a ship by stevedores, employed, di-
rected and paid by the shippers, and
on delivery two of them were found
to be nearly empty:
Held, That, even if the loss had
been the result of bad stowage, as it
had not been proved to be, the ship
was not responsible for it. The Dia-
dem,
247
2. On the arrival of a ship at New York,
her consignees published a notice,
stating the place of discharge, and
calling on consignees to attend to the
receipt of their goods, and giving no-
tice that all goods remaining on the
dock after five o'clock P. M., would be
stored at the risk and expense of the
consignees of the goods. Under this
notice thirty-five of thirty-nine casks
of wine, composing one consignment,
were discharged and delivered to the
consignee, without objection and with-
out any demand of freight. The de-
livery of the other four was refused
to the carman, unless the freight was
paid. The consignee of the wine,
being informed of this, with reasona-
ble dispatch caused the freight to be
tendered to the master of the ship on
board, and demanded the four casks
which were then on the wharf, it being
then almost five o'clock. The master
declined to receive the freight or de-
liver the casks, for the reason, that he
did not know the correct amount, and
that the place to pay the freight, was
the office of the consignees of the ship,
but offered to deliver the casks, if a
sum much larger than the freight was
deposited with him as security. The
consignee did not assent to this, and
the goods were sent to a storehouse.
This was on Saturday. On Monday
morning the consignee of the wine
paid the freight to the consignee of
the ship, who received it, and tendered
an order on the warehouse, for the de-
livery of the goods on payment of
charges. The consignee of the goods
refused to accept such an order, and
thereafter filed a libel against the ship,
to recover the value of the goods.
Held, That the master of the ship,
when the freight was tendered to him
at the ship, had the right to take a
reasonable time to ascertain the cor-
rect amount of the freight, but had not
the right, meanwhile, to store the
goods at the expense of the owner.
It is the duty of a shipmaster, when
a consignee of goods refuses to pay
the freight, to land the goods and
store them with some competent third
party, subject to the consignee's order
on payment of the freight. If there
is no such competent party at the port
of discharge, the master should proba-
bly land the goods at the nearest port
where such competent party can be
found. But he must act prudently
and in good faith, in view of all the
circumstances. For v. Holt, 278
Under a provision in a bill of lading,
that the vessel shall not be account-
able for leakage, breakage or rust,
the vessel is nevertheless responsible
for negligence or want of skill or care
in her lading, stowage or delivery of
the cargo. But such negligence or
want of care or skill must be affirm-
atively shown by the party alleging it.
The Delhi,
Where a bill of lading for cases of
plate glass contained the clause, “not
accountable for breakage," and it ap-
peared, that, when the cargo was dis-
charged, certain of the cases were
placed flatwise on the dock and others
placed endwise, and the attention of a
clerk of the consignees of the cargo
was called to the fact that some of
the cases were piled flatwise on each
other, but none of the cases appeared
to be broken or pressed in, and all the
cases were receipted for as in good or-
der, and, on opening the cases at the
consignees' store, some of the plates
in some of the cases that were piled
flatwise were found to be broken, as
were also some plates in the cases that
were placed end wise, (the claim for
damage to the latter having been
abandoned):
Held, That the consignees had failed
to show that the damage to the glass
was caused by the piling of the cases
flatwise, or by any other negligence
on the part of the ship.
Raisins were shipped on a vessel, un-
der a bill of lading which contained a
clause exempting the vessel from dam-
age caused by "any act, neglect, or
default of the pilot, master, or marin.
ers," or from damage "resulting from
stowage or contact with other goods,
for leakage, breakage, damage caused
by heavy weather, or pitching or roll-
ing of the vessel, or defective pack-
ages," or for damage "arising through
insufficiency or strength of packages."
Part of the raisins came out in bad or-
der, the tops and bottoms of the boxes
being crushed by other cargo. They
were re-coopered before being deliv
ered. In each box were layers of
raisins, with paper between. When
they were delivered, raisins were miss-
ing from every box, and the papers in
many of them were torn and soiled by
finger-marks:
Held, That, notwithstanding the ex-
ceptions in the bill of lading, the ves-
sel was liable for the value of the
raisins not delivered, no account being
given as to how the missing raisins
disappeared. The Bellona,
was signed by the mate of a bark,
and the mate, though called as a wit-
ness in court, was not asked in relation
to the truth of the copy, and did not
dispute it:
Held, That the copy was admissible
in evidence.
But a copy of a survey, not purport-
ing to have been made by any one con-
nected with the vessel, was excluded
as evidence, no witness able to prove
or disprove its correctness being
called, or shown to be within reach.
The Vivid,
319
In a conflict of evidence, mere num-
bers of witnesses must sometimes be
considered. The J. L. Hasbrouck, 359
As to the application of circumstantial
evidence, if a jury find any one cir-
cumstance clearly proved, which is
inconsistent with a certain theory, that
is sufficient to destroy the theory en-
tirely. The U. S. v. Cooke,
5. A paper, purporting on its face to be
the manifest of a steamer, was proved
to have been produced from the usual
place of deposit in the custom house
for ships' manifests, and it was proved
that no other manifest for the voyage
was on file, but no other proof of the
genuineness of the paper was offered:
Held, That the paper was admissible
in evidence. The Missouri, 410
See CARRIER, 2.
COLLISION, 16, 19, 23.
DAMAGES, 2, 3.
IMPORT ACTS, 2.
INTERNAL REVENUE, 2.
MORTGAGE, 1, 4.
UNITED STATES TREASURY.
See BANKRUPTCY, 3, 13, 16, 21,
22, 24.
INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS, 1.
LIMITATION, 2.
The owners of a vessel are justified in
detaining part of her cargo till the
2. It was proved that certain lots of
cigars were brought to the store-room
of the seizure department of the cus-
tom house, as seized goods, and the
reports of the seizure, required by the
regulation, and produced from the
files of the department, stated that
these lots had been found on the
steamer. No such lots of cigars ap-
peared on the manifest. In an action
brought to recover a penalty for not
having the cigars on the manifest:
Held, That this was not sufficient
evidence of the importation of the
goods in the vessel to shift the burden
of proof to the claimants.
id.
3. The Tariff Act of March 2d, 1861, im-
posed a duty of 10 per cent. on "Dutch
metal," and of 30 per cent. on manu-
factures, not otherwise provided for,
of brass, copper or other metal, "or
of which either of these metals, or any
other metal, shall be the component
material of chief value." The Tariff
Act of February 24th, 1869, imposed
a duty of 45 per cent. on "all manu-
factures of copper, or of which cop-
per shall be a component of chief
value, not otherwise herein provided
Held, That, under the Tariff Acts,
brass must be taken to be a metal, as
well as copper, and that, if Dutch metal
was a manufacture of brass, although
copper was the chief component of
brass, yet Dutch metal would not be
included in the Act of 1869, as being
a manufacture of which copper was a
component of chief value.
In cases of serious ambiguity in the
language ci a Tariff Act, or doubtful
classification of articles, or vague or
doubtful interpretation, the construc-
tion of the Act is to be in favor of the
importer. The U. S. v. Ullman, 547
See PLEADING, 3.
PRACTICE (Admiralty), 8.
SMUGGLING.
INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS.
1. A surety, who had signed a stipula-
tion for the release of property seized
at the suit of the United States, and
against whom judgment had after-
wards been entered up, and an execu-
tion issued, applied to open the judg
ment, and set aside the execution, on
two grounds: (1.) That he signed the
bond on the representation that it
should also be signed by one S., and
that it was not signed by S., but by
one B., who falsely personated S.
(2.) That, after his property had been
seized under the execution, it was
agreed between him and the United
States District Attorney, that, if he
would give certain information against
two other parties, his property should
be released; and that he gave the in-
formation, and the parties were in-
dicted, and thereupon his property
was released, but had now been seized
again on an alias execution:
Held, That it appeared, on the facts.
that the surety was not only aware of
the personation of S. by B., but him-
self procured such personation, and
that, therefore, B. was, to all intents
and purposes, S., as against the sure-
ty and his liability on his bond.
That his alleged agreement with the
District Attorney was not established,
but, if it was, it would not avail him
as a legal ground for the interposition
of the Court. The agreement set up
being a compromise of a case arising
under the Internal Revenue laws,
would not be valid without the con-
currence of the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Attorney General.
The U. S. v. A Quantity of Distilled
Spirits, &c.,
The 96th section of the Internal Rev-
enue Act of July 20th, 1868, (15 U. S.
Stat. at Large, 164,) is to be construed
to mean, that where the statute has
A question of jurisdiction should not
be disposed of on motion, but on hear-
ing. Cushing v. Laird,
70
2. A Court of Admiralty has the right
to decline to entertain jurisdiction,
where all the parties are foreigners
resident abroad. The Brisk,
3. Distilled spirits found on the prem-
ises on which the business of distilling
is carried on, being the product of
such business, are not “personal prop- 3.
erty used in the business" within the
meaning of the 19th section of the
Act of July 20, 1868, (15 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 133.)
id.
4. Where the producing capacity of a
distillery had been determined by a
survey, in accordance with sec. 10 of
the Act of July 20th, 1868, (15 U. S.
Stat. at Large, 129,) and the assessor
subsequently, without any new survey
being held, determined that the pro-
ducing capacity was greater, and as-
sessed the distillery accordingly, and
a suit was brought on the distiller's
bond to recover the excess of the as-
sessment above that which would
have been otherwise assessed:
Held, That the assessment was void,
and the excess could not be recovered.
The U. S. v. King,
A petition in involuntary bankruptcy
was filed on January 21st, 1868, and
an adjudication was made on February
1st, on default of the debtor to appear,
after personal service. The petition
stated that the debtor had resided in
the District for six months next pre-
ceding the filing of the petition; but
the testimony showed that from May
1st, 1867, to December 7th, 1867, he
resided in Boston, and that from that
time till the filing of the petition he
resided at New York, and did not carry
on business anywhere during the six
months. The debtor applied for a dis-
charge:
Held, That the Court had no juris-
diction over the case, because the
debtor had not resided in the District
for the longest period during the six
months preceding the filing of the pe-
tition. Leighton's Case,
457
The restrictions in section 11 of the
bankruptcy Act, as to the Judge to
whom the petition is to be addressed,
apply to proceedings under section
id.
See BANKRUPTCY, 8, 9.
LIMITATION, 3.
PRACTICE (Admiralty), 1, 5.
(Equity).
SEAMEN'S WAGES.
SMUGGLING, 2.
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT.
See TOWBOAT AND TOW, 8.
A lease was executed by H. S. to E. S.
which provided that, "in default of
payment for any year during said
term, said lease is to be void, and said
property is at once to revest in me,
or my heirs or assigns, without notice
to the lessee, in the same manner as
if this lease had not been given."
After the death of H. S., E. S. con-
tinued in possession of the whole
property till December 9, 1864, when
he conveyed the whole unexpired
term of the lease to S. & B., and on
Sept. 14, 1865, he quitclaimed to
them all his right, title and interest in
the property. S. & B. were there-
after declared bankrupts, and an as-
signee was appointed. H. S., by will,
left the bulk of his property to his
daughter T. for her life, and on her
death, to her children. There was a
failure to pay part of the rent due on
Oct. 21st, 1867, and a failure to pay
the rent due on the 21st of October,
1868, and the agent of the devisees
made a demand on that day, gener-
ally, for the rent due.
The assignee in bankruptcy, claim-
ing the possession of the property,
filed a bill in equity against all par-
Held, That the words in the lease
as to the non-payment of rent were not
words of limitation, but a condition
by which the lease might become void
at the option of the lessor.
That the devisees, having succeeded
to the rights of the lessor, were en-
titled to avoid the lease, on the non-
payment of rent, on October 21st,
1868.
That to work a forfeiture for non-
payment of rent, there must be a de-
mand of the precise sum due.
That no such demand was made
here, and the lease was therefore not
avoided.
That the assignee was therefore en-
titled to the immediate and exclusive
possession of the property, both real
and personal. Wildman v. Taylor,
See CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS, 2.
Coal was furnished by B. to a steam-
boat, on the procurement of her mas
ter. B. billed the coal to the vessel
and owners. The vessel was owned
within the State of New York. She
was under charter to a person residing
out of that State, but this fact was not
known to B. till after the coal was fur-
nished. No circumstances existed, to
the knowledge or belief of B., show-
ing a necessity for a credit to the
vessel.
Held, That the credit was not given
to the vessel, and that there was no
lien upon her for the coal.
Transit,
See BANKRUPTCY, 10, 14, 19.
MORTGAGE, 6.
POSSESSION, 1.
PRACTICE (Bankruptcy), 3, 11.
SMUGGLING, 2.
1. Whether in a Court of equitable juris-
diction the limitation of six months
contained in the bankruptcy Act, be-
gins to run in the case of a concealed
fraud, from the time of its commission
or from the time of its discovery, quere.
Baldwin v. Raplee,
A personal action was brought in be-
half of the United States, to recover
the value of certain merchandise as
forfeited, by reason of a violation of
the 66th section of the revenue Act of
March 2d, 1799, (1 Stat. at Large, 677.)
The defendants pleaded that the
causes of action did not accrue within
five years next before the beginning
of the action. The plaintiffs demurred
to the plea, as far as it related to
three of the causes of action; and, as
it related to the rest of them, they re-
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