's Ambassador in Petrograd in seven words, when, in response to the hope expressed by the Russian Foreign Minister that Great Britain would not fail to proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France, he pointed out that direct British interests in Serbia were nil.'* From an economic point of view, in the mouth of a British Consul, the statement would have been literally true. As a guiding principle in relation to the possibility of the gravest developments in the Near East, the dictum can only give rise to amazement. That M. Sazonoff evidently shared this feeling is shown by the pointed rebuke which Sir George Buchanan naïvely records, when he adds: To this M. Sazonoff replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Serbian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.'* The cogency of the Russian Foreign Minister's remarks requires no emphasis to-day, but in July 1914 Sir Edward Grey, having read his view of British interests in the Near East, could still telegraph to Sir G. Buchanan: I entirely approve what you said.'

Criticism on British diplomacy in the Near East is based on its failure, both before and during the war, to realise that the Near Eastern question, in whatever form it might be raised, was a part of the general European

*White Paper, Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914), [Cd. 7467], No. 6.

question, and that Great Britain could not afford to hold aloof from the problems it involved. Two factors of a general character contributed to prevent the Government in power before the outbreak of war from paying the necessary attention to the subject: (1) the practice of living diplomatically from hand to mouth, and (2) the conviction that there was nothing incompatible between the aims of Germany and British interests, and that consequently the two Powers could be brought together into a friendly rapprochement without any serious sacrifice of the ambitions of the one or the principles of the other. The ingenuousness of our diplomatic record, which bas consisted in the main of a series of efforts to cope with each fresh situation as it has arisen, is as much a proof of the absence of all sinister designs as our unpreparedness for this war is proof of the absence of any desire to provoke a quarrel with Germany. But ingenuousness can be carried too far, when the existence of a nation is at stake. The trumpet call of Germany's designs upon the Near East has been, too loud and insistent to go unmarked; and the fact that the British Government could ignore it can only be explained by the second of the contributory causes mentioned above, its belief that by preaching peace in Berlin often enough it would finally divert German ambitions into innocuous and praiseworthy channels. How strong was this belief and how powerfully it was allowed to influence British policy may be gauged from Sir E. Grey's enunciation of his desires and hopes on July 30, 1914, four days before the declaration of war between Germany and Britain. In a telegram despatched that day to the British Ambassador in Berlin he said: *

'If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavours will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis; and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been

* White Paper, Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914), [Cd. 7467], No. 101.

too utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.'

In the light of our present knowledge it would be difficult to pen a statement that would do more credit to the British Government's good intentions, or more clearly emphasise its failure to understand Germany's policy or to fathom German designs.

If there had been reason to suppose that Germany had no political ambitions in Europe, there would have been some excuse, in the interests of European peace, for keeping an open mind on her activities in the Near East and finding in them, as we affected to find in the Baghdad Railway scheme, merely a legitimate outlet for commercial enterprise. But the Germany with whom Sir Edward Grey on July 30, 1914, still hoped to be able to conclude 'some more definite rapprochement' was the Germany who in 1905 had coerced France and in 1909 had coerced Russia, by threats of war, and in 1911 had sent the 'Panther' to Agadir. It was the same Germany who had rejected every overture of the British Government 'to promote cordial friendship as the only alternative to constant liability to friction'; had added to her navy while Great Britain moderated her naval construction; and, when Lord Haldane tried his persuasive powers in Berlin (February 1912), had replied by an addition to the peace strength of her army, following it up the next year with a further increase of sixty per cent. Lord Haldane's mission, as he has since told the country, made him 'painfully conscious that there was at least the chance of a terrible war.'' He had come away from Berlin, he told an American correspondent, 'feeling uneasy. Germany was piling up armaments. She showed no disposition to restrict her naval development.’†

* Address, Hampstead Garden Suburb Institute, Nov. 17, 1915. It is of interest to note that a few weeks after Lord Haldane had returned, feeling uneasy' over the chance of a terrible war, and had done 'all that in him lay, all that seemed to him to be possible to bring home that information to the minds of his colleagues,' one of the latter, Mr