Supreme Court the arbiter of all constitutional questions, and by the force of former political association ever leaning to the views of the Federal party, held that the Court had full jurisdiction to pronounce, upon the validity of the Georgia laws. The Court declared the Cherokee Nation a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, and in which the laws of Georgia could have no force. It declared void the act of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in error was prosecuted, that the judgment of the State Court was a nullity, and that the plaintiff "was entitled to the protection of the Constitution, "laws and treaties of his country."

Thereupon arose the question, how was this decision to be enforced? Could the United States coerce a State?

The State of Georgia treated the decision as a nullity. No further action was taken by the Supreme Court; no effort made to enforce its decision. Chief Justice MARSHALL and his associates, by non-action, tacitly admitted that the United States had no constitutional power to enforce a decision against a sovereign State.

The State of Georgia did not appear as a party to these proceedings. The Chief Justice cited the State by writ of error "to show cause, if any there be, why "the judgment [of the State Court] should not be "corrected." The Governor laid the writ before the General Assembly, saying that he would not regard commands of the Federal Court which interfered with the constitutional jurisdiction of the State, and would oppose any attempt to execute them. The General Assembly sustained the Governor, and adopted a series

of resolutions to the effect that the action of the Chief Justice of the United States was "a flagrant violation "of the rights of the State;' that the Governor should pay no attention to the mandate; but that he was bound "to resist and repel any and every inva"sion, from whatever quarter, upon the administration "of the criminal laws" of the State, with all the "force "and means" entrusted to him by the laws of Georgia. They declared that "the State of Georgia will never so "far compromise her sovereignty as an independent "State, as to become a party to a case sought to be. "made before the Supreme Court of the United States "by the writ in question," and that the Governor should acquaint the sheriff of Hall county with these resolutions, as far as was necessary to ensure the full execution of the laws in the case of George Tassels. The sentence of the State court was executed by the hanging of Tassels, Dec. 28, 1830.

Depending upon a statement of G. N. Briggs of Massachusetts, who was at the time a member of Congress, Greeley, in "The American Conflict," vol. I, p. 106, relates that President Jackson said: "John "Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce "it!"

In accordance with the Georgia law of December 22, 1830, a missionary named Worcester, with other white persons who persisted in disobeying the statute, was sentenced to four years' imprisonmeut at hard labor. Worcester took the case before the Supreme Court of the United States, and the State of Georgia was once more cited to appear at Washington, before the Federal judiciary. Governor Lumpkin informed the Legislature that he would present a "determined resistance" to

such "usurpation." The Supreme Court once more attempted to annul the action of the State, but the State court refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus, and paid no attention to the decision. No effort was ever made by the Federal Government to enforce the decision.

The Government at Washington and the country at large, by acquiescing in the failure of the Federal Government to carry out the mandate of the Federal court, admitted that Georgia had the right to extinguish any title to her lands remaining in the occupancy of the savages, that she was right in refusing to appear at the bar of the Supreme Court, and right in executing her statutes in these cases, notwithstanding interference from the Federal Government. In the debate over the Force Bill, in 1833, two years later than the events here referred to, we find the verdict of the people expressed in the language of Senator Miller of South Carolina. "No reproof of her [Georgia's] refractory "spirit was heard; on the contrary, a learned review of "the decision came out attributed to executive coun"tenance and favor." It is to be borne in mind that the executive alluded to was the same who one year later, proposed at a public dinner at Washington, the toast, "The Federal Union, it must be preserved."

CHAPTER VII.

South Carolina and the Tariff-Continued Contest between the Agricultural and Commercial States-Calhoun and Nullification-The Force Bill and the Right of Coercion-Inconsistency of President Jackson-Calhoun's Victory Webster Retires from the Battle-Real Causes for the Proclamation, &c., &c.

"Why should we fetter commerce? If a man is in chains, he droops and bows to the earth because his spirits are broken; but let him twist the fetters from his legs and he will stand erect. Fetter not commerce! Let her be as free as the air. She will range the whole creation, and return on the four winds of Heaven, to bless the land with plenty."

PATRICK HENRY.

"To the Northern politician, who, during Monroe's administration recalled the past annals of the republic, the future was without hope. Incited by his devotion to Unionism, he had tried to strengthen the central power at Washington, but had been defeated on the occasion of the Alien and Sedition Acts; he had looked with disfavor upon the free navigation of the Mississippi, but the river had been bought; he was disinclined to territorial expansion, but Louisiana had been purchased; he had resisted the admission of new States from that purchase, but one after another, they were coming in."

DRAPER'S CIVIL WAR, vol. I, p. 360.

While the difficulty between Georgia and the Federal Government was still pending, the people of the United States, by a large majority, threw off the remaining vestiges of Federalism as represented by Adams, and elected Andrew Jackson to the Presidency by an electoral vote of one hundred and eighty-three, as against eighty-three for Adams. It is worthy of observation, however, that the victory of Jackson was not strictly upon principle. In New York, Pennsylvania, and in the West generally, Jackson was supported as the firm

friend of the protective tariff, and of internal improvements by the General Government; whereas, in the South he was zealously sustained by those who denied the right and constitutionality of those things, as being the friend of those Southern interests which were believed by them to be seriously injured by the laws protecting home industry.

The new President's inaugural address was extremely vague upon the question of the tariff. His first annual message was not much more explicit. It favored a modification of the protective features of the tariff, but at the same time suggested that a desire for successful competition of American products with foreign should furnish "the general rule to be applied in graduating "the duties." The friends of Calhoun lost confidence in the purpose of President Jackson to carry out the free trade views upon which they had voted for him.

The first protective tariff, that of 1816, was advocated by Calhoun and opposed by Webster. It was at that time believed that the South would establish factories, and that the building of this Chinese wall around New England would destroy her carrying trade. The question of principle was lost sight of; and policy alone attached Calhoun to a doctrine which he afterwards condemned, and caused Webster to advocate free trade, which his section a few years later repudiated. Between 1816 and 1824, New England took advantage of the tariff and invested largely in factories. In 1824 the protective system was championed by HENRY CLAY, and still resisted by DANIEL WEBSTER. Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia and the Southwest were unanimous against it, while Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio and Kentucky were unanimous for it. Massachusetts,