persist in feeding upon them during the rest of his healthful life."

Unquestionably there is matter for difference in respect to many of the acts of Mr. Lincoln's administration. In the pressure of events of a character utterly novel, and involving consequences of the utmost importance, with the need frequently of prompt decision and immediate action upon them, mistakes have been committed, and errors of judgment have occurred, such as were inevitable in a season of such stress and difficulty. Still further, the period has been one full of instruction to every man of candid and intelligent mind. The whole nation has been at school. It has been taught new ideas in respect to duty and to policy. Old ideas have been rudely shaken, and have given way to others more conformed to the necessities and changes of the time. A policy fit for 1861 is not the policy for 1864. Principles do not change, but their application to events is continually changing. The consistent statesman is not he who never alters his policy, but he who, adapting his policy to shifting exigencies, is true always to the fixed north star of duty and of principle. Above all, in a period of social convulsion, a true and honorable consistency does not consist in adherence to the details of any preconceived plan or system, but in the ready adjustment of its details to the novel demands of the time; and it is this consistency which, in our opinion, Mr. Lincoln has eminently displayed. In his Inaugural Address, he said, "The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and posts belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere." But he also said, "I hold that, in contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the union of these States is perpetual." And in support of this fundamental doctrine, his declaration that "there will be no using of force against or among the people anywhere" was rightly and consistently disregarded, and the tramp of the soldier in every seceded State was its commentary.

On no subject have the sentiments of the Northern people undergone a more entire change since 1861, than on the ques

tion of the right of the general government to interfere with slavery. Not only is their view of the relation of the Constitution to slavery essentially modified, but within the powers with which the Constitution invested the President has been found the arm from which slavery has received its death-blow. The idea of being called upon to use this arm had never crossed the mind of Mr. Lincoln up to the time of his inauguration. He, in common with the mass of the people of the North, was ready then to guarantee to the people of the South protection for slavery within its existing limits. His oath as President to support the Constitution was interpreted by him as depriving him of all lawful right to interfere, directly or indirectly, with the institution of slavery in the States where it then existed. But the progress of events taught him, as it taught the people, that slavery, like every other partial interest or relation, was subordinate to the general interest; that it was subject to the Constitution; that if, to preserve the Union, slavery must be destroyed, the Constitution, which formed the bond of the Union, could not be pleaded in its defence. His course on the matter was in accordance with the fundamental principles of his political creed. Other men, no doubt, earlier reached the same conclusions at which he arrived, and urged upon him the adoption of the policy which he at length pursued. But on them the responsibility of decision and action did not rest; and Mr. Lincoln's deep sense of that responsibility caused him to seem to reach slowly the point to which more eager and less considerate men had long before attained.

Moreover, in Mr. Lincoln's position, the conflicting interests and the contradictory opinions of men of the loyal, and especially of the Border States, have made it a task of extreme difficulty and delicacy to learn the true sentiment of the North. To unite and to keep united the people of the loyal States in the support of the administration, so far as such union was possible, was Mr. Lincoln's arduous task. On this union depended the power to carry on the war. Every delay, every disaster to our arms, every incompetence, every personal disappointment and private grief, every wounded vanity, all partisan hates and jealousies, every danger, in fine,

against which an American statesman could be called on to provide, lay in his path. He could not, if he did his duty, expect either wholly to please his friends or to win his enemies; he could not force compliance with his views, or insist on the adoption of measures which he might esteem desirable or essential. His character was not fitted to secure a strong body of personal supporters. He stood comparatively isolated and alone; and his duty was to save the Union, and to save it with its institutions sound and whole. Popular opinion was changing and developing rapidly. Mr. Lincoln's own views were changing and advancing with it. But it was impossible to make sure of popular opinion, so diverse were the voices of the people. "I am approached," said Mr. Lincoln, "with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men, who are equally certain that they represent the Divine will. I am sure," he added, with humorous irony, "that either one or the other class is mistaken in that belief, and perhaps in some respect both." The elements in the problem given him to solve were of the most complex and difficult character. He might well be pardoned, if, doing his best, he had failed. But he has not failed. Sagacious beyond most men in his estimate of popular opinion, he has the intuition of a genuine statesman as to the manner and the moment of its use. He has not fallen into the common error of politicians, of mistaking a gust of enthusiasm or of passion for the steady wind of conviction, or of fancying a thundersquall of violence to be a black storm of gathered discontent. He has not sought to control events, but he has known how to turn events, among the most important of which are to be reckoned the moods of a great people in time of trial, to the benefit of the cause of the nation and of mankind.

In regard to the question of slavery and emancipation, he has, fortunately for the country and for history, given a statement of the principles and motives of his policy in a brief letter, which must take rank as one of the most important documents in the remarkable series of state-papers which he has published since his accession to the Presidency. It is a production of the highest interest, not only as containing the authentic record of his opinions and his action on this great

topic, but as exhibiting the frankness, candor, integrity, and sagacity which are the distinguishing traits of his personal character. We cite this letter in full, because, in the crowd of matters of public concern, it has not received the attention it deserves as an exposition of the President's policy, and because it is well fitted to inspire confidence in the wisdom of its author.

"A. G. HODGES, ESQ., Frankfort, Ky.

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, April 4th, 1864.

"MY DEAR SIR: :- - You ask me to put in writing the substance of what I verbally stated the other day, in your presence, to Governor Bramlette and Senator Dixon. It was about as follows: :

"I am naturally antislavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel; and yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. It was in the oath I took that I would to the best of my ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take the office without taking the oath. Nor was it in my view that I might take the oath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I understood, too, that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary abstract judgment on the moral question of slavery. I had publicly declared this many times and in many ways; and I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery. I did understand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government, that nation, of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life, but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that to the best of my ability I had even tried to preserve the Constitution, if, to save slavery, or any minor matter, I should permit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution altogether. When, early in the war, General Frémont attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then

think it an indispensable necessity. When, a little later, General Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the blacks, I objected, because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, General Hunter attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had. come. When, in March and May and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the Border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come, unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition; and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter. In choosing it, I hoped for greater gain than loss; but of this I was not entirely confident. More than a year of trial now shows no loss by it in our foreign relations, none in our home popular sentiment, none in our white military force, no loss by it anyhow or anywhere. On the contrary, it shows a gain of quite a hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, seamen, and laborers. These are palpable facts, about which, as facts, there can be no cavilling. We have the men; and we could not have had them without the measure.

"And now let any Union man who complains of the measure test himself by writing down in one line that he is for subduing the Rebellion by force of arms; and in the next, that he is for taking three [one?] hundred and thirty thousand men from the Union side, and placing them where they would be but for the measure he condemns. If he cannot face his case so stated, it is only because he cannot face the truth.'

"I add a word which was not in the verbal conversation. In telling this tale, I attempt no compliment to my own sagacity. I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me. Now, at the end of three years' struggle, the nation's condition is not what either party or any man desired or expected. God alone can claim it. Whither it is tending seems plain. If God now wills the removal of a great wrong, and wills also that we of the North, as well as you of the South, shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong, impartial history will find therein new causes to attest and revere the justice and goodness of God.

"Yours, truly,

"A. LINCOLN."

This excellent letter, in giving the grounds and explaining the motives of Mr. Lincoln's action, affords a complete vindication from the complaints that have been frequently brought VOL. C. NO. 206.

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