July 30, 1862.-McClellan ordered to remove his sick, etc. Reconnaissance from Harrison's Landing to Jones' Ford, Chickahominy River. 31-Aug. 1, 1862.—Attack on Union camps and shipping between Shirley and Harrison's Landing. Aug. 28, 1862.-Reconnaissance from Hárrison's Landing and reoccupation of Malvern Hill by the Union forces. 3, 1862.-Reconnaissance on south side of James River and skirmish at Sycamore Church. McClellan ordered to withdraw his forces to Aquia Creek. 4-5, 1862.-Reconnaissance from Coggins Point beyond Sycamore Church. 5, 1862.-Skirmish at White Oak Swamp Bridge. Engagement at Malvern Hill. 6, 1862.-Skirmish at Malvern Hill. 13, 1862.-Preliminary orders issued for the movement of the Army of Northern Virginia from the Peninsula. 14-15, 1862.-The Third and Fifth Army Corps move from Harrison's Landing for Aquia Creek. 14-19, 1862.-Operations of the cavalry covering the rear of the Army of the Potomac from Harrison's Landing to Williamsburg. 17, 1862.-Reconnaissance toward Forge Bridge. 20, 1862.-The Fifth Army Corps embarked at Newport News. 21, 1862.-The Third Army Corps sail from Yorktown. 23, 1862.-The Sixth Army Corps embarked at Fort Monroe. GENERAL REPORTS. No. 1.-Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac. No. 2.-Brig. Gen. John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer, of operations from May 23, 1861, to August 15, 1862. No. 3.-Lieut. Col. Barton S. Alexander, U. S. Army, Engineer Officer, of operations from April 20 to July 12. No. 4.-Brig. Gen. Daniel P. Woodbury, U. S. Army, commanding Engineer Brigade, of operations from May 18 to June 30. No. 5.-Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, U. S. Army, Chief of Topographical Engineers. No. 6.-Col. Charles P. Kingsbury, U. S. Army, Chief Ordnance Officer. No. 7.-Brig. Gen. Stewart Van Vliet, U. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster, of operations from July 27, 1861, to July 10, 1862. No. 8.-Brig. Gen. Rufus Ingalls, U. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster, of operations from August, 1861, to September 2, 1862. No. 9.-Col. Henry F. Clarke, U. S. Army, Chief Commissary of Subsistence, of operations from August 1, 1861, to November 9, 1862. No. 10.-Surg. Charles S. Tripler, U. S. Army, Medical Director, of operations from March 17 to July 3. No. 11.-Surg. Jonathan Letterman, U. S. Army, Medical Director, of operations from July 4 to September 2. No. 12.-Maj. Albert J. Myer, Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army. No. 13.-E. J. Allen [Allen Pinkerton], Chief of Secret Service Division. No. 14.-Col. Robert O. Tyler, First Connecticut Heavy Artillery, commanding siege train. No. 15.-General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Department of Northern Virginia, of operations from April 15 to May 19. No. 1. Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac. NEW YORK, August 4, 1863. SIR: I have the honor to submit herein the official report of the operations of the Army of the Potomac while under my charge. Accompanying it are the reports of the corps, division, and subordinate commanders pertaining to the various engagements, battles, and occurrences of the campaigns, and important documents connected with its organization, supply, and movements. These, with lists of maps and memoranda submitted, will be found appended, duly arranged, and marked for convenient reference: SECOND PERIOD. CHAPTER I. The council composed of the four corps commanders, organized by the President of the United States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, adopted Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the movement of the Army of the Potomac upon Richmond. For the prompt and successful execution of the projected operation it was regarded by all as necessary that the whole of the four corps should be employed, with at least the addition of 10,000 men drawn from the forces in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe; that position and its dependencies being regarded as amply protected by the naval force in its neighborhood and the advance of the main army up the Peninsula, so that it could be safely left with a small garrison. In addition to the land forces, the co-operation of the Navy was desired in the projected attack upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, as well as in controlling the York and James Rivers, for the protection of our flanks and the use of the transports bringing supplies to the army. With these expectations, and for reasons stated elsewhere in this report, my original plan of moving by Urbana and West Point was abandoned, and the line with Fort Monroe as a base adopted. In the arrangements for the transportation of the army to the Peninsula by water the vessels were originally ordered to rendezvous mainly at Annapolis; but upon the evacuation of Manassas and the batteries of the Lower Potomac by the enemy it became more convenient to embark the troops and material at Alexandria, and orders to that effect were at once given. In making the preliminary arrangements for the movement it was determined that the First Corps, General McDowell's, should move as a unit first, and effect a landing either at the Sand-box, some 4 miles south of Yorktown, in order to turn all the enemy's defenses at Ship Point, Howard's Bridge, Big Bethel, &c., or else, should existing circumstances render it preferable, land on the Gloucester side of York River and move on West Point. The transports, however, arrived slowly and few at a time. In order, So much of this report as relates to the "First Period" will be found in Series I, Vol. V, pp. 1-66. + See Series I, Vol. V, p. 55. therefore, to expedite matters I decided to embark the army by divisrons as transports arrived, keeping_army corps together as much as possible, and to collect the troops at Fort Monroe. In determining the order of embarkation convenience and expedition were especially consulted, except that the First Corps was to be embarked last, as I intended to move it in mass to its point of disembarkation, and to land it on either bank of the York, as might then be determined. On the 17th of March Hamilton's division, of the Third Corps, embarked at Alexandria, and proceeded to Fort Monroe with the following orders: WASHINGTON, D. C., March 17, 1862. You will, on your arrival at Fort Monroe, report to General Wool, and request him to assign you ground for encamping your division. You will remain at Fort Monroe until further orders from General McClellan. Should General Wool require the services of your division in repelling an attack, you will obey his orders and use every effort to carry out his views. General C. 8. HAMILTON, Commanding Division. R. B. MARCY, On the 22d of March, as soon as transportation was ready, General Fitz John Porter's division, of the same corps, embarked. General Heintzelman was ordered to accompany it, under the following instruetions: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Seminary, March 22, 1862. GENERAL: Upon the disembarkation of Porter's division at Fort Monroe I have to request that you will move your two divisions (Porter's and Hamilton's) some 3 or 4 miles out from the fort, to find good camping places, where wood and water can be readily obtained, and where your positions will be good in a defensive point of view. You may find it advisable to place one division on or near the road leading to Yorktown from Newport News; the other upon that leading to Yorktown direct from Fort Monroe. If you find that the nature of the country will permit easy communication and mutual support between the two divisions it will be best to place one on each road. It will be best to remain pretty near the fort for the present, in order to give the impression that our object is to attack Norfolk rather than Yorktown. You will do well, however, to push strong reconnaissances well to the front, to ascertain the position of the enemy and his pickets. I will, as soon as possible, re-enforce you by the third division of your corps, and it is probable that a part or the whole of the Fourth Corps will also move from Fort Monroe. This will probably be determined before your disembarkation is completed, and you will be informed accordingly. My desire would be to make no important move in advance until we are fully prepared to follow it up and give the enemy no time to recover. The quartermaster of your corps will receive detailed instructions in regard to land transportation from General Van Vliet. It will be advisable to mobilize your corps with the least possible delay and have it prepared for an advance. I have directed extra clothing, ammunition, &c., to be sent to Fort Monroe, so that all deficiencies may be supplied without delay. Please report to me frequently and fully the condition of things on the new field of operations and whatever intelligence you gain as to the enemy. Engage guides in sufficient numbers at once, and endeavor to send out spies. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, The remaining divisions embarked as rapidly as transports could be supplied. On the 1st of April I embarked with the headquarters on the steamer Commodore, and reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d. In consequence of the delay in the arrival of the horse transports at Alexandria but a small portion of the cavalry had arrived, and the artillery reserve had not yet completed its disembarkation. I found there the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry and the Fifth Regular Cavalry. The Second Regular Cavalry and a portion of the First had arrived, but not disembarked. So few wagons had arrived that it was not possible to move Casey's division at all for several days, while the other divisions were obliged to move with scant supplies. As to the force and position of the enemy, the information then in our possession was vague and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtained from the staff officers of General Wool, and was simply to the effect that Yorktown was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks, with strong water batteries on the York River, and garrisoned by not less than 15,000 troops, under command of General J. B. Magruder. Maps, which had been prepared by the topographical engineers under General Wool's command, were furnished me, in which the Warwick River was represented as flowing parallel to but not crossing the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, making the so-called Mulberry Island a real island; and we had no information as to the true course of the Warwick across the Peninsula nor of the formidable line of works which it covered. Information which I had collected during the winter placed General Magruder's command at from 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of General Huger's force at Norfolk, estimated at about 15,000. It was also known that there were strong defensive works at or near Williamsburg. Knowing that General Huger could easily spare some troops to reenforce Yorktown-that he had, indeed, done so-and that Johnston's army of Manassas could be brought rapidly by the James and York Rivers to the same point, I proposed to invest that town without delay. The accompanying map of Colonel Cram, U. S. Topographical Engineers, attached to General Wool's staff, given to me as the result of several months' labor, indicated the feasibility of the design.* It was also an object of primary importance to reach the vicinity of Yorktown before the enemy was re-enforced sufficiently to enable him to hold in force his works at Big Bethel, Howard's Bridge, Ship Point, &c., on the direct road to Yorktown and Young's Mill, on the road from Newport News. This was the more urgent, as it was now evident that some days must elapse before the First Corps could arrive. Everything possible was done to hasten the disembarkation of the cavalry, artillery, and wagons in the harbor; and on the 3d the orders of march were given for the following day. There were at Fort Monroe and in its vicinity on the 3d, ready to move, two divisions of the Third Corps, two divisions of the Fourth Corps, and one division of the Second Corps, and Sykes' brigade of regular infantry, together with Hunt's artillery reserve and the regiments of cavalry before named-in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns, besides the division artillery. Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of the Second and Third Corps had not arrived, and Casey's division of the Fourth Corps was unable to move for want of wagons. Before I left Washington an order had been issued by the War Department placing Fort Monroe and its dependencies under my control, and authorizing me to draw from the troops under General Wool a division of about 10,000 men, which was to be assigned to the First Corps. During the night of the 3d I received a telegram from the AdjutantGeneral of the Army stating that by the President's order I was deprived of all control over General Wool and the troops under his command and forbidden to detach any of his troops without his sanction. This order left me without any base of operations under my own control, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it. On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James River was declared by the naval authorities closed to the operations of their vessels by the combined influence of the enemy's batteries on its banks and the Confederate steamers Merrimac, Yorktown, Jamestown, and Teazer. FlagOfficer Goldsborough, then in command of the United States squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it (and no doubt justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the Merrimac, and as he designed using his most powerful vessels in a contest with her, he did not feel able to detach to the assistance of the army a suitable force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was contrary to what had been previously stated to me and materially affected my plans. At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the Navy prepared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until after our land batteries had partially silenced the works. I had hoped, let me say, by rapid movements to drive before me or capture the enemy on the Peninsula, open the James River, and press on to Richmond before he should be materially re-enforced from other portions of his territory. As the narrative proceeds the causes will be developed which frustrated these apparently well-grounded expectations. I determined, then, to move the two divisions of the Fourth Corps by the Newport News and Williamsburg roads to take up a position between Yorktown and Williamsburg, while the two divisions of the Third Corps moved direct from Fort Monroe upon Yorktown, the reserves moving so as to support either corps, as might prove necessary. I designed, should the works at Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious resistance, to land the First Corps, re-enforced, if necessary, on the left bank of the York or on the Severn, to move it on Gloucester and West Point, in order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might have on the Peninsula, and compel him to abandon his posi tions. In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe serious difficulties were encountered from the want of precise topographical information as to the country, in advance. Correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, though known in its general features, we found to be inaccurately described in essential particulars in the only maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. This difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of the State of Virginia through which my military operations have extended. Reconnaissances, frequently under fire, proved the only trustworthy sources of information. Negroes, however truthful their reports, possessed or were able to communicate very little accurate and no comprehensive topographical information. |