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The United States v. One Case of Silk, &c.

disposition of it according to law. What is the meaning of the word "disposition," as used in the Act of 1866? There were in existence, at that time, several modes of finally disposing of seized property, both before and after suit. The forfeiture of it might be remitted by the Secretary of the Treasury, under the 1st section of the Act of March 3d, 1797, (1 U. S. Stat. at Large, 506,) or under the 16th section of the Act of July 18th, 1866. It might be delivered to the claimant on appraisement and bond, under the 89th section of the Act of 1799. It might, if not over $500 in value, be sold by the collector, under the 12th and 15th sections of the Act of July 18th, 1866. These dispositions of it would be dispositions of the same character with a disposition of it by the Court by a sale of it after condemnation, as provided for by the 90th section of the Act of 1799. They would finally dispose of the property as a res, as between it and the United States. I think these and these only are the dispositions intended by the word "disposition" in the Act of 1866-dispositions ejusdem generis with a disposition by adjudication-final dispositions of the res—not a mere change of its custody before final disposition.

Then comes the phrase, "unless otherwise provided for by law." Property seized is, "unless otherwise provided for by law," to remain in the custody of the collector, to abide adjudication, &c. If it be held, that the phrase, "unless otherwise provided for by law," has the effect to leave in force the provision as to custody by the marshal after process, then the provision of the Act of 1866 makes no change except to put vessels into the custody of the collector before and until process. These words, "unless otherwise provided for by law," must be construed in connection with the provision of section 43 of the same Act, repealing all "parts of Acts conflicting with or supplied by this Act." Custody until adjudication, and after as well as before process, is supplied by the Act of 1866. It was supplied by previous legislation.

The United States v. One Case of Silk, &c.

Custody after process was, by previous legislation, given to the marshal. It is, by the Act of 1866, given to the collector. The former provision for such custody by the marshal after process conflicts with the new provision as to custody by the collector after process. "Every affirmative statute is a repeal by implication of a precedent affirmative statute, so far as it is contrary thereto." (Dwarris on Statutes, 673.) The words, "unless otherwise provided for by law," cannot be held to embrace the prior provisions of law which are thus in conflict with and supplied by the Act of 1866. On the contrary, such prior provisions must be held to be superseded and repealed.

Nor is the question one which involves the jurisdiction or authority of the Court over the res that is prosecuted, or its jurisdiction over the suit in rem. The property having been seized as forfeited, and the seizure having been adopted by the United States, by bringing the suit in rem to enforce the forfeiture, the Court has jurisdiction to decree such forfeiture, and jurisdiction and authority to order the property, under the 89th section of the Act of 1799, to be delivered to the claimant on appraisement and bond and the payment of duties, and to cause the property, under the 90th section of the same Act, if not bonded, to be, when condemned, sold by the marshal or other proper officer of the Court, even though the property remains in the custody of the collector until adjudication. The views of Mr. Justice Story and of Chief Justice Taney, before cited, are sound in reference to a case where in fact the collector and not the marshal is to have custody after process. The property is, in contemplation of law, after process, in the custody of the Court, although the marshal docs not take it into his custody, provided it remains in custody, under a seizure for forfeiture, while the proceedings in Court against it are pending. The collector is its official keeper, for the Court, after process, and the

BT. VOL. IV.-35

The United States v. One Case of Silk, &c.

Court has, after process, as full control over it in the hands of the collector, and as full power to compel obedience by the collector to all orders of the Court respecting it, as if it were in the hands of the marshal, under process. Such appears to have been the view of Judge Betts in respect to custody by the collector after process, under the Rules of this Court in regard to summary proceedings in rem in behalf of the United States, where the matter in demand did not exceed fifty dollars; and it is a necessary view in respect to all property prosecuted for forfeiture, where the custody after process is given by statute to the collector.

It follows, that not only is the provision of the 4th section of the Act of 1792 abrogated by the Act of 1866, but the 9th Rule in admiralty, in view of the provision of the Act of 1866, does not apply to cases like the present one. Such cases are, in the language of that Rule, "otherwise provided for by statute."

Such being the interpretation of the Act of 1866, * what relief is to be granted on the motion in this case? I think the proper course is, to amend the alias monition, so that it shall command the marshal to attach the property by leaving with the collector or other person having the property in custody a copy of the monition, and also a notice requiring such collector or other person to detain such property in custody until the further order of the Court respecting it, and to give due notice, &c. This will be the proper form of monition to be issued in all cases where property is under seizure as forfeited for violations of the customs laws, and is in the custody of the collector or other principal officer of the customs.

T. Simons (Assistant District Attorney), for the United States.

John Sedgwick, for the marshal.

The United States v. Ullman.

FEBRUARY, 1871.

THE UNITED STATES vs. SIGISMUND ULLMAN.

TARIFF ACTS.--CONSTRUCTION.-COMMERCIAL DESIGNATION.-COPPER AND DUTCH METAL.

The Tariff Act of March 2d, 1861, imposed a duty of 10 per cent. on "Dutch metal," and of 30 per cent. on manufactures, not otherwise provided for, of brass, copper or other metal, "or of which either of these metals, or any other metal, shall be the component material of chief value." The Tariff Act of February 24th, 1869, imposed a duty of 45 per cent. on "all manufactures of copper, or of which copper shall be a component of chief value, not otherwise herein provided for."

Held, that, under the Tariff Acts, brass must be taken to be a metal, as well as copper, and that, if Dutch metal was a manufacture of brass, although copper was the chief component of brass, yet Dutch metal would not be included in the Act of 1869, as being a manufacture of which copper was a component of chief value.

In cases of serious ambiguity in the language of a Tariff Act, or doubtful classification of articles, or vague or doubtful interpretation, the construction of the Act is to be in favor of the importer.

It is not the province of the jury to construe the law, but to receive the construction from the Court.

This was an action to recover duties alleged to be due to the United States on an importation of "Dutch metal," made by the defendant, and entered at the custom house at New York, by him, on the 29th of March, 1869. The value of the importation was $1,067, in gold. The collector exacted from the defendant a duty thereon of 10 per cent., ad valorem, amounting to $106 70, in gold, which was paid by him, and the goods were delivered to him. It was now claimed, that a duty of 45 per cent. ad valorem on such value should

The United States v. Ullman.

have been paid on $988 worth of the goods. This suit was brought to recover, as the proper difference, $345 80, in gold, with interest from March 29th, 1869. The claim was based on the ground, that a duty of 45 per cent. ad valorem was imposed on the goods by the Act of February 24th, 1869, (15 U. S. Stat. at Large, 274), entitled “An Act regulating the duties on imported copper and copper ores." That Act provides, "that, from and after the passage of this Act, in lieu of the duties heretofore imposed by law on the articles hereinafter mentioned, there shall be levied, collected, and paid on the articles herein enumerated and provided for, imported from foreign countries, the following specified duties and rates of duty, that is to say: On all copper imported in the form of ores, three cents on each pound of fine copper contained therein; on all regulus of copper, and on all black or coarse copper, four cents on each pound of fine copper contained therein; on all old copper fit only for remanufacture, four cents per pound; on all copper in plates, bars, ingots, pigs, and in other forms not manufactured or herein enumerated, including sulphate of copper or blue vitriol, five cents per pound; on copper in rolled plates, called braziers' copper, sheets, rods, pipes, and copper bottoms, eyelets, and all manufactures of copper, or of which copper shall be a component of chief value, not otherwise herein provided for, forty-five per centum, ad valorem."

On the 7th of May, 1869, the Secretary of the Treasury issued a circular to the officers of the customs, (9 Internal Revenue Record, 172), in which, after reciting the said Act, he said: "The question has been presented to this Department, whether bronze powders' and 'Dutch metal' are properly liable to duty under the Act in question. It is the opinion of the Department that the articles named are manufactures, and it is understood that they are composed in part of copper. The principal question remaining is, whether copper is the component

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