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afford a favorable occasion for establishing a more liberal as well as a more stable commercial intercourse than had been enjoyed, and principles which should govern their conduct as belligerents and neutrals in time of war. It might also be advisable to settle the question, whether the security of republican institutions did not require the parties to prevent any European power from establishing a colony within the borders of the parties--a principle announced by Mr. Adams' predecessor, and generally known as the “Monroe doctrine."

The appointment of committees was, hy a rule of the senate, devolved upon the vice-president, as president of that body; and in constituting the committee on foreign relations, to whom the subject was referred, Mr. Calhoun had selected a majority of its members from the opponents of the administration.

The committee, on the 16th of January, reported adversely to the proposed mission. It was called a new and untried measure; and they saw no cogent reasons for departing from the established policy of the government. The objects of the congress should have been more particularly stated and defined, and the manner of their accomplishment more distinctly marked out. The committee took exception to several of the subjects of discussion mentioned by the different ministers, but to which the president had made no allusion. Nor did they consider the object of establishing the principles of a commercial intercourse as justifying a participation in the proposed congress. If the nations were wrong in supposing that their former commercial policy had been most conducive to their own interests, " the task of exhibiting their errors might be much better performed by particular discussions with each separately, than by general demonstrations made to all, assembled as a congress." They also questioned the authority of the government to enter into any negotiation with foreign nations for the purpose of settling or promulgating, either principles of internal policy, or mere abstract propositions, as parts of public law.

After an examination of all the reasons for the proposed mission, and the objects contemplated by it, the committee concluded their report with the resolution, “That it is not expedient, at this time, for the United States to send any ministers to the congress of American nations assembled at Panama."

A debate immediately ensued, in which the resolution was supported by Messrs. Flayne, Woodbury, White, Van Buren, Berrien, Dickerson, Benton, and Randolph ; and opposed by Messrs. Robbins, F. Johnson, Holmes, and others. Many of the speeches were of great length, and the debate, as a whole, has seldom been surpassed in point of ability, in that body. It was continued until the 14th of March, when the resolution was negatived, by a vote of 19 to 24. The nominations were then confirmed by about the same vote; and the injunctions of secrecy were removed from the journal.

The concurrence of the house of representatives being necessary in an act appropriating the money for carrying the mission into effect, the subject was referred in that body to the committee of foreign relations, who, on the 25th of March, 1825, made a report in favor of the mission. In the opinion of the committee, the congress of Panama had been improperly compared with that of the allied sovereigns of Europe. It was neither a meeting of sovereigns, nor a government or branch of a government. It had, therefore, no legislative power; nor could its members, by their acts, bind each other, or the governments which they represented. They were mere diplomatic agents, having power only to discuss and negotiate, whose conclusions were subject to the ratification of some organic body at home. Besides, it was expressly stipulated in the treaties between these new republics, that the meeting at Panama should “not affect the national sovereignty of the contracting parties, in regard to their laws, and the establishment and form of their respective governments."

With respect to the constitutional objection, they perceived in the constitution do restriction on the appointment of foreign ministers by the proper authority. The objection erroneously assumed, that the congress was a government, or part of a government, or a confederacy of governments. The United States therefore would not enter into a confederation, or form a union with foreign powers, by sending ministers to treat with them.

The objection that the subjects of discussion, the powers of the ministers, and the rules of the congress, were not sufficiently settled, was deemed of little weight. The principal topics to be discussed had been stated; and as the power of the ministers was expressly restricted to that of negotiation; and as they were to be bound by no decision of the congress without their own consent, a minute detail on the points abovo mentioned was of no great importance.

Nor did the committee think our attendance would endanger our neutrality. Having acknowledged the independence of the new republics, we had already established our right to treat them as free and independent states. They were at war with Spain. The allies of Spain were taking no part in the war. Great Britain, the most powerful of those allies, had acknowledged the independence of several of these states, and established diplomatic relations with them. These acts of the United States and Great Britain, not only weakened Spain as a belligerent, but directly violated her colonial laws; yet she submitted to them. If, then,

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our recognition of the independence of her revolting colonies, and our trading with them in contravention of her colonial laws, was no breach of neutrality, there could be none in our attendance at the proposed

congress.

To the objection that we might become involved in an entangling alliance with the new states, it was answered, that the project of such alliance was expressly disclaimed by the president; that the congress was not a government with which we could form an alliance; that any agreement entered into must be submitted to the constitutional ratifying powers at home; and that an entangling alliance was no more likely to result from this mission than from any mission to any power. Indeed, an alliance might be more easily formed with a foreign sovereign, particularly an absolute one, who was himself competent to form an alliance, than could be done by our ministers to Panama, who would be accredited to other ministers no more competent than our own to pledge their gov ernments. The committee farther observed, that the new republics being at war with the same enemy, and being in alliance with each other, an alliance with one of them would be as entangling as an alliance with them all. Hence, the reason that would forbid our attending the congress, would require us to withdraw our diplomatic connection with these

states.

The mission had been objected to as novel and unprecedented. Because the establishment of several new republics at once was an unprecedented event, it did not follow that their subsequent acts or ours should be called novel and unprecedented. It was natural that these states should hold diplomatic conferences with each other, and with neighboring nations which had important relations with them. Similar meetings of friendly states had frequently been held. In principle, our meeting at the congress would not be without precedent. The negotiations in 1782, which resulted in the treaties of peace between the United States, France, and Great Britain, were of the nature of the conferences of diplomatic agents. On the principle that every act must have an exact precedent, the most important measures of our government could never have been adopted.

The proposed congress had been likened to that of the allied sovereigns of Europe (the "Holy Alliance"). But the pernicious character of the European congress consisted not in their assembling and treating together, but in the character of the governments and the objects to be effected. The objections to a congress of despotic powers, wielding the force of large standing armies, and concerting measures for violent interference in the internal affairs of other states, and especially to prevent the establishment of free institutions, did not hold against a congress of republics governed by written laws and elective magistrates.

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Having considered the principal objections to the measure, and endeavored to show that it was consistent with our international policy, the committee considered the subjects of discussion, which, they said, by the terms of the invitation, as well as from the nature of the case, were to extend to all subjects of importance: (1.) To the new states, as among cach other. (2.) Or, as between them and Spain. (3.) Or of importance directly to us, in our connection with them. Each power might propose for discussion or negotiation any subject it pleased; except that the United States, as was understood, were to engage in no discussion inconsistent with neutrality.

The importance, to us, of the relations of the new states to each other, arose from their proximity to the United States. One of them, (Mexioo,) had an immense landed frontier on our territory, and, with two others, laid on those waters into which the great internal communications of the United States were discharged. With all of them we had important connections. Of the eight or nine independent states, formed out of the late Spanish and Portuguese colonies, seven, viz.: Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, the Provinces of La Plata, Chili, Peru, and Upper Peru, had adopted republican governments. It was to us a matter of interest how these should stand toward each other. Should they fall into dissensions and wars, the great advantages we had anticipated from their growth and prosperity would not be realized. It would have been as well for us and for themselves, that the mother country had continued to rule them, as that their energies should be wasted in civil wars. Controversies arising from rival claims to portions of territory, already existed, and in one instance had resulted in war. It had already become necessary to ask an additional appropriation for the naval service, of nearly one hundred thousand dollars, to protect the lives and property of our citizens from the dangers to which, in the progress of this war, they would be exposed. Now, it was expressly provided in the treaties which led to the formation of the congress at Panama, that the ministers there assembled should exercise the office of mediators when such differences should arise. To the work of mediation, the United States would come as the most disinterested party. And if in but a single instance we could avert or terminate a war, it would itself form a sufficient motive for accepting the invitation.

Upon the subject of the pelations of the new states with Spain, our ministers were not only to observe a strict neutrality, but to endeavor to effect a pacification; an object to us of vast importance. The revival of our languishing commerce with Spain, and its profitable expansion with the new states, could be expected only from the termination of the present contest.

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But the most important subjects of discussion were the direct interests between the United States and the new republics. With some of them we had no treaties whatever; and with Mexico, none that was satisfactory. A conference of the ministers of all these new states would afford the best opportunity of establishing liberal and uniform relations with all. The United States, the committee said, had long labored to introduce into public law more liberal and equal principles. Our policy respecting the laws of war and trade differed in many points from that of Europe : and these new republics now ask the benefit of our experience in the great school of international politics. To refuse our attendance when urged upon this ground, would be to neglect the fairest opportunity ever afforded of diffusing liberal doctrines of public law.

In accordance with the views of the committee, they recommended the adoption of the following resolution : Resolved, That, in the opinion of the house, it is expedient to appropriate the funds necessary to enable the president of the United States to send ministers to the congress of Panama.

A bill providing for the necessary appropriations was on the same day, (March 25,) reported by the committee of ways and means.

The resolution was taken up in committee of the whole, on the 4th of April. The debate commenced on an amendment offered by Mr. MʻLane, of Delaware, proposing to instruct the ministers to attend the congress in a diplomatic character merely, and forbidding them to discuss or consider any proposition of alliance or compact which should bind us to resist interference from abroad with the domestic concerns of the South American governments, or should commit the neutral rights of the United States in regard to any other nations or states.

Among those who advocated the amendment, were Messrs. M'Lane, Wickliffe, Rives, Hamilton, Buchanan, Hemphill, Ingham, Forsyth, Archer, and Cambreleng; all of whom were opposed to the administration.

The amendment was opposed by Messrs. Webster, Everett, Livingston, Buckner, Fr. Johnson, Wurtz, Thompson, and others. All the gentlemen last named were, it is believed, friends of the administration, except Mr. Livingston, of Louisiana. Several other amendments and substitutes were offered in the course of the debate, but they were all rejected. Mr. M'Lane's amendment was slightly modified before the final vote was taken upon it.

The amendment of Mr. M'Lane was opposed as being an infringement on the constitutional duties of the executive. The constitution vests the executive power in the president; and the giving of instructions to ministers was an exercise of executive power. The amendment virtu.

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