adoption of a precedent which allows a belligerent commander to settle questions of confiscation on the deck of a neutral steamer? If not, was it wise to plunge into a foreign war, while the national resources were strained in suppressing domestic insurrection? Such were the considerations, and the conclusion was irresistible. "If I decide this case in favor of my own government," wrote Secretary Seward in that remarkable letter which proclaimed the liberation of the prisoners, "I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself."*

Had President Lincoln, catching the brecze of popular favor, accepted the challenge of Great Britain, and gone to war for the sake of gratifying a false sense of national honor, the consequences must have been disastrous. All Europe protested against the seizure of the Trent as illegal, - which fact, however, was not known at the time of his decision, and had no influence upon it. Southern disloyalists, according to their historian, Mr. Pollard, looked upon the Trent affair as a special dispensation, and their friends in Congress, under the lead of Vallandigham, attempted to force a war by legislative enactment. But pursuing the path of safety, the administration brought to its support the sober second-thought of the people. Europe, so far from looking upon this decision as a weak surrender, accepted it as the strongest indication of our good judgment and honest intentions. In Great Britain there was a temporary reaction in our favor. The opponents of the Union were baffled; the question of recognition was postponed; and the North found time for developing its resources. The British government stood committed to a precedent which tended to restrain the proverbial tendencies of England on the ocean; while America gave more convincing proof than ever before that the difficult lesson of self-government had been mastered.

Our second crisis came nearly two years later. There was then a better feeling in the British community. The war to suppress insurrection had in the fulness of time become a

* Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, p. 425, et seq.

moral revolution; the idea of a restoration of the Union with its Constitution unchanged and unimpaired had been slowly abandoned; and freedom was at length inscribed on the banners of the Republic. This change of policy was not without its effects on a nation which had professed a stolid indifference to the merits of the original controversy, and had stigmatized the war on our part as a contest for empire, taking the view that a certain number of States sought to be released from a burdensome compact, while the others would not suffer them to depart in peace. The decree of emancipation called out the friends of freedom and reform, -a party always strong and vigorous; and numerous addresses of sympathy were issued by the anti-slavery societies and trades' unions in England, and forwarded to President Lincoln through Mr. Adams. The poorer classes turned their thoughts to a home in the New World; and emigration was stimulated and encouraged by this government as part of the regenerating work of its new career. Lord Palmerston's Ministry, which, despite its aristocratic bearing, leaned to the popular and liberal side, now softened its tone, and a better spirit toward the United States was indicated in the spring of 1863 by Earl Russell's speeches in Parliament, and still more by the seizure of the Alexandra. But the relations of the two countries were by no means satisfactory. It was now our turn to complain. We had tasted the sweets of British neutrality, and scarcely a week passed without bringing home to our merchants the news of some fresh spoliation on the high seas. American shipping was seeking protection under a foreign flag. Congress had authorized the President to issue letters of marque and reprisal. Mr. Adams had been promptly instructed to present the Alabama claims to the British government, and to press them discreetly; but Earl Russell repudiated all responsibility for our wrongs. The wealthy and conservative classes were still bitterly hostile. The Confederate cotton loan had been entirely taken up by them. New privateers were on the stocks, and the Lairds had commenced two formidable iron rams for operations against Northern cities. In Parliament a violent party, under Mr. Roebuck, sought to compel the immediate recognition of the Southern Confederacy. The Alabama controversy had drawn

out the suggestion from the British Secretary, that mutual amendments might be made so as to render the enlistment laws of the two countries more effective; but when Secretary Seward acceded to the proposal, it appeared that the Lord Chancellor considered the present act already sufficient, and that the Cabinet would consent to no change. Five months later, a fitting commentary upon this vacillating conduct was furnished by the decision of the Chief Baron of the Exchequer in the Alexandra case, to the effect that fitting out vessels and selling them for hostile purposes was no breach of the Enlist ment Act. This last piece of jugglery was not to be endured. The tide of military success had turned in our favor; and Secretary Seward now plainly declared, that, if the Alexandra doctrine should be sustained in the higher court, one of two things remained,—either that Great Britain should remedy the defects of the existing laws by additional legislation, or that the United States would protect its commerce against Liverpool armed cruisers as against the naval forces of a public enemy, and would claim and insist upon indemnity for its injuries.

This last appeal, strengthened as it was by the announcement of the July victories, and the perilous situation of European politics, brought the Palmerston Ministry to a better comprehension of its duties. Henceforth there was a disposition to maintain neutral obligations, and avoid rupture with a government which had so formidable a navy to enforce its demand. The tone of Parliament changed. The iron rams were detained by order of the crown, and held for trial. But in the courts justice was not swift-footed. The Alexandra case, like a wounded snake, dragged its slow length up to the House of Lords, and was lost in its own convolutions; and to relieve themselves of a dilemma, the officers of government were obliged to purchase the iron-clads. Only one case, that of the Pampero, was prosecuted to a successful issue in the Scotch courts, and the sentence of condemnation actually pronounced. The struggle rapidly degenerated into a mere effort on the weaker side to do all the mischief possible; and while the rescue of Semmes at the sinking of the Alabama and the St.

* Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, p. 308.

Albans raid, showed that British friendship was the result of expediency rather than conviction, the danger of foreign war

was over.

That sort of laissez-faire policy which the Palmerston Ministry early adopted in American matters, and which indirectly abetted the enemies of this Union, contrasts strongly with the vigilance and activity of late displayed in suppressing Fenianism. No one can doubt that a vigorous enforcement of the Enlistment Act would have prevented England from becoming the modern rival of the Barbary powers; and in spite of a jealous aristocracy, avaricious traders, and obsequious judges, the Southern cause would have withered for want of root. It is the duty of neutral nations to protect their good faith against the efforts of all ill-disposed subjects; and if a conviction cannot always be procured, prompt legal prosecution will sometimes clear the atmosphere wonderfully. When the French Revolution was at its height, and Minister Genet, with the prestige of his government to aid him, undertook to launch privateers from American ship-yards against the proud mistress of the seas, Washington resented it as a national insult. "Is the Minister of the French Republic to set the acts of this government at defiance with impunity?" was his indignant exclamation. Not long after, he signed a treaty which provided indemnity for the losses sustained by Great Britain through the remissness of subordinate officers, deeming it not derogatory to his country's dignity to remove a blemish from its fair name. How has this conduct been rewarded? British neutrality during the Rebellion was a gilded fraud. There was no strong arm to interpose the law between popular sympathy and public duty. Judicial decisions were invariably inspired by the desires of the hour. Our minister and consuls made the complaints, collected the evidence, and put the wheels of justice in motion; the crown officers, the customs commissioners, whose "wilful blindness and credulous partiality" were well understood by Mr. Adams, the judiciary itself, interposed delays and impediments. The United States, in such cases as the Trent, Perthshire, and Labuan, manifested respect for the principles of international law, even when it conflicted with our interests; but Great Britain made her own opinion her law, and, blindly

pursuing a selfish policy, founded her justification on the maxim, "The king can do no wrong," or, as modern authority has it, "Her Majesty's government are the sole custodians of their own honor."

We have not touched upon the Alabama controversy, because it has been exhausted by others, and is well understood by our readers. Mr. Adams has ably argued the case for this government; and the British nation can hardly suffer the subject to rest where Earl Russell, in his obstinacy and ill-temper, has seen fit to place it. We cannot retrace our steps; the time may come when the British government will wish to retrace theirs. Let reparation be made quickly, that it may be made honorably, before British merchants find their traffic given over to savage corsairs, - before it is too late to wipe out an infamous precedent,-before experience teaches that the Alabama lesson has a twofold application. Then we trust that privateering will take its place with piracy, and be at once and forever abolished from the code of civilized and Christian nations.

Neutral precedents have sometimes been adduced in defence of this covert war upon American commerce. Questions of international policy must be determined by broader considerations; and a case precisely analogous to our own cannot be found in history. The rogue sometimes goes unwhipt of justice, because the law is of limited application and cannot reach him; but nations, in their mutual intercourse, are not hampered by narrow rules or technical constructions. If existing laws are insufficient, the remedy is at hand. If officials are remiss in their duties, they can be removed. There is a philosophy, as well as a law, in politics, which cannot safely be disregarded. To sum up the case, no language can be more forcible than that of the statesman at the Court of St. James: "That Great Britain did, in the most terrible moment of our domestic trial in struggling with a monstrous social evil she had earnestly professed to abhor, coldly and at once assume our inability to master it, and then become the only foreign nation steadily contributing, in every indirect way possible, to verify its prejudgment."

* Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, p. 53.