a spark of that divine fire which we call genius, and that good fortune in war results from the same prompt talent and unbending temper which lead to the same result in the peaceful professions. Friedrich had certainly more of the temperament of genius than Marlborough or Wellington; but not to go be yond modern instances, he does not impress us with the massive breadth of Napoleon, nor attract us with the climbing ardor of Turenne. To compare him with Alexander or Cæsar were absurd. The kingship that was in him, and which won Mr. Carlyle to be his biographer, is that of will merely, of rapid and relentless command. For organization he had a masterly talent; but he could not apply it to the arts of peace, both because he wanted experience and because the rash decision of the battle-field will not serve in matters which are governed by natural laws of growth. He seems, indeed, to have had a coarse, soldier's contempt for all civil distinction, altogether unworthy of a wise king, or even of a prudent one. He confers the title of Hofrath on the husband of a woman with whom his General Walrave is living in what Mr. Carlyle justly calls "brutish polygamy," and this at Walrave's request, on the ground that "a general's drab ought to have a handle to her name." Mr. Carlyle murmurs in a mild parenthesis that "we rather regret this"! (Vol. III. p. 559.) This is his usual way of treating unpleasant matters, sidling by with a deprecating shrug of the shoulders. Not that he ever wilfully suppresses anything. On the contrary, there is no greater proof of his genius than the way in which, while he seems to paint a character with all its disagreeable traits, he contrives to win our sympathy for it, nay, almost our liking. This is conspicuously true of his portrait of Friedrich's father; and that he does not succeed in making Friedrich himself attractive is a strong argument with us that the fault is in the subject and not the artist.

The book, we believe, has been comparatively unsuccessful as a literary venture. Nor do we wonder at it. It is disproportionately long, and too much made up of those descriptions of battles to read which seems even more difficult than to have won the victory itself, more disheartening than to have suffered the defeat. To an American, also, the warfare seemed Liliputian in the presence of a conflict so much larger in its propor

tions and significant in its results. The interest, moreover, flags decidedly toward the close, where the reader cannot help feeling that the author loses breath somewhat painfully under the effort of so prolonged a course. Mr. Carlyle has evidently devoted to his task a labor that may be justly called prodigious. Not only has he sifted all the German histories and memoirs, but has visited every battle-field, and describes them with an eye for country that is without rival among historians. The book is evidently an abridgment of even more abundant collections, and yet as it stands the matter overburdens the work. It is a bundle of lively episodes rather than a continuous narrative. In this respect it contrasts oddly with the concinnity of his own earlier Life of Schiller. But the episodes are lively, the humor and pathos spring from a profound nature, the sketches of character are masterly, the seizure of every picturesque incident infallible, and the literary judgments those of a thorough scholar and critic. There is, of course, the usual amusing objurgation of Dryasdust and his rubbish-heaps, the usual assumption of omniscience, and the usual certainty of the lively French lady of being always in the right; yet we cannot help thinking that a little of Dryasdust's plodding exactness would have saved Fouquet eleven years of the imprisonment to which Mr. Carlyle condemns him, would have referred us to St. Simon rather than to Voltaire for the character of the brothers Belle-Ile, and would have kept clear of a certain ludicrous etymology of the name Antwerp, not to mention some other trifling slips of the like nature. In conclusion, after saying, as honest critics must, that "The History of Friedrich II. called Frederick the Great" is a book to be read in with more satisfaction than to be read through, after declaring that it is open to all manner of criticism, especially in point of moral purpose and tendency, we must admit with thankfulness, that it has the one prime merit of being the work of a man who has every quality of a great poet except that supreme one of rhythm which shapes both matter and manner to harmonious proportion, and that where it is good, it is good as only genius knows how to be.

ART. VI.-1. Diplomatic Correspondence for the Years 1861, 1862, 1863, and 1864. Washington. 9 vols. 8vo.

2. Documents relating to Mexican Affairs. 1862, 1863, and 1865. Washington. 3 vols. 8vo.

Ir is now more than fifteen years since Secretary Seward, then a United States Senator, in a speech which deserves to be remembered for its masterly grasp of the slavery problem, met the threats of Southern disunionists with the warning, that, if they should bring on civil war, a violent but complete emancipation of the negro race would follow, and that the day when the fountains of popular contentment should be broken up would bring forth the highest illustration of the excellence of our system of government. "Then it will be seen," said he, "how calmly, how firmly, how nobly a great people can act in preserving their Constitution, -whom love of country moveth, example teacheth, company comforteth, emulation quickeneth, and glory exalteth.""

In the revolution through which we have lately passed, wherein Mr. Seward himself has borne no light part, these words have proved prophetic; and not only is the land freed from a social curse, but popular institutions have endured the severest test, and come forth from the contest strong and vigorous, without the loss of a single prerogative. De Tocqueville's theory that democracy is incapable of sustained effort stands controverted by an historical fact; and while similar struggles to our own have generally resulted in anarchy or military despotism, the singular spectacle of a law-loving people growing wiser as the strife grows hotter, becoming revolutionists in self-defence, drawing upon their resources with care and moderation, now following up an advantage, now retrieving an error, patient in tribulation and magnanimous in the flush of victory, all this has been reserved for America and for these latter days.

The foreign no less than the domestic policy of President Lincoln was marked by certain leading traits, patience, good judgment, forbearance almost unparalleled, and a faith in the final triumph of republican principles which could not be

shaken. Those who look for subtilties, finesse, and strategical combinations, such as are too often displayed on the chessboard of European politics, will be disappointed. (The late administration, in its intercourse with other nations, chose to consider that governments are subject to the same rules of morality as individuals. The spirit manifested was frank, generous, and consistent. The policy was simple and thoroughly American, based upon the Jeffersonian maxim of good faith and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none. Of necessity it was a defensive policy; and while some important treaties were negotiated, its chief merit is not in what it developed, but in what it prevented. It was, however, the policy for the times; and if the national pride was sometimes wounded, the country's honor was never surrendered,

We purpose in this article to touch upon some of the leading points in the diplomatic history of the late Rebellion, as illustrated in the volumes of correspondence issued by the State Department. Diplomacy is not a favorite word with. Americans, eager for results and impatient of delays; and we are apt to consider the management of foreign relations as a system of political chicanery, a science of prudent delays adopted by nations seeking to outwit one another while each pursues its secret schemes of aggrandizement. That this is a partial and illiberal view of the subject need not here be argued; but no candid person can read these volumes without feeling that the history of our foreign relations during the last four years is closely identified with the cause of civilization, — that it is America's complete vindication pronounced before the assembled powers of the earth, that most solemn of human tribunals. We should feel proud of the record. It exhibits an enlarged and comprehensive statesmanship. And surely, when we consider that from the outset the two leading powers of Europe, jealous of our growth and hostile to demo cratic principles, persisted in a course of action which aimed at our dissolution; that they concerted schemes for the encouragement of the disloyal, so far as might conduce to this result; that nevertheless they were for four years constrained to postpone the question of recognition, and to respect a blockade not at all times complete, from which they suffered greatly;

when we consider that a single indiscreet act, an official despatch arrogant or tamely submissive in its tone, might have involved us in a hopeless war; that no opportunity was afforded them of intervention, either as open enemies or under the guise of a friendly mediation; that as neutrals they were held to observance of the laws of neutrality, and at last compelled to withdraw their concession of belligerent rights and to acknowledge the supremacy of the Union of these States, surely the foreign policy of President Lincolu may be pronounced no less successful than honorable.

When President Lincoln's term commenced, our foreign relations were in a pitiable state, and all things seemed hastening to destruction. The friends of the Union abroad were lukewarm and divided, while the new Confederacy was vigorously urging its claims. Influential partisans of the latter had already been secured in England and France. The insurgents expected material assistance from abroad; and with the conviction that cotton was king, they appealed not altogether in vain to the jealousy and cupidity of our commercial rivals. Our new tariff, already unpopular in England and France, was made doubly odious through their efforts. The new President was assailed with coarse abuse and ridicule, as the vulgar leader of a root-and-branch party. The monarchical tendencies of the Southern planters found favor with the cabinets of Europe, and their doctrines of Secession and State Rights had been so generally accepted that the sources of public opinion were poisoned. Meantime the diplomatic and consular agents of the United States were remiss in their duties. Some secretly favored the Confederates, others manifested an indifference scarcely less injurious to the national cause. Mr. Faulkner, Minister to France, and Mr. Preston, to Spain, had the insolence, in their official despatches, to warn the Executive, with threats, against what they termed "coercion "; while the former, as there is reason to believe, was treacherous enough to lend his official influence in procuring arms to be used for insurrectionary purposes.

An entire change was made in the foreign appointments under the new administration; and although the leading missions were filled before the necessity of civil war had deter