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tion, given us their votes, or even three of them, Ste"phens would have defeated Toombs and secession "would have been prostrated. I heard Toombs say to "Douglas that the result in Georgia was staked on the "action of the Committee of Thirteen. If it accepted "the Crittenden proposition, Stephens would defeat "him; if not, he would carry the State by 40,000 ma"jority. The three votes from the Republican side "would have carried it at any time; but Union and peace in the balance against the Chicago platform "were sure to be found wanting."

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Mr. SEWARD gave the cue for the defeat of the Compromise in his speech at New York on the 22d of Dec. He treated the position of the South as simply a political threat which it was not worth while to notice. He said that, in his opinion, the secession of South Carolina would not be followed by many other States, and would not be persevered in long. Everything looked brighter than on the 6th of November, and "sixty days more suns will give you a much brighter " and more cheerful atmosphere." Forthwith the Republican party professed to treat the danger as a mere bagatelle. The New York Tribune wished to know whether the party was "to convict itself of having either been a rank hypocrite before the election or of "being a skulking craven now." Mr. CHASE, in a letter from the Peace Congress, avowed the purpose of his party "to use the power while they had it, and "prevent a settlement." "Don't yield an inch," became the cry of the Republican press.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Effect of Seward's Speech-The Vote for Delegates to the Secession Convention-Meeting of the Alabama Convention-Caucus at Washington. Excitement in the Convention-Parties Nearly Equally Divided-Refusal to Submit the Ordinance to the People-Yancey's Threatening Speech-Counter Threats, etc., etc.

"I expressly said that now was not the occasion for the application of any doctrine of coercion; but by some strange misunderstanding I am represented as a determined and fierce advocate of coercion upon the seceding States."-J. J. Crittenden, Senate Jan. 23, 1861.

"And should the Northern vote (which is not among the possibilities) reject so fair a compromise [the Crittenden Compromise] then the entire Middle States, whose sentiments you so nobly vindicate, would be amply justified before the world and posterity, in casting their lot with their more Southern brethren."-[Horatio Seymour's Letter to Crittenden, Jan. 18, 1861.

The speech of Mr. SEWARD was made Dec. 22d, and the election for members of the Alabama Convention was held Dec. 24th; but notwithstanding the hostile attitude of the Republicans in repelling all proffers for an amicable adjustment, the returns of the election showed that nearly, if not quite, a majority of the people, were favorable to continued efforts to preserve the Union before resorting to a separation. It is almost impossible to arrive at a correct knowledge of the meaning of the vote, or the relative strength of the parties. The separate secession journal at the capital computed the vote at 36,000 for secession and 27,000 for co-operation, whereas the opposition journal computed it at 24,000 for secession and 33,000 for co-operation. The difference in their

estimates arises from the fact that in certain counties where two sets of candidates, were before the people, it was assumed that one set was for separate secession and the other set were for co-operation-whereas, both sets might have been for secession or both for co-operation. In some counties it was known that one set of candidates was for co-operation and another for unqualified Union. In other counties it was known that votes cast for a third candidate against two secessionists was simply an expression of dislike for one of the candidates, and was not an expression for co-operation. In some of the counties, there being none but secession candidates, a small vote was polled. In other counties there was similarly a small vote polled for the co-operation candidates. In one or two counties which were undoubtedly opposed to separate secession, the parties compromised, as it was called, upon prominent citizens who were elected without pledges, but who at the meeting of the Convention were found to be for immediate and separate secession, when they were supposed by their constituents to be favorable to another effort to preserve the Union. Thus it was that the number of secessionists or of co-operationists who were elected to the Convention was not an accurate index of the sentiment of the people. Certain it is, however, that in this momentous election the highest number of votes claimed to have been polled for secession candidates was but 36,000 out of a population which at the preceding Presidential election had polled more than 90,000

votes.

The Convention met and organized on the 7th of January, 1861, in the Hall of the House of Represen→ tatives at the State Capitol at Montgomery. Of the

one hundred delegates, not one was absent, so great was the anxiety to participate in the first action of the Convention, and so great was the doubt as to which party had secured the victory. On Sunday night it was believed that the Co-operation party was in the ascendancy, but on Monday, when the Convention met, it was known that there were 54 members for secession and 46 for co-operation. The first day was occupied with debating the resolution of resistance to the LINCOLN Administration, to which reference has already been made. While the co-operation members in their remarks upon Mr. WHATLEY's resolution did not withdraw their opinion that an effort should be made to preserve the Union by co-operation of the slave-holding States, they exhibited an uncertainty of expression and a confusion of purpose which bordered upon timidity. The clamor of the populace was in their ears. young blood of the State was at fever heat. The CRITTENDEN Compromise had been insolently rejected by an unanimous vote of the Republicans. Only two days before, the compromise proposition agreed upon by the border States had received only one vote in the Republican caucus, and the door of reconciliation upon any plan whereby the rights of the South could be guaranteed, was closed, it seemed, forever. If the united Southern members of Congress, of the Peace Congress and of the border States Convention, would not be listened to, was there any hope that an appeal by a Congress of co-operative slave States would meet with a better reception?

The

On the day before the Alabama Convention met the Senators from those of the Southern States which had called Conventions, met in caucus in Washington and

adopted resolutions favoring immediate secession and recommending the holding of a Congress of all the seceding States at Montgomery on the 15th of February. These resolutions were telegraphed to the Conventions of Alabama, Mississippi and Florida. South Carolina had already seceded, and her Commissioner, ANDREW P. CALHOUN, was in waiting to address the Alabama Convention. To confuse the public mind still more, and to intricate the plain question of what was best to be done for the interest of the people of the State, the Governor had seized Fort MORGAN and Fort GAINES at the mouth of Mobile Bay, and the U. S. Arsenal at Mount Vernon, and had garrisoned them with Alabama troops, while the State was yet a member of the Union. Thus while the Co-operationists were earnestly desirous and constantly voted to secure a plan by which disunion might be averted, they were met by all the adverse weapons that ever assailed a patriotic body of men. As Southerners they were entreated to prevent the coercion of South Carolina. As Alabamians they could not witness their State authorities arraigned for treason in seizing the forts whose guns might have been turned at any time against their liberties. As men they could not brook the insolence of the Republican party, which contemptuously spurned every overture towards a settlement.

On the second day of the Convention, Jan. 8th, Mr. CALHOUN presented his credentials and delivered an effective address. He asked Alabama to unite with South Carolina and form a Union of the Cotton States. So confident was he of the strength of the Cotton States alone, that he said: "An Union at the earliest day "between them, will guarantee success. We cannot be