which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.'

"

The solemn sanction of religion has been superadded to the obligations of official duty, and all Senators and Representatives of the United States, all members of State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution.'

"In order to carry into effect these powers, the Constitution has established a perfect Government in all its forms, legislative, executive, and judicial; and this Government to the extent of its powers acts directly upon the individual citizens of every State, and executes its own decrees by the agency of its own officers. In this respect it differs entirely from the Government under the old confederation, which was confined to making requisitions on the States in their sovereign character. This left it in the discretion of each whether to obey or refuse, and they often declined to comply with such requisitions. It thus became necessary, for the purpose of removing this barrier, and in order to form a more perfect union,' to establish a Government which could act directly upon the people and execute its own laws without the intermediate agency of the States. This has been accomplished by the Constitution of the United States. In short, the Government created by the Constitution, and deriving its authority from the Sovereign people of each of the several States, has precisely the same right to exercise its power over the people of all these States in the enumerated cases, that each one of them possesses over subjects not delegated to the United States, but reserved to the States respectively or to the people.'

"To the extent of the delegated powers the Constitution of the United States is as much a part of the constitution of each State, and is as binding upon its people, as though it had been textually inserted therein.

"This Government, therefore, is a great and powerful Government, invested with all the attributes of sovereignty over the special subjects to which its authority exends. Its framers never intended to implant in its bosom the seeds of its own destruction nor were they at its creation guilty of the absurdity of providing for its own dissolution. It was not intended by its framers to be the baseless fabric of a vision, which, at the touch of the enchanter, would vanish into thin air, but a substantial and mighty fabric, capable of

resisting the slow decay of time, and of defying the storms of ages. Indeed, well may the jealous patriots of that day have indulged fears that a Government of such high power might violate the reserved rights of the States, and wisely did they adopt the rule of a strict construction of these powers to prevent the danger. But they did not fear, nor had they any reason to imagine that the Constitution would ever be so interpreted as to enable any State by her own act, and without the consent of her sister States, to discharge her people from all or any of their federal obligations.

"It may be asked, then, are the people of the States without redress against the tyranny and oppression of the Federal Government? By no means. The right of resistance on the part of the governed against the oppression of their governments cannot be denied. It exists independently of all constitutions, and has been exercised at all periods of the world's history. Under it, old governments have been destroyed and new ones have taken their place. It is embodied in strong and express language in our own Declaration of Independence. But the distinction must ever be observed that this is revolution against an established Government, and not a voluntary secession from it by virtue of an inherent constitutional right. In short, let us look the danger fairly in the face; secession is neither more nor less than revolution. It may or it may not be a justifiable revolution; but still it is revolution."

The President having thus attempted to demonstrate that the Constitution affords no warrant for secession, but that this was inconsistent both with its letter and spirit, then defines his own position. He says:

What, in the mean time, is the responsibility and true position of the Executive? He is bound by solemn oath, before God and the country, 'to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' and from this obligation he cannot be absolved by any human power. But what if the performance of this duty, in whole or in part, has been rendered impracticable by events over which he could have exercised no control? Such, at the present moment, is the case throughout the State of South Carolina, so far as the laws of the United States to secure the administration of justice by means of the Federal judiciary are concerned. All the Federal officers within its limits, through whose agency alone these laws can be carried into execution, have already resigned. We no longer have a district judge, a district attorney, or a marshal in South Carolina. In fact, the whole machinery of the Federal gov ernment necessary for the distribution of remedial justice among the people has been

demolished, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to replace it.

"The only acts of Congress on the statute book bearing upon this subject are those of the 28th Februrry, 1795, and 3rd March, 1807. These authorize the President, after he shall have ascertained that the marshal, with his posse comitatus, is unable to execute civil or criminal process in any particular case, to call forth the militia and employ the army and navy to aid him in performing this service, having first by proclamation commanded the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within a limited time.' This duty cannot by possibility be performed in a State where no judicial au1 thority exists to issue process, and where there is no marshal to execute it, and where, even if there were such an officer, the entire population would constitute one

solid combination to resist him.

"The bare enumeration of these provisions proves how inadequate they are without further legislation to overcome a united opposition in a single State, not to speak of other States who may place themselves in a similar attitude. Congress alone has power to decide whether the present laws can or cannot be amended so as to carry out more effectually the objects of the Constitution

"The same insuperable obstacles do not lie in the way of executing the laws for the collection of customs. The revenue still continues to be collected, as heretofore, at the custom-house in Charleston, and should the collector unfortunately resign, a successor may be appointed to perform, this duty.

Then, in regard to the property of the United States in South Carolina. This has been purchased for a fair equivalent, by the consent of the Legislature of the State,'' for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,' &c., and over these the authority 'to exercise exclusive legislation' has been expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States from this property by force; but if in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants.

"

Apart from the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations between the Federal Government and South Carolina. He has been invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that State. This would be to invest a mere

executive officer with the power of recog nizing the dissolution of the Confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign States. It bears no relation to the recognition of a foreign de facto Government, involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on his part, be a naked act of usurpation. It is, therefore, my duty to submit to Congress the whole question in all its bearings."

Then follows the opinion expressed in the message, that the Constitution has conferred no power on the Federal Government to coerce a State to remain in the Union. The following is the language: "The question fairly stated is, 'Has the Constitution delegated to Congress the power to coerce a State into submission which is attempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn from the Confederacy?' If answered in the affirmative, it must be on the principle that the power has been conferred upon Congress to make war against a State.

After much serious reflection, I have arrived at the conclusion that no such power has been delegated to Congress or to any other department of the Federal Government. It is manifest, upon an inspection of the Constitution, that this is not among the specific and enumerated powers granted to Congress; and it is equally apparent that its exercise is not necessary and proper for carrying into execution' any one of these powers. So far from this power having been delegated to Congress, it was expressly refused by the Convention which framed the Constitution.

"It appears from the proceedings of that body that on the 31st May, 1787, the clause authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole against a delinquent State came up for consideration. Mr. Madison opposed it in a brief but powerful speech, from which I shall extract but a single sentence. He observed: "The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound.' Upon his motion the clause was unanimously postponed, and was never, I believe, again presented. Soon afterwards, on the 8th June, 1787, when incidentally adverting to the subject, he said: 'Any government for the United States, formed on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and fallacious as the government of Congress,' evidently meaning the then existing Congress of the old confederation."

At the time of the delivery of this message the excitement was very high. The

ments to the Constitution, as are deemed necessary and proper to avert that danger; and whereas in so great an emergency the opinion and judgment of the people ought to be heard, and would be the best and surest guide to their Representatives; Therefore, Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law without delay for taking the sense of the people and submitting to their vote the following resolution [the same as in his former amendment], as the basis for the final and permanent settlement of those disputes that now disturb the peace of the country and threaten the existence of the Union."

Memorials in its favor poured into Congress from portions of the North, even from New England. One of these presented to the Senate was from "the Mayor and members of the Board of Aldermen and the Common Council of the city of Boston, and over 22,000 citizens of the State of Massachusetts, praying the adoption of the compromise measures proposed by Mr. Crittenden." It may be proper here to observe that the resolution of Mr. Crittenden did not provide in detail for holding elections by which "the sense of the people" could be ascertained. To supply this omission, Senator Bigler, of Pennsylvania, on the 14th January, 1861, brought in "A bill to provide for taking the sense of the people of the United States on certain proposed amendments to the Constitution of the United States;" but never was he able to induce the Senate even to consider this bill.

President Buchanan exerted all his influence in favor of these measures. In his special message to Congress of the 8th of January, 1861, after depicting the consequences which had already resulted to the country from the bare apprehension of civil war and the dissolution of the Union,

he says:

Let the question be transferred from political assemblies to the ballot-box, and the people themselves would speedily redress the serious grievances which the South have suffered. But, in Heaven's name, let the trial be made before we plunge into armed conflict upon the mere assumption that there is no other alternative. Time is a great conservative power. Let us pause at this momentous point, and afford the people, both North and South, an opportunity for reflection. Would that South Carolina had been convinced of this truth before her precipitate action! I, therefore, appeal through you to the people of the country, to declare in their might that the Union must and shall be preserved by all constitutional means. I most earnestly recommend that you devote yourselves exclusively to the question how this can be accomplished in peace. All other questions, when compared with this,

sink into insignificance. The present is no time for palliatives; action, prompt action is required. A delay in Congress to prescribe or to recommend a distinct and practical proposition for conciliation, may drive us to a point from which it will be almost impossible to recede.

"A common ground on which conciliation and harmony can be produced is surely not unattainable. The proposition to compromise by letting the North have exclusive control of the territory above a certain line, and to give Southern institutions protection below that line, ought to receive universal approbation. In itself, indeed, it may not be entirely satisfactory, but when the alternative is between a reasonable concession on both sides and a dissolution of the Union, it is an imputation on the patriotism of Congress to assert that its members will hesitate for a noment."

This recommendation was totally disregarded. On the 14th January, 1861, Mr. Crittenden made an unsuccessful attempt to have it considered, but it was postponed until the day following. On this day it was again postponed by the vote of every Republican Senator present, in order to make way for the Pacific Railroad bill. On the third attempt (January 16,) he succeeded, but by a majority of a single vote, in bringing his resolution before the body. Every Republican Senator present voted against its consideration. Mr. Clark, a Republican Senator from New Hampshire, moved to strike out the entire preamble and resolution of Mr. Crittenden, and in lieu thereof insert as a substitute a preamble and resolution in accordance with the Chicago platform. This motion prevailed by a vote of 25 to 23, every Republican Senator present having voted in its favor. Thus Mr. Crittenden's proposition to refer the question to the people was buried under the Clark amendment. This continued to be its position for more than six weeks, until the day before the final adjournment of Congress, 2d March, when the proposition itself was defeated by a vote of 19 in the affirmative against 20 in the negative.

The Clark Amendment prevailed only in consequence of the refusal of six Secession Senators to vote against it. These were Messrs. Benjamin and Slidell, of Louisiana; Mr. Iverson, of Georgia; Messrs. Hemphill and Wigfall, of Texas; and Mr. Johnson, of Arkansas. Had these gentlemen voted with the border slaveholding States and the other Democratic Senators, the Clark Amendment would have been defeated, and the Senate would then have been brought to a direct vote on the Crittenden resolution.

It is proper for reference that the names of those Senators who constituted the ma