Naval Depot on the Chesapeake. part of its utility; it should also be connected Roads, large ships cannot sail when the wind is with the means of supplies of timber and naval ahead, in consequence of the narrowness of the stores, which no posture of war could cut off or channel; but if warping anchors, with buoys, be interrupt these are qualities of the first mag-laid down in the channel, (as is the case in all nitude. men-of-war barbors that are close,) ships can, with any wind, be warped into the Roads. There are other advantages, not indeed so indispensable, but still of a very high character, and which would be extremely fortunate to find with the qualities of primary importance already mentioned; such for example, as a populous neighborhood, from which supplies of labor and provisions might be commodiously drawn, and which would be at hand to give support to the depot in the event of a sudden attack; another of these incidental advantages, is a large, safe, and well defended outer harbor, into which the ships, when built, could be drawn and mancuvred without the hazard of exposure to a superior enemy. Hampton Roads, which I consider the outer harbor of Norfolk, is eighteen miles from Cape Henry. Ships can enter or proceed to sea from it, with the wind from any quarter. It furnishes excellent anchorage, and has sufficient room for a fleet to manœuvre in under sail-an advantage which no other harbor, that I know of, possesses. The distance from Hampton Roads to the navy yard at Gosport is twelve miles, and the shoalest water found in the river at ordinary high tides, is twenty-five feet. This depth is more than is sufficient for the seventy-fours we now have. You will find on the file in your office that the pilotage paid for the Independence, (seventy-four,) when she sailed for the Mediterranean, was twenty-four feet. The ships now building, although of great capacity, will not draw so much, by six inches. The present defences of Norfolk are, in my opinion, sufficient to protect it from any naval force that can be brought against it. It will be recollected, that during the late war, the enemy considered it absolutely necessary to get possession of Craney island, before they could pass up to Norfolk with their shipping; in consequence of which, a combined attack by their boats, and a considerable land force, was made on Craney island. The attack was repelled by a few pieces of cannon placed upon the sand, since which time it has been regularly fortified. All the approaches to Norfolk and the navy yard by land are interrupted by water-courses, and lead through swamps. Both places, with the exception of about two hundred yards, are insulated by creeks, unfordable by reason of the deep mud. These creeks can be, and I believe have been, connected by military works; nor is there any higher ground than that on which they stand, within cannon-range of either place. It is the opinion of military men, who have commanded there, that they are particularly well situated for defence against an attack by land. From Craney island up to the navy yard, (which I consider the timber harbor,) is six miles, in which space thirty sail-of-the-line may lay with perfect convenience; and it is at all times so smooth as not to interrupt the ordinary work or repairs that may be required. From Norfolk to Hampton The harbors of Malta and Port Mahon, which are considered two of the best harbors in Europe, can only be left or entered, when the wind is adverse, by warping. The navy yard at Norfolk comprises within its walls a square of about twenty acres, one side of which lays upon the channel of the river, at which sixteen sail-of-the-line can be laid up in ordinary, if they are brought to the pier, end on, as is practised at the naval arsenal at Antwerp. The navy yard, in its present state, furnishes as many conveniences for building or fitting out as any yard in the United States-two hundred thousand dollars at least having been already expended by the public in valuable improvements. The neighborhood furnishes abundance of oak and pine timber suitable for naval purposes, and also naval stores, a supply of which cannot be cut off by a blockading enemy. The advantage it possesses in consequence of its vicinity to a commercial city would be considerable, both as it regards the numerous mechanics and seamen that are to be obtained there, and the protection a large population would afford, in the event of a sudden attack. The climate of Norfolk is, I presume, similar to that of the shores of the Chesapeake generally on tide water. I will now proceed to the examination of York river. From Cape Henry light-house to Gloucester town, which is the first point on York river that could be rendered sufficiently strong to prevent the passage of a hostile fleet, is thirty-two miles. Ships can enter or proceed to sea from it with all winds. The distance from Gloucester to the Clay Banks, the place contemplated for the Navy Yard, is seven miles, and the depth of water is sufficient for any ship at all times of tide. It can unquestionably be defended against any attack by water. It is at present entirely unprotected by any fortifications. From the best information I have been enabled to collect, I am induced to believe that there are several rivers putting in from the Bay navigable for light craft and boats, and approaching within eight or nine miles of the Clay Banks, where a debarkation of troops might be effected. Of the nature of the intervening grounds I am unacquainted. The site selected as the best in this river for a Naval Depot forms at present part of the bed of the river, and no vessel drawing ten feet water can approach the bank nearer than a quarter of a mile. As the bottom is mud, it is probable that it will be found necessary to drive piles for the foundation of the Navy Yard, and the whole yard must of course be composed of artificial or made ground. There is a creek on each side of its heading, about half a mile in the rear, where they approach within about four hundred yards: at this point it is proposed placing the defences against a land attack. About eight hundred or a thousand yards to the right of this Naval Depot on the Chesapeake. position and the contemplated depot there is an extensive range of heights that overlook and command them. In consequence of which, I am of opinion that this position cannot be defended from a land attack with a less force than would be competent to meet the assailants in the field. It is believed that a supply of oak timber may be obtained from the shores of York river; but pine, fit for naval purposes, and naval stores, must be drawn from a distance. A blockading force, in time of war, might prevent the transportation of them by water-the only means by which they could be obtained in any quantity. From the unusual straightness of York river, the mouth of which lies open to the bay, it is much more rough, with particular winds, than rivers of its width generally are. With the wind blowing fresh up or down the river, I should apprehend that any repairs that would require working near the water would be interrupted. The inner harbor of this river, like that of Norfolk, cannot be left or entered when the wind is ahead, except by warping. be cut off in time of war by a blockading force. This place, as well as the harbors of Norfolk and York, from the narrowness of its channel, can only be left or entered, when the wind is adverse, by warping. Its climate is very similar to the climate of those places. There is an objection common to both York and St. Mary's, as the places of Naval Deposite, which has not yet been mentioned, and that is, that they both lie within the defences proposed to be raised from the HorseShoe to the Middle Ground. If you present to an enemy the combined attractions of your depot and your fleet, those works for the defence of the bay must be more numerous and strong, and consequently much more expensive; and it is for this, among other reasons, that I think it so much preferable to place both these objects behind the defences proposed to be established at the mouth of Hampton Roads. Having weighed all the advantages and disadvantages of the several positions, it is my decided opinion that the present navy yard at Norfolk, independent of the protection it would afford the Chesapeake, is, in all respects, incomparably the best place for a Naval Depot, if Hampton Roads be properly fortified; and in that case I should consider it the finest harbor I have ever seen. The only objection to it, in its present The next point embraced by your instructions is Tangier islands, lying about one hundred miles up the Chesapeake. From the survey and report of Captain Spence, the cominissioners were of opinion that that place was totally unfit for a Naval Depot, and therefore did not proceed to ex-state, is the mud-bar at the mouth of the river, amine it. For particular information respecting this place, I beg leave to refer to Captain Spence's survey and report. As your instructions did not particularize St. Mary's, and not being apprized that my colleagues intended to examine that place, I was not present when they did so. It lies on the upper side of the Potomac river, near its mouth, and about an hundred and twenty miles up the Chesapeake Bay. I am unacquainted with the depth of water, the extent of the harbor, its susceptibility of defence against an attack by water, or the supply of naval stores or building materials in its vicinity. From my want of local knowledge of this place, I can say nothing as to its particular advantages, and can only point out some prominent objections which present themselves. Its distance from the ocean I consider an insuperable objection to it as a Naval Depo: and rendezvous, in consequence of the difficulty and detention our ships might meet with in going out or returning from sea. Another objection is, that the population for a considerable distance is so thin that it cannot afford sufficient succor in case of a sudden attack. The river Patuxent lies a few miles higher up the bay than the Potomac, and approaches, where it is navigable for vessels of the largest class, within five miles of the rear of the harbor of St. Mary's. The harbor is everywhere surrounded on the land side by commanding heights, which are too numerous to be occupied and sustained, except by a large army; and, therefore, it would be necessary that a considerable land force should be kept there at all times, to insure its safety. Another very important objection is, that if the neighborhood does not afford sufficient supplies of timber, which I believe is the case, they might over which our largest ships cannot pass at low water; which is a sufficient objection in the present unprotected state of Hampton Roads, inasmuch as any of our larger ships, chased into the Roads by a superior naval force at dead low water, could not pass the bar at the mouth of the river, and would, of course, be exposed to attack. The expense of the requisite buildings for a Naval Depot, at either of the other places, together with the fortifications necessary for the protection of them by land and by water, would, in my opinion, be much greater than would be necessary to fortify Hampton Roads completely. Should either of the other places be fortified, they would require a much larger force to garrison them, and would render no material aid in the general defence of the Chesapeake. Permit me further to observe, sir, that it is the unanimous opinion of the Board that the waters of the Chesapeake should, at some point or other, be the place of a Naval Depot and rendezvous. The mildness of the climate enabling the workmen to continue their labor throughout almost the whole of the year, and the geographical situation of the place, seem to me to fit it eminently for this purpose. It is near the centre of our coast and of our commerce; and that portion of the Navy which would be stationed there, would possess thereby a facility in defending both by the rapid movements it would be enabled to make; and I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion that, by raising the fortifications which I have proposed, and placing the depot near the ocean, the Chesapeake, at present the most vulnerable point of the coast, would become one of the strongest. It would become itself a defence to our seaboard. The subjoined sketch of the waters in the Naval Depot on the Chesapeake. vicinity of the Chesapeake, was furnished me, a' Copy of the communication made by Commodore David Porter, Commissioner of the Navy, in rela tion to a Site for a Naval Depot, and the best means to the adopted for the defence of the Chesapeake Bay. NAVY COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE, December 27, 1816. and if perfect success should be obtained in the erection, it is quite problematical whether they would succeed at all times, and under all circumstances, in preventing the passage of a hostile fleet, or of securing to themselves the necessary supplies of provisions and water, when invaded by a powerful force. Therefore, for an uncertain object, I should consider it unadvisable to risk the destruction or injury of the present channel into the Chesapeake, and the opening of another that would require equal means to defend. If Hampton Roads can be fortified, the Chesapeake Bay, in my opinion (which I submit with due deference) could be best protected by a moveable force, that can seek the protection of batteries placed there and at York river. The chart (not yet completed) of the survey made under the superintendence of the Commissioners, and the report of the surveying officer, will place you in possession of the distances, depths of water, and other facts that have produced this SIR: In compliance with the call made by you opinion, as well as of the information required of the 16th ultimo, and for the reasons set forth by the examination of "Hampton Roads up to in the communication made to you by the Board, Norfolk." It, therefore, only remains for me to of the 24th instant, I have now the honor to send, give my opinion as to the latter place for a Naval for your consideration, facts, and my own opin-Depot. A want of sufficient depth of water, at ions, in relation to the points to which you have directed the attention of the Commissioners of the Navy, by your communication of the 7th May last. all times, for the easy ingress and egress of the largest ships, I have always considered a strong objection to Norfolk as a great Naval Depot. The objection does not, however, exist to the extent I supposed. The minute examination which has lately been made, discovers more water over the flats, below Craney island, than was ever before found; but yet not of sufficient depth to float, at at all times, ships of the largest class, with their provisions, water, and guns on board. Added to which, the channel is narrow, difficult to be found, and never to be passed, by ships of war, with a head wind. Under these scumstances, I can see no cause for changi opinion formerly entertained; and will now add, that if a higher perfection in our naval architecture, or the increased size of our ships, should render a greater draught of water necessary, and our ships are not to be put into a state for service until their arrival in Hampton Roads; if they are then to receive their guns, their provisions, and their stores, from the Naval Depot; if Hampton Roads, instead of affording protection to the whole Ches apeake, is to answer only the purpose of protecting our inoffensive ships, the main object of a Naval Depot at the mouth of the Chesapeake, will be defeated, and the objections to Norfolk proportionably increased. I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant, D. PORTER. Hampton Roads, it is believed, could be fortified to advantage by means of batteries placed on Old Point Comfort, and on the shoal of Willoughby's Point, in fifteen feet water, and the distance between batteries so placed need not be more than one mile and a quarter. But until a fair experiment has been made as to the expense of erecting them-the effect of the latter on the shoals and channels, and whether it could resist the violence of the waves to which it would necessarily be exposed-I should not deem it advisable to undertake to defend the Chesapeake by erecting a line of batteries across the mouth of the Bay, as, by so doing, the risk would be incurred of expending uselessly many millions of dollars, of choking up the channel on one side, and of changing the navigation to the other; by obstructing the waters, and thereby causing them to ebb and flow in larger quantities, and with greater rapidity, on the north side of the mouth of the Bay, clearing away a passage for the largest ships, by the removal of the light, and almost floating sand on that side of the Middle Ground, How far the fortifications of Hampton Roads where a safe and convenient channel already may justify ships' dropping down there in a deexists for vessels drawing sineen feet watered fenceless state will depend on experiments yet to failure in the completion, or the ultimate destruc-be made, and on the extent of those experiments. tion of the blocks, or islands, which must be It is now doubted whether one of our largest sunk in the channel, for the purpose of erecting ships, under the most favorable circumstances, such batteries, would create dangerous shoals, could steer through the narrow and crooked drain, which forms the channel over the flats, without grounding. The means, however, of determining this point are fortunately at hand, and it would not be difficult to make the trial. York river opposes no obstacles to the passage of the largest * Engineers say it would require nine batteries, mounting from one hundred to one hundred and fifty guns each, to defend the passage between Old Point Comfort and the Middle Ground. 昨。 Naval Depot on the Chesapeake. ships as high up as the Clay Banks, which appears to be the most suitable place on that stream for a navy yard. It offers advantages in streams of water for labor-saving purposes, and may be protected from maritime attack by batteries placed at York and Gloucester points, and near the channel on the Oyster Shoals above, (which are bare at low water,) as well as on the shoalest part of York Spit; and the passage of an enemy may be retarded by means of booms, and other obstructions. The climate is said to be subject to the same diseases as those which prevail at Norfolk, and it is said to be liable to attack from Severn river. It has, however, this advantage over Norfolk, (in addition to its depth of water,) that ships can go to sea with most winds with which they leave the place named as most suitable for a Naval Depot. Captain Sinclair's reports and survey of York river will afford you further infor1 mation on this subject. The Tangier islands were surveyed by Captain R. T. Spence-to that survey and the report which accompanies it, I beg leave to refer you for all the information possess respecting them. remark may apply to York. Norfolk has owed its protection to troops drawn from Richmond, which was thereby left exposed to attack. St. Mary's would be guarded by those from Baltimore and Washington, and placed in the most favorable situation to enable them to aid in their defence, as well as that of Richmond. The establishment of a Naval Depot at St. Mary's is not incompatible with the plan suggested for protecting the Chesapeake by means of a moveable force that shall seek the protection of batteries at Hampton Roads and York river. The protection of St. Mary's would depend greatly on that force, and the destruction of the Naval Depot, established there, would require a force (in addition to the one left to watch our fleet) proportioned to the protecting force stationed at St. Mary's; for it is not usual or prudent to leave an enemy unguarded in the rear, when he may be in a situation to avail himself of the advantages which a defeat might offer. A superior enemy's fleet which could (by plaIcing itself between the Naval Depot and St. Mary's, and our naval rendezvous at Hampton Roads) cut off all communication between them, could, by blockade, render both fleet and depot equally useless, were the latter at Norfolk. The command of our own waters, (the object for defending the mouth of the Chesapeake,) would secure to us an easy communication between our fleet and depot. And if this superiority is not to be obtained, our Naval Depot, placed wherever it may be, will not answer the end for which it was intended. A Naval Depot at St. Mary's would afford a safe and commodious Winter retreat for our fleets, which experience has taught me cannot be found in Hampton Roads, and which I have reason to believe cannot be found in York river. It would, from its central and convenient situation, afford protection and convoy to the commerce of the whole bay, even were its mouth blockaded by an enemy's feet; an advantage which could not be afforded by York or Norfolk. It would serve as a Commodore Rodgers and myself, on our passage down the Potomac, in conformity with your instructions, touched in at St. Mary's which is situated near its mouth. In point of healthiness of situation, security from maritime attack, and (I am informed) from ice, excellence of harbor, and the easy ingress and egress to an inner har bor, at all times, to ships drawing not more than twenty-four feet and a half of water, the advantages it offers by means of streams of water for labor-saving purposes, and its convenience to forests of fine timber, St. Mary's is, in my opinion, superior to any other place of which I have a knowledge on the Chesapeake for a Naval Depot. How far its distance from the sea, and the necessity for concentrating a land force for its protection from an enemy (which may attack it from the Patuxent) may weigh against these advantages, or whether it may be considered a disadvantage to have so concentrated, in a healthy situation, a force which may easily be transported rendezvous for the light cruisers from Baltifor a protection of other important points, or, in more, where they could easily elude an enemy's fine taking into consideration its central position, blockading fleet, by availing themselves of the and the speed with which vessels may get to choice of channels; an advantage which York sea with a favorable wind, through both channels does not possess in so great a degree, and one of of the Chesapeake,) whether such objections which Norfolk has been found to be entirely desshould be considered disadvantages, I beg leave titute. The blockade of the mouth of the Chesto submit to the decisions of Government: they apeake would constitute the blockade of Hampton involve military question of which I am not a Roads; consequently the supplies of the Naval competent judge. I shall merely observe, firstly, Depot, placed there, would be limited to those that whatever objections may be made to the received by the canals, and by the waters disdistance of St. Mary's from the ocean, when we charging themselves into Hampton Roads; while measure the sinuosities of the channel, we shall the whole resources of the Chesapeake, and its find the objection nearly as strong to Norfolk. tributary streams, as well as those which may be And when we take into estimation the time re-afforded by the projected canals connecting its quired to sail this distance, we shall find the com- waters with the Delaware, will be open to St. parison in favor of St. Mary's: and secondly, that whatever objection may be made to the assemblage of a military force for the protection of St. Mary's, still stronger objections might be made to their assemblage from the distant parts of Virginia, for the defence of Norfolk. And the same Mary's. A military force stationed at St. Mary's can aid in the defence of every part of the bay exposed to attack, while such aid has never been found in the force stationed at Norfolk, nor is it believed it would in any stationed at York. And, finally, Naval Depot on the Chesapeake. if the experiment of fortifying Hampton Roads should not succeed, a naval force that can issue from St. Mary's would not be less formidable, nor afford less protection to the Chesapeake, than one stationed there or at York. In closing these remarks allow me to observe that I should regret extremely that any difference of opinion existed as to the most suitable point for establishing a Naval Depot, were I not persuaded that this indifference will be the means of placing you in possession of the best information as to the merits and defects of the places under examination. And I am happy to have in my power to say, that there appears to be but one opinion among the Commissioners as to the necessity of such an establishment somewhere on the waters of the Chesapeake. Reasons of a po litical nature which may weigh for or against the particular spot to be selected for a Naval Depot, I leave to politicians; unbiassed by local interests or local prejudices, I have given my opinion solely in regard to the utility of such an establishment. I give them with deference; but with a perfect conviction, in my own mind, of the correctness of the position, that the defence of the Chesapeake, and the utility of a Naval Depot on its waters, will depend more on the conveniences and resources it can furnish, than the position of the depot. A Naval Depot is the source whence all the members receive their supplies and vigor to defend, not a particular spot or place, but the whole body corporate-not for the advantage of any particular section, but for that of the whole Union. D. PORTER. |