offence was committed and for two days previous, she was lying at anchor in a river by adverse winds, it was held, nevertheless, that she was navigating the river within the meaning of the statute, and if the offence be committed while the vessel is in a river, prosecuting her voyage, the case is within the statute, even though the port of departure and destination are both upon other waters. The statute should not be construed as authorizing any unnecessary departure from the common law rule respecting the venue in criminal cases.1

It has, therefore, been held where, at the time of the commission of the offence, the vessel was navigating a river and her port of destination, which she finally reached, was upon the ocean in a county beyond the mouth of the river, that no indictment lay in such county, but only in some county through which or a part of which the vessel passed while on the river. In relation to crimes on board of vessels navigating a river, it may often be nearly or quite impossible to ascertain in what particular county the offence was committed, and this difficulty might lead to the acquittal of the accused, although his guilt should be fully established, and this was the mischief against which the statute was principally directed.2

Also whenever any nuisance shall be erected or continued on or near the boundary lines of New York, Westchester and Queens, the same, and the persons by whom such nuisance shall have been erected or continued may be indicted in either county injuriously affected thereby, and thereupon the same proceedings shall be had and taken, and the sentence of the court may be enforced in the same manner as if the said nuisance was situated within the county in which the indictment was found.3

At. common law, larceny, like every other offence, must regularly be tried in the same county or jurisdiction in which it was committed; but it should be noted with respect to larceny, that the offence is considered as committed in every county or jurisdiction into which the thief carries the goods, for the legal possession of them still remains in the true owner, and every moment's continuance of the trespass and felony, amounts to a new caption and asportation.*

1 Peo. v. Hulse, 3 Hill, 309.

. Id.

'Laws 1851, ch. 415, § 1.

* 4 Blao. Com., 304; 3 Inst., 113; 2 Hale, 163, 1 Hale, 507, 508; 1 Hawk. P. C., ch. 33, § 52; 2 Russ. on Cr., 116.

The larceny may, however, in some respects, be considered as a new larceny, and as not necessarily including all the qualities of the original larceny; therefore, if the thing stolen is altered in character in the first county, so as to be no longer what it was when stolen, an indictment in the second county must describe it according to its altered and not according to its original state. Thus, where an indictment was preferred in H for stealing live turkies, and it appeared that they were stolen alive in C, killed there and carried dead into H, it was held that, though the carrying into H constituted a larceny in that county, yet it was a new larceny there, and a larceny of dead turkies, not of live ones.1

Also an indictment in the county of H for stealing one brass furnace, is not supported by evidence that the prisoner stole the furnace in the county of R, and there broke it to pieces and brought the pieces into the county of H.2

At common law, if a compound larceny, as robbing the mail be committed in one county, and the offender carry the property into another, though he might be convicted in the latter county of the simple larceny, he could not there be convicted of the compound larceny.3

But by statute in this State, it is provided that when property stolen in one county and brought into another, shall have been taken by burglary or robbery, the offender may be indicted, tried and convicted for such burglary or robbery in the county into which such stolen property was brought, in the same manner as if such burglary or robbery had been committed in that county.* Where property is burglariously stolen in one county, and the offender is apprehended and committed for such offence to the jail of another county, if he is indicted in the county where the property was stolen, the court will, on the application of the district attorney of that county, award a habeas corpus to bring up the prisoner so that he may be delivered to the sheriff of the county within which the property was stolen and there tried.5 It is also further provided by statute that every person who

1

4

Russ. & Ry., 497.

R. v. Holloway, 1 C. & P., 127.

'Rex v. Thompson, Hil. T., 1795.

2 R. S., 727, § 50; Haskins v. Peo., 16 N. Y. (2d Smith), 344,

Peo. v. Mason, 9 Wend., 505.

shall feloniously steal the property of another in any other State or country, and shall bring the same into this State, may be convicted and punished in the same manner as if such larceny had been committed in this State; and in every such case, such larceny may be charged to have been committed in any town or city, into or through which such stolen property shall have been brought.1

And under this section of the statute, it was held that a foreigner committing larceny abroad coming into this State, and bringing the stolen property with him, might be indicted, convicted and punished in the same manner as if the larceny had been originally committed here.2

Where property is stolen in one county and afterwards carried by the thief into another county, the prisoner must have the property under his control in the second county to render him liable to be indicted there, and it is not enough that he has the mere possession of it, he being in the custody of the constable who apprehended him.3

Every person prosecuted for stealing the property of another in any other State or territory, and bringing the same into this State, may plead a former conviction or acquittal for the same offence in another State or country, and if such plea be admitted or established, it shall be a bar to any further or other proceedings against such person for the same offence.*

The rule that where property is stolen in one county and is carried by the thief into another, he may be convicted of larceny in the latter county, applies as well to property which is made the subject of larceny by statute as to property which is the subject of larceny by the common law.

A man may be indicted for larceny in the county into which the goods are carried, although he did not himself carry them thither. Thus, where C and D stole the goods in the county of S, and D carried them into the county of M, where C subsequently joined him, and concurred in securing them, it was held larceny in both,"

In cases where a libel has been published in any paper in this State against any person residing therein, the accused shall be indicted and the trial thereof had in either the county where the paper was published or in any county where the party libelled shall reside, and in cases where a libel is printed or published against any person not a resident of the State, the accused is to be indicted and the trial thereof had in the county where the libel was printed and published, and in cases where the paper shall not, upon its face, purport to be or have been printed and published in a particular county of this State, the accused may be indicted and the trial thereof had in any county where the paper has been circulated. But a defendant shall not be indicted for the printing or publication of a single libel in more than one county of the State.1

Where threatening letters are written and mailed in one county, and directed to and received by the person to whom they are addressed in another county, the indictment for sending such letters should be found in the latter county."

§ 17. OF THE PRESENTMENT OF THE INDICTMENT.

Indictments found by a grand jury shall be presented by their foreman in their presence to the court, and shall there be filed and remain as public records; but such as are found against any person for a felony not being in actual confinement shall not be open to the inspection of any person, except the district attorney, until the defendants therein respectively shall have been arrested.3 It is customary for the jury, at the conclusion of their labors, to enter the court in a body, whereupon the clerk calls their names to see if a quorum are present; the foreman thereupon presents the indictments properly endorsed by him to the court. The court inquires of the foreman if the jury have any further business to transact; if they have, they again retire to transact it, and if they have concluded the business before them they are discharged, with the thanks of the court. The foreman of the grand jury should certify under his hand that such indictment is a true bill.4

Under the above provision of the statute in regard to the indictment not being open to the inspection of any person, except the district attorney, where the indictment is for a felony and the person against whom it is found is not in actual confinement, it is customary to present what is called a sealed indictment; that is, the indictment is enclosed in an envelope and sealed up, and after being marked as a sealed indictment, stating the court and term in which it is found, it is in that manner presented to the court. The clerk, in making the entry of its presentment upon the records of the court, instead of stating the name of the offender and character of the offence, as is customary in other cases, simply enters it among the list of other indictments as a sealed indictment. It is well enough for the district attorney, in all cases of sealed indictments, to number them in addition upon the outside of the envelope, by which means, when the person indicted has been arrested, he can identify the indictment against him without the necessity of opening other indictments which are also sealed.

No grand juror, constable, district attorney, clerk or judge of any court shall disclose the fact of an indictment having been found against any person for a felony not in actual confinement, until the defendant in such indictment shall have been arrested thereon, and every person violating the above provision shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.1

The above provision, however, does not extend to any district attorney, sheriff or other officer making any such disclosure by the issuing or in the execution of any process on such indictment, or in any other way, when it shall become necessary in the discharge of any official duty.2

' 2 R. S., 726, § 39. 2 R. S., 726, § 40.