1. A libel was filed against the steamer
Bristol to recover damages for a col-
lision between her and the bark
George S. Brown. The owners of 4.
the Bristol filed a cross-libel against
the bark to recover the damages sus-
tained by the steamer, and moved,
on notice to the proctors for the libel-
lant in the suit against the steamer,
to stay proceedings in that suit until
security was given on the cross-libel.
No process had been issued on the

cross-libel.

Held, That the Supreme Court did not
intend, by the 54th Rule in Admiralty,
to give this Court jurisdiction of the
second libel without a seizure of the
bark within the District.

That the object of the 54th Rule is to
compel the appearance and giving of
security by a respondent in a cross-
libel in personam, in cases where it
does not appear proper that he should
be relieved from giving such security.
The Bristol and the Geo. S. Brown,
57

2. Where a process was issued, contain-
ing a clause of foreign attachment,
and containing on its face a notice of
what the process demanded, and for
what cause, and of the time and place
when F. & T., the garnishees must ap-
pear and answer, and the marshal
made this return on the process:
"Personally served on F. & T. :"

Held, That service of the process on
the garnishees was service of the notice
required to be served on them, and
was a sufficient attachment of any
credits and effects of the respondent in
their hands.

That the marshal should have re-
turned, that the respondent was not
found, and had no goods and chattels
within the District, and that, there-
upon, his credits and effects had been
attached in the hands of the garnishees.

That the return could be amended to

5.

6.

The Transit,

126
138

Where exception is taken to the
method adopted by a commissioner in
ascertaining the damages, either the
report or the exception should show
what such method was, or the exeep-
tion will be unavailing. The Transit,
138

A possessory action was brought by
the owners of a vessel against the
master, and, after the vessel had been
seized by the marshal, under the pro-
cess in the action, the owners, through
a new master whom they had ap
pointed, chartered the vessel, and by
consent of the marshal, but without
the permission of the Court, began to
load the vessel under the charter:

Held, That the act of the owners, in
interfering as they had done with the
vessel, while in the custody of the law,
would well justify the Court in declin-
ing to exercise jurisdiction in the prem-
ises, but as that had been done with
the consent of the marshal, and the
rights of the defendant could be other-
wise protected, the Court would decree
that the libellants recover possession
of the vessel without costs, on their
paying into Court the inward freight
collected by them, less the usual in-
ward charges, including unloading
and crew's wages, as security for the
payment of any sum found due to the
master, in an action to be brought by
him within twenty days, if he was so
advised. The Brisk,

252

After such decree was entered, the
respondent gave notice of appeal, but
took no steps to perfect his appeal for
several days, and the owners applied
to the Court for leave to bond the
Vessel:

Held, That the Court would not grant
leave to bond the vessel, but would di-
rect that the decree be executed, unless

7. A quantity of cotton was shipped on
board the steamship Idaho, bound for
Liverpool, by M., who received a bill
of lading therefor, in the ordinary form,
dated May 4th, 1869. On the same
day an action of replevin was com-
menced by P., against the master of
the steamship, to recover the cotton as
his property. In that action, the cot-
ton was seized by the sheriff, and was
by him nominally delivered to P., the
plaintiff, but was not taken from the
steamship, and, by agreement between
P. and the owners of the steamship, it
was carried forward to Liverpool, and
there delivered to the agent of P., who
had agreed to indemnify the steamship
against any liability by reason of such
carriage and delivery to him.
having assigned his bill of lading to
H. & Co., a libel was filed on the
9th of June, 1869, by them, against
the steamship, to recover the value of
the cotton not delivered according to
the bill of lading. On the 19th of June
an action was commenced in the Court
of Exchequer, in Liverpool, by F., the
agent of H. & Co., against the owners
of the steamship, to recover damages
for the non-delivery of the cotton under
the bill of lading. After the filing of
the libel, H. & Co. were made parties
defendants in the replevin suit on their
own application. The answer of the
claimants, to the libel, set up the title
of P. to the cotton as a defence against
the claim of H. & Co.

M.

In this position of affairs P. applied
to the District Court, on petition, pray-
ing to be admitted to defend in this ac-
tion, and that the libellants be required
to litigate with him their title to the cot-
ton, or, if they would not stipulate to
do so, that their further proceedings in
the suit, in the English Exchequer, be
enjoined. The owners of the steam-
ship also applied for a stay of proceed-
ings in this cause, unless the libellants
should elect to stay proceedings in the
two other actions, and to proceed
herein.

Held, That the interest of P. in this
suit arose solely from his having agreed
to indemnify the claimants against the
result of the litigation; and that that

8.

circumstance was not sufficient to give
him the right to intervene in the ac-
tion.

That his application for a stay of
proceedings in this action must be re-
jected for the reason that he was not
a party to the suit, and did not pretend
that there was any collusive use by the
parties of the process of the Court to
deprive him of any substantial right.

That it is competent for a Court of
Admiralty to stay proceedings, in any
case before it, to prevent injustice: that
no reason was apparent why the trou-
ble and expense of the three litigations,
each involving the title to the same
property, should be cast upon the
owners of the ship; and that, on the
application of the claimants, proceed-
ings in the cause should, therefore, be
stayed, unless the libellants should elect
to stay proceedings in the other cases.
The Idaho,
272

A libel of information was filed against
goods, to forfeit them for alleged vio-
lation of the revenue laws, and process
was issued to the marshal, command-
ing him to attach the property and de-
tain it in his custody. The marshal
returned, that he had been unable to
attach the property and to detain it in
his custody, and an alias monition was
issued to him. On the record in the
cause, and an affidavit showing that
the goods had been, previous to the fil-
ing of the libel, seized by the collector
of the port of New York, and remained
in his custody, and that a certificate to
that effect had been issued to the mar-
shal, an application was made, on be-
half of the United States, for an order
that the alias monition be modified, so
as to conform to the provisions of the
31st section of the Act of July 18th,
1866, (14 U. S. Stat. at Large, 186):

Held, That the provisions of the 4th
section of the Act of May 8th, 1792,
(1 U. S. Stat. at Large, 277), requiring
the marshal to take custody of all goods
seized by any officer of the revenue,
were abrogated by the 31st section of
the Act of July 18th, 1866, (14 Id.,
186).

That the 9th Admiralty Rule of the
Supreme Court, in view of the provi-
sion of the Act of 1866, was not ap-
plicable to the case, it being a case, in
the language of that Rule," otherwise
provided for by statute."

That the alias monition would, there-
fore, be modified, so that it should
command the marshal to attach the
property by leaving with the collector,
or other person having the property
in custody, a copy of the monition and
a notice requiring such collector or
other person to detain such property
in custody until the further order of
the Court respecting it.
The U. S. v.
One Case of Silk,
526

See ATTACHMENT.

JURISDICTION, 1, 2.

MARSHAL

MASTER, 4.

SEAMEN'S WAGES.

2. BANKRUPTCY.

1. A proof of debt founded on a prom-
issory note, is defective if it does
not set forth the consideration of the
note, and whether any payments have
been made on it. Loder's Case, 125

2. The register, to whom a proceeding
in bankruptcy has been referred, is
not bound to file a deposition for
proof of debt, taken and certified to
before another register, which does
not appear to him to be in conformity
with law; but, if an issue of law or
fact arises thereupon, he should ad-
journ it into Court, under § 4 of the
Bankruptcy Act.

id.

3. The property of a bankrupt levied
upon under an execution was, under
an order of the bankruptcy Court,
delivered to the assignee, and sold
by him, subject to the determination
of the Court as to the validity of the
lien claimed by the creditor. The
assignee filed a petition praying that
such lien might be declared void.
The creditor's answer prayed that it
might be adjudged valid, and that
the assignee might be directed to
satisfy the execution out of the pro-
ceeds of the property held by him.
On an objection taken by the creditor,
at the hearing:

Held, That, as the matter was
brought up by petition, instead of by
bill in equity, it was irregular.

That both petition and answer
must fall, and the proceeding be dis-
missed, without costs, with leave to
the creditor to file a bill in equity, or
bring a suit at law, as he might be

4.

advised, within thirty days. Ballou's
Case,

135

A claim by petitioning creditors in
involuntary bankruptcy, for counsel
fees incurred by them, in the proceed-
ings before adjudication, cannot be
entertained by the Register in the
first instance, but must be presented
to the Court, on petition. Dibblee's
Case,
137

5. On March 26th, 1870, an order was
made requiring creditors to show
cause on April 21st, why a discharge
should not be granted to a bankrupt.
On April 7th, the Register granted
an order for the examination of the
bankrupt. The application for the
order was not in writing nor under
oath, nor was any cause for issuing
the order stated, except that the
applicants were creditors. The bank-
rupt appeared under the order and
objected that the application was in-
sufficient, and that the time to ex-
amine him had expired:

6.

Held, That the time to examine
the bankrupt did not expire with the
making of the application for his dis-
charge; that the granting of the
order by the Register was a matter
of discretion; and that nothing ap-
peared to show that his discretion
Solis
was improperly exercised.
Case,

143

An order to show cause why a dis-
charge should not be granted to a
bankrupt may be made after the ex-
piration of sixty days, and within
one year, from the adjudication of
bankruptcy, on a petition stating that
no assets have come to the hands of
the assignee; and such order will not
be set aside merely on proof that a
small sum of money has been offered
to the assignee for some of the assets,
there being strong evidence that they
id.
are absolutely worthless.

7. Creditors of a bankrupt, against
whose claim a protest had been filed
by the bankrupt, applied to the reg-
ister, on a petition making allega-
tions of fraud in the bankrupt's pro-
ceedings, for an order directing the
examination of the bankrupt, and of
witnesses, and extending the time to
show cause against the discharge till
after such examination. The register

9. In a proceeding in involuntary bank-
ruptcy, a warrant was issued, com-
manding the marshal to take posses-
sion provisionally of all the property
and effects of the bankrupt, and "of
all the goods, assets and property
lately conveyed, whether by bill of
sale or otherwise, by the said Alex-
ander Harthill to Joseph Henry."
Under this warrant, the marshal took
possession of certain property con-
veyed by the bankrupt to said Henry
before the filing of the petition. Henry
applied by petition to the Court, for an
order that the property be restored to
him, alleging that the transfer to him
was a bona fide purchase, and obtained
an order restraining the marshal from
any removal of the said property. A
reference was ordered to take proof as
to the validity and bona fides of the
purchase made by Henry from the
bankrupt, pending which the property
which had been taken by the marshal
was sold as perishable. On the evi-
dence as reported, Henry moved for
an order directing the delivery to him
of the proceeds in the hands of the
marshal.

Held, That the warrant, in so far as
it commanded the marshal to take

possession of the property which had
been conveyed by the bankrupt to
Henry, transcended the power con-
ferred on the Court by the 40th sec-

In a suit in equity under the jurisdiction
created by the bankruptcy Act, a de-
cree was entered for the plaintiff.
Within ten days thereafter the defend-
ant gave notice of an appeal to the
Circuit Court, as required by the 8th
section of the Act, to the clerk of the
Court and to the plaintiff, but gave no
bond as that section requires. After

the ten days had expired, he presented
to the District Court a bond for ap-
proval, as a bond on the appeal. The
bond was entitled in the Circuit Court,
with the title of the cause, was in the
proper amount, and referred to an ap-
peal "to reverse the final decree
rendered in the above entitled suit
by the Judge of the District Court,"
but did not in any other way state
the decree appealed from.

Held, That the right of appeal given
by the 8th section cannot be enlarged
by the Court.

That, as no bond was given within
the ten days, no appeal could now be
allowed.

That, if the bond was correct, there
was no reason why it should not be
approved.

That, as there was in the bond no
statement of the Court which rendered
the decree, except by a reference to
the title of the cause, and as the cause
was entitled in the Circuit Court, the
bond was not a sufficient bond and
could not be approved.

That, as no bond was given within
the ten days, the issuing of execution
on the decree could not be stayed.
Benjamin v. Hart,

PRESUMPTION.

See COLLISION, 18, 22.
EVIDENCE, 1.

454

Ꭱ

RECEIVER.

See BANKRUPTCY, 7, 8, 15.

RELEASE.

See POSSESSION, 2.

S

SALVAGE.

Fourteen men, the crew of a pilot boat,
having heard that a schooner had
been injured in a collision at sea, set
out in search of her, and after cruising
some days found her derelict, and suc-
ceeded after three days in towing her
into New York, expending about $160
in the service. The schooner and her
cargo were worth $4,000.

A

The Court awarded one-half as salv-
age, and added to it $100 and costs,
on account of the libellants having set
out to search for and find the wreck.
The Saxon,

SEAMEN'S WAGES.

18

Prussian bark, with a crew whose
term of service had not expired, was
laid up at Staten Island, on account
of the war between Prussia and
France. A difficulty arose between
the captain and the crew, and the men
demanded leave to go and see the
consul. This the captain refused to
allow, but agreed that one of them,
named L., might go. They insisted
that they would all go, and the cap-
tain went ashore to get the aid of the
police. After he had gone, the crew
informed the mate that they were
going to see the consul, and went
ashore, without serious objection from
the mate. The captain, returning,
was told by the mate that the men
had gone ashore, and high words
passed between them, which resulted
in the mate's saying that he would go
too, and he went ashore, without ob-
jection from the captain. The cap-
tain, with a police officer, overtook
the crew, and all hands went before a