SENATE. Internal Improvements. FEBRUARY, 1817. not the Congress prohibited from providing for and prosperity of the community, are provisions Will the power in question be claimed by that part of the Constitution which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce between the States? If so, to regulate commerce, means to promote, to facilitate, to secure it by all discreet measures, and the bill seems to have been framed in reference to such an exposition. Inspection laws are useful to promote commerce between States, and yet laws of this character have never been attempted by Congress; on the contrary, the States have the power, by irresistible implication, of enacting inspection laws, and there is an express power given to Congress "to revise and control them ;" and this enumeration of that power strongly implies, that no other power over this subject is intended to be given. Is there a power in the General Government over roads and canals, concurrent with the power of the States? If so, it may be asked, where are the limitations of these respective powers? Or have the Congress a sovereign authority, and is that of the States subordinate? The Constitution is silent on this subject-not so, where concurrent powers may be exercised. For example, in the tenth section of article first, it is provided that the States shall lay no imposts except such as are absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws-they may not keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, nor engage in war It would be wise, in the opinion of many, that unless actually invaded. It is within the province all promissory notes should be negotiable to faof the National Government to lay duties and cilitate commerce; and undoubtedly the whole imposts, to keep troops and ships of war, and es- law on the subject of inland bills of exchange is pecially to engage in war; yet these powers in intimately connected with commerce; the buythe cases specified and with the limitations pre-ing and selling of slaves in one State, to be transscribed, are retained by the States, and may be exercised concurrently. In the eighth section of the first article, and in the second section of the second article, there are more striking examples of concurrent powers. To the Congress, the power is given of calling forth the militia in the cases therein mentioned, and to the President the power of being their commander-in-chief when in actual service. There is also reserved to the States the power of appointing their officers and of training the militia. There may be some questions as to the precise extent of the powers of this Government and of the States over the militia, but a concurrent power is manifestly established and attempted to be defined. Mr. D. asked again, is this measure Constitutional, because Congress may provide for the "general welfare and common defence?" If so, then an enumeration of powers was wholly unnecessary, and is worse than useless; then there is no Constitutional limit to the powers of this Government, but the discretion of the Legislature; and, in truth, such is now a very prevalent opinion, if a judgment is to be formed from the manner in which power is claimed and exercised. The instrument may be termed "the sacred charter of our liberties-our polar star," and by many other pretty names, and at the same time be practically disregarded. Again, said Mr. D., all those internal and municipal regulations, of every description, which contribute to promote the strength ported into another, is a portion of the commerce 6 powers not delegated to the United States by It is said, however, that appropriations have It is further asserted that these roads and canals are to be constructed, and the expenditure made, FEBRUARY, 1817. Internal Improvements. SENATE. If, however, there were no objections arising from a want of Constitutional authority, Mr. D. said, that, in his judgment, the project was inexpedient. No details are provided. What is to be the amount of interest in these various projects? Are co-partnerships with States or with individuals to be formed, and the profits divided? Or are boards of works to be established in all the States, with all the machinery of management incident to them, to be superintended by Congress? On all these points, and many others which might be suggested, the bill is silent; and the only answer we hear from the friends of the bill, to our inquiries, is, no details can be agreed on; should details be attempted, the bill would not be carried. Is this a sufficient answer? Before we proceed to grant away more than twelve millions of dollars, it is reasonable that the manner of expenditure should be pointed out. with the assent of the States, and thus the power of Congress, if doubtful, is confirmed, and the bill in question is drawn with this aspect. Mr. D. said, on this point he would ask one question: Can money be appropriated by Congress for an object over which it is not authorized to legislate, because the States assent? Or, in other words, can a law be made, with the consent of the States, which is not warranted by the Constitution? By the Constitution, the judicial power extends to all cases arising under the Constitution, &c. Can Congress, with the assent of the States, extend the judicial power to murders, felonies, and other offences committed in the States? Where would be found a judge rash enough to execute such a law? It is believed that the true doctrine is, that the Constitution is the shield of every individual in the nation, and that its powers can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the States, except by amendments made in pursuance of its provisions. It may be added, that neither of the Presidents, The time also is not proper. A war has just Washington or Adams, ever proposed a measure terminated, leaving upon us a debt (with that of this character. The present Chief Magistrate which existed before) of one hundred and twenty has suggested it in one or more of his Messages, millions of dollars. Our navigating and manubut always with doubts as to the propriety of an facturing interests are languishing, and no small interference, without amendments to the Consti- portion of distress pervades many parts of our tution. President Jefferson, in his communica-country. It is not, then, the prosperous moment tion to Congress in 1806, after exhibiting the condition of the Treasury, and thereby showing the large surplusses of revenue, proceeds to inquire whether the import duties should be continued, and thereby the overplusses be accumulated; and, if so, how they should be disposed of; and, on this subject, makes the following observations: "On a few articles of more general and necessary use, the suppression, in due season, will doubtless be right; but the great mass of the articles on which impost is paid are foreign luxuries, purchased by those only who are rich enough to afford themselves the use of them. Their patriotism would certainly prefer its continuance and application to the great purposes of the public education, roads, rivers, canals, and such other object of public improvement as it may be thought proper to add to the Constitutional enumeration of Federal powers. By these operations new channels of communication will be opened between the States; the lines of separation will disappear; their interests will be identified, and their union cemented by new and indissoluble ties. Education is here placed among the articles of public care; not that it is proposed to take its ordinary branches out of the hands of private enterprise, which manages so much better all the concerns to which it is equal, but a public institution can alone supply those sciences, which, though rarely called for, are yet necessary to complete the circle; all the parts of which contribute to the improvement of the country, and some of them to its preservation. The subject is now proposed for the consideration of Congress, because, if approved by the time the State Legis latures shall have deliberated on this extension of the Federal trusts, and the laws shall be passed, and other arrangements made for their execution, the necessary funds will be on hand, and without employment. I suppose an amendment to the Constitution, by consent of the States, necessary, because the objects now recommended are not among those enumerated in the Constitution, and to which it permits the public moneys to be applied." to enter upon gigantic projects-it is not the time to expend millions on undefined objects. It would be unwise, at any time, to pledge this great amount, and pledge it beyond the control of Government in any exigency of affairs. We are now at peace-we may soon be at war. Yesterday a proposition to reduce the army was rejected; and a strong reason urged was, that our relations with a nation bordering on our territory were in a disturbed condition. We all have a painful recollection of the state of our pecuniary have now a full Treasury, and we speak of it as resources during the years 1813, '14, and '15. We inexhaustible. Young men, coming to the possession of ample fortunes, deem their riches endless; they plan, build, improve, project, and boast, that "to-morrow will be as this day, and more also." The issue of such schemes we have witnessed. No private or public treasure is inexhaustible, without frugal and discreet management. Are we sure of the continuance of our resources? That derived from the land tax we can no longer look to; the other internal taxes will surely follow that on the land. A disposition is manifest to rid the nation of these vexatious taxes, and they will soon die, without a struggle or a groan. Our revenue from imposts is liable, at all times, to be seriously affected or cut off by a war. In such an event, will the people acquiesce in supporting burdens to construct roads and canals? The appropriation can be made by the received before its next session, and not more than next Congress; no part of the $1,500,000 will be one dividend. A change in the aspect of our affairs may occasion regret for this measure. Many of the States have already expended large sums for the objects contemplated by this bill. The public is sufficiently accommodated. It is inequitable to burden such States with taxes, for a system of internal improvements, not needed by themselves, because other States have neglected these objects. The measure is inexpedient, because, upon the principles assumed in the bill, the United States may be defeated in the accomplishment of the proposed objects, by a refusal of the assent of the States. If this Government had not the power of controlling absolutely roads and canals, leave them with the competent authorities. If it has the power, it should be examined in a manner becoming the supreme authority, and not by bargains with States. There is also not a little reason to apprehend, that this project will produce much discord. On the subject of roads and canals, much sensibility is entertained by the citizens of the several States. Each section of a State will have its favorite plan. The State Legislatures and Congress will be besieged with applications and remonstrances, and a wide door opened to intrigue. In view of all these considerations, is it not a dictate of wisdom to pause before we adopt a measure so important, so doubtful in its expediency, so questionable as to its constitutionality? Mr. HARDIN Said: As the motion to postpone the bill until the 4th of March had not been made on account of any special reason, he could not see why the Senate should not now act on the subject; and as it would, if it prevailed, defeat the bill, it involved the merits of the subject, and to that he should turn his attention. I was in hopes, said Mr. H., that this bill had been so framed as to render the discussion of the Constitutional question-how far Congress had a right to make roads and canals-unnecessary; but, since it has been urged in debate, I flatter myself that I shall be able to show that there is nothing in this bill, nor in the measures it contemplates, which will violate the Constitution. From the general organization of our institutions, we are naturally led to look to the General Government for support and protection as to those matters which relate to our national rights; and to the States for those which relate to our individual or social rights. In questions which involve the rights of one State or its citizens, in confliction with the claims of another State, or the citizens thereof, it is the General Government which is to decide these matters. To this end has the Constitution given jurisdiction to the courts of the United States in controversies between different States, or the citizens of different States. We have a right, therefore, to contend, that from the general tenor of the Constitution, whenever there are rights which the State, as a State, cannot cherish or protect, without coming in collision with a sister State, the General Government has a right to interfere and to extend its aid. In relation to the intercourse between different States, it may frequently happen that two States, interested in promoting it, cannot succeed, owing to the want of co-operation, or of the permission of an intervening State; for example, the State of Ohio and the western parts of Pennsylvania and FEBRUARY, 1817. Virginia, have a deep interest in the navigation of the Ohio river and an intercourse with Louisville. It is known that the rapids of that river, at Louisville, present a great obstruction to the navigation; I have heard some men say, that they thought it the interest of Louisville and its vicinity, that these obstructions never should be removed; that they caused the stoppage of nearly every boat that passed, and thus rendered them tributary to the adjoining towns. This I know is not the sentiment of my countrymen generally, it is the opinion of a few only; but suppose this contracted policy was to pervade the States of Kentucky and Indiana, and they were to refuse their co-operation, aid, or assent, to improving this navigation, would you say, sir, that the nation is manacled; that it possesses no power to interfere and protect the rights of those who wish to navigate this stream? It is certain that the States of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, as such, could not. This power, the power to regulate and to promote intercourse between the States, ought to belong to the General Government. But what are the grounds on which it is contended that Congress do not possess this power? The honorable member from Connecticut (Mr. DAGGETT) has contended, that because the Constitution has expressly given the power to establish post roads, they are, by a legal rule of construction, excluded from establishing other roads. This would be correct, if there were no other parts of the Constitution from which this power could be fairly deduced; if the subject of post roads was not one which particularly called for such a provision as is contained in the Constitution. If no provision were in the Constitution relative to the establishment of post roads, I should not doubt the power of Congress to establish post roads from State to State. But it might well be doubted whether they had the power to establish a post road between two little towns within the same State, and off from the main post routes, for the purposes of neighborhood, not State, convenience. Hence the necessity for this express power in the Constitution. But let us resort to the Constitution, and see if it does not sanction the objects of this bill. It is not necessary for me to contend, that "to provide for the general welfare," is a substantive grant of power. Take the paragraph of the Constitution according to the most limited sense in which it is construed by any one, and omit intervening words, and it will read, "Congress have power to collect taxes, to provide for the general welfare." In other words, Congress have power to raise money when the public welfare shall require it, and to disburse it in providing for the public welfare. If Congress possesses this power, the first question presenting itself is, will the public welfare be promoted by great roads which shall extend from Maine to Louisiana, from the Atlantic to the Mississippi? which shall by canals connect inland navigation from one end of our union to the other-promote intercourse between State and State, expedite the mail, and facilitate the transportation of troops and munitions of war from one place to another in the hour of peril? I shall not be answered in the negative by any honorable member. I will not dwell on this point-the good sense of every one who hears me will respond in the affirmative. The public welfare will then be promoted by accomplishing the objects of the bill. In accomplishing those objects, will any State privileges, will any private rights be violated, is the next inquiry. It has been contended that the States have the right to make roads and canals, and, therefore, Congress do not possess the power. It is conceded that the States have this right-so have they the right to erect fortifications, to build ships of war. But Congress have the same right, and not only the right, but it is their duty to do it. Suppose, in a time of war, two neighboring posts separated by marshy ground; would not Congress possess the power to make a road between them to facilitate the marching of troops, and the transportation of the munitions of war? No man will deny this power. Whence is it derived? From the power to provide for the public defence, and to disburse money for the public welfare. Then Congress may make roads whenever these objects will be promoted, provided, in so doing, the rights of States or individuals are not violated. Who is to judge when and how these objects can best be accomplished? Surely the General Government. That this power might be so exercised, might be so abused, as to violate State rights, I admit. So may the power to erect fortifications. Were Congress wantonly to seize, for a fortification, ground consecrated by the laws of a State to the burial of the dead-were they to prostrate the capitol of a State, or demolish the country seat of a citizen under like pretences-when there was no necessity for so doing, when sites equally advantageous and not thus valuable were in their power it would be an usurpation; an act of tyranny on State and individual rights. It must, then, be in the manner of exercising the power, and not in the power itself, that State rights are to be violated. For I will ask honorable gentlemen to inform me what State rights can be violated if Congress were to erect, by contract with all the proprietors on whose soil it passed, a great highway through any State; say, for example, a road from this District through Virginia, to the mouth of the Kenawha? Have not the citizens a right to sell their lands? to grant a right of way over them? Could not any citizen, or combination of citizens, construct such a road without consulting the Legislature of Virginia? And shall we be told that the National Government cannot purchase this right for the American family? I ask what difference there is in constructing a road by contract with the proprietors over whose soil it passes, and building a fortification or a seventy-four within a State by contracts with the proprietors of the ground used for either purpose? The bill on your table, sir, expressly provides for SENATE. obtaining the assent of the State government where the money is to be disbursed. But we are asked by an honorable gentleman, whether the assent of the State government is to give us powers which we do not possess. Congress possesses the power to make post roads, and the power to make military roads or canals, in other words, roads or canals which shall directly aid in the defence of any post, frontier, or vulnerable point, without any pretence for the interference of the States on these points. And I trust I have shown that Congress possess the power to disburse the public money in constructing roads, canals, &c., between State and State, which shall promote the public welfare, provided in the manner of exercising this latter power they do not conflict with any State or private right. But if the State government give their sanction to the measure, there can be no confliction of powers or rights. Hence this provision in the bill, that there may be no confliction with, no jealousies on the part of the State authorities. Whenever there are doubts on Constitutional points, it is best to conciliate-it is best to quiet them by courtesy, if time and circumstances will permit. It is said by an honorable member, that even if the canals contemplated were constructed, they would be but little used in time of peace; that our citizens would prefer going round on the ocean, the great highway of nature. Does the honorable gentleman imagine we are always to remain at peace? Does he so soon forget the perils and difficulties from which we have so recently been relieved? For, notwithstanding the pride and satisfaction which every American bosom must feel at the general events of the war, and its honorable conclusion, the tear of pity must drop at the many cases of individual misfortunes and suffering, which occurred during its progress. Who can tell how many families were brought to penury, or the thousands of dollars that was paid for transportation? Who can count the millions worth of property that was lost or destroyed for the want of a market, during the war? Would not a great part of this have been avoided, if our inland communication had been what it might be in a few years? I verily believe a million of dollars, judiciously expended on the works now contemplated, would have saved many millions during the war to our Treasury, and tens of millions to our citizens. Shall we never profit by experience? Shall we fold our arms as soon as the storm is over, and loll in idleness? No. Let us recollect that peace is the time in which to prepare for war. Let us judiciously use our resources. Let us connect, by permanent roads or canals, those points which the experience of the late war, or our own reflections, teach us are most exposed, with our military depots, and with the heart of the country, whose population is to be their support in the time of need. Let us not again wait until an enemy is at our doors, before we begin seriously to prepare for him. We have been asked, Mr. Chairman, to postpone this bill until the meeting of another Con SENATE. Internal Improvements. FEBRUARY, 1817. gress; Not having been a member of Congress until The national sentiment is in favor of internal years will pass away; its advocates may be for- One remark more, Mr. Chairman. Whatever I had been accustomed, Mr. Chairman, to look to the Senate with a high degree of respect and veneration and as that body which was to give stability to our national affairs in those times of temporary excitement, which every free Government must at times be subject to. When I had the honor of taking a seat here at the commencement of the session, and formed a personal acguaintance with its members, the opinion which I had formed of this body was by no means les-By making your roads and canals, we shall have sened. more intercourse with each other, and shall be- I consider this bill as of the first importance to the nation, as the Government will thereby stand pledged to commence internal improvements. It will not then be in the power of any one branch of the Legislature to stop or embarrass the subject. It has passed the other House. A great portion of the present members of that body were mem- If, sir, this bill should pass at the present sesbers during the war, and felt the embarrassments sion, if any exertion of mine shall be calculated of our situation. It is surely then not detracting to aid its passage, I shall think that I have spent from the merits of the next Congress, to say that my Winter to some other purpose than that of I am unwilling to leave it to them. Many of receiving a portion of the public funds and formthem will be new members; and a great portioning a more extended acquaintance; I shall feel |