in Greece, if not earlier, the origin of our ideas has not ceased to be an interesting question. The limit to be assigned to experience, on the one hand, and to intuitive principles, on the other, has been a subject which has given rise to different and conflicting schools. It is obvious that this controversy might have some important light thrown on it, if we could know what passes in the infant-mind in the earliest dawnings of reason. At best, only an imperfect knowledge of this can be hoped for but we are not sure that something might not still be learned, by comparison of the studies of a number of thoroughly accomplished observers and trainers of infancy. We know that there are revelations of the infant-mind, fitted to show such intuitive principles, and nascent associations, too early for any observer but the parent or the nurse. Would, then, that the parent, or the nurse, were in a condition to understand the precious opportunity which the first years of infancy afford, for decyphering some of those hieroglyphics of human nature, which have given rise to theories as opposed* as those occasioned by the Egyptian monuments. In attempting to analyse our mental phenomena, at any age when we are capable of so doing, we do it under the spell of associations which have become incorporated with our intellectual life; and we are apt to mistake the actual analysis for an exposition of the origin of our ideas. If we could exactly know the process by which mind developes itself in early infancy, and what principles this development involves, we should at once solve the problem which still lies, partially at least, disputed between the empirical and the transcendental schools. We should know, somewhat better than we now sometimes seem to do-when we are setting ourselves to analyse and explain that which may be final and ultimate among the facts of psychology; or, on the other hand-when we are pronouncing a result of experience to be an à priori element. No observer can know all that is going on in the development of the infant susceptibilities and powers, and direct oral testimony is precluded; but we are

*For instance: the belief of mankind in the necessity of causation, was ascribed by Hume to association. Kant held this belief to involve a "synthetic judgment à priori ;" that is, to arise by a law of the mind, independent of experience, though operating on occasion of it. Hume's assertion of the undoubted fact that reason cannot prove the necessity of causation, was the germ of the Kantian philosophy. "Ich gestehe frei die Erinnerung des David Hume war eben dasjenige was mir vor vielen Jahren zuerst den dogmatischen Schlummer unterbrach, und meinen Untersuchungen im Felde der speculativen Philosophie eine ganze andere Richtung gab: u. s. f. Kant: Proleg. Einleitung.

of opinion that there is still a field of study, here, for the philosophical parent, and infant-teacher, which has not as yet been fully explored and exhausted. It might be well, too, if a race of accomplished students of infancy, or any other persons, would teach us (whatever school we may happen to belong to, whether English or Continental)—when we are mistaking a jargon of words for truth, a new set of phrases for a juster system, and are only mystifying men's minds under the appearance of profundity :—when we are imagining that we have solved a great problem in metaphysics, whereas we have only turned a period; perhaps have used terms without definite meaning, or possibly with some half-dozen meanings, without saying which :-errors these, some of which may attach more or less to all systems, not excepting the transcendental, old or new.

Not that it can be doubted that all systems, of all schools, English, Scottish, German, or Eclectic, furnish most valuable instruction. They all instruct, not only where they may most coalesce, but, also, and much more, where they most differ; for their differences-nay, their very errors and vagaries, may generally be traced to some important principle which they bring prominently to light, though it may be set in view from the wrong point, or overstrained, or too exclusively pursued. We are far from wishing to be understood as depreciating the ingenuity, the acuteness, the power of abstract thought, and the talent for developing a principle, which have been so eminently exhibited in some of the foreign schools of philosophy, especially the German. We see, in these schools, rich materials which have been undeservedly neglected by our own metaphysicians. But if our English or Scottish philosophers have too much contented themselves (according to the usual charge brought against them by the continental schools) with timidly confining themselves to a kind of "experimental" cruise along the shore of speculation, it certainly would appear that some of our neighbours have preferred the course of the aëronaut; and, while aspiring to a flight somewhat too transcendental for mortals, have unfortunately lost themselves in the clouds:

Expertus vacuum Daedalus aëra,
Pennis non homini datis:

and what is more—while claiming to scan truth which is "dark with excessive brightness," and to reduce it within the sphere of their subjective idealism, they have plunged themselves, from their sublime ele

vation, into the depths of absurdity, to say nothing more ;* having shared the fate of Icarus, who melted his wings by venturing too near the sun, and fell headlong into the sea.

Where speculation has run so wild as it sometimes has, in Germany, we need not wonder if it has occasionally been so profound as not only to bewilder ordinary humanity, but even philosophers themselves. A talented and somewhat facetious German writer, on the history of philosophy, says: “He (Fichte) has altogether peculiar notions respecting intelligibility. When Reinhold was of the same opinion with him, Fichte declared that nobody understood him better than Reinhold. But when the latter afterwards deviated from him, Fichte declared that Reinhold had never understood him. When he differed from Kant, he announced in print that Kant did not understand himself. I am here touching on the comic side of our philosophers. They are always complaining of not being understood. When Hegel lay on his death-bed he said: 'only one man has understood me;' but immediately afterwards he added, with chagrin: 'nor did he understand me neither.””†

Appendix C.

† “Er (Fichte) hat über Verständniss ganz eigne Grillen. Als Reinhold mit ihm gleicher Meinung war, “erklärte Fichte, dass ihn niemand besser verstehe als Reinhold. Als dieser aber später von ihm abwich, erklärte Fichte er habe ihn nie verstanden. Als er mit Kant differenzirte, liess er drucken : Kant verstehe sich selber nicht. Ich berühre hier die komische Seite unserer Philosophen. Sie klagen beständig über Nichtverstandenwerden. Als Hegel auf dem Todtbette lag, sagte er, ‘nur einer hat mich verstanden;' aber gleich darauf fügte er verdriesslich hinzu: und der hat mich auch nicht verstanden.""

Der Salon, von H, Heine: Zweiter Band. S. 220. Hamburg, 1834.

CHAPTER VI.

POPULAR EDUCATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES.

It is to be regretted that in taking the decennial census of the population, in 1841, provision should not have been made for recording the number of persons, up to fifteen years of age, who were under instruction in all kinds of schools, or at home by tutors and governesses; and how long their instruction had continued: also of those, up to the same age, who, though not actually in the course of instruction, had been instructed, and for what length of time. If the papers left at every house, to be filled up with population-returns, had also been made to include particulars, such as the above, respecting the children of each family, we should have had, so far, a consolidation of returns of population and education into one and although a separate school-census

advantage of a double census A comprehensive plan of this Quetelet, in reference to the

would still be necessary, much additional important information might have been obtained, independently of the of scholars, arrived at in different ways. kind has lately been drawn up by M. statistics of Belgium. Had such a plan been in operation among ourselves, in 1841, some of our controversies respecting the amount of education in the country, might have been brought within a narrower

compass.

The latest general statistics which we possess of the amount of education, in England and Wales, are those which are familiarly known by the name of "LORD KERRY'S RETURNS;" having been obtained, in 1833, pursuant to a vote of the House of Commons, in May of that year, on the motion of the late Earl. The results of the enumerations are given, in the Parliamentary Document, by way of "Summary," in the following Table; the several items of which correspond with the directions sent out to the parish-overseers by Lord Melbourne:

Schools. Scholars. Schools. Scholars. Schools. Scholars. Schools. Scholars.

6. SCHOOLS ESTABLISHED since the year 1818; or, more properly speaking, the INCREASE OF SCHOOLS SINCE 1818 :

Infant and other Daily Schools.. 19,645, containing.. 671,243 Scholars. Sunday Schools

. 11,285,

1,123,397 Scholars.

LENDING LIBRARIES OF BOOKS attached to Schools in England and Wales, are............ 2,464.

In these Returns, all schools where the children were said to leave school when, or before seven years old, were entered as "Infant Schools." Other "Daily Schools," included Colleges, (except those at Oxford and