There are eight clauses in this ninth section of the first article. The first relates to the prohibition upon Congress as to the migration or importation of certain persons prior to the year 1808. The second is the clause in question, which we are now considering. The third relates to bills of attainder. Of course, only Congress could pass a bill of attainder; and the prohibition against passing a bill of attainder is a prohibition upon Congress alone. The fourth relates to capitation or other direct taxes. The fifth to duties upon articles exported from any State. The sixth declares that no preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another. All these are prohibitions upon the power of Congress. The seventh, it is said, however, is not a prohibition upon the power of Congress. This provides that—

"No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."

The latter part of this, clearly, is an injunction on Congress; the first part of it would be an injunction on the Executive as well as on Congress. In regard to this, we must remember that this clause, which is said not to be a prohibition upon the powers of Congress, was not in the original draft of the Constitution; it was brought in by the subsequent report of a committee, very late in the session of the convention. The whole clause was inserted in this ninth section, to which, indeed, it is appropriate; for it contains an injunction upon Congress to make annual publications of the receipts and expenditures; and it does, in effect, prohibit their allowing the purse to go into the unfettered control of the Executive, but requires them to direct, by appropriations, the purposes to which the public treasure, of which they are the guardians, shall be applied. The last clause of this section, the eighth, is, undoubtedly, a prohibition upon Congress. "No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States," &c. Unless it be contended that our President has royal prerogatives, and is like the King of England, the fountain of honor, this prohibition cannot be supposed to be intended to be on him; and the permission in the last part of the clause is expressly to Congress to consent to the acceptance, by an officer of the United States, of any present, emolument, &c., from any king or State.

These are the whole of the eight clauses in that ninth section of the first article, and all relate to the power of Congress; so that, while it is legislative in its character, and cannot be anything else than legislative-it cannot be executive, for the simple duty of the Executive is to see that the laws are executed, not to make them, nor to repeal them, nor to suspend them. While, therefore, it is legislative in its character-legislative as to the place in which it is put by the Constitution, it is also legislative for another reason, which may be inferred from the Constitution. The second article of the Constitution describes the office of the President of the United States, gives his executive powers and his duties; and not one word do we see there of any authority to him to suspend the privilege of this writ, nor anything from which, by the most strained and forced construction, it can possibly be implied. So that, if we are to find any authority for the suspension, by mere executive power, of a constitutional provision enforced by legislative enactment, we must look to some higher law than the statutes of Congress or the Constitution of the United States.

I find, sir, in the letter addressed by the Attorney General of the United States to the President, that there is a great deal said about coördinate branches of the Government, and the unity and activity of the Executive, and about the power which the President may, under an act of Congress, exercise in the use of the force which the law puts at his command for public purposes; and we are gravely told that the President may use the Army of the United States to eject intruders-squatters-from the public lands; as if

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well may you justify the President for breaking into the Treasury and taking from it all the millions and the very last dollar in it, not in pursu ance of appropriations made by law, but without appropriations, and in the face of appropriations made for other purposes, that he may apply it as he thinks needful; as well may you do that, under the plea of necessity, as justify the suspension of the habeas corpus under this plea. I incline to think that the necessity in this latter case would often be much stronger than it would be in regard to the suspension of the personal right of the citizen. Indeed, sir, the greatest danger is to be apprehended from infractions of the law which seem to be sanctioned by good motives. It is not easy in other cases to make breaches in the Con

poses of corruption and oppression are not supposed to be intended, when a solemn duty only is supposed to prompt a little largeness of construction, some straining of the Constitution for a purpose of high patriotic duty, which disguises the danger of the example. But breaches in the Constitution once made, others are more easy; and soon its enemies, with the worst purposes, rush

a statute of Congress, the Legislature conferring the power upon the President expressly, not in violation of any principle of the Constitution, but in subordination to it; and the other a case in which they have conferred no such power, and where they cannot confer any such power. For I not only hold that the suspension of the constitutional and legal provisions in regard to the habeas corpus is not executive in its character, and cannot be exercised by the President, but that Congress itself cannot make the exercise of that power of suspension legal by any one else. It is their own power. It is intrusted to them exclusively as one of their legislative functions, and they can no more assign it than they can assign any legis-stitution, but this may be tolerated when purlative authority with which they are invested. The legislative powers of this Government must be exercised by Congress, in whom alone the Constitution reposes them. Then we are told that the President's constitutional oath is to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States," and that this "implies the power to perform" what he thus solemnly undertakes to do; that as it is his duty to put down insur-in to its destruction. As to the necessity in fact, or rection, he may, at his discretion, use all the means of force which the Constitution and the statutes place at his command, and that the manner in which he shall use these means depends solely upon his own discretion. And from these premises the Attorney General assumes-I cannot say argues the opinion that the President may, in a rebellion like the present, suspend the privilege of persons arrested by his order, upon the suspicion which he entertains that they are spies, emissaries, or accomplices of those in arms against the Government, and thus suspend the constitutional provision, the enactment of Congress, and the judicial authority conferred thereby. This doctrine would have been all-sufficient for Charles I or Charles II, and the Commons of England would have had no cause for exultation when the petition of right was signed, or the habeas corpus act passed, which, under this opinion, would have been worth only so much blank paper as they were enrolled on. It assumes that all provisions of the Constitution are inferior to that which imposes upon him the oath of office, and that the power implied from that oath overrides all other powers and provisions with which it may come in conflict; and so this great zeal for the preservation of the Constitution makes it a thing of wax, to be twisted and molded at the discretion of the Executive, instead of an inexorable fundamental law of the

land, beyond the reach of President or Congress, and only to be altered by the people in prescribed form and mode. I regret to be obliged to say all this, because I have always had great respect for not only the private but the professional character of the Attorney General.

Equally unfounded in law or fact is the allegation that the suspension of this constitutional privilege by the President was necessary.

rather as to the danger to the country of permitting to go at large those persons who have been arrested by order of various military men under the alleged authority of the President-I know many of these cases, and can confidently say that many of the persons arrested are wholly without any general personal influence for good or for evil; and that they will derive any political importance which they may acquire solely from the blunders by which they have been made into political martyrs. Many of them covet political influence no more than they do the restraints upon their liberty. They wonder at the baseness of the unknown informer and the folly of the zealous agent of the Executive; but are not the less indignant at the disregard of law and constitutional privilege which leaves them without the time-honored remedy for the wrong they suffer in the deprivation of their liberty.

So too, sir, these domiciliary visits, which are equally in violation of a provision of the Constitution, are sought to be justified by necessity. Now, let us see where these things are done. Nowhere, so far as I am informed, except in the State of Maryland, unless there be some exceptions in the State of Missouri. I believe there have been some in that State. I recollect to have seen one or two cases of a suspension of the habeas corpus there; but chiefly it has been exercised in Maryland, a loyal State-a State proved in its loyalty; a State whose remarkable quiet now, under all illegal and oppressive practices, is the best proof she could give of her loyalty and her submissiveness. Indeed whatever of disloyalty there may be in the State of Maryland to the Union grows out of these very abuses-the suspension of the habeas corpus by executive authority, and these unnecessary, sometimes absurd, and always irritating domiciliary visits and searches, which yield no public benefit whatever, and tend only to irritation, oppression, and mischief.

I know that never before in the history of this country has it been deemed necessary to suspend the habeas corpus even by Congress; that though upon a message of Mr. Jefferson to Congress, It was but the other day that some officer of during the alleged treasonable conspiracy of Aaron volunteers-I do not know who-marched some Burr, the Senate did pass such a bill, (in secret three hundred of his men from a point in one of session, I think,) it was rejected overwhelmingly the counties in Maryland to another, a little vilby the House of Representatives-the vote being lage, where there are about the same number of 113 to 19. I know, too, that Mr. Jefferson, that residents, of every description. This little village great apostle of liberty, whom so many gentlemen found itself invested by three hundred armed men here profess to revere as the founder of the polit-carly in the morning. There was a double object: ical creed in which they place the most implicit confidence and faith, declared himself, at the very time of the formation of the Constitution, as opposed to any suspension whatsoever, even by legislative authority, of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; declared himself in favor of its eternal and unremitting force; and, sir, I very much incline to think he was right. I doubt very much whether the good to be effected by its suspension, in any condition of things in which the country can be placed, will be at all commensurate with the evil undoubtedly sure to follow from such suspension. If necessity, which is an odious plea, known for hundreds of years as "the tyrant's plea"-a plea by which you may overthrow all constitutional provisions—if that plea is efficient here; if that is a justification for a violation of one provision of the Constitution, it is equally a justification for any and all violations of it. As

to search for arms, which were not to be found; to search houses where there were no arms; and to arrest one party, perhaps two, one of whom was arrested and carried to a military camp out of the county. Well, sir, two houses were particularly designated as proper to be searched. One of them was the house of a gentleman of the bar of distinguished ability and high cultivation; and though I believe he is an extreme southern man for that region of Maryland, he nevertheless holds this doctrine-that there can be no greater absurdity possible, in the State of Maryland, than to think of getting up an organization in opposition to the power of this Government, and in violation of its constitutional authority. He has strong southern sympathies; that is about the amount of it. His house was searched from top to bottom by a detective police officer, who happened to be one of these three hundred men marched to that point.

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They found nothing, simply because there was no conspiracy, no gathering of arms for rebellious purposes, no intention on his part to engage in any secret organization against the Government. Nevertheless, he felt this searching of his house to be an injustice, an affront, and an oppression. The other was the case of an old gentleman of over eighty years of age, who is now and always has been, the strongest Union man of the county. He was lying at the time on a sick bed, from which his family fear he may never rise. The ladies met the officer at the door, and felt very much disposed to resist, if it had been in their power; but finally, when told that his object was to search for arms, answered promptly: "There are two guns here; one is a bird gun.' "That I do not want," said the officer. Then there is another gun here-a drilling gun.' "Ah! that is what I want. "Very well," answered one of the ladies; "I pledge you my honor I will bring it to you in two or three minutes; but do not come into the house, for Heaven's sake.' It so happened that a company of little boys of eight, ten, or twelve years, were playing the military, and drilling with wooden guns; and one of these poor little wooden guns was the trophy which the lady brought to the officer, very much to his mortification. I believe he did not care about receiving it, though she insisted upon his taking it. There are two cases. Who can suppose that any honest, loyal citizen, had given information against these two gentlemen? Is it not palpable that it was owing to the malicious, wanton, and wicked interference of some base mischief-maker, that the military were dragged some twenty miles, and marched back the same distance, for the purpose of searching these two houses, and looking into a little village armory, where they did not get a solitary gun, I believe?

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President knew nothing of it; the Secretary of War knew nothing of it; General Scott knew nothing of it; and I think I may say without any impropriety, was exceedingly sorry to hear that such an act had been committed. It could not be traced to any officer of superior authority. General Banks knew nothing of it; and finally he was released by the Secretary of War upon representation of the facts to him. But while this and similar proceedings have been in progress, while these imprisonments have been suffered, irritation has been springing up, friends have been dissatisfied, and the people have asked themselves, is this the paternal Government that we have a right to expect will protect us, or is it one that looks upon us as aliens, as conquered foes surrendered at discretion, as rebellious subjects who have been reduced to a condition of obedience and vassalage? I say this, sir, not so much for the Senate as in the hope that it may some way or other reach the ears of those in power, and teach them the propriety and the prudence of stopping these irritating, vexatious, illegal, and unconstitutional proceedings.

Sir, in my opinion there is, in the State of Maryland, at this time, not the slightest probability of any further emeute. No man regrets more than I do the riot of the 19th of April. I unhesitat ingly admit that it was illegal; it was in every respect wrong; quite as prejudicial to the State of Maryland as it was injurious to the Government of the United States. No man rejoiced more when the organization which followed it was dissipated. But I do not think that the disturbances of that day-the attack of the rioters upon the Massachusetts soldiers and the subsequent proceedings -can, without the grossest outrage, be made the pretext for a series of aggressions upon the constitutional rights of the people throughout the State. There was a single, unorganized popular tumult on the 19th of April. Senators will recollect that the mob on that occasion were not organized into an armed force. They were armed with paving stones and brickbats. Those are not the weapons used by conspirators who are organized for the deliberate purpose of overthrowing government. As for the few pistols that appeared there, they will be found in all tumultuous assemblages that grow into riot. And the after proceed

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Sir, these things have been repeated elsewhere. In my own neighborhood, three or four hundred men, who had gone over in a steamboat from Annapolis to one of the country districts, marched into the town of Easton, and on their way, meeting two gentlemen standing at a gate, arrested them, and said: "you must come and march with ""Why?" They chose to give no answer, except to say, that they understood there are secessionists in the town, and if they chose to fire upon them, these gentlemen should be in the frontings by the authorities, however much their prorank-take the fire first; and thus, two men, of whom they knew nothing, and who, unquestionably, were not concerned in any treasonable act, were thus wantonly arrested and marched from their residence to the town, to be contemptuously dismissed. An armory, belonging to the State, was searched and the arms taken. There were some arms, I suppose not more than two or three hundred guns in all, many of which were of little value, being old, and having been there from time immemorial, with some cannon. Two of these belonged to the commissioners of the county, and had been purchased in the year 1832, just after a memorable event in Virginia, and were intended for the defense of the county against internal foes.

Sir, these are but a few of the instances that have occurred. I have known houses to be broken open, wardrobes and bureaus to be rudely searched, and young men to be arrested, because they talked saucily. They were not more mutinous, I presume, than poor Jenks, whom the privy council put in prison for talking mutinously at Guildhall, when he wanted to have a petition presented to the King. These young men, without public influence, without that position which gives control of society, without the ability to command the services of a single man in any organization against the Government, are seized and taken away from their business, one from his farm, another from his store, and carried off to Fort McHenry, or some other military station, and lodged there, without warrant in form of law, or upon affidavit, without even a decent ground of suspicion that they were affiliated with secessionists in arms, or had any intention to associate with them, and when, indeed, they were further from violating their duty to the Constitution and the law than the men who thus ruthlessly violated both.

In the first case I mentioned, one gentleman was captured, taken prisoner, and carried to Cockeysville, and there remained for some days; and when inquiry was made by his friends, nobody knew by whose orders he was taken. The

priety may be doubted, had at least one effect: that of reducing, by the military organization that followed, the tumultuary elements of the State into such a condition that they could be controlled, which, without that military organization, I very much fear would not have been the case, and then the evil might have been much more serious to the Government, the people of Baltimore, and the State of Maryland. Be that as it may, I do not defend that proceeding or palliate it; but I do say that however much gentlemen may condemn that emeute in Baltimore, it was punished severely on the spot; for the blood which flowed then was more that of the people of Maryland engaged in the tumult than those against whom they illegally directed the riot. The resentment which was felt in the North was natural, but it did not justify the threat of razing the city to the ground, nor does it justify any other proceedings than legal ones for the prosecution of those concerned in it. It must be remembered, too, that the President himself was satisfied that the authorities of Baltimore had acted with perfect loyalty, and that the popular excitement there was an unfortunate occurrence, unforeseen by the authorities, and which they could not control, though the mayor, the marshal of police, and others, risked their lives in the effort to control it, and to protect the soldiery from the attack.

Now, sir, here are the police commissioners of the city who have been imprisoned for a month, and during the session of the grand jury which have been finding bills of indictment against persons suspected of treasonable practices. They have found a number of bills (I do not remember how many) for treason, but they have found no bill against these gentlemen; nor have we heard, from any source whatever, any intimation of any specific conduct of theirs which could be declared to be illegal. On the contrary, the only intimation upon which I understand their arrest to have been founded, is that contained in the proclamation of General Banks on the 1st of July, in which he says they were supposed to entertain some pur

pose not known to the Government, but believed to be detrimental to its peace and security. I think that is the language. I know I am right in regard to the other words-"some purpose not known to the Government. I understand that General Banks admitted that there was no charge affecting the integrity of these gentlemen; that they had been arrested rather with a view to prospective events than for anything then done by them. And yet, sir, not only are these gentlemen still suffering illegal confinement, but I see by the papers of the morning that they are now being transported from the State of Maryland to some northern fortress, where they are to be deprived of the sympathy and service of their friends, torn from the partial association of their families hitherto permitted, and doomed to imprisonment among strangers, where kindred and friends can no longer cheer and sustain them. Why is this? What prospective event makes this necessary? It is most unusual, extraordinary, and I think oppressive. Partisans of the Administration in Maryland may defend it; but no one else, however earnest and ardent in his attachment to the constitutional union of the States, can be otherwise than indignant.

Now, sir, this police organization is a part of the State system. With as much authority might this Government undertake to suppress the State Legislature itself, and put its members in military jails. As well might they suppress the whole organization of the different departments of the government of the State of Maryland. The State is prostrate this moment at the foot of the executive power of the United States, and that for no reason that I can perceive, except the fact of the emeute of the 19th of April. Certainly no conduct on the part of the State of Maryland since then has caused any apprehension or surmise, that such a state of things prevails there as would justify the violation of the Constitution and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the other oppressions which I have described.

Mr. President, there are other things to which I should desire to allude at this time, but, as the Senate perceive, I am laboring under difficulties which make it very arduous for me to make any remarks at all. Nothing but a deep sense of the duty which I owe to my constituents, and the knowledge that it was expected of me that I should say something on this subject, has induced me to trouble the Senate at this time. I shall, of course, not vote for the joint resolution; and the more, because I believe that, if these things which have been done by the Executive are legal, there is no necessity for Congress to undertake to validate or ratify them; and, if they were illegal and unconstitutional, no power of this Congress can give them any authority whatsoever. Congress may pass indemnity bills; they may indemnify their officers who violate the law by paying all expenses which may be incurred; but they cannot make an illegal and unconstitutional thing legal by a declaration that it is so. That is impossible. The doctrine I hold, as to the suspension of the habeas corpus, is sustained by the highest judicial authority-by Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Iredell of the Supreme Court, Judge Story, and by the present pure and able Chief Justice. It has never been questioned by any known jurist of eminent character, unless there be one exception in a northern State; and it has been the received doctrine from the origin of the Government to the present day.

Mr. McDOUGALL. Mr. President

Mr: FESSENDEN. I move that the further consideration of this joint resolution be postponed, with a view to take up the tariff bill.

Mr. McDOUGALL. I addressed the Chair first, I believe.

Mr. FESSENDEN. I was recognized by the Chair.

Mr. McDOUGALL. I want the floor on this

question.

Mr. FESSENDEN. It is important to pass the tariff bill this morning; we almost passed it last night.

Mr. McDOUGALL. I do not want to interfere with the course of business. The motion to postpone was agreed to.

THE TARIFF BILL.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. No. 54) to provide increased revenue

from imports, to pay interest on the public debt, and for other purposes, the question being upon its passage.

Mr. SIMMONS. I wish to get the unanimous consent.of the Senate to make one or two verbal amendments in the bill. In the second section I want to strike out the word "herein," and insert "in this section." There will be no objection, I presume.

The PRESIDING OFFICER, (Mr. KING in the chair.) If there be no objection, that amendment will be considered as agreed to. The Chair hears no objection, and the amendment is adopted.

Mr. SIMMONS. In the second section of the income tax portion of the bill, after the words "United States," in the fifth line, I want to insert, "and in the District of Columbia." That happened to be left out in the provision for assess

ors.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair

hears no objection, and the amendment is agreed

to.

Mr. GRIMES. I wish to understand the exact

position of the bill, whether or not the question now before the Senate is on the adoption of the amendment proposed by the Senator from Rhode Island in relation to the income tax, or whether the question is upon the final passage of the whole bill, including the tariff and the income tax bill.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the final passage of the bill as amended, on which the yeas and nays have been ordered.

The question being taken by yeas and nays, resulted-yeas 22, nays 18; as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Anthony, Baker, Clark, Collamer, Cowan, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden, Foot, Foster, Howe, King, Lane of Indiana, McDougall, Morrill, Pomeroy, Simmons, Sumner, Ten Eyck, Wilkinson, Wilmot, and Wilson-29.

NAYS-Messrs. Bayard, Breckinridge, Bright, Browning, Carlile, Grimes, Harlan, Harris, Johnson of Tennessee, Johnson of Missouri, Kennedy, Latham, Pearce, Polk, Powell, Rice, Saulsbury, and Trumbull-18.

So the bill was passed.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE.

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. ETHERIDGE, its Clerk, announced that the House had passed a bill (H. R. No. 71) to provide additional revenues for defraying the expenses of Government and maintaining the public credit, by the assessment and collection of a direct tax and internal duties.

The message further announced that the House had passed a resolution directing the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives to close the present session of Congress by adjourning their respective Houses on Friday, the 2d day of August, at twelve o'clock, noon, in which the concurrence of the Senate was requested.

The message further announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the bill (S. No. 20) authorizing the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and fixing the salary of the same, and for other purposes.

The message further announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the bill (S. No.31) to increase the medical corps of the Navy, and for other purposes.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED.

The message further announced that the Speaker had signed the following enrolled bills; which thereupon received the signature of the President pro tempore:

A bill (S. No. 24) authorizing the Secretary of War to reimburse volunteers for expenses incurred in employing regimental and other bands, and for other purposes;

A bill (H. R. No. 45) to define and punish certain conspiracies; and

A bill (H. R. No. 81) making an appropriation for the purchase of arms for the volunteer and regular troops of the United States.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED.

The bill (H. R. No. 71) to provide additional revenues for defraying the expenses of Government, and maintaining the public credit, by the assessment and collection of a direct tax and internal duties, was read twice by its title, and re

ferred to the Committee on Finance, and ordered to be printed.

ORDER OF BUSINESS.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The joint resolution which was under consideration, and passed over informally, is now before the Senate."

Mr. TRUMBULL. I believe it was postponed. I move that all other business be postponed, and that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate bill No. 33.

Mr. WILSON. I hope we shall take the vote upon the joint resolution, and have it disposed of, that it may be got out of the way. I understand the Senator from California desires to speak upon it. If that be the case, I will not press it now. I hope to-morrow, however, that we shall have

a vote.

Mr. McDOUGALL. I do not propose to detain the Senate long. I do not wish to make what is called a set speech, but to state my opinions briefly.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair is informally with a view to take up the tariff bill, informed that the joint resolution was passed over which has now been disposed of; and therefore it now comes up again for consideration; but the Senator from Illinois moves to postpone this and all prior orders, with a view to proceed to the consideration of the bill (S. No. 33) to suppress insurrection and sedition, and for other purposes.

Mr. BAYARD. Yesterday the report of the Committee on the Judiciary, asking to be discharged from the memorial of the City Council of Baltimore, was before the Senate; and I offered resolutions, in lieu of the report of the committee on their resolution to be discharged. All I desire is a vote upon them. I thought them reasonable in themselves. They were postponed then until to-day. I hope that the honorable Senator from Illinois will suffer me to take the vote on this before he calls up a bill which will give rise to a good deal of discussion. I only desire a vote on them.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the motion of the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. TRUMBULL. The bill, the consideration of which I have asked, is somewhat germane to those very matters to which the Senator from Delaware alludes. There may be some discussion upon it, which may be applicable also to these proceedings in Baltimore, and I would prefer that the bill should come up for action rather than that we should spend our time upon resolutions which lead to no practical legislation.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore, The question is on the motion of the Senator from Illinois, to take up the bill indicated by him. The motion was agreed to.

SUPPRESSION OF INSURRECTION.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, accordingly proceeded to consider the bill (S. No. 33) to suppress insurrection and sedition, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill and the amendment of the Committee on the Judiciary will be read.

Mr. TRUMBULL. I imagine that it will be unnecessary to read both the bill and amendment. The amendment is a substitute for the bill, and is the text of the original bill, with some verbal alterations, and perhaps one section stricken out that was in the original bill. It will be, substantially, reading the same thing twice over to read both; and unless some Senator desires it, I suggest that the substitute recommended by the committee be read, instead of the original bill.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. That course will be taken, if no objection be made.

Mr. BAYARD. I only got hold of the bill yesterday, and I should prefer not to have it brought up to-day; but I believe the substitute and the bill are essentially the same, with the exception of an additional section added to the substitute.

Mr. TRUMBULL. And the omission of one section. The twelfth section of the original bill is omitted in the substitute, and another section added to it.

Mr. BAYARD. At least the substitute ought to be read. I do not care about the original bill being read. They are both essentially the same.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The substi

tute alone will be read, unless the reading of the original bill is demanded.

The Secretary read the amendment reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, to strike out all the bill after the enacting clause, and insert the following substitute:

That the Commanding General of the Army of the United States, the commanders of the several military departments and military districts within the military jurisdiction specially assigned to them, shall have power within their several commands, and within States, Territories, or districts of country which may have been, or shall hereafter be, declared by the President of the United States to be in a state of insurrection, or in actual rebellion against the Government of the United States, to declare, by proclamation, the territory so designated by the President as aforesaid within their respective commands, or any part thereof, to be in a state of insurrection and war, which proclamation shall be extensively published within the districts to which it

relates.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That after the publication of said proclamation as aforesaid, the said commander shall make and publish such police rules and regulations, conforming as nearly as may be to previously existing laws and regulations, as he may deem necessary to suppress said rebellion and restore order, and to protect the lives and property of all the loyal citizens within said districts; and all the civil authorities within said district shall be bound to carry said rules and regulations into effect.

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That if, from any cause whatever, the said civil authorities fail to execute the said rules and regulations, the said military commander shall cause them to be executed and enforced by the military forces under his command.

SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That from and after the publication of the proclamation heretofore mentioned, the operation of the writ of habeas corpus shall be so far suspended that no military officer shall be compelled to return the body of any person or persons detained by him by military authority; but upon the certificate, under oath, by the officer having charge of any one so detained, that such person is detained by him as a prisoner under military authority, further proceedings, under the writ of habeas corpus, shall be dismissed by the judge or court having issued the said writ.

SEC 5. And be it further enacted, That all persons who, after the publication of said proclamation, shall be found in arms against the United States, or otherwise aiding and abetting their enemies or opposers, within any district of country to which it relates, and shall be taken by the forces of the United States, shall be either detained as prisoners for trial on the charge of treason or sedition, or other crimes and offenses, which they may have committed whilst resisting the authority of the United States; or may, according to the circumstances of the case, be at once placed before a court-martial, to be dealt with according to the rules of war in respect to unorganized and lawless armed bands not recognized as regular troops, or may be discharged on parol not to serve against the United States, nor to aid and abet their enemies or opposers.

SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That no sentence of death pronounced by a court-martial upon any person or persons taken in arms as aforesaid, shall be executed before it has been submitted to the commander of the military department within which the conviction has taken place, or to the Commanding General of the Army of the United States, who shall either approve of said judgment of the court-martial or commute the sentence, or may discharge or pardon the person so sentenced.

SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That all prisoners dismissed on parol, if retaken in arms, or found aiding and abetting the enemies and opposers of the Government, shall be placed before a court-martial, and if identified and convicted by competent testimony, shall be ordered to suffer death, or such other punishment as said court may direct; the said sentence to be submitted to the said Commanding General or commander of the department as aforesaid.

SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That any military commander aforesaid, in any district declared to be in a state of insurrection and war, may cause any person suspected of disloyalty to the Government of the United States to be brought before him, and may administer, or cause to be administered, to such person an oath of allegiance, as follows: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign, and that I will bear true faith and loyalty to the same, any ordinance or resolution of any State convention or Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding; and further, that I do this with a full determination and pledge, without any mental reservation or evasion whatever: so help ine God." And on their refusal to take such oath, they shall be detained as prisoners until the restoration of quiet and peace in the locality where such arrests may have been made. And any person having taken said oath who shall afterwards be taken in arms against the Government, or found aiding and abetting its enemies and opposers, shall be subject to the same punishment prescribed for those who violate their parol, as provided in the seventh section of this

act.

SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That all arms, acconterments, horses, or movable effects whatever, taken from arined men resisting the authority of the Government, or taken from men aiding and abetting the enemies or opposers of the Government, shall, in time of insurrection and rebellion, as aforesaid, be treated and held in the same manner as property taken in war from foreign enemies. SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That whenever, in the opinion of the Commanding General, or the commander of any military department or military district, the neces sity for declaring a state of insurrection and war to exist within their respective commands shall have ceased, such declaration shall be publicly recalled, and all the powers and authorities vested by this act in military commanders and authorities shall likewise cease.

SEC. 11. And be it further enacted, That all felonies, petit larcenies, assaults and batteries, not provided for in

THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION.

the "Act for establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States," approved April 10, 1806, which may be committed by any officer, soldier, sutler, retainer to the camp, washerwoman, or other person employed in or about the colunins, detachments, guards,

barracks, quarters, camps, or forts occupied by the troops of the United States, upon the person or property of any other officer, soldier, sutler, retainer to the camp, washerwoman, or other person employed in or about the Army as aforesaid, which offenses, or any of them, if committed within the United States in time of peace, would be cognizable before the ordinary courts of law, shall, if committed beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, or in any part of a State or Territory of the United States in a state of insurrection or rebellion against the same, be tried and punishable by a general court-martial: Provided, That no sentence rendered by such court shall be executed that is not known to the criminal jurisprudence of at least some one of the United States.

Mr. TRUMBULL. I desire to make some verbal alterations in the substitute before we proceed with the debate upon the question. In section seven, line five, I ask that the words "by competent testimony," and also the words "be ordered to," be stricken out; so that it shall read "and if identified and convicted, shall suffer death." Another verbal alteration is necessary in the fifteenth line of the eighth section. The words now are in the plural number, when what precedes is in the singular. The word "their," after" he," should be stricken out, and "his" inserted in its place; and the word "they" should be stricken out, and "he" inserted. The word "a" should be inserted before "prisoners," in the sixteenth line; and the word "prisoners" should be made to read "prisoner." In the seventeenth line, the letter " "should be 'stricken out; so that the word "arrests" will be "arrest. "These amendments merely put the section in the singular number, as the oath is provided for in the singular.

The PRESIDING OFFICER, (Mr. FOSTER in the chair.) Unless objection be made, these alterations will be considered as agreed to, without taking the vote.

Mr. POLK. I did not hear the first alteration. I should be glad to have it reported.

The SECRETARY. It is proposed, in section seven, line five, to strike out the words "by competent testimony," and also the words "be ordered

to.

Mr. POLK. Unless it be the privilege of the Senator to amend the bill in that way, I cannot give any consent to that amendment.

Mr. TRUMBULL. I have no objection to allowing the words which I have moved to strike out remain in the bill; but I thought it read better without them. I supposed, of course, that the party must be convicted on competent testimony. If the Senator from Missouri thinks it better to have those words in, I have no sort of objection to allowing them to remain. I suppose, as a matter of course, that when a party is tried and convicted, is must be on competent testimony. I think the sentence would read better by leaving out the words, and that is the only reason why I proposed the amendment. In regard to striking out the other words, "be ordered to," I only moved the amendment because it is an awkward expression to say " be ordered to suffer death." However, if the Senator from Missouri likes that phraseology, I have no objection.

Mr. POLK. I prefer that the words "by competent testimony"should remain; for it looks like some regard to evidence in a bill which is certainly one of the most extraordinary I have ever known proposed in a deliberative body acting

under a written constitution.

Mr. TRUMBULL. Does the Senator object to the proposed alteration?

Mr. POLK. I prefer that the words should remain in the bill.

Mr. TRUMBULL. Do you object to striking out the words "be ordered to?"

Mr. POLK. I do not care about that. Mr. TRUMBULL. Then I move to strike out the words "be ordered to."

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. TRUMBULL. As this bill, in my judgment, is a very important one, and perhaps the most important of any action which Congress may

WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 1861.

take at its present session, I will, if I can get the attention of the Senate for a few moments, explain what the object of this bill is. I wish to premise by saying that I am as much for standing by the Constitution of the country, and for putting down this rebellion in a constitutional and legal way, as any gentleman here. I will not yield to the Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. BRECKINRIDGE,] or any other Senator, in my veneration for the Constitution of the United States. I will not wink at its violation. I believe that that instrument was intended by its framers to be perpetual. I believe it contains all the power necessary to suppress even this gigantic rebellion; and the object of this bill is to confer the necessary power on the military authorities, in cases of insurrection and rebellion, to suppress them, and to regulate, as far as practicable, by law the exercise of those powers. The object of the bill is to provide for putting down rebellion in a constitutional and legal man

ner.

The present insurrection broke out during the recess of Congress, and the President was compelled to provide as best he could for the preservation of the Government until Congress should meet. It was the duty of the President-sworn to take care that the laws be faithfully executedto use all his constitutional powers to preserve the Constitution and the Government from overthrow; and in doing this, I admit-and the Senators who have denounced the President for the acts which he has done may have the full benefit of the admission-that the Executive has been compelled to do, and has done, acts for which it may be difficult to find, in the strict letter of the law, the authority; but, sir, that I am ready to justify. This was necessary when Congress had not assembled; but after Congress convenes, clothed with the power to grant whatever authority may be necessary to crush rebellion, I say we shall be derelict in our duty if we leave our positions here without having regulated by law the action of the Executive. There can be no excuse for the Executive, when Congress meets, in exercising questionable authority, and we should not ask him to do it; but we should use the high powers vested in us to clothe the Executive with all the authority which may be necessary to preserve the Government. That is what is intended by this bill.

Let me be distinctly understood on that point. I justify the President in the exercise of the authority which he has used upon the great principle (as was said the other day by my colleague) of self-defense. Here was a rebellion aiming at the overthrow of the Government; a blow was about to be struck at the very heart and life of the Republic; and unless warded off, it would have destroyed the Government. Under such circumstances, I justify and sustain the Government in doing whatever was necessary to preserve it till Congress could be assembled. When we do assemble, there is a duty incumbent upon us; and it is, in my judgment, to provide by law for the putting down of this rebellion.

By reference to the Constitution, it will be found that various powers are conferred on Congress. I will read some of them, for it is under these grants of power that I claim the authority for the bill which is now under consideration. The Constitution provides that "Congress shall have power" "to declare war," "to make rules concerning captures on land and water," to "raise and support armies,"" to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,

," "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurdeclares that Congress shall have authority "to rections, and repel invasions;" and it further make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." It also provides that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of rebellion or invasion, whenever the public safety requires it.

NEW SERIES.....No. 22.

Under these various grants of power I derive the authority for the bill in questfon. When authority is given to declare war, and when authority is given to call forth the militia to enforce the laws of the Union and to put down insurrection, all the incidents necessary to the successful prosecution of the war to accomplish the ends for which it is declared, all the incidents necessary to the suppression of the rebellion to put down which your militia is called forth, necessarily follow. You will observe the language of the Constitution is not that Congress may declare war against foreign nations, nor is it necessary that Congress should, in so many words, proclaim a declaration of war; it is enough if Congress does that which recognizes the existence of hostilities, and then all the incidents follow connected with the declaration of war. When the Constitution gives authority to call forth the militia for the purpose of enforcing the laws of the Union, it is not a meaningless authority; it does not mean that the militia is called forth for a mere display; but they are called forth to accomplish the object for which the Constitution authorizes them to be called out; and that object is to put down the rebellion-to enforce the laws of the Union; and whatever authority it may be necessary to exercise to accomplish that object, I say your militia and your Army may lawfully exercise. If it be necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, if it be necessary to ravage the country and plunder towns, if it be necessary to slay persons, to search houses, to do anything that men in time of war may do, then that authority is given in the Constitution. And when the war begins, when the Army is called forth to the field, it is not to wait for the operation of the courts; your habeas corpus cannot interfere with it. It is the exercise of the military power-the great power which is placed under the control of Congress, and authorized to be called out to put down rebellion. When the Constitution authorized the calling out of the troops to put down rebellion, did it not mean that you should put it down by force? Did it mean anything else? And all the powers necessary to accomplish this object necessarily follow from this one grant of power. You will find, by reference to the works upon international law, that it is laid down by all writers that whenever an insurrection assumes such formidable proportions as to be recognized by the Government, and whenever the civil authority is unable to put it down and the military is called out, then all the incidents which, according to the laws of nations, may be done by an army, follow your Army called out for that

purpose.

The Supreme Court of the United States has decided this very question; and as much of the reasoning of the court is applicable, as I think, to the condition of things now in the country, I will, if the Senate will bear with me, read two or three pages of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, delivered in the case of Luther vs. Borden and others, in 1849, reported in 7 Howard. The reasoning of the court here, it seems to me, is conclusive, so far as we need judicial authority; but I do not think it would be necessary. I think the Constitution itself is plain, and that whatever is inconsistent with the putting down of this rebellion, according to the mode of civilized warfare, is overridden by the grant of power to the Government to call forth its forces to put it down. In this case, in the opinion of the court, the Chief Justice says:

"The fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States provides that the United States shall guaranty to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on the application of the Legislature, or of the Executive, (when the Legislature cannot be convened,) against domestic violence.

"Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State; for as the United States guaranty to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And when the Senators and Representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which they are appointed, as well as its republican

character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority, and its decision is binding on every other department of the Government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal."

This is particularly applicable to the condition of Virginia at this time. Congress has decided that very question in the very mode pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United States as the appropriate one:

"It is true that the contest in this case did not last long enough to bring the matter to this issue; and as no Senators or Representatives were elected under the authority of the government of which Mr. Dorr was the head, Congress was not called upon to decide the controversy. Yet the right to decide is placed there, and not in the courts.

"So, too, as relates to the clause in the above-mentioned article of the Constitution, providing for cases of domestic violence. It rested with Congress, too, to determine upon the means proper to be adopted to fulfill this guarantee. They might, if they had deemned it most advisable to do so, have placed it in the power of a court to decide when the contingency had happened which required the Federal Government to interfere. But Congress thought otherwise, and no doubt wisely; and by the act of February 28, 1795, provided, that in case of an insurrection in any State against the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the Legislature of such State, or of the Executive, (when the Legislature cannot be convened,) to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or States, as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to suppress such insurrection.""

And, by the second section of that act, it will be remembered that it was provided

"That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed in any State by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by this act, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia of such State, or of any other State or States, as may be necessary to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed."

It was under that provision that the President called out seventy-five thousand men, in the first instance, for the purpose of suppressing the existing rebellion. The court, in commenting on this act further say:

"By this act, the power of deciding whether the exigency had arisen upon which the Government of the United States is bound to interfere, is given to the President. He is to act upon the application of the Legislature or of the Executive, and consequently he must determine what body of men constitute the Legislature, and who is the Governor, before he can act."

The court here were speaking in reference to calling out the militia on the requisition of the Legislature or of the Governor of a State, as provided in the first section of the act, and not in reference to the case provided for in the second section.

"The fact that both parties claim the right to the gov ernment cannot alter the case, for both cannot be entitled to it. If there is an armed conflict, like the one of which we are speaking, it is a case of domestic violence, and one of the parties must be in insurrection against the lawful government. And the President must, of necessity, decide which is the government, and which party is unlawfully arrayed against it, before he can perform the duty imposed on him by the act of Congress.

"After the President has acted and called out the militia, is a circuit court of the United States authorized to inquire whether his decision was right? Could the court, while the parties were actually contending in arms for the possession of the government, call witnesses before it and inquire which party represented a majority of the people? If it could, then it would become the duty of the court (provided it came to the conclusion that the President had decided incorrectly) to discharge those who were arrested and detained by the troops in the service of the United States, or the government which the President was endeavoring to maintain. If the judicial power extends so far, the guarantee contained in the Constitution of the United States is a guarantee of anarchy, and not of order. Yet if this right does not reside in the courts when the conflict is raging, if the judicial power is at that time bound to follow the decision of the political, it must be equally bound when the contest is over. It cannot, when peace is restored, punish as offenses and crimes the acts which it before recognized, and was bound to recognize, as lawful.”

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"It is said that this power in the President is dangerous to liberty, and may be abused. All power may be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to point out any other hands in which this power would be more safe, and at the same time equally effectual. When citizens of the same State are in arms against each other, and the constituted authorities unable to execute the laws, the interposition of the United States must be prompt or it is of little value. The ordinary course of proceedings in courts of justice would be utterly unfit for the crisis. And the elevated office of the President, chosen as he is by the people of the United States, and the high responsibility he could not fail to feel when acting in a case of so much moment, appear to furnish as strong safeguards against a willful abuse of power as human prudence and foresight could well provide. At all events, it is conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must therefore be respected and enforced in its judicial tribunals.

"A question very similar to this arose in the case of Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheaton, 29-31. The first clause of

the first section of the act of February 28, 1795, of which we have been speaking, authorizes the President to call out the militia to repel invasion. It is the second clause in the same section which authorizes the call to suppress an insurrection against a State government. The power given to the President in each case is the same, with this difference only, that it cannot be exercised by him in the latter case, except upon the application of the Legislature or Executive of the State. The case above mentioned arose out of a call made by the President, by virtue of the power conferred by the first clause, and the court said that whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person to be exercised by bim upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.' The grounds upon which that opinion is maintained are set forth in the report, and we think are conclusive. The same principle applies to the case now before the court. Undoubtedly, if the President, in exercising this power, shall fall in error, or invade the rights of the people of the State, it would be in the power of Congress to apply the proper remedy. But the courts must administer the law as they find it.

"The remaining question is, whether the defendants, acting under military orders issued under the authority of the government, were justified in breaking and entering the plaintiff's house."

Now, the portion of this case which I am about to read, and to which I desire to call the attention of such Senators who will give me their attention, is peculiarly appropriate to the present condition of things. In this case the Legislature of Rhode Island had declared martial law; and the military officers of the State of Rhode Island, notwithstanding the clause in the Constitution that forbids the searching of houses, went by force into the houses of private citizens, broke then open, and arrested and imprisoned the occupants; and that without any warrant whatever from any court. Suit was brought against them, and this act of the Legislature of Rhode Island declaring martial law, and authorizing its soldiers, by the strong hand, and without regard to writs from courts, to seize and imprison men who were supposed to be hostile to its government, was pleaded in justification of the proceedings of the military; and here is what the court say in reference to that:

"The remaining question is, whether the defendants, acting under military orders issued under the authority of the government, were justified in breaking and entering the plaintiff's house.

"In relation to the act of the Legislature declaring martial law, it is not necessary in the case before us to inquire to what extent, or under what circumstances, that power may be exercised by a State. Unquestionably a military government, established as the permanent government of the State, would not be a republican government, and it would be the duty of Congress to overthrow it. But the law of Rhode Island evidently contemplated no such government. It was intended inerely for the crisis, and to meet the peril in which the existing government was placed by the arined resistance to its authority. It was so understood and construed by the State authorities."

Now, see the rule which the court lay down: "And, unquestionably, a State may use its litary power to put down an armed insurrection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The power is essential to the existence of every Government; essential to the preservation of order and free institutions; and is as necessary to the States of this Union as to any other Government. The State itself must determine what degree of force the crisis demands. And it the government of Rhode Island deemed the armed opposition so formidable and so ramified throughout the State as to require the use of its military force, and the declaration of martial law, we see no ground upon which this court can question its authority. It was a state of war; and the established government resorted to the rights and usages of war to maintain itself, and to overcome the unlawful opposition. And in that state of things, the officers engaged in its military service might lawfully arrest any one who, from the information before them, they had reasonable grounds to believe was engaged in the insurrection, and might order a house to be forcibly entered and searched when there were reasonable grounds for supposing he might be there concealed. Without the power to do this, martial law and the military array of the government would be mere parade, and rather encourage attack than repel it."-Howard's Reports, vol. 7; Luther vs. Borden et al., pp. 42, 43, 44, 45, 46.

That is the solemn decision of the Supreme Court of the United States pronounced a dozen years ago in reference to a State. Judge Woodbury dissented from the opinion of the court, and placed his dissent chiefly upon the ground that a State had not this power, admitting that the Government of the United States might exercise it. Here is an express decision that the military power may interfere in a case where the civil authorities are overborne, and may arrest any one when they have reasonable grounds to believe that he is engaged in the insurrection, and may enter houses for that purpose; and the court say that if this were not so, the military array of the Government would be mere parade, and rather encourage than repel attack. Shall it then be said, when express power is given by the Constitution

of the United States to call out the militia to enforce the laws of the country, that they are merely to make a parade? What more has your military power done in this instance than was done in the State of Rhode Island? Have they done anything more in Baltimore than to arrest persons suspected of favoring this insurrection? Nothing. The writ of habeas corpus cannot relieve them; the courts cannot interfere; and this power, the court say, is essential to the preservation of order and free institutions and the existence of every Government, and they would draw the power from the nature of Government itself if it were not expressly given in the Constitution.

That case covers, in my judgment, every feature of the bill now under consideration. This bill provides in its first section that the President may declare any district of country in a state of insurrection; and when the President has declared that, it authorizes the commanding officer of that military department to issue a proclamation reiterating that insurrection exists there, and that there is a state of war.

Mr. COLLAMER. Will the gentleman have the goodness to refer me to the expression which gives that power to the President?

Mr. TRUMBULL. The first section of the substitute declares that

"The Commanding General of the Army of the United States, the commanders of the several military departments and military districts within the military jurisdiction specially assigned to them, shall have power within their seyeral commands."

Now, where?

"Within their several commands and within States, Territories, or districts of country, which may have been or shall hereafter be declared by the President of the United States to be in a state of insurrection or rebellion," &c.

Now, whatever State or district of country the President of the United States declares to be in a state of insurrection or rebellion, in that district of country the commanding general of that department may issue his proclamation setting forth this fact; and then, after having done that and caused it to be published throughout the district, he is to adopt such police rules and regulations, conforming as nearly as may be to previously existing laws, as shall be necessary to preserve order and to put down the insurrection. The very object which the Constitution of the United States had in view when it gave the power to call forth the militia to enforce the laws, is to be carried out by this bill. The commanding officer is to adopt the necessary rules for that purpose, and the civil authorities are to enforce them; but if they refuse to do it, then he is to enforce them by the military power.

The fourth section of the bill makes provision in reference to the writ of habeas corpus, which express authority is given to suspend in cases of insurrection. This fourth section provides, not that the writ shall not issue, but that no military officer shall be compelled to return the body of any person detained by military authority; but upon the certificate under oath of the officer having charge of such a person that he is detained as a prisoner under the authority of this bill, the judge who issued the writ is to dismiss it.

Subsequent sections provide for the treatment of disloyal persons who are captured, require an oath to be administered to them, and on their refusal to take it, provide that they shall be held in custody as prisoners, and also provide punishment against those who shall violate their parol, or who, after having taken this oath, shall be found in arms against the United States. Other sections of the bill provide that when peace and order are restored, all these military rules and regulations which have been adopted during_the time of insurrection shall cease to have effect. The last section provides for the punishment of offenses committed by persons in the Army, or attached to the Army, upon each other during a state of insurrection, or when they are beyond the jurisdiction of the United States; and it is made applicable only to such cases as are not already provided for by the rules and articles of war.

I believe, sir, this is all that I desired to say in reference to the bill. Perhaps it may be imperfect; it may be defective in its details; but the object is to confer upon the military authorities the warrant of law for all that it may be necessary for them to do in crushing out this rebellion.

Mr. CARLILE. Mr. President, I desire to move to strike out from this bill the eighth sec