police justice, where the captain made a complaint against the mate and the crew for mutiny and desertion. The justice informed the captain that he had no jurisdiction, but he directed a policeman to take the men into cus- tody, and they were locked up. The captain then went before the Prus- sian consul, and made complaint, re- questing that the crew be punished, and that they be kept in custody pre- liminarily, and stating that he could not receive the mate on board again. The consul then issued a requisition, to a commissioner of the Circuit Court of the United States, stating that the men had deserted, and asking for a warrant to arrest the men, and "if said charge be true," that they be de- tained until there should be an oppor- tunity to send them back.
This requisition the captain took to the police justice, who thereupon, without examination, committed all the men to the county jail, where they lay for ten days. On the direction of the consul, they were then released, and came to the consul's office, where they were advised to go to the ship, and ask the captain for their wages. Some of them went, and the captain agreed to meet the crew at the consul's office next day. He came there, but the parties failed to meet each other, and thereafter the seamen executed assign- ments of their wages to the mate, but without consideration, and he filed this libel against the vessel, to recover the wages of all. The captain was part owner of the ship. He defended the suit, and claimed that the men had forfeited their wages by deser- tion; that they had agreed in the articles not to bring the suit; and that the Court, under the treaty be- tween the United States and Prussia, had no jurisdiction.
Held, That, as to the mate and L., there could be no pretense of deser- tion, for they left the vessel with the captain's consent;
That, as the other seamen only left the ship, without taking their clothes, to go and see the consul, the charge of desertion was not made out against them;
That the conduct of the captain, in imprisoning the men, was unlawful, and sufficient to dissolve the contract of the mariners;
That no law permits the imprison- ment of deserters in our jails, except on proof of the facts before a compe- tent tribunal;
That the men were not prevented from bringing this suit by the clause in the articles referring to that pro- vision of the German mercantile law, that "the seaman is not allowed to sue the master in a foreign port," be- cause this is not a suit against the master, and the master having, by his unlawful conduct, absolved the men from their agreement, had absolved them from this portion of it with the rest;
That the clause in the treaty be- tween the United States and Prussia, that the consuls, vice consuls, and commercial agents shall have the right, as such, to act as judges and arbitrators, in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless, &c., &c.," was not sufficient to oust this Court of its jurisdiction over this con- troversy.
Whether this clause has any appli- cation to suits in rem-quære.
That the Prussian consul had not acted in this matter as judge or arbi- trator, which words must be taken in their ordinary sense, implying inves- tigation of facts upon evidence, the exercise of judgment as to their effect, and a determination thereon;
That the consul is not a Court, and neither his record nor his testimony is conclusive on this Court;
That, as the consul, though really appointed as consul of the North German Union, was recognized by the Executive Department as consul of Prussia by virtue of such appoint- ment, the action of the Executive was binding on the Court, and he must be held to be the Prussian con- sul;
That the seamen might file a peti- tion to be now made co-libellants, and on such petition being filed, and the cancellation of their assignments to the mate, they would be entitled to decrees for their wages.
In admiralty, minors are allowed to sue for wages in their own names. The Elwin Kreplin, 413
1. The bark John Griffin was libelled as forfeited for a violation of the 50th section of the Act of March 2d, 1799, for smuggling cigars. One Albreu, who owned the cigars, testified that the captain of the bark, in Havana, had made an agreement to smuggle the cigars for him; that he sent the cigars from Havana to Matanzas, where the bark was lying, and re- ceived a letter from the captain say- ing they were shipped; that he then came to New York, and after the arrival of the bark in New York, re- ceived his cigars, which were brought him by a carman, and paid the cap- tain the agreed freight. It also ap- peared in evidence that on the seizure of the cigars Albreu's papers were also seized, among which were the invoices of the cigars from Havana to Matanzas, and the letter from the captain. The captain denied that the cigars ever were on board the vessel, and otherwise contradicted Albreu, but gave no satisfactory explanation of the letter. Some other testimony was given confirming some parts of Albreu's story. His character for truth was seriously impeached.
Held, that the evidence sufficiently sustained the charge against the ves- sel, and that she must be forfeited.
The Government assumes no obli- gations towards ship owners to pre- vent fraudulent discharges of cargo, and the liability of the vessel is the same whether the officers of the cus- toms do or do not prevent such dis- charges. The John Griffin,
2. An information was filed against the steamship Queen and her master, al- leging that the vessel belonged, in whole or in part, to a citizen or citi- zens of the United States, and charg ing that certain merchandise, not in- cluded in the manifest on board, had been imported by her into the United States, contrary to section 24 of the Act of March 2, 1799, which, for such offence, imposes upon the master a forfeiture equal to the value of the goods not included in the manifest, and that, by section 8 of the Act of July 18, 1866, the vessel is holden for the payment of the penalty against the master, and becomes liable to be
seized and proceeded against, by libel. to recover the same. The answer of the owners of the vessel denied the allegations of the infor- mation, and especially that they were citizens of or residents in the United States, and excepted to the informa- tion as alleging no cause of action against the vessel, inasmuch as it did not show that the master or owners of the vessel had been convicted of the acts complained of. The answer of the master also denied the state- ments of the information and excepted to it, in that it did not set forth a joint cause of action against the vessel and the master, and in that parties were improperly joined, and in that the parties joined were entitled to differ- ent modes of trial, and in that this action could not be sustained against the vessel and the master jointly. The suit, as to both vessel and mas- ter, was tried before the Court with- out a jury, as a civil cause of Admi- ralty and maritime jurisdiction:
Held, That it was clearly proved that the violation of the law set forth in the information was committed.
That the vessel was a British ves- sel, and that, as, under the law, it is immaterial whether the offending vessel is a vessel of the United States or a foreign vessel, the information might be amended without terms, in respect to the ownership of the vessel, and by averring a violation of sec- tion 25 of the act of 1866, which ex- tends the provision of the Act of 1799 to vessels owned, in whole or in part, by foreigners.
That the Court had jurisdiction to enforce the penalty against the vessel, in such a proceeding as this, without - a trial by jury.
That the vessel might be proceeded against for the penalty, irrespective of any proceeding against the master.
That the suit to recover the penalty against the master was a suit at com- mon law, and he was entitled to a trial by jury, under the seventh Amend- ment of the Constitution of the United States.
That the right to recover against the vessel in the present form of pro- ceeding was clear, and, as the answer of the master excepted to the informa- tion on the ground that the suit could not be maintained against the vessel
July 31, Seizures, Sept. 24, Judiciary, 76, 77, 79, 242, 243, 530, 539 1790, August 4, Seizures, 530, 531, 536 1792, May 8, Process, 81, 530, 531, 532, 535, 536, 537, 538, 541, 542, 543,
There is no case, in which a penalty or forfeiture is incurred, or any crime or offence committed, simply because the duties on imported goods are not paid, or accounted for before the im- portation is complete. It is by acts or omissions subsequent to the im- portation, that forfeitures or penalties are incurred or crimes or offences committed, unless there is some law 1804, March 26, Limitation, 461, 462, expressly declaring the importation itself, or the manner of making it, un- lawful.
1793, March 2, Practice, 1797, March 3, Forfeiture, 1799, March 2, Imports, 20, 239, 240, 411, 461, 462, 463, 464, 466, 526, 531, 532, 533, 535, 536, 537, 541, 542, 543, 545
The secret and clandestine manner of the importation with the intent to defraud the revenue, and not the non- payment of or not accounting for the duties prior to the importation, con- stitutes the gist of the offence of smuggling under the 19th section of the Act of August 30, 1842. The U. S. v. Thomas, 370
4. On the arrival of a steamer from Hav- ana at the port of New York, several lots of cigars, no one of which lots consisted of as many as three thou- sand, or had any shipping marks on them, were found in different parts of the vessel. No permits were obtained by any one for the landing of any of these lots, and they were not on the manifest, and were not returned by the officers as landed with the cargo:
Held, That, as no entry of cigars of less than three thousand in a single package can be made, (14 Stats, at Large, 328), and as all goods on the manifest must be designated by a shipping mark, (1 Stats. at Large,
463, 464 1829, March 2, Treaty with Prussia, 422 1839, February 28, Judiciary, 461, 462,
1842, August 23, Judiciary,
August 30, Smuggling, 1846, August 8, Treaty with Prussia,
1853, February 26, Costs, July 26, Costs,
1861, March 2, Tariff, 551, 555, 556, 557 558
Where the owners of a vessel permitted one K. to act as master of the vessel while she was getting ready for sea, the understanding being that he should command her as master if he should purchase an interest in her, and one of the owners made oath at the custom house that K. was the owner, and K. cleared her at the custom house as master, but, fail- ing to purchase an interest, was dis- placed as master:
Held, That the owners could not now be permitted to say that K. had not the ordinary power of a master to order stores for the voyage.
That they were liable for stores, ordered by him, which were proper for the voyage and were used on the vessel. Stringham v. Schloener,
1. Where a tug was employed to take a schooner out of a slip from alongside another vessel, and the men on the schooner gave no directions as to the mode or time of taking her out, and in taking her out, her stay caught the yard-arm of the other vessel, and her topmast was carried away:
Held, That the tug was bound to adopt a method of taking the schooner out without injury.
That the method selected was man- ifestly hazardous, and the tug was liable for the damages occasioned by her want of success. The M. M. Caleb,
2. A steamboat agreed to tow certain canal boats from New Brunswick to New York, by way of the Raritan
river and the Kills. On reaching the mouth of the river, inside of which there was good anchorage and a safe harbor, there was found outside a high wind and a heavy sea. The steamer, however, went out, and, not being able to cross the flats, the tide being ebb, took a circuitous route by the channel, going by South Amboy and down around the buoy at tail of the flats, and so around to Perth Am- boy. While making this passage, two of the canal boats were sunk by the violence of the sea and the dashing of the boats against each other:
Held, That it showed a want of or- dinary care for the steamboat to ven- ture out with such a tow when she did;
That, the violence of the sea fur- nishing an adequate cause for the disaster, and the steamboat being in fault for placing the boats in such cir- cumstances, she must be held to strict proof of any negligent act on the part of the boats, which she claimed to have been contributory. The Blanche
Where a steamtug was employed to tow out a ship, which was lying stern out at Pier 37 East River, and, hav- ing attached a hawser to her stern, towed her out stern foremost into the river, and then cast off the hawser and attempted to come alongside and take another hawser from the ship's starboard bow, and the hands on board the ship failed to promptly catch the heaving-lines, and before the hawser could be properly attached, the ship drifted stern foremost against a pier on the opposite side of the river, and received injury:
Held, That the injury was sioned by negligence on the part of the tug, in towing the ship so far out into the river, before casting off the hawser. It should have been cast off as soon as the ship had fairly cleared the New York piers.
That the tug was liable for the damages. The M. A. Lennox,
4. A tow-boat took several vessels in tow to tow them through Hell Gate from New York. The tide was flood, and the weather fair. After passing through the Gate, one of the vessels struck some obstruction under water,
causing her to leak, and making it necessary to run her ashore. Her owner filed a libel against the tug, claiming that the tug had taken in tow more vessels than she could man- age, and that the vessel was allowed to be carried by the tide out of the channel, and to strike a rock on the shore. The tug claimed, on the other hand, that the vessel struck a sunken wreck in the channel:
Held, That, on the evidence, the tug had taken in tow more vessels than she had power to manage.
That, therefore, the burden was upon her to prove that the object which the vessel struck was one the presence of which the tug was not bound to have known.
That she had failed to show this, and was, therefore, liable for the dam- ages. The George Farrell,
of the master of the tug, whereby the tug had not full control of the barge; that another tug, passing close by the tow, raised a swell, which, with the tide, gave the barge a sheer towards the dock, which the tug was not able to check, owing to the slackening of the bow line; and that the collision was caused by inevitable accident:
Held, that, as the tug had acquiesced in the slackening of the bow line, she became responsible for whatever con- sequences resulted from that arrange- ment.
That the tide was known and ought to have been calculated for, and the effect of the passing of the other tug ought to have been guarded against.
That the circumstances, therefore, did not make out a case of inevitable accident. The Olive Baker, 173
See COLLISION, 7, 10, 13. PLEADING, 2.
The defendants, having presented at the sub-treasury of the United States certain seven-thirty notes of the United States, to be retired under the provisions of the Act of April 12th, 1866 (14 U. S. Stat. at Large, 31), and having received the money there- for, it was afterwards claimed by the Government that eighteen of them were counterfeits, and an action of assumpsit was brought by the United States against the defendants, to re- cover the moneys paid for such al- leged counterfeits.
Held, That, in order to entitle the United States to recover, it was neces- sary for them to prove that the eighteen notes were delivered to the United States by the defendants, that the United States paid their money for them, and that they were issued by the United States under any Act of Congress.
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