Morality: Its Nature and JustificationBernard Gert's classic work Morality, in which he argues his distinctive and comprehensive moral theory, is now in its sixth edition. Gert argues that morality is an informal system that does not provide answers to every moral question but does always limit the range of morally acceptable options and so explains why some moral questions cannot be resolved. Gert describes the two-step procedure that is used in moral decisions and judgments, and he shows that moral rules cannot be understood independently of the system in which they are embedded. Although his moral theory is sophisticated, it is presented with a clarity that will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students alike, as well as anyone with a general interest in applied ethics.In this new edition, Gert perfects the consistency of his views by presenting his argument in greater detail; he also revises the text in light of a critical book and two symposia dedicated to his theory that have surfaced since the book's last publication. This is the definitive edition to the work that has received so much attention and acclaim. |
Contents
Morality | 3 |
Rationality and Irrationality | 29 |
Chapter 3 | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
account of morality acting immorally acting irrationally acting morally adequate reason answer avoid behavior benefit Bernard Gert categorical imperative chapter cheating claim common morality concerned consequences consequentialist counts depriving of freedom disability disagreement egoism ethical egoism ethical relativism evil five rules fully informed harm immoral action impartial rational persons impartial with regard involves irrational action irrational desires irrational to act kill kind of violation kinds of actions moral agents moral attitude moral impartiality moral judgments moral rules moral system moral virtues morality requires morally acceptable morally relevant features motives one's self-interest oneself person can publicly personal virtues persons would publicly philosophers prevent psychological egoism publicly allow punishment question R. M. Hare rational egoism rationally allowed reasons for acting requires impartiality result rule prohibiting simply society someone suffering system that applies tion tional persons traits unjustified violations veil of ignorance violating a moral weakly justified