who would object are those who have acquired a passion for secrecy for its own sake, or who cherish a blind dislike of the press. As to the first point, one type of professional man will always try to make a mystery out of his craft, and will refuse to bring to bear upon it the light of reason. Such a type is blind to the political grounds for a certain kind of publicity. Yet there is not only a political justification, but a sound military purpose-the necessity of keeping the troops in the field in good heart and of making certain that recruits of the right kind will be forthcoming from home. As to the second point a great deal of nonsense is often talked. The press has many sins to its charge, and no doubt the war correspondent of other days was often a nuisance. His real offence was that he was apt, by booming this or that general, to create popular reputations which had often a slender basis in fact. But the enormities with which he has been credited are largely fictitious. The stories of how Archibald Forbes revealed to the Germans through a despatch the French movements before Sedan, and how Gortschakov derived valuable information during the Crimean war from Russell's letters to The Times,' have long ago been exploded.

There will always be many matters in which the most rigid Censorship is right. Dispositions, numbers, plans, the situation of the various headquarters, gun positions, routes of transport, experiments-these are eternally confidential. So, too, should be all the details of an army before an action. On such matters no Censorship could be too stringent. Moreover, a censor's judgment should always lean against publicity; and, when there is the slightest doubt, the decision should be for suppression. Even when it is morally certain that the enemy is in possession of certain information, it is wise to run no risk and to assume that he is ignorant. But these rules cannot apply to the work of battalions when an action is over. The enemy will have prisoners or dead in his lines; and the identity discs will enable him to discover what troops have been against him, in the unlikely event of his not knowing all about them before. It will be of no assistance to him to know what battalions constituted what brigade when the battle is over. As for the work of these battalions, he knows all about it from

first-hand experience. To say that the 1st Blankshires took a redoubt will be no news to him, though he may deny it in his communiqués. But, if we suppress all mention of the gallant Blankshires, they will have nothing to console them for their certain losses; the relations of the dead will have no fine tale to relieve their sorrow; and Blankshire will miss the best of all incentives to recruiting. Those who have undertaken this work know that in every district by far the strongest appeal is made by pointing to the achievements of the local battalion.

Take the case of Loos. There a very remarkable advance was made, an advance which in certain circumstances might have led to a decisive victory. Some of the best work was done by divisions of the New Army. The nation at home was strung to a high pitch of expectation, and any gossip was avidly seized upon. Presently the wounded returned and they told a confused tale, mentioning among other things the failure-not difficult to explain-of one of the new divisions. The consequence was that no recruiting advantage was gained by the splendid performance of certain of the new troops; and for some weeks the new divisions in general lay under a most undeserved stigma. Sir John French's despatch put the main lines of the action in their proper light, but the country still lacks the details of a great story. This story, let it be repeated, is not wanted for the delectation of newspaper readers at large, but for two purposes, both directly subservient to the conduct of the war-to stimulate the formation of future armies and to convince the men in the field that the nation is aware of their prowess.

We do not suppose that any responsible soldier will differ from the views which we have expressed, but the trouble is that there is no machinery to mend matters. The ordinary despatch is prepared by the digestion at headquarters of a large number of army, corps, divisional and brigade reports. Obviously a busy Commander-inChief and his Staff have not the time in despatches of a moderate length to do justice to the work of battalions. In some conspicuous cases, like the performance of the 2nd Worcesters at the first battle of Ypres, there may be a regimental reference, but details of this kind would be out of perspective in the normal despatch. Nor does

the remedy seem to be the granting of wider facilities to accredited war correspondents. The best correspondents will produce a patchy, and therefore an unfair, account. It is work for a Staff officer with full knowledge of the orders, with the chance of studying the scene, and with access to all the troops concerned. In the earlier months of the war two distinguished soldiers acted as 'Eyewitnesses,' and wrote many illuminating but highly generalised articles on the campaign. It seems to us that 'Eye-witness' might well be revived with a different mission. One or two Staff officers, gifted, as so many of them are, with the power of weighing evidence and describing intelligibly a complex operation, would do invaluable work if they collected the details of battalion fighting, and within a reasonable time after an action gave them to the world. For one thing this plan would preserve a great deal of tactical history which is now being lost. It would be a real aid to the preparation of the official despatches, for the digestion of a number of reports is not the same thing as first-hand knowledge passed through the medium of a single mind. It would do for our battalions what France and Germany now do for theirs, and give every man in the fighting line the confidence that his work would not be overlooked. Finally, it would provide the nation at home with what it deserves to have, since it has voluntarily provided the fighting men-with what it must have if its spirit is to be kept keen and its resolution high.

Much nonsense has been talked by scaremongers about what they call 'the truth about the war,' as if there was some dark mystery being kept hid by the men in power. There is no such sinister secret. The truth about the war' is perfectly well known to every civilian who takes the pains to inform himself and has some rudiments of military knowledge. But there are truths which get suppressed because it is nobody's business to publish them, truths which the enemy knows all about, truths which should be proclaimed on every housetop because they can only hearten and invigorate the nation. The chief is the wonderful record of our fighting men. What Mr Redmond has rightly asked for on behalf of the Irish troops, the nation is justified in demanding on behalf of the whole army. Germany has made an

elaborate business of publicity and uses the press as a branch of her military machine. She sows tares in every neutral field and does her foolish best to creep in by night to the Allied furrows. We have failed to emulate her activity, and perhaps it is as well. England would not be England if she could play that game as adroitly as her enemies. Other Powers may use their press to spread false news and mislead the foe; our traditions of freedom and candour make it difficult for us to follow suit. Our press will never lend itself readily to Government control; but, if it cannot be adapted to cripple the enemy's strength, let us see that neither by sins of omission nor of commission it cripples

our own.

II. IN AMERICA.

ONE thing is abundantly clear to those who have followed the War in the American newspapers-that the British Government appreciates neither the uses nor the dangers of publicity. It knows neither how to direct it nor how it affects national success. It has grasped one elementary fact that certain information must be concealed from the enemy; but beyond that it has not advanced a single step. If there was nothing to be gained by the publication of news but the gratification of curiosity and the allaying of anxiety, the authorities might be right in dropping a veil of mystery over the War. But there are other nations besides the combatants; and to them England looks not only for sympathy, but material and financial aid. The Censorship must be considered as it affects these, as well as the belligerent Powers.

Hitherto, the Government has been singularly fortunate in its relations with the United States. There the British and French raised an enormous loan. They induced the bankers, against strong opposition from the pro-German financiers, to advance $500,000,000 upon no more specific security than the Allies' promises to pay. Moreover, it is not at all unlikely that before long recourse will be made again to the coffers of Wall Street. Again, it is to the United States that the Allies, and Great Britain as much as any of them, are looking for

the supplies of munitions, of clothing, of draft animals, of drugs, and of all the innumerable commodities, without which the conflict could not be carried on for a month. From the United States Europe is drawing more than its ordinary quantity of grain and raw materials for the support of its armies in the field; yet against the United States Great Britain is using her great naval power and enforcing justifiable, but to the American shipper none the less galling, supervision over foreign trade.

Common prudence, then, should impel the British Government to see that its side of the great argument is properly set forth in America, and, to use an Americanism, that'the Allies put up a good front.' Such news should be cabled across the Atlantic as would hearten their friends and induce confidence in their ultimate success, so that bankers and manufacturers might be encouraged to put their capital at the service of the British, French and Russian Governments, without misgivings concerning the safety of their investments. As things are, it is not the Censor's fault that the American, for sheer business reasons, has not buttoned up his pocket and asked to be shown the colour of British gold before accepting a single order for munitions or merchandise.

For what is the news vouchsafed to him, on which he must build his confidence? From the actual battlefronts he gets day by day brief paragraphs bristling with proper names, hardly more comprehensible than chemical formulæ. From the neutral capitals he learns of diplomatic activities that too often bode no good for the Allies. From special correspondents in England he hears of awful conditions in the trenches, or heroic deeds that only bring out the enormous difficulties of victory. From special correspondents in Germany, on the other hand, he gets glowing descriptions of Prussian thoroughness and morale, and the carefully coloured matter that the Wilhelmstrasse doles out to the American writer. Sayville, with only its wireless, can manage to supply the United States with the announcement of German successes every day; while all that the cables from England can do is to send word of strikes and political differences, despairing appeals for recruits and pessimistic speeches in Parliament. Truly, if it were not for their abounding Vol. 225.-No. 446,

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