road, and that narrow, and swept with numerous artillery. He immediately began to fortify his position, which was flanked on each side by a creek, the approach to his front being commanded by the heavy guns of his shipping in addition to those mounted in his entrenchments. He had reached at last a safe cover for his shattered columns; but after a series of defeats that had demoralized his command, inflicted upon him a loss of not less than twenty thousand in killed and wounded, and was fatal to his designs upon Richmond. The immediate fruits of the Confederate success were the relief of Richmond from a state of siege; the rout of the great army which had so long menaced its safety; more than ten thousand prisoners, including officers of high rank; the capture or destruction of stores of the value of millions, and the acquisition of thirty-five thousand stand of small arms, and fifty-two pieces of superiour artillery.

It is true that this success, great as it was, fell below public expectation in Richmond, which had looked for the capitulation or annihilation of McClellan's entire forces, after they had been driven from the north side of the Chickahominy. Of this disappointment, Gen. Lee writes: "Under ordinary circumstances, the Federal army should have been destroyed. Its escape was due to causes already stated. Prominent among these was the want of correct and timely information. This fact, attributable chiefly to the character of the country, enabled Gen. McClellan skillfully to conceal his retreat, and to add much to the obstructions with which nature had beset the way of our pursuing columns. But regret that more was not accomplished, gives way to gratitude to the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe for the results achieved."

The expression of pious thanks was fervently repeated by Jackson. He wrote, in his official report: "Undying gratitude is due to God for this great victory—by which despondency increased in the North, hope brightened in the South, and the capital of Virginia and of the Confederacy was saved."

It was indeed a glorious success. A week before, and an invading army, superiour to the Confederates in numbers, and in the material of war, closely beleaguered their capital, and vauntingly proclaimed its speedy conquest. Now the remains of that confident and threatening host lay on the banks of James River, anxious only to recruit from the effects of disastrous defeats; and Richmond, erect and exultant, was secure in the protection of an army whose fresh victory had been obtained over a force that had had every resource that could be summoned to its assistance, every possible addition of numbers within the reach of the Federal Government, and every material condition of success to insure for it the great prize of the capital of the Confederacy.

66

CHAPTER XVIII.

EFFECT OF M'CLELLAN'S DEFEAT IN THE NORTH.-ORGANIZATION OF ANOTHER FEDERAL ARMY UNDER GEN. POPE.-POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF POPE'S APPOINTMENT.-NEW MEASURE OF VIOLENCE IN THE WAR.-M'OLELLAN'S IDEAS OF THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.—HIS HARRISON-BAR LETTER. ."-DIVISIONS OF SENTIMENT IN THE NORTH AS TO THE CHARACTER AND MEASURES OF THE WAR.-POSITION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. THE RADICALS IN CONGRESS.-THEIR ANTI-SLAVERY DESIGN.-THEIR THEORY OF REVENGE UPON THE SOUTH.-CARDINAL ERROUR OF THIS POLITICAL SCHOOL.-DECLARATION OF WENDELL PHILLIPS. SYSTEM OF SPOLIATION AND DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH.-GEN. POPE'S ADDRESS TO HIS ARMY IN VIRGINIA.-HIS WAR UPON NON-COMBATANTS.-LEGALIZATION of plunder.-IRRUPTION OF THE NORTHERN SPOILSMEN INTO VIRGINIA.-POPE'S MILITARY LINES.-GEN. LEE BETWEEN TWO FORCES.-HE SENDS JACKSON AGAINST POPE.-HB THREATENS M'CLELLAN'S COMMUNICATIONS.-BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN.-BANKS AGAIN DECEIVED BY JACKSON.-A RAPID AND SEVERE ENGAGEMENT.GEN. LEE MOVES OUT TO THE LINES OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK.-ADVENTUROUS MOVEMENT OF JACKSON TO REACH POPE'S REAR. HIS PERILOUS POSITION. HE IS APPARENTLY IN THE JAWS OF DESTRUCTION.THE AFFAIR OF MANASSAS AND BRISTOE STATION.-THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS.LONGSTREET'S MARCH TO REINFORCE JACKSON.-HIS PASSAGE OF THOroughfare GAP.— HIS TIMELY AND CRITICAL ARRIVAL ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE.-A CLOSE CONTEST.FIGHTING AT TEN PACES.-THE BATTLE OF THE FIRST DAY NOT DECISIVE.-DISPOSITION OF THE TWO ARMIES FOR THE GREAT CONTEST OF THE SECOND DAY.-JACKSON AT CLOSE QUARTERS.-HE DRIVES THE ENEMY.-THE WHOLE CONFEDERATE LINE OF BATTLE ADVANCING.-A SUBLIME SPECTACLE.-SCENES ON THE BANKS OF BULL RUN.-POPE RETREATS TO CENTREVILLE AND THENCE TOWARDS WASHINGTON.-JACKSON STRIKES HIM AGAIN. ENGAGEMENT AT OX HILL.—POPE'S IMMENSE LOSSES.-HIS ABSURD CLAIM OF VICTORY.-LUDICROUS CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN POPE AND HALLECK.-RAPID AND BRILLIANT CHANGE IN THE FORTUNES OF THE CONFEDERACY.-THE WAR TRANSFERRED FROM THE INTERIOUR TO THE FRONTIER.ALARM IN THE NORTH.-POPULARITY IN THB CONFEDERACY OF AN OFFENSIVE WAR.-A TRUE STATEMENT OF GEN. LEE'S DESIGNS IN CROSSING THE UPPER POTOMAC AND INVADING MARYLAND.-WHY HE DID NOT MOVE UPON WASHINGTON AND ALEXANDRIA.-HIS PROCLAMATION AT FREDERICK.-WEAK RESPONSE OF THE MARYLANDERS.—EXPLANATION OF THIS.-CAPTURE OF HARPER'S FERRY, &C. -HOW JACKSON INVESTED IT.-M'CLELLAN AT THE Head of the FEDERAL ARMY.—HIS INACTIVITY. HE BECOMES ACQUAINTED WITH LEE'S PLANS BY A CURIOUS ACCIDENT.—HE PRESSES FORWARD TO RELIEVE HARPER'S FERRY.-FIGHT IN BOONESBORO' GAP.-GEN. LEE RETIRES TO SHARPSBURG.-MEANWHILE JACKSON COMPLETES THE REDUCTION OF HARPER'S FERRY.-BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG.-COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES.-FLUC

TUATION OF THE TIDE OF BATTLE ON THE CONFEDERATE LEFT.-REPULSE OF THE ENEMY. -THE CONFEDERATE CENTRE IS BROKEN AND RECOVERS. THE ENEMY GETS POSSESSION OF THE BRIDGE OVER THE ANTIETAM.-THE DAY CLOSES WITH THE ENEMY REPULSED AT ALL POINTS, AND A VICTORY FOR THE CONFEDERATES.--WHY GEN. Lee did NOT RENEW THE BATTLE THE NEXT DAY.-WHY HE RETREATED.—M'OLELLAN'S CLAIM OF VICTORY.— HOW IT WAS AN AFTERTHOUGHT.-LEE'S ARMY RECRUITING IN VIRGINIA.

THE news of the retreat of the great Federal army under the command of McClellan from before Richmond to the James River, caused great excitement throughout the North. The details of the repulse fell upon the community with disheartening effect, and produced such a shock as had not been felt since the commencement of the war. A fierce clamour was raised against the unfortunate commander; and the occasion of the organization and direction of another Federal army against Richmond under Maj. Gen. Pope, who had actually crossed the Rappahannock, as if to seize Gordonsville, and move thence upon the Confederate capital, was busily used to throw McClellan into the shade, to disparage his career, and to break down whatever public confidence might yet be disposed to linger in his name. Divisions and recriminations between these two grand wings of the Federal forces in Virginia were early developed. Several of McClellan's generals of division asked relief from duty under him, regarding him as inefficient and incompetent, and had been assigned to Pope's army. The friends of McClellan were not slow to retaliate that Pope was an upstart and braggart, who by trickery and partisan politics, had become chief' favourite of the Washington Cabinet, and a military impostor, convenient only as a tool in the hands of the Radical party, who mistook brutality in the war for vigour, and were for increasing the horrours of hostilities by emancipating and arming the slaves, legalizing plunder, and making the invaded country of the South the prey of white brigands and "loyal" negroes.

The appointment of this man to the command of the Federal forces gathered on the Rappahannock was significant of the design of the Washington Administration to introduce new measures of violence in the contest, and to re-enter upon the campaign in Virginia with a new trial of warfare. The desperate fortunes of the war were now to be prosecuted with a remarkable exasperation. Pope was a violent Abolitionist, a furious politician; his campaigns in the West had been remarkable only for the bluster of official despatches, big falsehoods in big print, and a memorable career of cruelty in Southeastern Missouri. He had suddenly risen into favour at Washington. McDowell, a moderate Democrat, having no sympathy with the Anti-Slavery school of politics-who some months before had been stationed at Fredericksburg, and was promised chief command of the movement thence upon Richmond when joined by Banks, Shields, and Fremont, but whose hopes had been destroyed by the rapid marches

and victories of "Stonewall" Jackson-was humiliated to find his plans and chief command entrusted to an incompetent man, and himself put in an obscure and subordinate position under Pope.

Whatever question there may have been of the military capacity of McClellan, it is certain that there were political reasons at Washington for putting him out of the way. He was a Democrat; his constant interpretation of the war had been that it was a contest for the restoration of the Union, not a war of vengeance, and should not be diverted or degraded from what he esteemed a noble and laudable object, by revengeful designs upon the population of the South and a recourse to savage outrage. He had already obtained certain respect from the people of the South by a studious regard for the rights of private property within the lines of his military command, and his honourable disposition to direct war and deal its penalties against bodies of armed men rather than against the general population of the country without regard to age, sex, and other conditions, appealing to humanity and protected under the civilized code of war. The distressed commander, under the weight of a great defeat, yet had power of mind to write, a few days after his retreat to James River, a letter to President Lincoln, at Washington, which, apart from his military career, must ever remain a monument of honour to his name. The text of this letter deserves to be carefully studied as the exposition of the doctrines of a party in the North, that was for limiting the objects of the war to its original declarations, and conducting it on humane and honourable principles:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "CAMP NEAR HARRISON'S LANDING, VA., July 7, 1862.

"MR. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in the front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army, or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war, shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.

"The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our national trouble.

"The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power, even for the present terrible exigency.

"This rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organizations of States, or forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment.

"In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations; all private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanour by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments, constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received.

"Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political right. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorders, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service slave labour should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favour of the Almighty.

"Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concentration of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

"In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army, one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders, by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superiour.

"I may be on the brink of eternity; and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love for my country.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"His Excellency A. LINCOLN, President."

"GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,

Major-General Commanding.

The letter of McClellan was significant of a remarkable division of sen