imports are paid by the earnings of the people. If there were no exports, and consequently no imports, the people would still have their earnings, and the government could appropriate the same portion of them by taxing domestic productions, or in any other way. The cotton sent abroad has been fairly exchanged for foreign merchandise, and the consumer of the latter has paid more for it than the value of the cotton, because the government chose this method of taxing him to obtain a revenue. But of this tax the original owner of the cotton obviously never paid a farthing, unless he chose to consume a portion of the imported merchandise.

It looks indeed more plausible to say that all duties on imported manufactures enhance the price of similar manufactures at home, and that in this way the Southern consumer is taxed for the benefit of the Northern producer. This is a favorite argument of Secessionists abroad, and has been greedily caught up and retailed by their foreign advocates, especially in England. But this is simply begging the question, and all such assertions are contrary to notorious facts. In the first place, the enormous preponderance of consumption of foreign merchandise is in the Northern States, and this for a plain and simple reason. The classes of merchandise imported from abroad must necessarily be of superior quality and value, that the expenses of importation may not form too large a proportion of their cost, and thus exclude them from the market. Precisely this description of merchandise is largely consumed at the North, where labor is honorable and well rewarded, and pecuniary competence is almost universal. At the South, on the contrary, while a few families indulge in great extravagance, the mass of the people, both white and black, are confined to the coarsest and commonest species of manufactures, such as can be produced in the North without protection, and in which Northern manufacturers can successfully compete with foreign rivals in distant markets. It is plain then, not only that the South has not built up Northern manufacturers, and has not furnished all the revenue of the government, but that it has in fact supplied but a small and very disproportionate part of it.

But this is not all. The revenue raised chiefly in the North, has been expended chiefly for the benefit of the South. While the post-offices and custom-houses of the North have been selfsustaining and a large source of national revenue, those of the South have been a heavy drain upon the national treasury. The public expenditure for the administration of justice and for national defence has been proportionately far greater at the South than at the North. The huge tracts of territory, whose scanty inhabitants now lay claim to local independence, were first purchased by Northern wealth, then cultivated by Northern industry, defended by Northern arms, and enriched by Northern enterprise.

And while the Southern States have contributed so little to the national treasury, the contents of that treasury have been far more liberally expended upon them, in proportion to population, than upon the North. Indeed it may well be questioned, whether so sparse and poor a population as that of our Southern States could permanently sustain a government, except under conditions of despotic authority, which would render social progress impossible.

In full accordance with these views we find that the immediate result of secession was to produce universal financial derangement at the South. Indeed the mere agitation of the subject and preparations for it produced a general panic. The South as usual was in debt; but ready money was indispensable, and to obtain ready money it had but one resource-to sell its cotton. The North for obvious reasons was equally eager to buy, and consequently its ready money was swept off with such rapidity as to threaten a temporary bankruptcy. This appears to be the true explanation of the financial crisis of November and December, 1860, for which there was no explanation in the general condition of commercial affairs, and which passed away as rapidly as it had arisen, leaving few traces of injury, except in the channels of Southern trade.

Having disposed of its cotton crop for ready money, the next financial resource of the South was the familiar and obvious one of repudiating its debts to the North, which, in the common course of trade, this same cotton would have paid.

As many
honest Southern merchants would have refused to
lend themselves to such a project, the matter was simplified by
a decree of the "Confederate Congress," enjoining upon all
debtors, under heavy penalties, to pay into the Confederate
treasury the amounts due their Northern creditors.

Even before this, similar action had been taken by State au-
thorities at the South. In the meantime heavy taxes were
laid
upon
all classes of the people, and "voluntary contribu-
tions" were extorted from the rich. In these various ways
large amounts of money were obtained for the service of the
rebellion.

By this time, however, war was fairly inaugurated, and Southern industry, never very productive, had become more restricted than ever. It could no longer produce either money, or that which could be exchanged for money. Yet money must be had. The usual resort of despotic governments soon followed-an irredeemable paper currency, or what is the same thing, a currency redeemable six months after the acknowledg ment of Southern independence. A government with ample resources, like that of England or the United States, may with perfect propriety, when engaged in a desperate struggle for national existence, put forth its paper promises, conscious of its ability to redeem them in due time to the uttermost farthing. But with what semblance of decency can any body of men profess to promise payment on behalf of a community already hopelessly insolvent, whose crops are pledged before they come to market, whose so-called capital is the flesh and blood of its laboring population, and whose very land is worthless till released from the control of its present owners?

The result is a matter of course. Practically the people of the Southern States have been plundered of everything, to support for a brief season the mockery of a government which has ruined them. Small as their wealth has been, it has all been taken. Not as in some Oriental countries, a tenth, a fifth, or a third, but everything has been swept away by the relentless agents of tyranny. Whatever could feed or clothe the army has been appropriated for that purpose; whatever could, by possibility, fall into the hands of the enemy, has been reck

lessly destroyed. Whatever mechanical skill existed has been applied to military purposes, and he that could do nothing else was made to fight, nolens volens, in the "Confederate" ranks. In this manner the whole resources of the people were seized, and appropriated to the purposes of a small knot of conspirators; and the only equivalent offered consisted in the worthless promises of a bankrupt Treasury! A more audacious system of wholesale spoliation and plunder was never recorded in history.

The slow progress and comparative failure of the measures first adopted by the Federal government to crush the rebellion have necessarily resulted in adding greatly to the strength of the Southern despotism; for no community can remain long without a government, and in this case there was no alternative. Accordingly, all the resources of legitimate authority gradually fell into the hands of the usurper, though pitiably curtailed. Customs duties, direct taxes, voluntary loans, all have been tried with the most meagre results; and the desperate necessities of the Confederate government have left it no alternative, even at the outset of its swindling career, but to confiscate the property of its victims with the one hand, while extending to them its paper promises with the other.

Of course this cannot last forever. A promise to pay is val ueless unless it is kept, and with every fresh issue of such promises, payment beccmes more impossible. The mere delay of payment by solvent communities will depreciate their currency, if more notes are issued than are absolutely required for business purposes. This was evident in the history of the Bank of England about the beginning of the present century, and is equally evident at the present time in the currency the United States. How much worse must the result be in the case of a currency utterly worthless in itself, and forced into circulation to an amount far exceeding the wants of the community. Even if the rebellion were successful, it would probably never be redeemed at par; if unsuccessful, of course it cannot be redeemed at all.

of

The triumph of the rebellion would therefore involve a permanent depression of all classes of Southern society, except

the great slaveholding aristocracy and their immediate dependants, including those enriched in various ways at the expense of the public. Land and slaves would obviously be more valuable than ever, while the redundant paper currency, if not absolutely repudiated, would be of little use to its unfortunate possessors for the purchase of the necessaries of life. The enormous and consolidated wealth of the few would doubtless be employed to establish a hereditary and permanent oligarchy, which would monopolize the government of the country. The middle class of merchants and traders would be greatly diminished and impoverished by the loss of capital and business; the small planters would be more than ever overshadowed by their wealthy neighbors, and labor would be worse paid, and of course more despised than ever.

If the rebellion is subdued, it is true that great loss and suffering cannot be avoided, but they may be mitigated and ultimately repaired. The property plundered from the people and sacrificed in a war of selfish ambition, can never be restored; and the worthless paper, for which it was exchanged, will soon disappear from view. But the resources of the country will remain undiminished, and once released from the incubus of a controlling oligarchy on the one hand, and the demoralizing effect of slave labor on the other, they will be developed with a rapidity and power, which will astonish no one so much as the Southern people themselves.

One of the favorite fallacies of Southern partisans has always been that the North owes all its wealth and power to the good-natured liberality of the South. "Our cotton," they say, "has enriched the Northern factors, agents, merchants, and bankers; has freighted Northern ships, has supplied Northern spindles, and swelled the colossal fortunes of Northern manufacturers, jobbers, and merchants, wholesale and retail, without number." This style of reasoning is not unnatural nor altogether new. It is the language of the man, who, having come into the world not to minister unto others, but to be ministered unto, and having by fortune, or violence, or fraud, the means of commanding the services of others, imagines that he confers a great favor upon them by allowing them to work for him!