RECONNOISSANCE OF CONFEDERATE POSITION.

473

Hagerstown, covering the road from that place to Williamsport. This position covered both the ford at Williamsport and the remains of the pontoon - bridge at Falling Waters. It ran along a range of high ground, and was very difficult to attack in front, owing to the broken character of the country. The right wing was protected by the river. On the left the country was level, but the proximity of Conococheague creek, which empties into the Potomac river at Williamsport, and the numerous stone walls made it a difficult position to turn. General Lee had added to its natural strength by entrenching it completely; and behind these earth - works his army lay, while his engineers were making herculean exertions to establish communication with the south shore. On the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th of July the cavalry of the two armies was constantly engaged, the Confederates endeavoring to block the advance of the Union forces, and the Federals to clear the way.

"By the night of the 10th of July the Twelfth, Second, Fifth, and Third corps were across Antietam creek and in front of Williamsport, on which rested the right flank of the enemy. The Sixth, Eleventh, and First Corps were near Funkstown and Hagerstown in front of the Confederate left. On the 11th and 12th of July the army advanced in line to feel the enemy, and ascertain how he was posted. Before this the commanding general had tried by personal reconnoissances to find out something of the Confederate position, so that an attack could be directed against the weak points. He was assisted by the two ablest men in the army,- General Warren, his chief engineer, and General Humphreys, his chief of staff. The

former was the man whose foresight had saved the Round Tops and the position of Gettysburg to the Federal army on the memorable 2d of July. The latter was distinguished as one of the two generals who had gained laurels at the battle of Fredericksburg. Both were clear - headed men, and no one could accuse either of any want of stomach for a fight. Yet they could find no point for an attack. 'Wherever seen, the Confederate position was naturally strong,' says General Humphreys in his book, "Gettysburg to the Rapidan." It presented no vulnerable points, but much of it was concealed from view. Its flanks were secure and could not be turned. In this condition of affairs,' continues General Humphreys, 'General Meade determined on the evening of the 12th of July to move forward the next morning and make a reconnoissance in force, supported by the whole army, feel the enemy and attack him where weakest, if it should give any promise of success.'

"What followed is best told by General Meade himself in his testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war. I give his own words:

Having been in command of the army not more than twelve or fourteen days, and in view of the tremendous and important issues involved in the result, knowing that if I were defeated the whole question would be reversed, the road to Washington and to the North open, and all the fruits of my victory at Gettysburg dissipated, I did not feel that I should be right in assuming the responsi bility of blindly attacking the enemy without any knowledge of his position. I, therefore, called a council of my corps commanders, who were the officers to execute this duty, and laid before them the precise condition of affairs.'

GENERAL M'LAWS' ACCOUNT.

475

"The council of war, with but two dissenting voices, disapproved of the general's aggressive policy, and opposed an attack. In this decision the Federal commander acquiesced, and agreed to defer the attack for one day, in order that an endeavor might be made by means of further reconnoissance to find some weak spot in the enemy's lines. The 13th of July was devoted to this work, and orders were issued on that evening for the whole army to move forward in accordance with the plans. of the day before. But it was too late. The bird had flown. By superhuman efforts General Lee had re-established the pontoon - bridge. Across this bridge on the night of the thirteenth, he moved his baggage and artillery, the infantry taking the fords. Before morning the whole Confederate army was once more on the soil of Virginia."

General McLaws, in his article in the Philadelphia Weekly Press, referred to in the previous chapter, says:

"General Lee's forces fell back leisurely without any engagement between the infantry forces worthy of notice, and on the 12th, when the main body of the enemy arrived, took position previously selected, covering the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, where it remained for two days with the enemy immediately in front, manifesting no disposition to attack, but throwing up entrenchments along his whole line.

"The Confederate army was now concentrated and on the defensive. General Lee himself had recovered in a great measure from his fatigue consequent on his exhausting labors, and as he rode along the line he had adopted I joined him and rode with him for some distance.

He

was in good spirits and seemed confident of success if his lines were attacked, and he was evidently wishing for it. If General Meade had attacked, his chances of success would have been much less than they were at Gettysburg, as the troops were eager to engage, and if they could have been allowed to try to provoke an attack would have done so.

"On the 13th, the river having become fordable and the bridge at Falling Waters having been reconstructed, General Lee, finding it difficult to obtain flour for his troops, concluded not to wait on General Meade any longer and retired across the river, with no great loss of men or material-in fact, with much less than usually attends such a movement made under such circumstances.

"And thus the invasion of Pennsylvania by the Confederate forces, under General Lee, was brought to a close, and to General Meade is due the honor of the result."

Upon ascertaining in the morning that the enemy had succeeded in effecting his escape, General Meade put his army in motion, and marching by Pleasant Valley, crossed the Potomac at Berlin. Halting a day on the Leesburg and Winchester pike to ascertain the movements of the enemy, and to be assured that an attempt to capture the National Capital by a rapid march by his rear, would not be made in case he advanced and left the way open, he again put his columns in motion and at length, near the close of July, reached his old position on the Rappahannock. Lee moved rapidly down the valley, and passing through the mountain below Strasburg, concentrated his army at Culpeper, and the memorable Pennsylvania campaign of less than two months in duration was ended.

CHAPTER X.

THE GREAT WAGON TRAIN OF WOUNDED.

S stated in a previous chapter, as soon as the darkness of night closed over the terrible scene of the third and concluding day of the series of battles at Gettysburg, General Lee began his preparations for returning with his defeated and shattered forces to Virginia. His first and greatest care, next to the safety of his army, was for his large number of wounded, and he determined to take as many of these with him as possible. Consequently all his available transportation was used for this purpose, and an immense train, not less than twenty-five or thirty miles long, was loaded with wounded and suffering men. All that could walk were required to accompany this train on foot, and the remainder of the wounded were left to the care of the Federals. This train was placed in charge of General J. D. Imboden, and the head of it left the scene of conflict amidst a terrific rain storm about four o'clock in the afternoon of Saturday, July 4th. It recrossed the South Mountain by Cashtownthe same way the army had come,-and at Greenwood left the turnpike and took a country road which cuts directly across toward the Potomac, leaving Chambersburg to the right. This side road is known as the Pine Stump Road