intervention of a court-martial. The committee, however, expressed the opinion, that it would have been more correct for Gen. Jackson, after having submitted the case to a court martial, to acquiesce in its decision as to the punishment to be inflicted.

On the 8th of February, the question was taken on the report of the military committee and Mr. Cobb's resolutions, which were disagreed to, as follows: On disagreeing to that part of the report which related to the case of Arbuthnot, 108 to 62. On that which related to Ambrister, 107 to 63. A resolution was then moved by Mr. Cobb, declaring the seizure of the Spanish posts at Pensacola and St. Carlos de Barancas to have been contrary to the constitution of the United States. After a motion to postpone its consideration indefinitely had been negatived, 87 to 83, the resolution was disagreed to, 100 to 70.

In the senate the subject was referred to a select committee, who also made a report disapproving the acts of Gen. Jackson. They charge him, first, with having raised his army in disregard of positive orders. The constitution gives to congress "the power to raise armies, and to provide for calling forth the militia to suppress insurrections and invasions; " and in conformity with this provision, congress has authorized the president, on such occasions, to call on the governors or any militia officers of the states for the requisite militia force. Gen. Jackson had been ordered to make such call on the governor of Tennessee; but he had, contrary to orders, himself raised a volunteer force of 1000 mounted gun-men to serve during the campaign. He had also himself appointed the officers, in direct violation of the provision of the constitution, which reserves to the states this power; and five of these officers, created by him, and holding their office at his will, were members of the court martial. The committee saw no necessity of thus hastily increasing the regular army. The whole strength of these undisciplined banditti of Indians and fugitive slaves, did not exceed 1000 men, while under Gen. Gaines, previous to Gen. Jackson's taking the command, there were 1800 regulars and militia, and the 1500 friendly Indians subsidized by the former general.

Gen. Gaines, it was said, had been enjoined, in case the enemy should take refuge under a Spanish garrison, not to attack them there, but to report the fact to the secretary of war. Gen. Jackson having succeeded to the command, ought to have observed the injunction. Having annulled the civil and military government of Spain, he abolished her revenue laws, and established those of the United States, as being more favorable to our commerce; appointed a collector, and instituted a new government, the powers of which, civil and military, were vested in military officers.

As Spain had not invaded the United States, nor congress declared war against her, his taking possession of the Spanish posts, and imposing terms of capitulation, were acts of war against that nation which congress alone had power to declare or make. Had Spain violated every article of the treaty, the executive was bound to require its observance on our part, until it should have been annulled or revoked by congress. Her conduct, though it had been deemed by congress good cause of war, would not make her a party to the war: this could be done only by opposing Gen. Jackson by physical force.

The committee also noticed the projected expedition against St. Augustine. More than two months after the war had been terminated, suspecting that the agents of Spain or the officers of St. Augustine had excited the Indians to hostility, and furnished them with means of war, he issued an order to Gen. Gaines, dated Nashville, August 7, 1818, directing him, if evidence of this fact should be obtained, and his force should be deemed sufficient, to take and garrison the fort with United States troops, and to hold the garrison prisoners, until he should hear from the president, or to transport them to Cuba, as he should think best. The general declared the order to rest, "not on the ground that we are at war with Spain, but on the broad basis of the law of nature and of nations, and justified by giving peace and security to our frontiers." The committee considered this an assumption of authority to make war on a neutral colony, in disregard of the legislative and executive authorities of the United States. The secretary of war, on receiving a copy of the order, promptly countermanded it. "And then," say the committee," was arrested a military scheme as unconstitutional as it was impolitic, and which might, as stated by the secretary of war, in his letter of the 8th of September, 1818, have involved this nation in a war with all Europe."

The committee considered the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister "as an unnecessary act of severity," without precedent in our conflict with the savages, and dishonorable to our national character. This committee, as that of the house, controverted the principle that these men, by uniting in war against the United States, while we were at peace with Great Britain, "became outlaws and pirates, and liable to suffer death." This principle was not recognized by the custom and usages of civilized nations.

The report was made to the senate on the 24th of February, 1819too late a day to admit its being acted on during the session, which closed the 3d of March. Strictures written with great ability, strongly animadverting upon the character of the report, and vindicating the general, soon appeared in the newspapers; and at the next session of

congress, Gen. Jackson presented to the senate a memorial in his own defense against the conclusions of the committee's report.

The general alleged, in justification of his proceedings, the discretionary orders from the department of war. He had been directed to act offensively—to bring the war to a speedy termination; to inflict exemplary punishment for hostilities so unprovoked ; and to establish a peace on such terms as would make it honorable and permanent. Powers more ample could not have been conferred. He was not bound by the orders issued to Gen. Gaines. But even if they had been obligatory, they must have lost their force, as the case they contemplated never occurred. The orders to himself had superseded those directed to Gen. Gaines; he could not therefore be guilty of their violation : and the subsequent approval of his measures by the executive, he considered as settling the question.

The terms of capitulation had been settled by the general government; and he, not as negotiator, but as conqueror of the country, had received their submission on those terms, which demanded the surrender of the instigators of the war.

The occupation of the Spanish posts was necessary to the execution of his orders. The war could not have been effectually terminated while the enemy were assisted and encouraged in their savage hostilities. The authority of Spain over Florida, according to the acknowledgment of her own commanding officers, had ceased ; and he was not bound to respect an authority that did not exist—a sovereignty that was not asserted or exercised. The aid rendered the savages was so flagrant a violation of good faith on the part of Spain, as wholly to merge the neutral character. Ambrister had appeared before St. Marks with about 500 negroes and Indians; and an equal number had been seen about Pensacola, the most of whom had been equipped for war by governor Magot; a strength sufficient, in both instances, for a forcible occupation of these posts. The governor had refused the passage of provisions up the Escambia for the relief of our starving troops; and the vessels had been detained and captured. Had he waited for additional orders from the war department, the object of anticipating the enemy in obtaining possession of the fort, would have been defeated; the time of the militia force would have cxpired before any thing efficient could have been done, and the campaign rendered abortive.

These proceedings were not acts of war: they had not been directed against the government of Spain. The Spanish government did not so consider them. The two governments still acknowledged themselves at peace. It would appear from the correspondence, that he had entered the territory of Spain as a friend, to chastise an enemy of both nations,

and to enforce obligations and duties which the Spanish authorities had pleaded inability to perform. Nor was it true, as stated by the committee, that the garrisons were made prisoners of war.

As to the new government, nothing more was contemplated than some kind of civil authority to protect the lives and property of the citizens during the temporary occupancy of the fortress. The temporary govo ernor was a military officer; but civil officers were appointed to the different departments from amongst the citizens. The establishment of the revenue laws of the United States became necessary to prevent smuggling, as well as to admit the American merchant to an equal participation in trade, which was denied by the Spanish laws.

The execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, he said, was justified by precedent and the laws of nations. They had become identified with the outlawed Red Sticks and fugitive negroes, who were in a state of open rebellion—associates in war, and acting as their chiefs. Great Britain would not interfere in their case; and the Spanish authorities either would not, or could not. Respecting none of the laws of civilized warfare, they could not claim the benefit of these laws, and were as much outlaws to all their provisions as a pirate on the ocean. It should be remembered that these British outlaws and the Indian chiefs were the monsters deranded to be surrendered by the treaty of Fort Jackson, the terms of which had been antecedently settled by the government, ratified by your honorable body, and carried into effect by congress; and that these British incendiaries were the instigators of the war, upon whom "exemplary punishment” was to be inflicted. The rights and privileges secured by the rules and articles of war, belonged only to our own countrymen; and the offenses having been committed by foreigners beyond our territorial limits, the only law applicable to the case was the law of nations, which attaches to their crimes no other penalty than that of death. Hence, the last sentence of the court in the case of Ambrister being deemed void, the first was confirmed and executed.

Gen. Jackson also denied that, in raising the volunteers, he had disregarded the orders of the war department, or the constitution and laws. His orders were to call upon the governors of the adjacent states for such additional force as he might deem necessary to beat the enemy, no number or description of troops having been mentioned. He had been, in the language of the department, "vested with full powers to conduct the war as he might judge best.” He cited facts to show that the danger and distress of the frontier settlements and a part of the army were such as to demand immediate relief. As it was not known that the governor was then at Knoxville or in the Cherokee nation, and as there was danger in waiting for the slow process of drafting militia, he had

appealed to his old and tried comrades in arms; and on the saine day the governor had been written to, apprising him that, if the appeal for volunteers should not be promptly answered, 1000 drafted militia would be required : and the measure had received the governor's approval and cooperation.

Nor had he, as the committee alleged, appointed the officers; they had, at his own request, been chosen by the volunteers themselves. The appointment of an inspector-general of the southern division, to superintend the organization, and lead them to Fort Scott, where he took the command, was his only agency in the whole transaction. Every measure touching the raising and organizing of the volunteers, had been fully approved by the department. The committee, to make it appear that there was no necessity for this hasty increase of the army, had misstated the number of the enemy. They had been computed by Gen. Gaines at 2,800, and by Arbuthnot at 3,500. So also had the forces under Gen. Gaines been greatly exaggerated.

In vindicating his order for the occupation of St. Augustine, the general admitted that the war had been supposed to be at an end; but subsequent information had proved the opinion to be erroneous. A number of murders and other outrages had been committed. Intelligence from Major Twiggs had created a strong presumption that this post also had become a depôt and retreat for the negroes and Indians after they had been driven from Negro Fort, St. Marks, and Pensacola. The order, however, was conditional and prospective; and had the facts reported been established, there would have been the same reason for the occupancy of St. Augustine as of the other Spanish fortresses.

From the foregoing summary of facts and arguments, the reader is left to draw his own conclusions. The character of our public men and that of the nation, are inseparable. What affects the former, necessarily affects the latter. The various public services of Gen. Jackson have given his name a conspicuous place on the roll of our distinguished men. When, subsequent to the transactions here recorded, he was before the public as a candidate for the presidency, the old charges of usurpation of power, and of insubordination to the constitution and the laws, were revived; and many of our citizens formed their opinions of his official acts from representations made at a time and under influences not the most favorable to candid inquiry and calm consideration. It therefore seemed to be due to Gen. Jackson, to give a detailed sketch of his proceedings in the Seminole war, and to allow him the benefit of being heard in self-defense. With regard to the justice of the high charges preferred against him, there was at the time a wide difference of opinion. His acts appear to have been fully justified by Mr. Adams,

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